Overestimating the Social Costs of Political Belief Change (WP-24-25)
Trevor Spelman, Abdo Elnakouri, Nour Kteily, and Eli Finkel
How do U.S. partisans expect members of their political ingroup to react when they diverge from the typical view of their party on a partisan issue (e.g., a Democrat adopting a more conservative stance on private gun ownership)? How accurate are these expectations, and how do they influence whether people choose to speak up or stay silent? Five main studies and five supplemental studies (N = 4,535) employing diverse research methods—including surveys, behavioral outcomes, live participant interactions, and coded open-ended responses—revealed that partisans consistently overestimate the social sanctions they will face for changing their minds (average weighted effect size (d) of .87). These inflated expectations, which are associated with a greater likelihood of self-censoring dissenting views, appear to stem from a concern that dissent will signal greater group disloyalty than it actually does. Indeed, a brief intervention prompting individuals to reflect on their past loyalty to the group reduced this concern and produced more accurate expectations about ingroup reactions to their dissenting belief change. By examining the social forces that suppress dissent within political groups, this work offers insight into how to reduce conformity pressures and promote more open political discourse.