Who Governs the Business Association? (WP-26-19)
Benjamin Egerod, Brian Libgober, and Sebastian Thieme
Business associations play an important role transmitting elite opinion to policymakers. But which members do these groups represent and why? The authors examine these questions in the US context through extensive data collection and the use of qualitative and quantitative methods. They document important variation in the voting rules of these groups. Most appear to have recognizably democratic franchises, but some use resource-proportional voting or have self-selecting boards. Associations often depend on large firms for resources. Unsurprisingly, larger and politically active firms are over-represented in leadership. Representation on association boards has consequences for lobbying behavior that vary depending on aspects of governance. While members on some association boards is sticky, after four years most associations lose a majority of their board. These findings demonstrate that organized business interests have variable governance arrangements which influence their political behavior. Two case studies illustrate the downstream consequences for politics and policymaking.