Can Norm-Based Information Campaigns Reduce Corruption? (WP-23-33)
Aaron Erlich and Jordan Gans-Morse
Can norm-based information campaigns reduce corruption? Such campaigns use messaging about how people typically behave (descriptive norms) or ought to behave (injunctive norms). Drawing on survey and lab experiments in Ukraine, Erlich and Gans-Morse unpack and evaluate the distinct effects of these two types of social norms. Four findings emerge: First, injunctive-norm campaigns produce consistent but modest, temporary effects. These may serve as moderately effective, low-cost anti-corruption tools but are unlikely to inspire large-scale behavioral transformations. Second, contrary to recent studies, the researchers find no evidence that either type of norm-based messaging “backfires” by inadvertently encouraging corruption. Third, descriptive-norm campaigns emphasizing corruption’s decline produce relatively large and long-lasting effects — but only among subjects who find these messages credible. Fourth, both types of norm-based messaging have a substantially larger effect on younger citizens. These findings have broader implications for messaging campaigns, especially those targeting social problems that, like corruption, require mitigation of collective action dilemmas.