The Limits of Policy Feedback as a Party-Building Tool

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ABSTRACT

The researchers outline the limits of policy feedback as a party-building tool. They make three arguments: First, policies do not always, or even very often, generate their own political supports. Second, even when they do, there is little reason to think they will cement partisan loyalties. Third, and finally, although policy-building and party-building are symbiotic and mutually dependent, they do fundamentally different things.
The Limits of Policy Feedback as a Party-Building Tool

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From Social Security to Medicare, the Civil Rights Act to the Affordable Care Act, Democrats have long treated policy success as if it were tantamount to political success, assuming that the enactment of significant legislation would create supportive constituencies that would reward the party at the voting booth. President Obama appeared to make the same calculation during his presidency. Instead of working to strengthen his party organization with an eye toward improving Democrats’ electoral prospects across the board, he focused almost exclusively on achieving significant policy accomplishments, assuming that those policy successes would redound to the party’s electoral benefit.

His policy-centered approach, however, did not do much to help Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election or down-ballot Democrats during his two terms in the White House. Over that period, Democrats lost control of both houses of Congress (including 63 House seats and 11 Senate seats), 10 governorships, 27 state legislative chambers, and almost 1,000 state legislative seats. At the time of Donald Trump’s inauguration, Republicans controlled more legislative seats than at any time since the party’s founding, while Democrats enjoyed unified government in only 6 states, their lowest number since the Civil War.

The notion that policies generate feedback effects that result in electoral benefits for parties is so commonly held that it has become almost an unstated premise of political thinking. Voters freely admit the link: in the key Rust Belt states of Ohio and Michigan, for example, voters said they felt they “owed” Obama for his efforts to save GM and Chrysler and planned to “thank” him with their votes in 2012; Obama predictably made the bailout central to his reelection campaign message (Zremski 2012; Gomez 2012). These expectations also have deep roots in political science scholarship. Whether the topic has been Civil War pensions, minimum wage increases, voting rights, labor laws, or tax cuts, political scientists have long assumed that voters express their enthusiasm for the policy benefits they receive by voting for the party they associate most closely with the policy’s enactment (Schattschneider 1935; Skocpol 1993a; Bartels 2008).

Sophisticated theories of “policy feedback” have taken a step further to explain how new policies, once implemented, can “create a new kind of politics” by setting in motion self-reinforcing processes that effectively “lock in” policies, bolster their political supports, and alter subsequent political developments (Schattschneider 1935; Lowi 1964; Pierson 1993, 2000; Skocpol 1993b; Metter 1998; Hacker 2002; Campbell 2003). These theories have taken hold in the public sphere as well, where left-leaning writers often encourage policymakers to enact policies that are explicitly “aimed at creating reinforcing feedback loops that will further empower

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1 Authors listed alphabetically; both contributed equally to this article. We would like to thank Phil Rocco, Andrew Kelly, Matthew Lacombe, and Mara Suttmann-Lea for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
progressive policymaking...and designed to mobilize beneficiaries to protect the benefits they enjoy” (McElwee 2017). These same “feedback loops” are feared on the right. In 1993, Republican strategist William Kristol famously warned that the enactment of Bill Clinton’s health care plan would generate feedbacks that would tilt the electoral balance of power in the Democrats’ favor for many years to come:

“...Its passage in the short run will do nothing to hurt (and everything to help) Democratic electoral prospects in 1996. But the long-term political effects of a successful Clinton health care bill will be even worse—much worse. It will re-legitimize middle-class dependence for "security" on government spending and regulation. It will revive the reputation of the party that spends and regulates, the Democrats, as the generous protector of middle-class interests. And it will at the same time strike a punishing blow against Republican claims to defend the middle class by restraining government.”

Recent scholarship has pursued this line of inquiry even further, examining how, “if policies do indeed make politics, rational politicians have opportunities to use policies to create a future structure of politics more to their advantage” including specifically “the structure of partisan politics” (Anzia and Moe 2016, 775, 766). While smoking gun evidence of intentionality -- of politicians’ strategic uses of policy to benefit their parties -- is hard to come by, careful case studies can provide strong empirical support for the proposition. For example, Anzia and Moe (2016a, 2016b) demonstrate that state-level public sector labor laws were widely expected to “advantage the Democratic Party, just as the expansion of private-sector unions had” (773). In their review of policy feedback effects, Suzanne Mettler and Mallory SoRelle (2014) summarize the party-building upshot of these policy feedback processes: “Policies may foster partisan identities associated with the protection of particular public programs and, in the process, enable parties to mobilize voters who rely on them, thus turning those parties into devoted defenders” (141).

But upon inspection, the intellectual basis for thinking that policies are good vehicles for building electoral majorities -- or good substitutes for the more tedious work of organizational party-building -- is quite thin. Our aim here is to sketch out, in cursory fashion, the limits of policy feedback as a party-building tool. We make three arguments: First, policies do not always, or even very often, generate their own political supports. Second, even when they do, there is little reason to think they will cement partisan loyalties. Third, and finally, although policy-building and party-building are symbiotic and mutually dependent, they do fundamentally different things.

The Limited Lock-in Effects of Policy Feedback

When Lyndon B. Johnson signed Medicare into law in 1964 in spite of the opposition of the medical community, he wagered that once enacted, senior citizens would mobilize in continued support of the program and cement Medicare’s future (Patashnik and Zelizer 2013: 2

http://www.perspectives.com/blog/archives/002834.htm
Johnson’s gamble paid off. The post-enactment history of Medicare is often hailed as an archetypal example of how powerful feedback processes can ensure that a policy, once enacted, generates its own self-reinforcing dynamics over time. Policies may induce new investments by key stakeholders, incorporate earlier opponents as supportive constituencies, and reconfigure the political terrain in ways that make their reversal unlikely. But as recent scholarship has shown, policies do not automatically or even necessarily create those conditions.

Instead, policy feedbacks that generate self-reinforcing dynamics are but one of many possible future courses a policy might take. Sometimes, policies fail to take hold in the first place; other times, they can produce self-undermining dynamics or “negative feedback effects” that cause them to “unravel” over time or be “eroded or reversed” (Oberlander and Weaver 2015: 40; Weaver 2010; Dagan and Teles 2015; Campbell 2011; Patashnik 2008; Patashnik and Zelizer 2013). Policy makers may have little ability to influence which of these paths a policy takes, as the nature of policy feedback -- whether self-reinforcing, -undermining, negative, or eroded -- may be shaped by contextual factors. These include the degree of support the policy receives at the outset, the partisan context during enactment and implementation, design features of the policy itself, and administrative challenges that may arise (Pierson 1993; Mayhew 2002; Maltzman and Shiplan 2008; Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; Campbell 2012; Oberlander and Weaver 2015; Patashnik and Zelizer 2013; Jacobs and Mettler 2017). Political polarization may also undermine the routine “policy maintenance” that is needed for policies to function in a crowded “policyscape” (Mettler 2016).

Even when policies manage to resist repeal or dismantlement, they may fail to activate their own supportive constituencies. It is difficult for constituencies to form, for example, when policies lack visibility or traceability to the government -- a condition that applies to many of the “submerged policies” that make up the contemporary American policy landscape (Arnold 1990; Mettler 2011; Morgan and Campbell 2011; but see also Thurston 2015; Thurston Forthcoming). Yet visibility and traceability can undermine support, too. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was on its surface a highly visible and traceable program, particularly for individuals who gained coverage through it (Jacobs and Mettler 2017). Somewhat predictably, ACA opinion did become more favorable for those who enrolled in state insurance marketplaces, and more negative for those who did not gain insurance. Yet some of the decline in favorability towards the ACA came among people living in states that had opted out of Medicaid expansion. In those cases, voters may have incorrectly attributed the failure of a highly visible government program to the creators of the program, rather than to the state governments that decided not to implement it.

Negative experiences with a policy can also erode support among its constituents, as Soss (1999) finds in his work on welfare, and Weaver and Lerman (2010) demonstrate in their work on citizens’ experiences with the carceral state. Finally, regardless of visibility or traceability, policies can simply fail to move public opinion. As Soss and Schramm’s (2007) study of welfare reform reveals, even when Democrats employed a deliberate strategy to use welfare reform to move mass opinion towards investment in anti-poverty programs, the effort failed to significantly change public opinion. Taken together, none of these findings bode well for parties wishing to use public policies to cement durable party majorities.
The particular context of Obama’s presidency was marked by many features that scholars have argued reduce the likelihood of policy-generated self-reinforcing dynamics: a partisan context that incentivizes opponents to push for designs that make credit-claiming more difficult and by a style of policy delivery that tends to obscure the role of the federal government from its beneficiaries (Patashnik 2008; Patashnik and Zelizer 2013).

Obama’s economic stimulus package in the wake of the Financial Crisis and Great Recession offers a case-in-point. Funds were directed not toward highly visible, hallmark programs that could easily be associated with the federal government in the mold of, say, Hoover Dam, Skyline Drive, or the WPA. Instead, government funding was directed toward less visible and exciting, but certainly no less crucial, ends, including:

“helping states avoid drastic cuts in public services and public employees; unemployment benefits, food stamps, and other assistance for victims of the downturn; and tax cuts for 95 percent of American workers. And the money that did flow into public works went more toward fixing stuff that needed fixing--aging pipes, dilapidated train stations...--than building new stuff. In its first year, the stimulus financed 22,000 miles of road improvements, and only 230 miles of new roads” (Plotz 2012).

One reason the Administration pursued these less visible initiatives may simply be because the opposition party made it difficult to move legislation through Congress that would have allowed for Democratic credit-claiming. Another is that such projects may have been the most financially responsible ways to generate employment, improve infrastructure, and bolster cash-strapped state governments.

Though perhaps good policy, its aftermath reveals the limits of the stimulus package to generate mass policy feedbacks on a scale needed to benefit the Democratic Party. A year after the passage of the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, a Pew survey found that almost two-thirds of respondents did not believe that the $787 billion package created jobs; even among Democrats, only 51 percent thought it had contributed to job creation (Barr 2010).

The Challenges of Cementing New Partisan Loyalties

Even when policies do happen to generate supportive constituencies, there is little reason to think they will generate partisan loyalties and “lock in” reliable electoral constituencies for the party’s majority-building purposes. While it is possible that voters will: (a) link the policies they like to the party most responsible for enacting those policies, (b) develop strong party attachments as a result, and then (c) translate those new party attachments into reliable voting behavior, existing research suggests that each step in that three-step process poses formidable obstacles.

The first step--linking favored policies to parties--requires, first and foremost, that voters are able to identify the policy effects at stake. But as a long and venerable tradition of political science scholarship has shown, most citizens have a very limited understanding of how policies operate, many are not aware of policy benefits they receive, and few are able to identify which party is responsible for it (Converse 1964; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992; Deli Carpini
and Keeter 1996; Mettler 2011). Some citizens, to be sure, will be able to appreciate policy effects and associate them with a party, and certain conditions will be more conducive to making this connection than others—for example, when the issues are salient, elite cues are strong, and partisan frames are well constructed (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Kuklinski et al 2000; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Druckman 2004; Chong and Druckman 2007). But given the multiple cognitive steps citizens must take within a competitive, polarized political environment, their ability to durably link policy benefits to support for a particular party is likely to be limited.

More often, causation will run in the opposite direction—rather than develop strong party attachments as a result of favored policy benefits, citizens’ policy views will be shaped by their partisanship. We know, for example, that citizens engage in “motivated reasoning,” meaning they tend to accept information that aligns with their existing beliefs and disregard information that does not (Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006; Achen and Bartels 2016). Moreover, we know that party identification and elite partisan frames powerfully shape how information is processed, including information about public policies (Green et al 2002; Gaines et al 2007; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Kriner and Reeves 2014). But for over 60 years, political science has confirmed that party attachments tend to be sticky and slow to change, and that “only an event of extraordinary intensity can arouse any significant part of the electorate to the point that established political loyalties are shaken” (Campbell et al 1960, 151). Real movement is only likely if there is a shock during a time in which an individual is particularly vulnerable (e.g., developments during the teenage and early college years). Most policies are unlikely to rise to this level of intensity. Thus, most scholarship would suggest that the second step—the development of strong party attachments as a result of newly favored policies—faces steep hurdles.

But the third step may be the trickiest of all. Even in those rare circumstances in which voters understand and favor new policies, link those policies to a particular party, and develop new, durable party attachments as a result, it is another thing altogether to expect reliable voting for that party (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Historically, even major changes in party positioning—such as the Democrats’ position on civil rights—produced only very gradual changes in voting patterns (Schickler 2016). Even in cases where positive experiences with a policy (such as food stamps) leads to greater political participation and indirect electoral gains for the party, there is scant evidence of a causal pathway running from policy mobilization to party conversion and loyal voting (Kogan 2016).

There can be little doubt that under some circumstances, policies can generate supportive new constituencies. But even in those cases, support is more likely to be for the continuation of the policy than for the political party most responsible for its creation. Consider Social Security, one of the best-known examples of a public policy that produced an entrenched constituency ready to mobilize against any threats to their benefits. In a 2010 poll of AARP members, 95% of respondents agreed that it was “important that a candidate pledge to protect Social Security as a guaranteed, life-long benefit.” Yet rather than translating into Democratic gains, support for Social Security has been strong among senior citizens regardless of party.

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Policy longevity, at least in this case, would appear to be linked to the generation of cross-partisan support for the program.

Public support in early 2017 for Republican efforts to “repeal and replace” the ACA while preserving its most popular features also puts this distinction in sharp relief, as it occurred immediately after the electoral repudiation of the party most responsible for the ACA’s enactment. The first clue that voters had not made a partisan connection between the policy features they liked and the Democratic Party was the positive correlation between counties that saw the highest increases in enrollment for Obamacare and electoral support for Donald Trump in the 2016 election (Ravitz 2017; Kliff 2016). Clinton and Sances (2017) observe that county-level increases in insurance coverage covaried with increases in political participation in 2014 (in both registration and turnout, up to 3 percentage points), but that this participation boost evaporated by 2016, thus failing to generate cumulative electoral gains for the Democratic Party.

Perhaps most revealing of all is Lerman and McCabe’s (2017) finding that Republicans who received new health insurance through the ACA were more likely to support the policy, but not necessarily the Democratic Party. As the Republican Party labored to keep its commitment to “repeal and replace” throughout Trump’s first year in office, public opinion revealed strong, persistent support for key features of the policy -- no insurance denial for those with pre-existing conditions, keeping children on their parents’ health insurance until age 26 -- but respondents did not seem to care which party took credit for their protection.

Policymakers who seek to enact significant new public policies that both endure and advance party-building objectives appear to face a tradeoff in the contemporary era: the policies that generate the broadest support often cut across parties and may even undercut efforts at party-building; while the greater the association between the policy and the party, the more vulnerable the policy may be to retrenchment.

The Distinctive Roles of Policies and Parties

Very late in his term – too late, as it turned out – Obama acknowledged that policy could not, by itself, produce electoral benefits, generate loyalty to the Democratic Party, or stave off dismantlement by opponents. Attention must also be paid to bottom-up organizational party building, he told former aide David Axelrod:

“Look, the Affordable Care Act benefits a huge number of Trump voters. There are a lot of folks in places like West Virginia or Kentucky who didn't vote for Hillary, didn't vote for me, but are being helped by this…The problem is, is that we're not there on the ground communicating not only the dry policy aspects of this, but that we care about these communities…Part of what we have to do to rebuild is to be there and -- and that means organizing, that means caring about state parties, it means caring about local races, state boards or school boards and city councils and state legislative races and not

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5 http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/03/obamacare-repeal-preexisting-conditions-237902
thinking that somehow, just a great set of progressive policies that we present to The New York Times editorial board will win the day.”

To put it somewhat differently, if policies generated their own political supports, there would be no need for party organization. But as Obama regretfully observed, many recipients of ACA benefits did not develop a partisan connection between the policy benefits they favored and the Democratic Party. This left the Democrats weakened electorally and the ACA vulnerable to significant revision or repeal under a Republican administration. Party organization was therefore still needed, both to promote policy accomplishments and to build the electoral majorities necessary to preserve and protect those same policies in later rounds.

This, after all, is what parties do. To promote and protect a set of policies desired by key allied groups and constituents, parties seek to build legislative majorities and fill key elective offices across the decentralized federal system (Epstein 1986; Aldrich 1995). But parties do not perform these “functions” automatically -- they require significant investments of resources, time, and attention from their leaders (Galvin 2010, 2012). Party organizations must be built and maintained if they are to help candidates win elections and promote and protect policies. “It’s not rocket science,” retiring Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid said recently. “It doesn’t take a lot of brain power to figure out what needs to be done…take a few states every election cycle, maybe three maybe four, and help them develop the infrastructure for good state party organization” (Hellmann 2016). Attractive public policies, of course, can serve as powerful rallying cries in the building of party organization and can provide useful incentives for collective action among party activists, groups, and voting constituencies (Aldrich 1995; Bawn et al 2012). Indeed, there is little doubt that “policy position-taking” is integral to the party-building project, and that for the purposes of winning elections, where politicians stand is often far more important than what they -- or their policies -- actually do (Mayhew 1974). But while policies and parties are symbiotic and mutually dependent, they operate on different dimensions and do fundamentally different things.

Facing recriminations from many corners of the Democratic Party, Obama acknowledged at the end of his presidency that he was so preoccupied with the policy challenges stemming from the Great Recession that he was not able to pay as much attention to building his party organization as he (in retrospect) should have. “Partly because my docket was really full here, so I couldn't be both chief organizer of the Democratic Party and function as Commander-in-Chief and President of the United States. We did not begin what I think needs to happen over the long haul, and that is rebuild the Democratic Party at the ground level.” To be fair, Obama did make a handful of organizational party-building moves in his second term (Galvin 2016). Not enough, though, to prevent the decimation of his party’s electoral standing or equip it to resist the rollback of much of his policy legacy under Trump. Which only serves to illustrate our main point: policies do not create their own political supports. That’s what parties are for.

**Scrutinizing the Presumed Connection**

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Why, then, if policy feedback is such a poor party-building tool, do politicians so often seem drawn to the idea of using policy to expand their parties? Even Republicans have been allured by the prospect. George W. Bush and Karl Rove, for example, openly sought to use major policies to engineer a partisan realignment in the early 2000s: the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, for instance, was expected to cement the loyalty of senior citizens and help build a “permanent Republican majority.” More recently, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) noted that if Republicans enacted Trump’s tax cut plan it would mean “the difference between succeeding as a party and failing…It’s the difference between having a majority in 2018 or losing it. It’s the difference between one term and two.”

Perhaps political actors are simply unaware of the many perils and pitfalls along the road from policy enactment to the building of partisan majorities. (Or perhaps hope just springs eternal.) But it is also possible that political actors have drawn a mistaken lesson from history. The Democrats’ electoral and policy successes in the 1930s-1960s period are so often conflated in composite historical concepts like “the New Deal Order” and the “Democratic Political Order” that it hardly seems surprising that politicians see a connection between policy accomplishments and the construction of durable partisan majorities (Fraser and Gerstle 1989, Plotke 1996).

But that connection, we would argue, is likely more apparent than real. At least, far more scrutiny is needed to flesh out what is causing what, and when might the dynamics be expected to vary. At present, it is not even clear in which direction the causal arrows point. Were the Democrats’ electoral successes in the post-New Deal period really a function of policy feedback effects? Through what mechanisms? How much of a contribution did policy-generated supports make to the party’s electoral prospects, relative to other factors?

Or might there have been a third factor (or more) that produced both policy feedbacks and electoral successes? For example, as Eric Schickler (2016) has shown, key constituency and group bases of the Democratic Party -- specifically “CIO unionists, African Americans, Jews, and other urban liberals” (14) -- were instrumental in both the formation of Democratic majorities and in the passage of major civil rights laws. But as the organizing capacities of these groups withered after the 1970s – most notably in labor unions – the competitive standing of the Democratic Party weakened and key policies became more vulnerable to retrenchment, layering, and drift. Was the ostensibly relationship between policy feedbacks and the Democrats’ electoral success just a function of these group-level processes or contingent on combinations of context-specific factors?

And what of the simplest explanation -- that causation actually runs in the opposite direction? When one considers the effects of the “Reagan Revolution” on civil rights enforcement in the 1980s (Days 1984), the partial privatization of Medicare under unified Republican government in the 2000s (Kelly 2016), or the gutting of the Voting Rights Act by the conservative majority on the Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), it seems easier

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to argue that the durability of the Democrats’ key policies depended more on the Democrats’ continued electoral success than vice versa.

While policies clearly have effects on parties, those effects are likely to be more indirect and instrumental than direct and causal. Taking policy stands, for example, is undoubtedly an integral part of winning elections, and fashioning attractive policy agendas is surely an essential part of building partisan majorities. Being “for” tax cuts and “against” big government likely helped Republicans swell their numbers of elected officials in recent decades, and promising to protect social insurance programs and defend voting rights likely helped Democrats win elections. But on balance, we do not think the effects of policies, once enacted, are likely to offer politicians much by way of electoral benefit. As David Mayhew (2001, 251) put it, “I remain convinced that politicians often get rewarded for taking positions rather than achieving effects.”

Admittedly, our pessimistic view of the party-building potential of policy feedback raises more questions than it answers. But we are hopeful that greater attention to causal mechanisms, historical conjunctures, and configurative explanations – all common themes for scholars steeped in the scholarly traditions of American political development – will yield more precise understandings of this commonly assumed relationship.

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