Social Provision and Regulation: Theories of States, Social Policies and Modernity

Ann Shola Orloff
Faculty Fellow, Institute for Policy Research
Professor, Sociology, Northwestern University
a-orloff@northwestern.edu

DRAFT
Please do not quote or distribute without permission.

Presented at “New Challenges for Welfare State Research”
Annual Meeting of the International Sociological Association
Research Committee on Poverty, Social Welfare and Social Policy (RC19)
August 21-24 2003, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
Social Provision and Regulation: Theories of States, Social Policies and Modernity

Abstract

Research in international relations has identified a variety of actors who appear to influence U.S. foreign policy, including experts and "epistemic communities," organized interests (especially business and labor), and ordinary citizens or "public opinion." This research, however, has often focused on a single factor at a time, rather than systematically testing the relative importance of alternative possible influences. Using three decades of extensive survey data, Jacobs and Page conduct a comparative test, attempting to account for the expressed foreign policy preferences of policymakers by means of the preferences of the general public and those of several distinct sets of elites. The results of cross-sectional and time-lagged analyses suggest that U.S. foreign policy is most heavily and consistently influenced by internationally oriented business leaders, followed by experts (who, however, might themselves be influenced by business). Labor appears to have significant but smaller impacts. The general public seems to have considerably less effect, except under particular conditions. These results generally hold over several different analytical models (including two-observation time series) and different clusters of issues (economic, military, and diplomatic), with some variations across different institutional settings (the U.S. House, Senate, and executive branch).

1 A revised version of this essay will appear in Remaking Modernity: Politics, History and Sociology, edited by Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff (forthcoming 2004 from Duke University Press). Many thanks to colleagues who have read and commented on earlier versions of this essay, including those at the initial "Remaking Modernity" conference held at Northwestern University in spring of 2001. Lis Clemens, Lynne Haney, and Rianne Mahon offered especially useful critiques and suggestions. Julia Adams was more than a co-editor: she read countless versions of the draft (and of particularly difficult paragraphs, relayed back and forth over email), made insightful comments and offered helpful rewordings, citations, arguments, all the while convincing me that this essay could indeed be written under unusual circumstances. (The curious may ask me in person about the roast pig, the printer that is "just like a woman," and how I worked under the sign of "torno subito.") I am grateful to the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences at Northwestern University for support of a sabbatical leave, during which I wrote this essay.
Introduction

Social provision and regulation have taken on many public and mixed public/private forms, from poor relief and publicly-subsidized charity, to “workingmen’s insurance” and pensions, “social security,” “the welfare state,” “welfare capitalism,” “the social state,” or “l’etat providence.” They have been a central focus of politics across the West in the centuries since modernizing states first began to challenge the Church for control of the functions of relieving those in distress, disciplining subjects and maintaining order, and found relief and other forms of welfare useful in larger projects of regulating and mobilizing populations. Indeed, some public (or quasi-public) form of social provision has been a distinctive feature of modern, Western capitalist societies for a very long time, although in the last half-century public social security systems have spread to all corners of the globe. These systems have come to be the principal domestic undertaking of states in the West — and after World War Two have trumped even military operations (in terms of spending), except in the U.S. Social provision has centrally defined the relations among states, capital, and labor (the “social partners” in Euro-lingo), and between states and citizens/subjects, and has been critical to the viability of markets and the reproduction of populations. It is essential to the constitution of politically-salient groups, identities, and goals, and of moral and cultural orders. Systems of state social provision and regulation are quintessentially modern in their linkage with capitalist industrial orders and the emergence and regulation of the realm of “the social.”

Social scientists, including sociologists at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, concerned themselves with the “social question.” The “social question” grew out of elites’ difficulties in maintaining social integration and order as growing urban working classes emerged as political actors in the context of increasing democracy and the development of new forms of risk and inequality. The character of social provision was significant, for these developments emerged in a context in which accepting relief implied a loss of citizenship rights — a situation which was understood to contribute to workers’ unrest (Orloff 1993a: chs.4-5). Indeed, sociology as an academic discipline developed alongside the social question, and its successors (e.g.,

Outside the developed world, however, the proportions of the population covered are quite small, usually limited to civil servants and, sometimes, members of urbanized working and middle classes. As industrialization proceeds, economies grow, and the model of state modernity spreads, social security expands, as has been the case in East Asia and Latin America — evidence that earlier theories of the expansion of social provision based on the “logic of industrialism” (Wilensky 2002) were not entirely incorrect, even as they must be modified to encompass the political and cultural concomitants of modernity.
the “urban crisis” of the 1960s or the “welfare mess” of the 1980s in the US; see, e.g., Steinmetz 2004). The varied answers to the social question, which centrally involved social insurance, pensions, other forms of assistance, and novel forms of state regulation, depended on the new knowledges produced by the social sciences (see, e.g., Horn 1994; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996). Systems of social provision and regulation have been an enduring focus of social scientific scholarship ever since. Yet take note that there are two (albeit not entirely distinct) veins of scholarly work on these systems. First, there is scholarship directed at helping states “regulate the social” through analyses of social problems and policy. I will not here cover the vast bodies of information produced by the research *apparatchiks* in various state systems of social provision or by the closely-related, government-funded university research projects, which might be best understood as varieties of state discourse. Second, there is scholarship — including by historical sociologists — that aims to understand the relations among capitalism, modernity, and systems of social provision and regulation; the contributions of welfare to relations of power, difference, and inequality; and the character of modern institutions. It is this latter work which most interests me.

---

3 See historian Alice O’Connor’s brilliant dissection of the production of “poverty knowledge” (the title of her 2001 book) in twentieth-century America. She makes clear that the ways “poverty knowledge” so often functions to reinforce the policy status quo has little to do with the intentions of the rank and file researchers in the projects of state bureaucracies — whom I have perhaps been unkind in calling “*apparatchiks*” — and much more to do with the political constraints under which their scholarship must be produced. A key theme of her book is the way in which the demands for “scientific” standards reinforced tendencies for individualist explanations of poverty.

4 My central focus is on U.S. historical sociologists and the ways in which what I have elsewhere called “second wave” debates have given way to potential “third wave” challenges and new theoretical controversies (Adams, Clemens and Orloff 2004). “Second wave” historical sociology refers to the work that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, following a “first wave” of historical analysis among the now-classical sociologists. The second wave contested the lack of historical context and sensibility in mainstream sociology; see the discussion of the different waves of historical sociology in the introduction to Remaking Modernity: Politics, History and Sociology, by Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens and Ann Shola Orloff (forthcoming from Duke University Press, 2004); available as a working paper from the Russell Sage Foundation: http://www.russellsage.org/publications/working_papers.htm

The subdisciplinary and national focus of my essay were determined by this larger project of surveying where U.S. historical sociology stands today. I focus on...
For many years — even before being formalized in modernization theories — changes in the character of social provision were seen as part and parcel of the development of “modern” capitalist societies. Responsibilities for social protection were seen to have shifted from families and communities to the national state. This occurred alongside a shift away from deterrent and punitive poor relief toward social protections as right of citizenship, which took the form of what was then thought to be an ever-widening and linked set of provisions which came to be called the “welfare state” in the post-World War Two era. This was captured in book titles such as *From Poor Law to Welfare State* (Trattner 1999 [1974]). That story differed somewhat in accounts influenced by Marxism, in that these shifts were seen as the product of class struggle. But the progressive cast of the story was similar, with a similar end point: social citizenship and greater material equality, even if these were understood as a “ransom from capital” to maintain social stability and economic productivity. It was expected that all countries would eventually wind up with a “complete” set of programs to deal with social risks, because welfare states were seen to be essential features of modern democratic capitalism. There were also distinctive national subplots: the U.S. as welfare laggard (e.g., Rimlinger 1971), or the egalitarian Swedish welfare state helping to lay the foundations for socialism, for example (e.g., Stephens 1980).

Things began to change after the 1970s, with various political attacks on core programs of social provision and more or less serious policy changes, variously described as dismantling or restructuring welfare states (e.g., Pierson 1994; Huber and Stephens 2001). The overarching progressive story has been unravelled, replaced by a more complex story of uneven changes. After decades of assuming the irreversibility of

“U.S.” sociology partly because disciplines have nationally-bound histories. Of course, no survey of this field can afford to ignore entirely the contributions of historical institutionalist political scientists or scholars from outside of the U.S., and readers will find plenty of literature from outside my home country — but perhaps not as much as had I been unconstrained by the larger undertaking.

---

5 Deterrent and local forms of social assistance were dominant in the early years of capitalist industrialization. They have diminished in importance relative to contributory social insurance or universal benefits, yet they remain (variably) significant components of social provision everywhere (Eardley, Bradshaw, Ditch, Gough and Whiteford 1996a, 1996b). Modernization analyses have tended to construe these as “remnants” of “traditional” provision that would eventually disappear. No sign of this as yet.
welfare states, a host of political, economic, and social trends shook this assumption: the emergence of neo-liberalism and the elections of “anti-welfare warriors” Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan; the fall of “actually existing socialism” and its extensive systems of paternalist-authoritarian social protection; and the rise of newly-industrializing states whose competitive economic advantage stemmed in part from lower social spending. Moreover, the factors that had been traditionally associated with the emergence of modern welfare states also have been profoundly changed, as we see the expansion of service sectors and the decline of manufacturing; the decline of breadwinner/full-time caregiver, marriage-based households and the increase of nonmarital births, and single-person and dual-earner households; and expanded capital mobility and concomitant concerns about employers’ increased capacities to demand lower taxes and social spending. This progressive story was not undermined only by events, of course. Theoretical developments have been important as well. Many accounts of welfare states and social provision feature “new” actors (new to social scientists, that is) — women and men (as gendered persons), whites and blacks, natives and immigrants, pronatalists and eugenicists, and so on, in addition to workers, capitalists and political elites; for some of these actors the story of progressive expansion does not hold even for the period before the “crises.” Attention to discourse and culture has increased. And less benign visions of social policy have emerged: Piven and Cloward (1971) famously proclaimed that welfare was directed at “regulating the poor,” while a Foucauldian strain of work emphasized darker (if still “productive”) aspects of social policy: bio-politics, surveillance, discipline, classification.

This essay provides an overview of the theoretical battles that have raged across the terrain of modern systems of social provision and regulation — the “modern welfare state.” I will make the case that we could use some fraternization (that is, greater theoretical complexity) across the battle lines, and that feminist work provides an admirable example of theoretical hybridity, drawing on the significant theoretical resources associated with Weberian, Foucauldian, culturalist and Marxist analytic traditions. I also argue that we need to exorcise more fully the spirits I take the liberty of associating with Marx — particularly those of social determination — which live on in this area of scholarship, but today as a mostly unacknowledged presence.

Hovering over the theoretical debates around modern welfare systems — something like the Heavenly Father in Veronese’s paintings of Venezia’s battles with their foes — is the spirit of Marx, whose vision of industrial capitalism and its social conflicts informs most accounts of modern social provision. But rather than sticking to Marxist doctrine about class struggles and the state, it would be preferable to historicize the Marxist (and socialist) elements that have shaped the development of modern systems of social provision.

6 Marxist influences abound, for it was Marxism in its political guises — the
“spectre haunting Europe” — which was one of the most important forces shaping developments of modern social provision and regulation. Indeed, one can read the development of the modern welfare state as “socialism by other means” or as reform functioning as the alternative to revolution. Early working-class movements inspired by Marxist and other forms of socialism worried elites, some of whom turned to social policy to deter revolution. More mature movements staked their political fortunes on expanding social provision for their constituents. For Western political elites, the Soviet bloc with its full employment and extensive welfare provision was to be combatted by the welfare state along with the military means of the Cold War. Weber’s spirit appears as well, guiding our understandings of the development of state bureaucracies and at times, the cultural dispositions which guide our experiences of capitalism and risk. More recently, the dark jester of modern social theory — Michel Foucault — has come to haunt the field. His followers scoff at the Enlightenment modernism of the Weberian variety, while allowing the Marxisante vision of elites and populace, now discipliners and disciplined to remain, and still hoping for “resistance,” if not revolution. Culturalist approaches to politics have emerged across a range of arenas, offering non-materialist understandings of the formation of identities and goals and the mobilization of actors. But the stolid mainstream studies of pensions, workers’ health insurance funds, and

6 In the course of circulating earlier drafts of this essay to colleagues who, like me, were “brought up” intellectually in a Marxist context — or at least in one heavily influenced by Marxism, I was told I more than once that I was being “too hard” on Marx. After all, Marxism is multi-faceted, encompassing, for example, on the subject of ideology, clunky Lukacsian social determinism but also sophisticated Gramscian indeterminism. Now, I will admit that I like Gramsci as much as the next woman, but I am too unsettled by the demise of “actually existing” socialism and revelations about the grave defects to which it gave rise — yes, in the land where my great-aunt fought in the October revolution and in the lands where others fought the good fight against fascism — to ever be comfortable again in invoking Marx without a slew of qualifications. In particular, the ongoing revelations (pioneered, of course, by dissidents before the “fall”) of how state power was corrupted to serve foul ends mandate — at the least — caution before accepting Marxist accounts of politics. “Exorcism” of intellectual spirits strikes me as a rather mild form of de-Marxification. No doubt others have come to question Marxism via other, perhaps more exclusively theoretical/analytical, routes; I have found these compelling as well. Like Stark and Bruszt (2001) in the recent debate over sociological theory and the end of communism, I believe that Marxism’s monopoly on critical theory has been decisively broken; like Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley (2001) in that same symposium, I would argue for an “immanent critique” of capitalisms (and “their” welfare states). For a somewhat different take on these theoretical dilemmas, see Nancy Fraser’s wittily-titled Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition (1997).

-5-
welfare bureaucracies continue, almost unaffected by these developments in the “superstructure.” The dominant perspectives in the field — most now identifiable as institutionalist — mix different portions of Marx and Weber, sticking fairly closely to a materialist understanding of politics; among more marginal approaches, we find those who take their Foucault more or less straight, as well as those with a range of culturalist understandings. This field would benefit from some theoretical hybridization, partly because it offers a way to break more fully with materialism, but also because there are insights to be gleaned from both mainstream and more marginal perspectives. Feminist work provides a model of productive hybridity.

Feminists are gathered under diverse theoretical banners to disrupt the masculinist stories of welfare states as involving only capitalists, bureaucrats, and workers (gender unmarked but clearly men, whether wearing suits or overalls), or the similarly masculinist if otherwise more perverse narratives of the Foucauldians. If one must pick one theorizing woman to guide us, let it be Simone de Beauvoir, who famously avowed that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman,” and whose analyses ushered in the fertile outpouring of feminist scholarship on the social (and political) construction of gender that has nourished scholars of welfare along with many others. Feminists have raided many theoretical armories to fight their battles, and to develop understandings of how gender, class, “race,” and other forms of difference and power are implicated in the developments that have given us modern welfare states, and how in turn those relations are shaped by — indeed constituted with — welfare systems. Their approaches have tended to take culture and signification more seriously than have mainstream perspectives, while they are simultaneously more attuned to the classic issues of political economy, family, and state than are many culturalists and Foucauldians (feminist or not). Yet while such theoretical cross-breeding might be useful, it is hard to imagine that all of the institutionalist mainstream, especially those drawing ever closer to rational choice perspectives, will take this up. But for those willing to listen, I offer this narrative animated by hopes for hybridity, or, at least, tolerance.

7 Using Beauvoir as a signifier for feminist work on welfare states is more than a little ironic, given that her theoretical contribution was in the construction of gender, and not at all around the labor or emotions associated with care — which has been a hallmark of gendered analyses of systems of social provision and regulation.

8 I here employ the convention of putting scare quotes around race to indicate that racial groups are social constructions, not biological entities; this should be understood whenever race is invoked in the rest of the essay.
Defining the Modern Welfare State

Before we enter the story of the various theoretical debates that make up the literatures on modern welfare systems, I want to stop for a moment to consider the object of our study, “the modern welfare state” — how it has been variously defined, and what problems attend to the possible alternative definitions. Among many U.S. comparative and historical sociologists, the term “welfare state” has functioned as an accepted, if often anachronistic, shorthand for systems of social provision in the developed capitalist world (and sometimes even beyond). A typical definition of the welfare state was “a state commitment of some degree which modifies the play of market forces in the attempt to achieve a greater measure of social equality” (Ruggie 1984: 11). Modernization theorists took for granted the political claim embedded in the very term “welfare state”: that states were committed to citizens’ welfare. More politically-critical Marxists and others might not accept that claim, but still tended to view the welfare state as a more or less unified project of state and bourgeois elites to secure their rule by extending material benefits to the less advantaged, notwithstanding claims about the contradictory demands of legitimacy and of accumulation. Yet this would seem to accept what should be proven — that social provision results in something that can legitimately be called “welfare.” Even if one does not wholeheartedly endorse the Foucauldian or social control visions of welfare, these analysts have unearthed material which undermines any easy or unmodified acceptance of the modernist, progressive view of welfare, for example, the eugenicist policies which accompanied positive welfare in almost every Western country (yes, even Sweden).

Perhaps as troubling is the inattention to the historical and national specificity of the term “welfare state.” The shorthand may be convenient, but it occludes the significant cross-national and historical variation in the meaning attached to and the content of the various programs that today scholars group together as welfare states. The British coined the phrase “welfare state” in 1939 to counterpose to the Nazi “warfare state,” grouping under this umbrella several heretofore separate social insurance, social assistance and universal citizenship programs (Williams 1976). Following the defeat of fascism, Britain and most other European countries reformed and expanded their systems of social provision in the direction of universal coverage for workers; at the same time, social provision was articulated with the political goal of “equality,” understood in class terms, in the concept of a welfare state (see, e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1978). The modernism, statism and progressivism of the term are apparent. The gendered aspects of this articulation are also now clear; social insurance covered workers, who were mostly men, with spousal coverage for most women; protection focused on loss of income, not care (Lewis 1992; Sassoon 1987; for the Swedish [partial] exception, see Lewis and Astrom 1992). Even after the long Thatcherite attack, the “welfare state” still has resonance in the U.K., while Western Europeans define themselves partly through their attachment to the welfare state: “social Europe,” or the “European social model” (Hemerijk 2002). The term certainly has never had similar resonance in the U.S., where “welfare” is politically
despised although “social security” — initiated by Franklin Roosevelt — is still popular (Skocpol 1988). And, looking back in time, before the term “welfare state” gained currency, social analysts, reformers, and politicians referred to “relief,” “workingmen’s” or social insurance and pensions, or the “social state” (see, e.g., Rubinow 1913). These terms, and the systems they referenced, reflected different politics, targets of policy and sets of state activities than do contemporary systems (see, e.g., Steinmetz 1993 on the German case). Even if some of these might eventually have metamorphosed into today’s programs, it may be assuming too much to speak of the “origins of the welfare state,” and it is certainly misleading to speak of the “early welfare state.”

Most analysts of systems of social provision and regulation have studied the origins, historical development, or “crisis” of the welfare state by focusing on a standardized array of programs, given quasi-official definition by states and international organizations themselves (e.g., in the U.S., Social Security Programs Throughout the World [U.S. Social Security Administration, Office of Policy 1999] or the publications of the International Labour Organization): old-age and survivors’ insurance, disability and sickness insurance, workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, family benefits, social assistance, and, sometimes, maternity insurance and parental leaves. Modernization analysts were interested in the relationship between levels of industrialization and “welfare state generosity,” the proportions of GNP devoted to social spending, that is, to this standard group of programs (or, even more crudely, to all non-military public spending). Even today some scholars use these measures, while others find the focus on spending inadequate, and have instead developed concepts such as decommodification, stratification, extent of public versus private provision, defamilialization, or personal independence (Esping-Andersen 1990: ch. 1; Korpi 2000; Lewis 1992; Lister 1997; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shafer 1999: ch. 1; Orloff 1993b). But when these concepts have found their way into empirical analyses, they are almost always operationalized from data on that same standard array of social programs.

In taking such programs as definitive of “modern welfare,” analysts also take on the embedded understandings of what is a “risk,” and which risks are legitimately social, against which states ought to provide protection. Modernization theorists assumed that systems of social provision were functional arrangements for dealing with conditions to which all humans are subject — old age, sickness, accident — which leave them with needs for protection and care that must be solved collectively. Once people are reliant on wages, these problems become understood as risks of income insecurity, and there is a new risk, unemployment; then interest centers on the social programs dealing with those risks: old-age pensions, workers’ compensation, unemployment and health insurance, and survivors’ insurance. Of course, analysts do not accept even this minimal definition of risks as entirely unproblematic; indeed, the progressive narrative of the development of the welfare state assumes a transition from “traditional,” familized or communal ways of dealing with needs to “modern,” public and collective means (Baldwin 1990). The more politically-oriented scholars of historical sociology’s second wave and their successors have seen the extent to which needs and risks are dealt with
publicly rather than privately as reflecting the class (or gender, or other) balance of power (among other things). To some extent, this insight has become embodied in the notion of a “welfare regime,” which gained currency in the 1990s; rather than focusing solely on state provision, regime analysts examine the interdependent provisioning from states, markets (e.g., employer benefits and private insurance), and families (and, sometimes, communities), and argue that the institutional location in which different needs are met reflects and in turn influences balances of power. One should also note the gendered dimensions of these definitions: The focus is on cash, and risks of losing income because of inability to find or undertake employment — but not on care or services, and risks of losing income because of having to undertake care or due to the dissolution of family relationships which underwrite caregiving.

While mainstream analyses admit an irreducibly political component to defining need and risk, they have been less interested in their (simultaneously) cultural or discursive constitution. For some analysts, this is genealogical work on the modern system of social provision, its styles of thought and its (cultural) contribution to capitalism. For example, Francois Ewald described the emergence of the epistemological transformation — the “philosophy of risk” — which displaces juridical notions of fault and accompanies the birth of social insurance: “Insurance... signifies at once an ensemble of institutions and the diagram with which industrial societies conceive their principle of organization, functioning and regulation” (Ewald 1991: 210; see also Ewald 1986). Moreover, there are classificatory processes which bring groups into political being, and further, the political and cultural discursive work through which their “needs,” “risks,” or, possibly, “rights,” are defined within existing systems of social provision, as in Nancy Fraser’s (1989) influential analysis. All take the very categories of analysis of the earlier-referenced authors as the objects to be explained. For many of these analysts, it is not the welfare state that is the object of scrutiny, but the invention and regulation of “the social,” a constitutively modern sphere or “arena located ‘between’ the economy and state” (Steinmetz 1993: 55), or, “that modern domain of knowledge and intervention carved out by statistics, sociology, social hygiene and social work” (Horn 1994: 4). This invention is constitutive of modern capitalism, rather than its functional byproduct or the effect of the class politics it spawns. And the welfare state became a primary mode of regulating this sphere in the twentieth century (although whether it will continue is at least open to question).

In this essay, when making general references, I will use the phrase “systems of social provision and regulation” rather than “welfare states.” I include “regulation” as well as

9 Feminists have unmasked the ways in which discussion of needs for support on the part of “dependents” often conflates what they have called “inevitable” and “derived” dependency — the former refers to dependency that “flows from the status and situation of being a child, and often accompanies aging, illness or disability,” while the latter “flows from the role of caretaker and the need for resources their caretaking generates” (Fineman 1995:162).
“provision” to underline that benefits are never delivered without some sort of discipline, regulation, or categorization. But where one could make a reasonable claim that welfare states — states responding to the claims by citizens and denizens for protection against some of the risks of modern industrial and family life — do exist, I will use the term. And where I am describing theoretical perspectives that do not focus on regulatory issues, I will refer simply to work on “systems of social provision or protection.” Finally, for variety and simplicity, I will sometimes allow myself the shorthand terms “welfare” or “welfare systems.”

Explaining State Social Provision and Regulation

Scholarship on modern social provision surely ranks as one of the success stories of historical sociology of the second wave and beyond. This work exemplifies the advances of the second wave and its friendly institutionalist successors in establishing that “politics matters,” historicizing accounts of social provision, giving greater attention to political processes and to states, and producing richer and less economistic understandings of interests, goals, and identities. Analyses of systems of social provision and regulation were not a theme of the classical theorists of the first wave (welfare states were not yet invented). However, they have been a major battleground in several major scholarly controversies involving historical sociologists since the 1970s: between modernization theorists and scholars interested in conflictual politics; between researchers in the “society-centered” power resources tradition and “state-centered” scholars; between institutionalists and ahistorical rational choicers (more prominent among political scientists than sociologists); and within the research community of institutionalists and advocates of power resources theory, between those who do and do not incorporate gender into their analyses. Some nationally-based narratives have been substantially altered in part due to the work of historical sociologists: a signal achievement here is the recasting of the U.S. narrative, recognizing its lead in early-twentieth-century “maternalist” social politics and provision even as its adoption of

10 The classical sociologists did not develop theoretical interpretations of the legislation and programs now understood as precursors of modern welfare states. Indeed, Marx’s famously ambiguous musings on the state, or on the passage of factory legislation — seeing it as a kind of functional necessity for capitalist society — helped to give rise to wildly divergent orientations among neo-Marxists writing on the capitalist state in the 1970s and 1980s. Marx, suitably revised, was also a key resource for theorizing reformist social-democratic projects. Weber advocated certain types of protective labor legislation while opposing Bismarck’s paternalistic approach, but did not theorize social protection (Steinmetz 1993: 23). Neo-Weberians have drawn on his more general insights about bureaucracy, war, and rationality to develop accounts of social policy developments.
protections for workingmen took place later than in other industrializing countries. The
gendered theme has also been pushed forward in studies of post-war welfare regimes,
and has contributed to the reorientation of mainstream scholarship to incorporate
relations among states, markets, and families in examining work, fertility, and politics. In
addition, one can point to an historicizing transformation of the whole field of scholarship
on social provision and regulation. The dominant paradigms in the field make historical
arguments about the influence of factors such as class coalitions, patterns of partisan
dominance, state structures, and policy legacies on past and contemporary social
politics and policies (for an excellent literature review, see Myles and Quadagno 2002).
Some analysts explicitly invoke the language of path dependency, but the historical
move is even more widespread.

In tracing the lineage of contemporary debates, we should note the different statuses of
the contending intellectual currents. The second wave historical sociologists were not
displaced as the dominant forces within the field; rather, their new intellectual formation
— institutionalism — became the new core of scholarship on welfare states and other
systems of social provision. Feminists, those taking the cultural or discursive turn, and
scholars arguing for the significance of race, ethnicity, or nation are challengers, whose
work has been taken more or less seriously by the institutionalist mainstream. And in
this field of scholarship, one also sees the continuing deficiencies of institutionalism,
even at its historicized, processual best: utilitarian assumptions about interests and
identities; a focus on the political economy to the exclusion of other social arenas; a thin
understanding of how culture shapes politics; and exclusions of the sexual, racial,
ethnic, and national elements in welfare even as some limited headway has been made
with respect to gender. Feminist scholars have introduced questions about informal
labor, care, dependency, dominance, and bodies into work on welfare. But to the extent
that work on gender has penetrated the mainstream, it has been on materialist grounds
and on the terrain of work, rather than dominance, bodies, or sexuality. And while
continuing to resist analysis of race and nation, work on welfare systems is spreading
beyond the (West) European-white settler society core to Latin America, post-socialist
Eastern Europe and Asia, and East Asia, and the ways in which the multifaceted
phenomenon of “globalization” shapes contemporary welfare have attracted a good deal
of attention (see, e.g., Esping-Andersen 1996; Gough 1999; Pierson 2001; Scharpf and
Schmidt 2000; Williamson and Pampel 1993).

Culturist or disciplinary examinations of social provision have been in a quite separate
intellectual space, identifying a different object of study and utilizing different analytic
strategies than the mainstream, and locating their work on the broader terrain of culture
and politics or governmentality, rather than on the ground of the welfare state tout court.
(This may have contributed to lessening their impact on mainstream scholarship,
although I believe it is more a case of mutual intellectual incompatibility.) Many scholars
influenced by the cultural turns have shown how discourses about the poor, paupers,
workers, the unemployed, teenage mothers, and other problematized categories shape
social welfare practices and social policies (e.g., Fraser 1989; Haney 1996, 2002; Mohr
1994; Mohr and Duquenne 1997; Steinmetz 1993; historical anthropologist Ann Stoler
The shift from sovereignty to governmentality and associated changes in the character of power, with the emergence of surveillance, “biopolitics,” and population as targets of state activities have fascinated Foucauldians. Sometimes these are associated with the “welfare state,” but more often with the regulatory or supervisory professional practices occurring on its outskirts (see Horn 1994 and the essays collected in Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991). Historical sociologists have probed the interface of practices, discourses and institutions of welfare provision and the regulation of various deviant categories of individuals, as in David Garland’s (1985) work, Punishment and Welfare (in nineteenth-century Britain), or John Sutton’s (1988) examination of the emergence of juvenile courts and “justice” in early-twentieth-century America. But Francois Ewald, Foucault’s intellectual and professional heir, did subject the emergence of l’etat providence (in France, at least) to a fully Foucauldian analysis, arguing that the invention of the social, and of insurance as technique and discourse for regulating it, was constitutive of capitalist modernity; as Colin Gordon described it, “capitalism’s Faustian daring depends on this capacity [of insurance] of taking the risk out of risk” (1991: 39). This may be. But these intriguing insights are lost for the mainstream when they cannot be (or are not) connected to the Marxist-Weberian apparatus of welfare states.

The culturalist challenge has mainly been ignored, even as institutionalism has accepted a greater role for “ideas” and the role of interpretation in the development of identities and interests. Institutionalists continue to neglect the deeper cultural foundations of social provision — such as the perceived racial and religious homogeneity of the Scandinavian welfare meccas in their “golden age,” or, indeed, rationality and risk themselves. Some mainstream analysts argue that these matters can be taken as settled for the purposes of their studies (e.g., Baldwin 1990: 12, note 10), or simply carry on as if they did not matter. Yet one might well doubt the fixity of categories of risk, the status of citizenship and citizen claims based on even a cursory familiarity with contemporary political debates about immigration, Islam, and the (Christian) religious and (homogeneously white European) ethnic basis of the welfare states of Europe, or their counterparts in the U.S. and other settler societies (where ethnic, racial, and religious diversity has a different status) (Williams 1995; Yuval-Davis 1997). But while this potentially unsettling message falls on deaf ears in some corners of the field, culturalist and discursive perspectives are influencing feminist work in productive ways, a subject to which I return below.

Historical sociologists of the second wave first entered the fray about welfare states in

11 World system analysts in the John Meyer school take the spread of social security programs to all corners of the globe, often in purely formal terms, as evidence of cultural diffusion of the emblems of modernity and modern states, but show little interest in the capillaries of power that have intrigued Foucauldians.
the late 1970s and 1980s, when apolitical modernization approaches focusing on the “needs” of “society” held sway, countered by a naïve pluralism or a radical structural Marxism that focused on the “needs” of “capital.” With allies among other political sociologists and political scientists, they dismantled modernization accounts thoroughly, showing that social policy developments have not been “automatic” responses to social change, nor have they followed a progressive line of development. Politics matters for the character of social provision in modern societies, but in ways not fully captured by pluralism. They also argued against the structuralist Marxist account, along lines similar to their anti-modernization critique — especially in stressing politics and variation among capitalist countries. But they took structuralist Marxism more seriously than modernization theory — they were, after all, more or less on the same side of the intellectual and political barricades of the time, and also took for granted the “structural” and “instrumental” power of capital and capitalists. And Marxism still defined the puzzles they were trying to solve.

Second wave historical sociologists were joined by others, who were as critical of the welfare state itself as of social science accounts of it. For example, Piven and Cloward’s influential analysis held that social provision “regulates the poor” in the interests of capital and political elites, although there are transitory moments — ushered in by “poor people’s movements” — when the poor could get something from the state (Piven and Cloward 1971, 1977). More important to a later generation of historical sociologists taking the cultural turn were the works of Michel Foucault and his followers, first appearing in the 1970s. These offered a much darker vision of what welfare represented, linking welfare with the penal system (Garland 1985), other disciplinary technologies, and a eugenic concern with population. However, Foucauldians and their fellow travellers have remained at odds with the institutionalist successors to the second wave. For while second wavers, institutionalists, and power resources analysts recognized that systems of social provision were initially created by political elites with the interests of business and state in mind, they have stressed the post-World War Two face of welfare as also a significant social right of citizenship, an accomplishment of

12 Piven and Cloward focused on English poor relief and U.S. welfare (AFDC, or Aid to Families with Dependent Children) rather than the social insurance programs targeting employed workers that interested other analysts, especially in Europe. Their view can be understood as reflecting the peculiarities of U.S. politics and social policy, but it has been extended by some to refer to the social control aspect of all welfare systems. They were not historical sociologists in the vein of the second wave, for they used historical materials illustratively, rather than to assess alternative explanatory claims; indeed, their argument that state social spending expands and contracts in response to the rise and fall of popular disruption was more directly derived from 1960s welfare rights politics.
social-democratic politics, and linked to greater class equality and social protection. In short, they held to a modernist and progressive vision, however qualified. The second wavers battled modernization theory and quasi-functionalist Marxist accounts, but it was not because they saw welfare states in anti-enlightenment terms.

One could tell the story of these developments in a number of ways. I will tell it as I now understand my experiences of living through it, beginning my narrative with the second wave (where I began my scholarly career), then moving to its institutionalist successors, and finally to some of its more successful critics — the feminists (among whom I’m now spending time), who are creating a channel through which discursive and culturalist work may yet reshape the mainstream. I close with some brief thoughts about other challenging intellectual currents that have appeared in the field of welfare state studies.

The key debates of the second wave around welfare states took off from Marxist theories of the state which posited that social policies would ultimately be functional for capitalism, if only by preventing revolution, and which assumed that capitalist states were fundamentally similar. This did not mean that the state was literally the “executive committee of the bourgeoisie,” for Marxists also believed in the “relative autonomy of the state,” which allowed “state managers” to act against the explicit preferences of capitalists in order to pursue the long-range interests of capitalism. The autonomy, however, was always “relative,” for state managers would always ultimately be limited by structural constraints: the need to respond to the demands of legitimation and accumulation faced by all capitalist states. (The canonical texts cited for these positions are O’Connor [1973], Gough [1979], and Offe [1984]; the view, however, was widespread.) Structuralist Marxists posed welfare as a functional but contradictory and crisis-engendering solution to these demands; welfare bought off popular unrest, thereby securing legitimacy. It also promoted capitalist accumulation and the commodification of labor by ensuring labor force stability and productivity when welfare programs siphoned off unproductive workers and demanded discipline and steady work histories for entitlement. But it was expensive, triggering fiscal crises, or, if cheaper but inadequate, legitimacy crises (for a review of the literature on fiscal crisis, see Block

A number of recent studies in political science have stressed the role of business elites and firms in creating economic coordination and social policies, which under certain circumstances — such as those obtaining in Sweden or much of continental Europe, might result in more egalitarian outcomes than has been the case where the market is less constrained (e.g., the U.S.) (Hall and Soskice 2001; Swenson 2002). Welfare states are still seen as progressive accomplishments, even if the actors responsible are different from those identified in the social-democratic model.
In these accounts, “crises” were more or less constant, or at least imminent, but in the meantime, critique of welfare was a necessary exercise of demystification.

These highly general and abstract Marxist accounts could not easily deal with the multiplicity of social policy profiles to be seen across the advanced capitalist world (see, e.g., Block 1986; Skocpol 1980); why, for example, did Sweden’s workers demand so much higher a proportion of state spending than America’s to secure their (presumed) docility? Nor were these theories of much use in explaining instances of policymaking which seemed to go against the interests of capital, such as the Wagner Act which empowered U.S. unionists to organize with some state protection. And what allowed state managers to be so much more far-sighted than the capitalists in whose ultimate interests they toiled? What political mechanism (as opposed to logically-induced necessity) actually guaranteed that state managers would not transgress the limits set by accumulation and legitimation? The problem of the state’s “relative” or “potential” autonomy — a problem that made sense only within the Marxists’ theoretical frame, which still animated the second wave even as they attacked it — inspired a debate between so-called society-centered (social-democratic, or “power resources”) theories and state-centered (neo-Weberian, later “institutionalist”) analyses about the role of the state in social policy developments. The former drew upon a social-democratic reading of Marx, augmented by Karl Polanyi and T.H. Marshall, the latter mixed their Marx with large doses of Weber, Tocqueville and a dash of Hintze.

Walter Korpi, John Stephens, John Myles, and Gosta Esping-Andersen, the intellectual progenitors of the power resources or social-democratic approach, first mobilized to take on structural Marxism and political Leninism, which assumed that welfare states “serve capitalist interests,” and that social democracy is just a “milder version of capitalist politics as usual” (Esping-Andersen 1985: xiii; see also Korpi 1978, 1989; Myles 1984; Stephens 1980; key texts of this analytic school and their critics are collected in O’Connor and Olsen 1998). For these analysts, the potential for state autonomy from capital was critical, but full autonomy would be problematic: They asserted that parliaments could control states, for workers through social-democratic parties could win control of parliaments, then progress down the parliamentary road to socialism. They drew on the social-democratic traditions of Marxism — Bernstein, Kautsky, the Austro-Marxists, and contemporary Scandinavian social democrats — along with T.H. Marshall and Karl Polanyi, iconoclastic scholars writing in mid-century Britain about the development of citizenship, the embeddedness of markets, and the need for social protection. Polanyi (1957 [1944]) was critical in revealing the centrality of the commodification of labor to the functioning of capitalist markets while simultaneously insisting on the social embeddedness of the market, which is self-regulating only in the fantasies of economists and ideological liberals. Social provision — partly in the form of what Esping-Andersen would later call “decommodifying” benefits — was necessary for “society” to protect itself from the market, even as the inherent tensions between the two would continue to influence politics (see also Block and Somers 1984). T.H. Marshall (1950) was called upon for his account of the historical development of citizenship rights, in which he argued that political rights (e.g., suffrage, rights to
organize) could be used to claim social rights, which offer protections against the market. Thus, welfare states reveal the possibilities of “politics against markets”: Social rights, won by workers in the democratic arena, work to counter capitalist economic power, and most importantly, affect the very character of the class structure, augmenting the power resources available to workers, who then push for even greater concessions — perhaps on into socialism. As Esping-Andersen (1985: 33) put it, the “ultimate instrument of social democratic class formation... is state policy.” Here is one key source for the institutionalist approach to social politics, showing the constitutive role of state policy.

Led by Theda Skocpol, the state-centered analysts — of whom I was one — broke with neo-Marxist views about the relative — that is, ultimately limited — autonomy of the state, and about the sources of group formation, using welfare states as a proving ground. Skocpol’s 1980 article on the New Deal and neo-Marxist theories of the state was a key switching point in second wave historical sociology, ushering in work on critical political junctures and the patterns of social policy development, without relying on teleological Marxism.14 Following on the heels of States and Social Revolutions (Skocpol 1979), this work established Weberian- and Tocquevillian-inspired scholarship on states — with welfare states taking center stage — as a contender with academic Marxism or social-democratic approaches. (Much of this literature, along with contending perspectives, is reviewed in Skocpol and Amenta [1986]). It was not only the possibility for state policy to break with capitalist preferences or the “structural prerequisites” of capitalism that interested us, although we tried to examine this question empirically. We could agree with the social-democratic analysts that under some circumstances, working-class political forces might well affect policy developments, but viewed their understanding of political possibilities as too narrow and economistic. Rather, we looked at the ways in which state elites might pursue projects beyond any suggested by any “social” actors (that is, actors outside the state). State and other political elites, we argued, were situated not only with respect to domestic class structures, but also participated in transnational networks, considered the geopolitical situation, and worried about electoral and organizational issues. They were influenced by the organizational or fiscal capacities and structures of the state: an institutional mediation of political strategizing. (This opening to geopolitical or “global” concerns has yet to be exploited fully.) We broke with economistic, socially-determinist accounts of the formation of collective political actors by examining what we would now

14 See Fred Block’s classic essays on relative autonomy, state managers, and “the ruling class that does not rule” (collected in Block 1987) for a similar break with functionalist tendencies that remained within the Marxist framework.
call the institutional constitution of actors, that is, the ways states influenced patterns of
group formation, including interests and political identities. All of this provided an
opening to considering different kinds of politics not based on class — those of fraternal
orders, religious groups, feminists or “maternalists,” and so on. Considerations of
culture were not too far away.

The state-centered attack engendered its own critique, from those who would bring
“class” or “society” “back in,” or from those who had remained steadfastly convinced of
the explanatory power of U.S. business interests (e.g., Domhoff 1996). Many historical
sociologists insisted on the efficacy of capitalists’, or less often, workers’ political efforts
vis-a-vis U.S. social (and labor) policy, usually turning to different elements of the New
Deal policy arena to prove their points (Manza 2000 provides a review; see also Gilbert
and Howe 1991; Jenkins and Brents 1989). Quadagno (1988) offered an intriguing
explanation for U.S. policy developments that relied partly on the power of capital, but
even more significantly, the institutionally-mediated and historically-changing role of
white Southern planter elites. Yet many single-case studies made no use of historical or
comparative variation to check their explanations of policy developments (Amenta 1998;
Orloff 1993a); other institutionalist accounts challenged their interpretations (see, e.g.,
Finegold and Skocpol 1995, Hooks 1990). Ultimately, however, the charges and
countercharges could not be resolved on the ground of the New Deal alone.

Scholars in the power resources group struck back, emphasizing the determinative
significance of social-democratic partisan strength in shaping welfare outcomes and the
limits imposed on state officials by the “societal power structure” (Korpi 1989: 324).
Many critics and reviewers used specifications of the key premises of the state-centered
approach that were inadequate at best, misleading at worst. Often, it boiled down to a
public-choice-style set of assumptions, including that “number of bureaucrats” tapped
our construct of “state autonomy,” since increasing their own numbers allegedly
represented state elites’ core interests. In other instances, the “state-centered”
approach was caricatured as arguing that the state is autonomous and powerful, rather
than that this is one potential. Of course, I would argue that the key insights
encompassed both potential autonomy and the structuring role of states (autonomous
or not). Luckily, institutionalism soon brought a more sophisticated understanding of
states and other political institutions shaping policy, while moving beyond debates about
state autonomy that were unlikely ever to yield to empirical resolution.

Institutionalism built on the intellectual innovations of second wave analysis, particularly
the break from economic determinism to a broader social and political terrain. At least
implicitly responding to critiques of their work as lacking attention to process and
agency, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, leading second wave scholars of social
provision developed new lines of research that foregrounded the development of social
policy over time and the activities of political actors, contributing to historically
contingent outcomes. The shift from the state-centered and society-centered
perspectives of the second wave to institutionalism occurred against the backdrop of the
intellectual decline of paradigms inspired by Marxism and the political demise of
socialism after 1989. As Marxism lost force, the animating spark for the debates around state autonomy was also extinguished. Moreover, both sides relaxed the weakest parts of their arguments. State-centered scholars first moved to the terminology of “political institutionalism” in order to make clear our analytical interest in the whole range of political institutions (not just the state), and to legislate against misreadings of the perspective as being opposed to the influence of “social” factors. The society-centered group admitted the structuring and mediating role for the state and other political institutions on the influence of class actors (while remaining recalcitrant — or steadfast — on the subject of potential state autonomy). Both sides could meet on “institutionalist” ground, the Tocquevillian issues of the institutional constitution of political actors, identities, and interests and of the variable conditions for successful institutional innovation or stability. Furthermore, different foes were emerging — neo-liberalism politically (from the Thatcher and Reagan elections of 1979 and 1980), and (certain varieties of) rational choice intellectually. Here, the debates pitted the former foes (state-centered and society-centered analysts), now friendly cooperators in the institutionalist project, against those assuming exogenous “preferences” and pre-political identities in political “games” seemingly undistorted by power asymmetries.

Institutionalist work on systems of social provision has been particularly strong in two areas: comparative and at least implicitly historical analyses of the modern, Western welfare states, or “regimes,” and historical and at least implicitly comparative studies of the development of U.S. social policies, which have overlapped significantly with studies of American political development, largely located in political science. And there have been as well two key intellectual orientations in explaining social policy developments, claiming ancestry from the social-democratic/power resources approach and the neo-Weberian or state-centered approach, respectively, although — as outlined above — they are less sharply demarcated than in the past. Two spectacularly influential works of the early 1990s, Gosta Esping-Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) and Theda Skocpol’s Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (1992) capture the new institutionalist spirit in these two streams and in the two intellectual idioms. All of this work reflects the interests of politically-engaged scholars concerned with social equality which could no longer be imagined to be reliably guaranteed — much less attained — through revolution; welfare states could be understood as contributing to an evolutionary version of progress toward equality, and were linked to the still-attractive politics of challenging groups. Yet there was a far broader understanding of those challenger politics. The social-democratic/power resources analysts, while retaining a focus on working classes and a basically materialist approach, broke with the notion that their interests could be identified only with socialism; under certain circumstances they might be identified with Christian-democratic or liberal-labor forces. The neo-Weberian institutionalists made a stronger break with class determinism, if not necessarily material determinations, allowing for a very wide range of ways in which identities and political claims may be realized. They all built on the second wave insight that there are multiple forms of capitalism, exploring the conjunctural and multiple causation involved in distinctive policy and political outcomes. Finally, all have accepted
the significance of history for explaining contemporary as well as past developments; this is often referenced in the phrase “policy creates politics,” or in the notion of “path dependency.”

Esping-Andersen’s (1990) innovative formulation of “three worlds of welfare capitalism” set the terms for comparative and historical work on the eighteen-plus advanced capitalist democracies, drawing on power resources or social-democratic analysis but moving it in identifiable institutional directions (see also Carroll 1999; Esping-Andersen 1996, 1999, 2002; Hicks 1999; Hicks and Misra 1993; Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi and Palme 1998; Wennemo 1994). Welfare is viewed as varying qualitatively; differences among states are not unilinear — more or less generous, as in older formulations — but configurational. Building on the work of Richard Titmuss and his own collaborative work with Korpi, Esping-Andersen famously argued that capitalist welfare comes in three distinctive forms, or “regime types”: liberal, conservative, and social-democratic; these reflect the dominant political force in each and feature distinctive profiles of state-society, or public-private, divisions of responsibility for provisioning; stratification; and levels of the decommodification of labor. The concept of welfare regimes has sometimes given rise to typological arguments, thus continuing the “comparative statics” which characterized much second wave historical work. But more significantly, there are also notions of policy feedback and path dependency, in which policy creates politics — the implicit history of this wing of scholarship on welfare provision — and here regime analysis encourages more processual thinking. Regime types can be seen as distinctive political-institutional opportunity structures, producing historically- and nationally-specific sets of interests or preferences, identities and coalitions (and, neo-Weberians would add, administrative capacities) that influence social politics in path-dependent ways. Moreover, the different “worlds of welfare capitalism” are the products of different political-institutional histories, featuring distinctive class coalitions, profiles of partisan dominance, and state structures.

Theda Skocpol’s (1992) pathbreaking revisioning of U.S. social provision introduced social scientists to America’s “maternalist” reformers and their efforts to develop a maternalist system of social provision for mothers and their children; it further expanded knowledge about America’s “precocious” social spending program, Civil War pensions for a large percentage of the late-nineteenth-century nation’s elderly men in the North (see also Orloff and Skocpol 1984). The book showed that U.S. patterns differed qualitatively from European ones, rather than being simply a tardy, incomplete version; even while focusing on a single national case, Skocpol located it fully in comparative

---

15 This genre of work on social provision retains a quantitative analytic orientation, and has been the site for post-positivist methodological experimentation (e.g., using Charles Ragin’s QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis), see Amenta and Poulsen 1994, 1996; Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan 1992; Huber and Stephens 2001; Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993).
context. The book reoriented the field in multiple ways, notably in the encouragement
given to the institutionalist emphasis on politics as process (especially through “policy
feedback”). But perhaps most notable was the way that gender was brought onto the
same analytic ground as class, community, and ethnicity — that is, as a potential basis
for the development of identity and political goals, given specific social, cultural, and
political-institutional conditions. Skocpol’s work on maternalism proved to be inspiring
for new generations of historical social scientists and historians (of women) to explore
gender issues in welfare (about which, more below). My own work on the comparative
politics of pensions (Orloff 1993a) examined the ways in which “needs” were constituted
through the lens of ideology and mediated by existing social provision, and then were
rendered effective politically in historically-specific ways, conditional on the particular
political-institutional context. Amenta (1998) questioned the dominant understanding of
the U.S. system of social provision as ever-lagging and stingy, showing that during the
Roosevelt administration, the U.S. was (briefly) the world leader in social spending, and
developed a great deal of innovative social policy such as the Works Progress
Administration. The institutionalist perspective also found adherents among political
scientists examining, for example, the connections between policy ideas, policy
feedback, and state capacities in the area of employment (Weir 1992); the dismantling
or retrenchment of welfare in a new era of crisis (Pierson 1994); the political sources of
ineffectiveness in unemployment policies in the U.S. and Britain (King 1995); the
relationship between the “tax state” and the “expenditure state” (Howard 1997); the
development of a gendered and “divided” citizenship (Mettler 1998); the symbiotic
relationship between public and private provision (Hacker 2002); transformations in
European welfare states (Ferrera and Rhodes 2000); the shaping of U.S. social
 provision by racial inequality (Brown 1999; Lieberman 1998); the critical role of
capitalists and firms in the development of alternative models of welfare provision
(Swenson 2002; Hall and Soskice 2001) — to name only a few.

Theda Skocpol had consolidated her position as a leading figure in historical
sociology’s second wave with her work on social provision (e.g., Skocpol and Ikenberry
1983; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Skocpol and Amenta 1985). The turn to
“institutionalism” dates from 1988, with the publication of an edited volume of essays,
many by her students, on the politics of social policy in the U.S. (Weir, Orloff and
Skocpol 1988). In this volume, we further developed the concept of policy feedback,
which has come to be significant in institutionalist accounts of systems of social
provision; policy shaped subsequent politics in terms of state capacities, understandings
of social problems, and development of constituencies. Policy feedback was joined
analytically with state structures and capacities, and patterns of democratic political
involvements, related to patterns of class formation and mobilization.
Investigations of how racial factors led to the underdevelopment of the U.S. system of social provision have assumed greater prominence within institutionalist and political-economic scholarship (Manza 2000; Misra 2002: especially 28-31; Quadagno 2000). For example, Quadagno (1988, 1994) explored the racial power and racism underlying the Southern political economy and its institutional mediation in Congress, and traced the ways in which U.S. welfare was racialized during the period from the New Deal through the Great Society (see also Brown 1999; Lieberman 1998; Reese 2001). Dorothy Roberts (1993, 1995) showed how the devaluation of African American’s reproduction was expressed in hostility to black women’s motherwork (a theme also taken up in Mink 1998). This work tends to take racial groups as already constituted, then examines how racial hierarchies have been consolidated and restructured through social provision. Some feminist work, discussed below, has been more likely to take a constructionist view of racial (or national) categories, which are understood as simultaneously gendered (e.g., Boris 1995; Glenn 2002; Koven and Michel 1993; Lewis 2000; Williams 1995).

The fruitful line of institutionalist work continues today, making contributions especially in showing the relevance of historicizing analysis with the concepts of path dependency and policy feedback. It seems clear that the economic difficulties of the 1970s and the political attacks on welfare that followed, most dramatically in the English-speaking world, helped to undermine the progressive story of expanding welfare states that had heretofore held sway. A number of studies have attempted to understand how programs unravel (Hooks 1990; Reese 2001; Soule and Zylan 1997; Stryker 1989). With reference to the most recent rounds of unraveling, it was soon clear that not all programs were equally vulnerable to attack, and that there was a great deal of resilience to modern welfare states. Paul Pierson’s Dismantling the Welfare State? (1994) subjected the patterns in the U.S. and U.K. to systematic analysis, and concluded that policy had created politics in the sense of creating constituencies which would defend “their” programs from attack. Thus, politicians would engage in “blame avoidance” and stealth politics in order to cut certain programs, which, while popular, were tempting targets for budgetary savings or rolling back state activities that offended other important constituencies. Esping-Andersen used his regime analysis for similar purposes: Regimes were understood as putting into place distinctive sets of constituencies and interests (anchored to what was referred to as “welfare state stratification”), which then produced distinctive patterns of social politics. Thus, for example, universalistic welfare states such as the social-democratic regimes of Scandinavia are seen to give rise to a broader-based popular support than the residual states of the liberal (mainly English-speaking countries’) regimes, in which the limited coverage of state protection leaves most citizens dependent on private provision and indifferent if not hostile to state welfare. There is now a thriving literature investigating the resilience — or lack thereof — of welfare states against the threats usually represented as globalization, neo-liberalism and the associated liberal (or, “Anglo-
The embedded nationalistic and racialized thinking that goes into the term “Anglo-Saxon” welfare model has always struck me as ripe for deconstructive analysis. The country that allegedly represents this model best — the U.S. — is the most racially and ethnically diverse among the developed countries. “Anglo-Saxons,” if we accept the term for a moment, do not even represent an ethnic majority among white Americans. Even the U.K., putative ancestral home to “Anglo-Saxons,” features much greater heterogeneity than the term allows. Furthermore, what is it about “Anglo-Saxonness” that is thought to be associated with the allegedly stingy welfare systems of the U.S. and U.K.? I expect it would be more productive to investigate the links among levels of ethnic/"racial" heterogeneity; social solidarity; and the character of social provision. Contemporary debates about immigration in Europe offer a new ground on which to examine these issues (see, e.g., Lewis 2000; Pred 2000; Williams 1995).
Institutionalism could become more compelling if scholars address some continuing problems, particularly the thinness of understandings of culture in the construction of identities and goals, and in the very development of the categories of state welfare. The prevailing weakly utilitarian understanding of actors either should be toughened up with more explicit links to utilitarianism and rational actor perspectives, or, as I would prefer, discarded for a more fully culturally-situated conception of selves. Gendered scholarship on welfare has highlighted the significance of care in human development and in productivity, but care cannot easily be fully commodified and rationalized, posing theoretical difficulties for analytic models that depend on narrowly utilitarian, rationalistic conceptions, a point to which I return below. Ethnicity and race have begun to receive attention, but this could be more systematic, and the uses of welfare in building and sustaining nations given greater play. And, finally, the global, geopolitical concerns affecting political elites and others — first noticed in the state-centered period, should be more effectively integrated with studies of American or Western developments. In particular, scholars could explore the ways in which Cold War commitments were significant for the postwar expansion of welfare, and the ways in which the demise of socialism has affected the welfare states, which were importantly understood as providing alternatives to it.

Feminist work on systems of social provision first emerged concurrently with the second wave historical sociologists, offering a parallel critique and revision of Marxist accounts. Feminists (usually also “socialist” in this area of scholarship) highlighted “social reproduction,” gender, and family as sources of interests and solidarities, along with the class and production politics which concerned Marxist analysts of welfare (for a

18 Among feminist scholars engaging Marxism, welfare states were only one of a number of sites for critical analysis. “Feminist theories of the state” focused on men’s control of women’s sexuality and associated violence (e.g. MacKinnon 1989) or on men’s control of the distribution of productive and reproductive labor — in both strands of scholarship, raising explicit parallels to Marxism. The socialist feminists, following Heidi Hartmann (1981), memorably discussed the “unhappy marriage between Marxism and feminism” (see essays collected in Sargent 1981). All raised questions about the necessary connection between states and male dominance. This latter strand of scholarship soon linked up with studies of the welfare state (McIntosh 1978), which was at first understood as reproducing patriarchy (e.g., Pateman’s [1988] analysis of the “patriarchal welfare state,” which joined the “sexual contract” with gendered citizenship forms based largely on wage labor and unpaid domestic labor). This mainly negative view of welfare states was countered by Scandinavian and other scholars, including Helga Hernes (1987) with her influential formulation about the “woman-friendly” potential of some states (for a review, see Borchorst 1994). The work of R.W. Connell (1987, 1995) can be read as an attempt to incorporate some of these lines of thinking into an encompassing but still historically-situated analysis of gender relations, including states. I review these debates at greater length elsewhere (Orloff 1996; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999: ch.1).
pioneering analysis, see Jenson 1986; much of this work is reviewed in Laslett and Brenner 1989). By the late 1980s and early 1990s, historical investigations of women’s politics pushed scholars beyond the deductive, materialist and naturalistic understandings of “women,” “men,” and their interests that characterized socialist feminism. Here, historical sociologists have made key contributions. Skocpol’s work on maternalism reflected the conceptual broadening of gender scholarship on policy developments in the U.S. and elsewhere. Around the same time, a number of feminist sociologists critiqued mainstream comparative institutionalist scholars, notably Esping-Andersen, unveiling the gendered (masculinist) assumptions about actors and political goals parading as (universal) class actors and interests, and specifying the ways in which gender shaped social provision (Hobson 1990; Lewis 1992; O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993b; Sainsbury 1996). (Thus, paralleling gender-free institutionalist work, there are two hubs of activity among feminists: historical investigations of U.S. social policy development, with a focus on maternalism and its successors, and comparative work on welfare regimes, sometimes but not always historical.) Research on welfare and men — as gendered persons, rather than as “universal” citizens or workers — is still in its infancy (but see, e.g., Coltrane and Galt 2000; Connell 1987, 1995; Haas 1992; Hobson 2002; Leira 2002; Orloff 1991; Orloff 1993a; Orloff and Monson 2002). Yet as in the task of “provincializing Europe,” or other analytic moves to investigate dominant and unmarked categories, this work will need to be pushed forward to develop a fully gendered understanding of state social provision and regulation.

Theda Skocpol (1992), Seth Koven and Sonya Michel (1993), Linda Gordon (1994) and Susan Pedersen (1993), among others, developed the concept of maternalism to describe women’s political activities around the turn of the century in a number of industrializing democracies, in which women entered politics on the basis of “difference,” made claims to citizenship based on their capacities to mother, and idealized a maternalist state that could care for its citizens, especially mothers and their children. This scholarship sharply disagreed with presentist notions of “women’s interests,” common among mainstream researchers, as solely consisting in entry to the paid labor force and the development of public provision of care services; moreover, gendered “difference” was understood as socially and culturally-constructed. These works provide a model for comparative analyses sensitive to national and regional (or, in the U.S., state-level) differences in how women were understood as, and encouraged to be, “mothers” as opposed to “workers,” a theme that has continued into investigations

19 I see, in retrospect, that this has been a continuing concern of mine. RC19 veterans may remember the general hilarity accompanying the discussion of “men as men” in a paper of mine given at the 1997 meeting in Copenhagen!
of contemporary social policies and politics (e.g., Duncan and Edwards 1997; Leira 1992; Lewis 1997a). To explain divergent policies about maternal and infant health, public provision of child care, or maternity leaves, scholars call upon factors such as employers’ demands for women’s labor, trade union men’s capacities to command a “family wage,” state officials’ interests in promoting fertility, and women’s organizations’ demands for economic independence, protection of motherhood, and/or entry to particular occupations — all of which are simultaneously discursive or “cultural” as well as “material.” In the contemporary period, I would argue that we are collectively saying “farewell to maternalism,” with the shift to social policies encouraging employment for mothers as well as others and citizenship claims made on the basis of gender “sameness,” or employment (Orloff forthcoming).

Many feminist analysts of U.S. policy history have built on Skocpol’s work on maternalism and work on the gendered U.S. welfare state, with masculine and feminine “streams,” “channels,” or tiers, shaped by gendered assumptions about work, citizenship, and supervision and reflecting and recreating a pervasive gendered inequality (Fraser 1989; Nelson 1990). There has been a good deal of research on the development of the “feminine” policy stream that flowed from the state-level mothers’ pension programs initiated in the 1910s and 1920s to the establishment, expansion, and recent demise of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, or “welfare” in American terms), and the successor program, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF, still “welfare”). This research has uncovered the gendered — and simultaneously raced and classed — assumptions guiding U.S. social policy, especially with reference to motherhood and (paid) work, and policies’ gendered, and stratifying, effects. Scholars have been concerned especially with the racially and sexually exclusionary character of mothers’ pensions (and other maternalist social provision) and AFDC, arguing that welfare has been constitutive of (historically variable) racial and ethnic inequalities and differences (Bellingham and Mathis 1994; Glenn 2002; Naples 1997; Quadagno 1994; Reese 2001).

Work on gendered welfare regimes and comparative gender policies emerged in the context of an interdisciplinary, international community of gender scholars, including many historical sociologists. Inspired by mainstream comparative analysis, institutionalist work, and gender studies, and building on earlier work on social reproduction, analysts have carried out both feminist critique and empirical research on

20 Yet in certain respects some of this scholarship — unlike the works that inspired it — seems quite decontextualized: It relies on the idea of a gendered, “two-tier” state, but does not situate the U.S. feminine stream with respect to any sustained analysis of the “masculine” stream, which is treated more or less as an ideal-typical foil to demonstrate gender inequality. Nor does it pay attention to the comparative or historical context. In this way, it parallels some of the research on state autonomy and class politics in the U.S. New Deal. Both suffer from a ferocious U.S.-centrism.
programs and policies seen as especially relevant for the political construction of gender. I would call attention to several aspects of this work: its inductive and historicizing approach; its insistence on the continuing significance of central state institutions in constituting gender relations; its qualified modernist embrace of emancipatory feminist goals; its doggedly comparative approach; its provisional acceptance of the regime concept; its simultaneous engagement with gender studies and the institutionalist mainstream of comparative welfare state scholarship; and its opening to culture and discourse (see, e.g., Bergqvist et al. 2000; Hobson and Lindholm 1997; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999).

Since many scholars use the regime concept, it may be worth assessing how this compares to mainstream work. Welfare regimes are understood as reflecting particular political configurations — class coalitions expressed in partisan alliances above all — of predominant liberalism, social democracy or Christian democracy (conservatism/corporatism in the original formulation); they express more or less unified logics with respect to (de-)commodification, stratification, and the institutional locus of welfare provision (state, market, or family). Gendering the regime concept has not left us with a strictly parallel notion, however. Unless one accepts the deeply problematic notion of a “gender contract” between men and women, there are no gender analogues to class coalitions. Instead, we have only the unmasking of the gendered aspects of the political forces explicitly involved in legislating welfare provision and, sometimes, the bringing to light of previously ignored actors. And yet we have all looked for ways to compare, systematically, across difference. In my own work (e.g., Orloff 1993b), I have tried to develop some understanding of what would be a dimension of analysis and political intervention that would allow for such systematic comparison, and would simultaneously index the emancipatory potential of welfare states vis-à-vis women —

21 Some scholars — Simon Duncan and Rosalind Edwards come to mind — do utilize the concept of a “gender contract” to (as they say, ironically) parallel “the idea of the social-democratic contract, or ‘historical compromise’, between capital and labour” deployed by social-democratic analysts in the tradition of Esping-Andersen (Duncan and Edwards 1999: 223). They trace the concept to Yvonne Hirdmann (1991). They go on to argue for a compound concept — combining the gender and the capital-labor contracts: “genderfare.” This strikes me as merely compounding the dehistoricizing tendencies to be found in all these notions of contract! For a deconstructive and historicized analysis of a gendered “social contract” in recent U.S. social policy, see Naples (1997).

22 For example, Bismarck is Bismarck, Roosevelt is Roosevelt, the Social Democrats are the Social Democrats, whether understood in terms of class, gender, or some other characteristic.
parallel to Esping-Andersen’s decommodification for workers. Eschewing the deductive, Marxist approaches of my youth, I instead attempted to read the historical record of women’s demands on state systems of provision across a number of Western countries. While feminist political claims differed cross-nationally and over time, especially with respect to questions of mothers’ paid work and (unpaid) care, it struck me that there was a common core in demands for the means to ensure personal independence, and the capacity to enter or leave familial or marital relations on the basis of choice rather than necessity (to be secured in different ways, to be sure — state benefits or access to paid work and services). Similarly-inspired notions — of personal independence or “defamilization” — have been put forward by other feminist sociologists (e.g., O’Connor 1993; Lister 1997). Moreover, the notion of “gender logics” may be a useful analytic tool — revealed through explorations of the articulation of policies as, for example, Julia O’Connor, Sheila Shaver and I (1999) carried out vis-a-vis biological and social reproduction and the labor market in four “liberal” regimes. But our approach is not at odds with Adams and Padamsee’s (2001) warning that one cannot assume that each nation-state has a single, coherent regime — a simplifying shorthand rampant in all the literatures on modern systems of social provision and regulation which we would all do well to be on guard against.

The conversation between feminist and mainstream institutionalists has been a relatively productive one, and many of the leading figures of institutionalist welfare regime analysis have of late incorporated gender into their analytic models, with Esping-Andersen (1999, 2002) taking up feminists’ concept of “defamilization,” exploring the “household economy,” and arguing for a “new gender contract”; Korpi (2000) investigating the politics of different gendered family models in social policy; and Huber and Stephens (2000) exploring the political sources of Scandinavians’ “woman-friendly” provision of public services. Interestingly, this is one of the few substantive areas in which mainstream political analysts have acknowledged the significance (first brought to light by feminist scholars) of women’s political participation, paid work/unpaid care work

23 This approach has been referred to by some, dismissively, as modernist. Perhaps so; it certainly does (deliberately) recognize the link between modernity and contemporary Western feminism.

24 And, I cannot resist pointing out, in the 2002 version performatively contradicting the more explicit commitment to gender equality (as compared with the 1999 version) by failing to cite any of the feminist texts (yes, mine included) that were the inspiration for the notion that we need more egalitarian gender arrangements (however it has been modified in rational choice directions). To give credit where it is due, Korpi, Huber and Stephens have been more equitable in their citation practices.
trade-offs and family dynamics — however inadequate their appreciation of the full significance of gender. Perhaps this is because there are such notable and unsettling postmodern or postindustrial changes in labor and capital markets, with the decline of the standard [male] industrial worker and the increase in capital mobility; families, with the decline of male breadwinner/female full-time caregiver households and the increase in different household forms; and states, with the decline in national state capacities vis-à-vis capital. And women service workers may be the next best hope for the social-democratic project.

Yet the conversation has not been entirely satisfactory, not simply because certain voices are “heard” (that is, cited) more than others. Mainstream scholars’ conceptions of gender are fairly thin — often confined to ideas about on the “reconciliation of work and family,” but especially when it comes to bodies, violence, sex, dependency, or the cultural concepts of masculinities and femininities, which are notable by their absence (Adams and Padamsee 2001; Brush 2002). Men appear not to even have a gender. Mainstream analysts rely upon a particular conception of political subjects: as rational, autonomous, unburdened by care, impervious to invasions of bodily integrity — and therefore (heterosexual and) masculine. Indeed, their work on women shoehorns them into this ill-fitting conception (which may improve upon structuralist accounts in recognizing women’s agency, but falls short in other ways). We see this, for example, in their writings on the new “gender contract” we are now supposed to need (Esping-Andersen 2002). This concept calls upon the notions of freely-choosing individuals of liberal social contract theory — individuals whose existence is as illusory as that of self-regulating markets (which — being good institutionalists and social democrats — these analysts do recognize as fantasy!). The complexities, burdens and joys of care, about which feminists have written so eloquently, are simply dissolved in the assumption that we can commodify care sufficiently to allow all adults to enter paid labor.25 Such a

25 The feminist scholarship on care, particularly among political philosophers, is as voluminous as it has been innovative and inspiring for sociologists; for a small sampling of these rich analyses with particular relevance for welfare and citizenship, see Fineman (1995); Kittay (1999); Noddings (2002); Sevenhuijsen (1998); Tronto (1993). Feminist sociologists pioneered the study of care and welfare — both in terms of the relations of caring and the provision of care-related services (see e.g., Balbo 1982; Finch and Groves 1983; Land 1978; Sassoon 1987; Waerness 1984). Among these pioneers, Hilary Graham (1983: 30) memorably argued that “Caring is experienced as a labour of love... whose form and content is shaped (and continually reshaped) by our intimate social and sexual relationships,” and connected caring to women’s development as social beings. But, of course, care is not only about love, but work, and the conditions of that work. An influential sociological analysis of “rights to time to care” is found in Knijn and Kremer (1997); Daly and Lewis (2000) examine how “social care” has been used in studies of welfare states; Antonen and Sipila (1996) consider care and regime typologies. Meyer (2000) collects essays, including some historical, dealing with care and welfare. Empirical work on child care arrangements and gender is another
“solution” to women’s disproportionate share of the household division of labor and concomitant difficulties in entering and staying in the labor market could not hold up under serious scrutiny: It would be far too expensive given current budgetary constraints, even if it were “optimal” for those doing the caring and those who receive care — which it does not seem to be (see, e.g., Ungerson 1997). And, of course, these conceptions are innocent of the deeply gendered historical developments through which modern political subjects were birthed (see, e.g., Landes 1988; Lister 1997; Pateman 1989; Zerilli 1994). Citizenship has always been, and remains, gendered, and neither past nor contemporary social politics can be understood without reference to the (diverse) masculine and feminine characters of different political identities. But, unfortunately, the mainstreams’ thin concept of gender is likely to be stretched even thinner as these scholars draw closer to rational choice formulations of risks, preferences, and agents. Meanwhile, many feminist historical sociologists seems poised to move in quite opposite directions — precisely to understanding the cultural and discursive processes which are integral to gendering welfare.

Feminist historical sociologists of welfare are increasingly open to analyses of culture, discourse and signification, through interchanges with historians of women and gender, political theorists and others. Especially influential have been Nancy Fraser’s (1989, 1997) work on the (discursive, cultural) “politics of needs interpretation” and, with Linda Gordon, analyses of the genealogy of key welfare concepts such as “dependency,” “contract” and “citizenship” (Fraser and Gordon 1992, 1994). Opening up to scrutiny the “risks” and “needs” to which welfare is addressed has been immensely productive, allowing scholars to examine the creation of categories of clients or beneficiaries, as well as the creation of demand for the services and expertise of various professionals connected to the welfare and disciplinary bureaucracies. (Scholars would do well, however, to pay more attention to the agency of the “discipliners,” as Steinmetz [1993] argued.) Lynne Haney’s (2002) work on “the invention of the needy” in postsocialist Hungary develops these ideas, showing the ways in which understandings of women’s needs and associated policy strategies and administrative organizations changed over the course of several distinct phases of social politics from the 1940s through the present. Haney’s combined ethnographic and comparative historical project, like her work investigating the local implementation of AFDC-related programs (Haney 1996), also highlights the payoffs of analyzing the different levels of welfare politics and administration, with their potentially contradictory exigencies and effects. These are not exactly Foucauldian analyses of the “capillaries,” but do draw on the insights about the normalizing techniques of power — while remaining open to the structuring role of national state policies. Adams and Padamsee (2001: 16) have suggested a systematic reworking of the regimes concept to highlight signification and culture, and encompassing “signs, subjects, strategies, and sanctions”: “A state policy regime, then, expansive literature (see, e.g., Michel and Mahon 2002). Finally, one can mention work on the (economic) “costs of caring” (e.g., Joshi 1990; England and Folbre 2002).
can be defined as a set of policies with accompanying sanctions, which are in turn the precipitates of subjects’ actions undertaken on the basis of ordered signs.” They offer illustrations from the literature on maternalism, arguing against various socially-determinist accounts, and contending that “initially, making the claim that maternalist ideas matter in politics involves showing how the sign of ‘motherhood’ organizes and links together a number of otherwise separate and subordinate signs” (Adams and Padamsee 2001: 11), then going on to investigate the “hailing” or recruitment of subjects, their strategic policy making, and the sanctions or capacities they may call on to enforce strategies.

The historical construction of gendered divides between public and private — which changes over time — is a critical moment in the gendering of welfare, fixing (temporarily) which needs may be addressed through public social policy, and which are to be left to the family, charity or the market (Gal and Kligman 2000a; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999). A number of scholars have examined the provision of childcare through this lens; when the care of children is understood to be women’s “natural” vocation, or a “labor of love,” state provision is ruled out and women must find private solutions if they must or want to enter the paid labor force (see, e.g., Michel 1999; Michel and Mahon 2002). Meanwhile, when masculinity is defined in opposition to caregiving activities, changes in familial divisions of labor are stymied and fathers may resist taking up parental leaves — even those designed to encourage their participation (Hobson 2002; Leira 2002). In taking up the cultural turn, these scholars have not, it would seem, abandoned progressive understandings of welfare as a potentially emancipatory weapon in the political struggle for gender equality. While the insights of Foucault and others have proved useful in calling attention to the significance of discourse and categorization, and to the capillary and productive character of power, they reject the political implications of Foucault’s analysis — which leaves us with “resistance” and little else.26

Feminist scholarship on Western systems of social provision and regulation has been, arguably, at its most radical in deconstructing the subject of welfare states and welfare state scholarship and in highlighting the significance for “public” welfare of practices —

26 In hilarious form, Marshall Sahlins, in Waiting for Foucault, Still (2002: 52) skewers the bastardized “Foucauldian” impulses one sometimes finds behind the call for “resistance”: “Ever since Gramsci, posing the notion of hegemony has entailed the equal and opposite discovery of the resistance of the oppressed. So the anthropologist [or sociologist!] who relates the so-called grand narrative of Western domination is also likely to subvert it by invoking ‘weapons of the weak,’ ‘hidden transcripts’ or some such local discourse of cultural defiance. In any case, this is a no-lose strategy since the two characterizations, domination and resistance, are contradictory and in some combination will cover any and every historical eventuality.”
particularly care work — that take place in the “private” sphere (see, e.g., for recent 
debate around these issues, Adams and Padamsee 2001, 2002; Brush 2002; Jenson 
1997; Lewis 1997b, 2001; Orloff 1997; Shaver 2002). But until recently, this work has 
remained focused on the Western welfare states. Yet there are interesting parallels — 
in opening up private spaces to analytic scrutiny — to feminist work on colonial and 
postcolonial, socialist and postsocialist states. For example, Foucauldian inspiration is 
evident in analyses stressing the significance of “the intimate” and “carnal knowledge” to 
colonial rule, to borrow the evocative terms of Ann Stoler (2002). Stoler examined Dutch 
colonial welfare administration in the Indies, tracing relationships of domination and 
(sometimes) intimacy among women and men across “race,” nation and class, and 
excavating racial and gendered classificatory schemes from the documentary traces of 
institutions of social provision and regulation. And gendered themes are being 
developed in novel ways in analyses on the socialist and post-socialist states, in which 
questions of “public” and “private,” the political significance of reproduction (biological 
and social), and gendered patterns of labor all take on forms which upset settled 
understandings based on Western experiences (see, e.g., Emigh and Szelenyi 2001; 
Gal and Kligman 2000a, 2000b; Kligman 1998; Fodor 2003; Haney 2002). For example, 
why was abortion — either when it had been available on demand (e.g., Poland), or 
when it had been outlawed (Romania) — one of the first questions taken up for political 
debate after the fall of socialist regimes? Work on gender and social policy in 
postcolonial states is similarly challenging to accepted views about women and 
(welfare) states (see, e.g., Charrad 2001; Haney and Pollard 2003). In all of these 
contexts, modernity, with its associated institutional forms — such as welfare states — 
is articulated in complex ways with imperialism, and “women’s status,” as expressed in 
family law, civil rights and social provision is often the flashpoint for tensions around 
these connections, as when women’s labor force participation can signify modern 
gender equality, capitulation to imperialism, or the capitalist degradation of the family! 
We would surely benefit from more explicit comparisons of gendered patterns of work 
and welfare across time and space.

Conclusion

In studies of modern systems of social provision and regulation, Marx has met Weber 
(metaphorically). I have suggested that we need to perform a kind of collective exorcism 
of Marxism, if I can call on “Marx” to signify the whole set of socially-determinist analytic

27 Or, at least, it has been limited to welfare states in industrialized countries; 
genendered welfare arrangements in Japan have attracted considerable attention; see, 
e.g., Ito Peng’s (2002) work linking gender, demography, and postwar developments in 
the Japanese welfare state.
approaches that have held us back from making a cultural turn in this field, as well as a politics which takes for granted the identity, goals, and goodness of working-class mobilizations (to say nothing of an often sentimental and unjustified evaluation of the former Soviet bloc). Yet I also want to historicize the Marxist contribution to the development of modern welfare, to investigate how certain sets of ideas derived ultimately from (more or less adulterated versions of) Marx have guided both the politics and analysis of welfare states; how the threat of socialism, socialist movements and parties pressured elites to enact social reforms, and actually existing socialist states — and then their demise — shaped and continue to shape Western welfare provision. This would suggest that we should probe more deeply into the geopolitical elements of the context in which contemporary systems of social provision and regulation developed. It also should encourage greater attention to the ways welfare was provided in the socialist bloc, and how socialist modes of provision and regulation have influenced ongoing transitions to capitalism.

But why stop with Eastern Europe? We clearly need to understand social provision and regulation outside the heartland of social Europe, in the rapidly-developing capitalisms of Latin America, East and South Asia, as well as in past colonial outposts of the European metropoles — for what this can tell us about welfare’s multiple forms and sources and its relationship to diverse forms of capitalism, including in the “core.” This means, among other things, situating modern social provision wherever it has developed more fully with respect to nation, race and ethnicity. In contexts where industrialization is not fully established, and modern systems of social provision and regulation are embryonic, we can hardly expect a level of interest in pensions — the perhaps-too-thin lifeblood of welfare state studies — comparable to that found across the developed world. After all, “welfare states” are only one possible institutional form for more widespread activities.

I would also like to encourage the ongoing encounter between Weber and Foucault, if I can call on “Foucault” to signify the whole set of regulatory, capillary, disciplinary and discursive analytic themes that have enriched studies of politics in many areas, and “Weber” to stand in for both attention to states and the “means of administration,” and to the deeply contradictory effects of modernity on modern subjectivities and relationships. State-centered work, and then the broader institutionalist movement, has drawn principally on Weber’s administrative themes to enrich understandings of welfare states as products of class politics. But, as I have argued above, this leaves out significant dimensions of social politics and provision, even within the Weberian tradition — such as the development of modern dispositions. Foucauldian scholarship has insisted on the

---

As someone whose dissertation and first book concerned pensions, I hope no one will take offense at the suggestion that pensions on their own cannot sustain an area of scholarship — as the best pension studies demonstrate!
fact that provision is never free of classification, regulation, and discipline. This is not to say these are always bad things to be resisted, although in many cases they are — fascist or eugenicist racial classification comes to mind (see, e.g., on Nazi policies and gender, Bock 1991; Koonz 1987). Rather, it is to say that their character is consequential for politics and culture. In many cases (in democratic or democratizing contexts particularly), categories of provision and regulation are bases for mobilization. And here, one could foresee a fruitful linkage to Weberian-inspired studies of “policy creating politics” and the role of state and political structures.

I would especially like all of these “gentlemen” to meet de Beauvoir, signifying the gendered contribution, to enliven studies of welfare with considerations of bodies, gendered identities, reproduction, and care. But of course, my real concern is with the real men and women working under the signs of “Marx, Weber, Foucault” or, alternatively, under the sign of “de Beauvoir.” In a number of venues, conversations have begun, but they could go much further in a theoretical vein. How does incorporating gender change our understandings of the historical trajectories of systems of social provision and regulation, and of capitalist modernities? Having learned a great deal about gender and modern welfare systems — for example, about the relationships among families, markets and states, the role of women service workers in postindustrial transformations, or the ways assumptions about masculinities and feminities have informed social policies — we can, and should, engage fundamental questions of agency, power, structure, modernity. In short, we need more talk across theoretical and analytic divides, and especially more openness to subjects excluded or repressed for too long in mainstream scholarship.
References Cited


——. 2000. “Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class and Patterns of Inequalities in Different Types of Welfare States.” *Social Politics* 7:127-91


Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. New York: Cambridge University Press.


