Northwestern | INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH

RESEARCH EXCELLENCE • POLICY IMPACT

IPR Working Paper Series

WP-24-01

Partisan Antipathy and the Erosion of Democratic Norms

Eli Finkel
Northwestern University and IPR

Alexander Landry
Stanford University

James Druckman
University of Rochester

Jay Van Bavel
New York University

Rick Hoyle
Duke University

Version: January 17, 2024

DRAFT

Please do not quote or distribute without permission.

Abstract

Does partisan antipathy undermine democracy? Over the past decade, claims of such an effect have pervaded both popular and scholarly discourse—to the point where the link has become widely accepted as an article of faith. But an impressive stream of new studies has raised credible doubts about whether such an effect actually exists. In the present report, even as the researchers replicate the null effects in that nascent literature, they demonstrate that partisan antipathy, when properly conceptualized and operationalized, does indeed predict antidemocratic tendencies. Leveraging cross-sectional, longitudinal, and experimental methods, including a study conducted during America's 2022 Midterm Elections, they developed and validated a measure of political sectarianism (a blend of othering, aversion, and moralization toward opposing partisans), which robustly predicted antidemocratic tendencies. In contrast, the influential construct of affective polarization (assessed in terms of cold feelings toward opposing partisans) did not. These findings have important implications for theory and measurement in the social sciences, for understanding democratic erosion, and for applied efforts to bolster American democracy by bridging partisan divides.

Significance Statement

Across the political spectrum, alarm is growing about Americans' eroding support for democracy. In response, dozens of civic organizations have invested hundreds of millions of dollars to bolster American democracy by ameliorating partisan antipathy. However, the evidence that such antipathy actually causes democratic erosion is thin, and new findings suggest that such a link may be illusory. The present research explores whether these null findings may be driven not by a true non-effect in the world, but rather by limitations in the prevailing conceptualization and measurement of partisan antipathy. This research pits the traditional approach against a novel approach to conceptualization and measurement, producing clear and consistent evidence that partisan antipathy does indeed undermine support for democratic fair play.

Word count: 119

Partisan Antipathy and the Erosion of Democratic Norms

And if one thing is clear from studying breakdowns throughout history,
it's that extreme polarization can kill democracies.
— Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018)

American democracy is ill. According to Freedom House's Global Freedom Index,[1] the United States was less democratic in 2021 than every established democracy in Western Europe—less democratic, even, than the historically compromised democracies of Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Mongolia. This represents a precipitous fall from 2015, when the United States was on par with venerable democracies such as Canada, France, and Japan.

But although there is little doubt that the patient is sick, the etiology—the sources of the poison coursing through the nation's political bloodstream—are in dispute. A prime suspect is surging partisan antipathy,[2] [3] [4] as exemplified by a tripling, from 19% in 1994 to 58% in 2022, in the percentage of partisans with a "very unfavorable" view of the opposition.[5] Insofar as people hate opposing partisans, the argument goes, political victory becomes a necessity; commitment to democratic norms wobbles as people reckon with the horror of those evildoers holding the levers of power. Such wobbling matters, as low public support for democracy is a crucial risk factor for democratic erosion.[6] [7] [8]

Many researchers have sided with the prosecution, concluding that partisan antipathy is guilty of poisoning support for democratic fair play.[2,3,4] But others have built a rousing case for the defense: that partisan antipathy does not contribute to democratic erosion. After all, the correlational evidence supporting the association of partisan antipathy with antidemocratic tendencies is mixed,[9] [10] [11] and eight recent experiments that successfully reduced partisan antipathy nonetheless failed to influence antidemocratic tendencies.[12,13]

This trial is crucial, as the threat of democratic decline is grave, and the resources for counteracting it are finite. Recent years have seen a surging social movement—to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars across dozens of organizations[14]—that seeks to reinforce American democracy in part by ameliorating partisan antipathy. If partisan antipathy is indeed guilty of poisoning American democracy, then this social movement may well represent a wise investment. But if not, it may be frittering away the precious resources available for democracy-promotion.

In this report, we argue that the case against partisan antipathy is strong, but that its prosecution has been compromised by a case of mistaken identity. Sharper construct conceptualization and better measurement are required to provide proper tests of the hypothesis that partisan antipathy predicts antidemocratic tendencies, which we conceptualize in terms of support for political tactics such as rigging the electoral game and engaging in partisan aggression. Researchers, including those who have built the strongest case for exoneration,[12] generally conceptualize partisan antipathy in terms of *affective polarization*. This construct, defined as "the extent to which partisans view each other as a disliked out-group,"[15] is typically measured with a feeling thermometer, from 0 to 100 degrees, assessing the extent to which sentiments toward opposing partisans are cold vs. warm.[16] We argue that the culprit is not affective polarization, but rather a broader, theoretically richer construct called political sectarianism.

Political sectarianism was fingered in 2020 by a team of 15 researchers from across the social sciences, who characterized it as a quasi-religious phenomenon consisting of three tendencies toward opposing partisans: othering, aversion, and moralization.[17] First, individuals who are higher in political sectarianism feel especially distant from opposing partisans (*othering*). They view those partisans not only as embodying a distinct social identity,[18] [19] [20] [21] but also as holding beliefs that are incomprehensible, even epistemologically bewildering.[22] Second, individuals who are higher in political sectarianism hold especially negative feelings toward

opposing partisans (*aversion*); this is the component of sectarianism that is probably most similar to the construct measured by feeling thermometers. Third, individuals who are higher in political sectarianism view opposing partisans as devoid of integrity, even evil (*moralization*). These three tendencies coalesce in the unitary construct of political sectarianism.

The interdisciplinary research team portrayed political sectarianism as a "poisonous cocktail" that "poses a threat to democracy."[23] Given that this article appeared in the issue of *Science* that sat on American newsstands during the week of the 2020 election—which proved to be ground zero for one of the gravest threats to the United States's political system since the 1870s—one could argue that its "threat to democracy" claim was prescient. However, although the claim was based on an expansive literature review, it has not been tested directly because, until now, no measure of political sectarianism has existed.

Research Overview

To test whether political sectarianism undermines democratic norms, even if affective polarization may not, we pursued three goals. First, we developed and validated the first measure of political sectarianism (Studies 1 and 2). Second, we employed correlational methods to pit the two constructs against each other in predicting antidemocratic tendencies (Studies 1 and 2), including in the days preceding the 2022 Midterm Elections (Study 2). Third, we employed experimental methods to test whether affective polarization or political sectarianism (or both, or neither) mediates the causal effect of an established intervention on antidemocratic tendencies (Studies 3a and 3b). We hypothesized that political sectarianism would be robustly linked to antidemocratic tendencies, whereas any potential association of affective polarization with such tendencies would be weaker, perhaps even nonexistent. All preregistrations, survey materials, data, and analysis code are available at https://osf.io/3n74e/.

Study 1

In Study 1, we generated 45 candidate items for assessing political sectarianism, 15 each for othering, aversion, and moralization. We presented these items to 1,331 Americans (747 Democrats and 584 Republicans) recruited from Prolific, an online survey platform.[a] Extensive exploratory and confirmatory psychometrics helped us derive a 9-item measure that is unidimensional, valid, and highly reliable (α=.93)—and that exhibits consistent properties across Democrat and Republican participants.[b] (Supplemental Appendices A, B, and C respectively present the 45 candidate items, the final 9-item measure, and the psychometric analyses.) On average, participants scored a bit above the midpoint of the 9-item scale (*M*=3.22, *SD*=1.41), which included items such as:

- Othering: "No matter how hard I try, I can't see the world the way [Republicans][c] do."
  - 0=*I don't have any difficulty seeing the world the way [Republicans] do*
  - 6=*It's impossible for me to see the world the way [Republicans] do*
- Aversion: "My feelings toward [Republicans] are negative."
  - 0=*My feelings toward [Republicans] aren't negative at all*
  - 6=*My feelings toward [Republicans] are overwhelmingly negative*
- Moralization: "[Republicans] are evil."
  - 0=*[Republicans] are not evil in any way*
  - 6=*[Republicans] are evil in every way*

For Democrat and Republican participants, we assessed affective polarization with the standard out-party feeling thermometer (0=*cold*, 100=*warm*), which we reverse-coded so higher values represented greater polarization—greater coldness toward opposing partisans (*M*=69.71,

---

[a] As preregistered, these counts exclude four participants who failed an attention check, 37 who completed the survey implausibly quickly, and 44 who listed their political affiliation as "Other." It also excludes the 115 participants who identified as pure independents. (In Studies 1 and 2, Independents who leaned Democrat or Republican were included as partisans. Study 3 recruited only pure partisans—those who do not "lean" toward either party.)

[b] We had anticipated that the psychometric analyses would reveal a higher-order factor structure in which each item would load uniquely on one of the sectarian tendencies (othering, aversion, moralization), which in would load on the superordinate construct of political sectarianism. In reality, all nine items loaded on this superordinate construct; including the intermediate level did not improve model fit.

[c] The example items show the wording for participants who identify as Democrats. For Republicans, the bracketed words were replaced with those representing the other party (e.g., "Republicans" was replaced with "Democrats").

SD=24.62).[d] We assessed antidemocratic tendencies with three items gleaned from the literature[11,24]: "For the good of the country, [Democrats] should do whatever is necessary to pass policies, even if it seems undemocratic," "[Democrats] should redraw districts to maximize their potential to win more seats in federal elections, even if it may be technically illegal," and "It is justified for [Democrats] to use violence in advocating their political goals these days" (1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*; *M*=2.53, *SD*=1.34, α=.76).[e]

Table 1 reports the results of our primary hypothesis tests. First, we examined bivariate associations of both affective polarization and political sectarianism with antidemocratic tendencies (top-left of Table 1). Political sectarianism exhibited a robust correlation with such tendencies, whereas affective polarization did not. The difference between these two correlations[25] was statically significant, z=9.39, $p < .001$. Consistent with our theorizing that feeling thermometer ratings capture a slice of the broader political sectarianism construct, the two measures were robustly correlated, r=.66. When pitting them against each other in a multiple regression analysis (top-right of Table 1), political sectarianism continued to exhibit robust associations with antidemocratic tendencies (an effect that was statistically comparable among Democrats and Republicans, β=.05, t[1326]=0.62, p=.533), whereas affective polarization did not. Indeed, after accounting for the effect of political sectarianism, the latter effect trended in the opposite direction (a reversal we had not predicted).

Study 2

[d] Some take the difference between the in-party and out-party thermometers instead of focusing solely on the out-party rating. Our results are robust using that operationalization.

[e] Our measures of antidemocratic tendencies across studies diverged from the preregistered measures, which conceptualized support for rigging the electoral game and support for partisan aggression as separate constructs. There are two reasons for this change. First, we are compelled by recent research that has favored lumping over splitting in assessing antidemocratic tendencies (Braley et al., 2023). Second, scale reliability in our studies was stronger when lumping all relevant items in a single measure rather than when splitting them out (especially in Study 1 which included only three relevant items in total).

In short, Study 1 developed a reliable and valid measure of political sectarianism that dominated the prevailing measure of affective polarization (the feeling thermometer) in predicting antidemocratic tendencies. In Study 2, we stress-tested this political sectarianism measure by conducting confirmatory psychometric analyses on a sample of partisans who were quota-matched to the age, gender, and racial demographics of their respective parties. Using demographic benchmarks from the 2020 American National Election Studies,[26] we worked with Bovitz, an online survey company, to recruit 1,067 partisan participants (563 Democrats, 504 Republicans).[f] As detailed in Supplemental Appendix C, the confirmatory psychometric analyses provided strong additional evidence for the validity and reliability of the political sectarianism measure, on which participants once again scored above the midpoint of 3 (M=3.58, SD=1.45, α=.95).

We once again assessed affective polarization with the standard out-party feeling thermometer, reverse-scored so higher numbers represented colder feelings (M=58.68, SD=28.96). In Study 2, we used a more extensive, and highly reliable, 13-item measure of antidemocratic tendencies derived from previous research (M=2.33, SD=1.12, α=.91).[11,27,28] Supplemental Appendix D reports all items; examples were: "[Democrats] should NOT accept the results of elections if they lose" (1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*) and "When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary [Democrat] in the public to harass an ordinary [Republican] on the Internet, in a way that makes the target feel frightened?" (1=*never*, 7=*always*).

The primary hypothesis tests in Study 2 replicated the core results from Study 1. Both affective polarization and political sectarianism exhibited robust correlations with antidemocratic tendencies (middle-left of Table 1), although the effect of sectarianism was larger, z=5.46, p < .001. As in Study 1, the two measures of partisan antipathy were robustly correlated, r=.58. When pitting them against each other in a multiple regression analysis (middle-right of Table 1), political

[f] As preregistered, this count excludes 159 participants who failed either of two attention checks.

sectarianism continued to exhibit robust associations with antidemocratic tendencies, whereas the effect of affective polarization became nonsignificant. The association of political sectarianism with antidemocratic tendencies was robust for both Democrats (r=.25, $p < .001$) and Republicans (r=.43, $p < .001$), although it was stronger for Republicans, β=.09, $t(1063)$=3.24, p=.001.

The 2022 Midterm Elections took place on November 8th, about seven months after the Study 2 baseline survey. We re-contacted participants on November 4th to assess their support for antidemocratic tendencies during the final stretch of that important Congressional election, asking them to complete a follow-up survey by end-of-day on November 7th. We reached out to the 1,027 participants (of the original 1,067) who were still associated with Bovitz, 831 of whom enrolled in the follow-up survey (81%).[g] After omitting 9 participants who switched parties (and whose partisan antipathy reports were, consequently, irrelevant to our hypotheses), 14 who did not complete the survey, and 121 who failed either of two attention checks, our final sample for the follow-up survey was 687 participants (360 Democrats, 327 Republicans).

We developed a 16-item measure to assess antidemocratic tendencies vis-à-vis the Midterm Election (M=2.96, SD=0.97, α=.91). Again, Supplemental Appendix D reports all items, which began with the stem, "During the upcoming Midterm Election …." Examples were: "… [Democrats] should use any means, even violence if necessary, to keep the [Republicans] from winning Congress" (1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*) and "… how would you vote if you knew your state's [Democratic] candidate supported efforts to reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Republicans]?" (1=*definitely vote for the Democratic candidate*, 7=*definitely vote for the Republican candidate*).

[g] The baseline scores on political sectarianism (M=3.60 vs. 3.49, p=.321), affective polarization (M=59.62 vs. 55.36, p=.047), and antidemocratic tendencies (M=2.30 vs. 2.43, p=.118) were comparable for participants who did vs. did not complete the follow-up survey. The participants who did so were perhaps a bit higher on baseline affective polarization and perhaps a bit lower on baseline antidemocratic tendencies, for example, but any such differences were small and directionally inconsistent.

These election-specific analyses also supported our hypotheses. Both affective polarization and political sectarianism (assessed at the initial survey in March) exhibited robust correlations with antidemocratic tendencies vis-à-vis the Midterms in November (bottom-left of Table 1), although the effect of sectarianism was (marginally) larger, z=1.82, p=.068. When pitting the two measures of partisan antipathy against each other in a multiple regression analysis, political sectarianism continued to exhibit robust associations with antidemocratic tendencies, whereas the effect of affective polarization became nonsignificant (bottom-right of Table 1). As in the cross-sectional results, the association of political sectarianism with antidemocratic tendencies was robust for both Democrats (r=.28, $p < .001$) and Republicans (r=.46, $p < .001$), but it was stronger for Republicans, β=.08, t(683)=2.34, p=.020.

Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 identified and stress-tested the first-ever measure of political sectarianism and employed correlational methods to demonstrate that this construct is much more robustly linked to antidemocratic tendencies than affective polarization is. Indeed, when considering associations with antidemocratic tendencies across the three multiple regressions reported in Table 1, political sectarianism exhibited a consistent standardized effect of β=~.3 (a moderate effect size), whereas affective polarization exhibited erratic associations averaging to a standardized effect of β=~.0.

To address the possibility that the dominance of political sectarianism over affective polarization resulted from the asymmetry in the number of items between the two measures (nine items vs. one),[29] we replicated all primary results across Studies 1 and 2 at the item level, separately pitting each sectarianism item 1-on-1 against affective polarization in predicting antidemocratic tendencies. As presented in Supplemental Appendix E, these item-level analyses yielded conclusions that largely align with those in Table 1.

The findings thus far provide clear correlational evidence that political sectarianism is robustly linked to antidemocratic tendencies, even as affective polarization is not. However, they cannot speak to whether political sectarianism might mediate the effect of an experimental manipulation on antidemocratic tendencies—whether interventions that reduce partisan antipathy also ameliorate antidemocratic tendencies via partisan sectarianism.

Study 3

Study 3 employed experimental methods to address this issue—and did so twice. First, we worked with Bovitz to recruit 1,654 partisans (838 Democrats and 816 Republicans), who were, as in Study 2, quota-matched to the age, race, and gender demographics of their party. Next, we conducted a virtually exact replication on a new sample of 1,627 partisans (819 Democrats and 808 Republicans) recruited from Prolific.[h] The results were very similar across the two samples, so we discuss them together as Study 3a (the Bovitz study) and Study 3b (the Prolific study).

We randomly assigned participants either to a neutral control condition or to an experimental intervention previously demonstrated to predict antidemocratic tendencies. In selecting a promising intervention, we leveraged insights from the Strengthening Democracy Challenge, which tested 25 interventions that researchers or practitioners designed to reduce Americans' partisan animosity and antidemocratic tendencies.[27] We adopted the Correcting Division Misperceptions intervention because it was especially effective at reducing support for antidemocratic tendencies. In this intervention, designed by Samantha Moore-Berg and colleagues,[24 30] "[p]articipants watched a video featuring several Democrats and Republicans learning that the other side is less extreme on immigration and out-party dehumanization than they expected." Given that none of the eight experiments reported by Broockman, Voelkel, and their

[h] As preregistered, these sample sizes exclude the 424 participants in Study 3a and the 31 participants in Study 3b who failed an attention check or did not affiliate with the Democratic or Republican party.

colleagues[12,13] influenced antidemocratic tendencies (i.e., none influenced the distal variable in the theorized pathway: *intervention →partisan antipathy →antidemocratic tendencies*), Studies 3a and 3b are the first to test whether affective polarization or political sectarianism may help to drive such an effect. We hypothesized that political sectarianism would mediate the effect of this intervention on antidemocratic tendencies, but that affective polarization would not.[i]

Our measure of political sectarianism was once again highly reliable (Study 3a: M=3.46, SD=1.51, α=.95; Study 3b: M=3.40, SD=1.41, α=.95), as was our 8-item measure of antidemocratic tendencies (see Supplemental Appendix D), which we assessed on a scale akin to the affective polarization measure (0=*strongly disagree or never*, 100=*strongly agree or always*; Study 3a: M=19.02, SD=21.12, α=.90; Study 3b: M=10.79, SD=14.97, α=.86). This latter measure was virtually identical to the one used in the Strengthening Democracy Challenge.[27]

Table 2 and Figure 1 present the results of the intervention on the proposed mediators (affective polarization and political sectarianism) and the proposed outcome (antidemocratic tendencies). As with the manipulations employed by Broockman, Voelkel, and their colleagues,[12,13,27] the intervention significantly reduced affective polarization in both studies: Participants in the intervention condition exhibited significantly warmer feelings (i.e., less coldness) toward opposing partisans than did participants in a neutral control condition (Figure 1, Panel A). And, as hypothesized, a parallel effect emerged for political sectarianism in both studies:

[i] Statistical mediation cannot provide definitive evidence for a given causal sequence. However, it provides valuable clues regarding the plausibility of such a sequence, especially in situations where two putative mediators cannot be independently manipulated (as is likely the case for affective polarization and political sectarianism). A statistically nonsignificant effect suggests that a given mediational sequence is unlikely, whereas a statistically significant effect suggests that it is plausible. Further, if a multiple-mediator model produces significantly stronger evidence for mediation by one variable (e.g., political sectarianism) than by the other (e.g., affective polarization), that suggests that the latter causal sequence is likelier than the former. The viability of this latter causal sequence grows stronger when (1) the independent variable is experimentally manipulated (rather than measured) and (2) the alternative causal pathway makes much less theoretical sense (e.g., that the intervention causes antidemocratic tendencies, which in turn cause political sectarianism).

Participants in the intervention condition exhibited significantly less sectarianism toward opposing partisans than did participants in a neutral control condition (Figure 1, Panel B).

As hypothesized, the intervention also reduced antidemocratic tendencies: Relative to participants in the neutral control condition, participants in the intervention condition exhibited less support for antidemocratic tendencies (Figure 1, Panel C). This effect was statistically significant in Study 3b (p=.003) and marginally so in Study 3a (p=.069).

Next, we turned to our key hypothesis, which focused on mediation. We employed multiple-mediator bootstrapping methods[31] to test whether affective polarization or political sectarianism (or both, or neither) significantly mediated the effect of the Correcting Division Misperceptions manipulation on antidemocratic tendencies. Consistent with our hypotheses, political sectarianism significantly mediated the effect of the manipulation on antidemocratic tendencies in the hypothesized direction, whereas affective polarization did not (see Figure 2). Indeed, in an echo of the Study 1 results, the residual effect of affective polarization, after accounting for the effect of political sectarianism, unexpectedly trended in the opposite direction from prevailing theory, with greater coldness linked to *lower* antidemocratic tendencies.

As in the correlational studies, we replicated the experimental results in Figure 2 at the item level, separately pitting each political sectarianism item 1-on-1 against affective polarization in statistically mediating the effect of the intervention on antidemocratic tendencies. As presented in Supplemental Appendix F, these item-level analyses yielded conclusions that closely aligned with those in Figure 2. Indeed, across Studies 3a and 3b, the 1-on-1 item-level effects for political sectarianism were statistically significant in 17 out of the 18 models (and nonsignificant in the remaining model). In contrast, the effects were significant in the hypothesized direction for affective polarization in only 4 out of the 18 models (and were significant in the opposite direction in 6 out of the 18 models).

Discussion

What implications do the present results have for the trial to determine whether partisan antipathy is to blame for poisoning American democracy? The results provide strong support for the "mistaken identity" perspective: Partisan antipathy is indeed to blame, but the guilty party is political sectarianism, not affective polarization. Insofar as people experience othering, aversion, and moralization toward opposing partisans, they are more likely to support using undemocratic tactics to pass partisan policies, gerrymandering congressional districts, reducing the number of polling stations in locations that support the opposing party, ignoring unfavorable court rulings by opposition-appointed judges, failing to accept the results of elections that one loses, and using violence and intimidation toward opposing partisans. In contrast to these robust effects for political sectarianism, affective polarization failed to exhibit consistent effects on antidemocratic tendencies.

Such findings have potentially major implications for theory and measurement regarding partisan antipathy, a topic that has rapidly ascended toward the top of the priority list for social science.[17] When Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes launched the affective polarization literature in 2012, they started not by using theory to specify the construct, but by identifying an available measure. They analyzed feeling thermometer data from the American National Election Survey, discovering that cold feelings toward opposing partisans had been increasing since the 1970s, with sentiments chilling from tepid to frigid. That 2012 article spawned a massive and increasingly sophisticated literature, but insufficient attention to issues surrounding construct conceptualization and measurement have prevented it from reaching its lofty potential. Perhaps "coldness" is too narrow or too weak to capture the elements of partisan antipathy that pose alarming implications for democratic functioning. Indeed, as demonstrated in the item-level analyses in Supplemental Appendices E and F, the items with the strongest links to antidemocratic tendencies in our studies

are those that capture partisan antipathy in the strongest terms—items assessing feelings of "hatred" and assessments of "evil." Insofar as survey researchers want to assess partisan antipathy in its broader and more intense forms, we recommend assessing political sectarianism, even if the survey only has room for three items, one each for othering, aversion, and moralization.

The present results also have major implications for the nascent social movement seeking to strengthen democracy in America.[14] In a world with finite resources, we must ask whether the movement's emphasis on ameliorating partisan antipathy holds promise for strengthening American democracy. Despite recent claims to the contrary,[12] the present findings suggest that such an emphasis does indeed hold promise. Insofar as these civic organizations can reduce political sectarianism, they are likely to produce a body politic that increasingly prioritizes democratic means over partisan ends.

References

[1] Freedom House (2023). Global freedom index. Accessed 24 November 2023 from https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores?sort=desc&order=Total%20Score%20and%20Status.

[2] Drutman, L. (2020). *Breaking the two-party doom loop: The case for multiparty democracy in America*. Oxford University Press, USA.

[3] Graham, M. H., & Svolik, M. W. (2020). Democracy in America? Partisanship, polarization, and the robustness of support for democracy in the United States. *American Political Science Review*, *114*(2), 392-409.

[4] Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). *How democracies die*. Crown.

[5] Pew Research Center (2022). As partisan hostility grows, signs of frustration with the two-party system. Accessed 16 October 2023 from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/08/09/as-partisan-hostility-grows-signs-of-frustration-with-the-two-party-system/.

[6] Claassen, C. (2020). Does public support help democracy survive? *American Journal of Political Science*, *64*(1), 118–134.

[7] Easton, D. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*. New York: Wiley.

[8] Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, *53*(1), 69–105.

[9] Holliday, D. E., Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., & Westwood, S. J. (in press). Uncommon and bipartisan: Anti-democratic attitudes in the American public. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*.

[10] Kingzette, J., Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2021). How affective polarization undermines support for democratic norms. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *85*(2), 663–677.

[11] Kalmoe, N. P., & Mason, L. (2022). *Radical American partisanship: Mapping violent hostility, its causes, and the consequences for democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[12] Broockman, D. E., Kalla, J. L., & Westwood, S. J. (2023). Does affective polarization undermine democratic norms or accountability? Maybe not. *American Journal of Political Science*, 67, 808–828.

[13] Voelkel, J. G., Chu, J., Stagnaro, M. N., Mernyk, J. S., Redekopp, C., Pink, S. L., ... & Willer, R. (2023a). Interventions reducing affective polarization do not necessarily improve anti-democratic attitudes. *Nature Human Behaviour*, *7*(1), 55–64.

[14] Bridging Divides Initiative (2023). Accessed 24 November 2023 from https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/.

[15] Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012, p. 406). Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *76*(3), 405–431.

[16] Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *22*, 129–146.

[17] Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., ... & Druckman, J. N. (2020). Political sectarianism in America. *Science*, *370*(6516), 533–536.

[18] Green, D. P., Palmquist, B., & Schickler, E. (2004). *Partisan hearts and minds: Political parties and the social identities of voters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[19] Mason, L. (2018). *Uncivil agreement: How politics became our identity*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

[20] Pietraszewski, D., Curry, O. S., Petersen, M. B., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2015). Constituents of political cognition: Race, party politics, and the alliance detection system. *Cognition*, *140*, 24–39.

[21] Van Bavel, J. J., & Packer, D. J. (2021). *The power of us: Harnessing our shared identities to improve performance, increase cooperation, and promote social harmony*. New York: Little, Brown Spark.

[22] Lee, J. J. (2021). Party polarization and trust in science: What about democrats? *Socius*, *7*, 1–12.

[23] Finkel et al. (2020), p. 533.

[24] Moore-Berg, S. L., Ankori-Karlinsky, L. O., Hameiri, B., & Bruneau, E. (2020). Exaggerated meta-perceptions predict intergroup hostility between American political partisans. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *117*(26), 14864-14872.

[25] Lee, I. A., & Preacher, K. J. (2013, September). Calculation for the test of the difference between two dependent correlations with one variable in common [Computer software]. Available from http://quantpsy.org.

[26] American National Election Studies (2021). *ANES 2020 Time Series Study Full Release* [Data file]. Stanford University and the University of Michigan (Producers). Retrieved from www.electionstudies.org.

[27] Voelkel, J. G., Stagnaro, M., Chu, J., Pink, S., Mernyk, J., Redekopp, C., ... & Willer, R. (2023b). *Megastudy identifying effective interventions to strengthen Americans' democratic attitudes*. Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University.

[28] Crawford, J. T. (2014). Ideological symmetries and asymmetries in political intolerance and prejudice toward political activist groups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 55*, 284-298.

[29] Ansolabehere, S., Rodden, J., & Snyder, J. M. (2008). The strength of issues: Using multiple measures to gauge preference stability, ideological constraint, and issue voting. *American Political Science Review*, *102*(2), 215-232.

[30] Moore-Berg, S. L., Pasek, M. H., Littman, R., Gallardo, R., & Kteily, N. (2023). Reducing political polarization by correcting erroneous meta-perceptions: A video intervention.

[31] Hayes, A. F. (2012). PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed variable mediation, moderation, and conditional process modeling.



Figure 1 (Studies 3a and 3b): The effects of the experimental manipulation on the two conceptualizations of partisan antipathy—(1) affective polarization (Panel A) and (2) political sectarianism (Panel B)—and antidemocratic tendencies (Panel C)

Note: Each gray dot represents a research participant, and the red bars depict standard errors. For graphical clarity, the y-axis in Panel C truncates at the midpoint of the scale (at 50 on the 0-to-100 scale); the statistical models reported in the text and underlying the bars in these graphs incorporated all values, including those in the upper half of the scale.

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p = .069$



Figure 2 (Studies 3a and 3b): Mediation of the experimental effect on antidemocratic tendencies via the two conceptualizations of partisan antipathy—(1) affective polarization and (2) political sectarianism

Note: All estimates are standardized regression coefficients. The estimates in parentheses capture the direct effect of the intervention on antidemocratic tendencies without the mediators in the model. The negative indirect effects via political sectarianism (the lower pathway in each panel) suggest that this construct uniquely mediated the effect of the intervention on antidemocratic tendencies in the hypothesized direction (after controlling for the effects of affective polarization). The positive indirect effects via affective polarization (the upper pathway in each panel) suggest that, if anything, affective polarization uniquely *reduced* the effect of the intervention on antidemocratic tendencies (after controlling for the effects of affective polarization).

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p = .069$

Table 1 (Studies 1 and 2): Associations of each conceptualization of partisan antipathy—(1) affective polarization and (2) political sectarianism—with antidemocratic tendencies

	Bivariate Association		Multiple Regression			
	r	*p*	*β*	*t*	*df*	*p*
Study 1						
Affective Polarization	.00	.955	–.23	–6.54	1326	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.20	<.001	.35	9.98	1326	<.001
Study 2 (cross-sectional)						
Affective Polarization	.19	<.001	–.01	–0.14	1062	.885
Political Sectarianism	.34	<.001	.34	9.61	1062	< .001
Study 2 (longitudinal)						
Affective Polarization	.31	<.001	.14	3.10	683	.002
Political Sectarianism	.36	<.001	.28	6.36	683	<.001

Note. The bivariate associations (*r*) are Pearson product-moment correlations. The multiple regression associations (*β*) are standardized regression coefficients capturing the unique effect of each predictor variable after controlling for the effect of the other predictor variable. All significant effects were in the expected direction other than the effect of affective polarization in the multiple regression analysis in Study 1; this negative effect suggests that, if anything, greater affective polarization is uniquely linked to *reduced* antidemocratic tendencies (after controlling for the effects of affective polarization).

Table 2 (Studies 3a and 3b): Experimental effects of the misperception correction intervention on the two conceptualizations of partisan antipathy—(1) affective polarization and (2) political sectarianism—and antidemocratic tendencies

	Control		Intervention					
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*d*	*t*	*df*	*p*
Affective Polarization								
Study 3a	75.80	23.75	64.96	26.25	–.43	–8.82	1652	<.001
Study 3b	76.08	22.47	64.43	26.25	–.48	–9.63	1625	<.001
Political Sectarianism								
Study 3a	3.71	1.50	3.17	1.47	–.36	–7.38	1652	<.001
Study 3b	3.71	1.36	3.07	1.39	–.47	–9.41	1625	<.001
Antidemocratic Tendencies								
Study 3a	19.92	20.96	18.02	21.26	–.09	–1.82	1652	.069
Study 3b	11.87	15.21	9.69	14.63	–.15	–2.94	1625	.003

Note. The effect size estimates (*d*) represent the difference between the two conditions' means (*M*), as assessed in standard deviation units (*SD*).

Supplemental Appendices for: "Partisan Antipathy and the Erosion of Democratic Norms"

Eli J. Finkel*

Alexander P. Landry

James N. Druckman

Jay J. Van Bavel

Rick H. Hoyle

* Corresponding author: finkel@northwestern.edu

Table of Contents

Supplemental Appendix A
The 45 Political Sectarianism Candidate Items Completed by Participants in Study 1

Instructions: "The items below assess your reactions to THE TYPICAL [REPUBLICAN]. We are not asking about [Republican] politicians here. Rather we're asking about the typical person who supports the [Republican] party and tends to vote for [Republican] politicians."

Othering: The tendency to view opposing partisans as essentially different or incomprehensible to oneself.

1. ****I am different from the typical Republican.****
   - 0: There are no ways in which I am different from the typical Republican.
   - 6: I am as different from the typical Republican as can be.

2. **I can't think of ways that I am similar to the typical Republican.**
   - 0: I don't have any difficulty thinking of ways that I am similar to the typical Republican.
   - 6: I find it impossible to think of ways that I am similar to the typical Republican.

3. **I have little in common with the typical Republican.**
   - 0: I have absolutely everything in common with the typical Republican.
   - 6: I have absolutely nothing in common with the typical Republican.

4. **My views are incompatible with the views of the typical Republican.**
   - 0: My views aren't at all incompatible with the views of the typical Republican.
   - 6: My views are completely incompatible with the views of the typical Republican.

5. **The typical Republican and I see the world differently.**
   - 0: The typical Republican and I don't see the world at all differently.
   - 6: The typical Republican and I see the world differently in every important way.

6. **My personality is the opposite of the typical Republican's personality.**
   - 0: My personality isn't different from the typical Republican's personality in any way.
   - 6: My personality is the complete opposite of the typical Republican's personality.

7. **It's hard for me to understand the motives of the typical Republican.**
   - 0: I don't have any difficulty understanding the motives of the typical Republican.
   - 6: It's impossible for me to understand the motives of the typical Republican.

8. **It's hard for me to see why the typical Republican behaves the way they do.**

- 0: I don't have any difficulty understanding why the typical Republican behaves the way they do.
- 6: It's impossible for me to understand why the typical Republican behaves the way they do.

9. It's hard for me to see why the typical Republican believes what they believe.
- 0: I don't have any difficulty understanding why the typical Republican believes what they believe.
- 6: It's impossible for me to understand why the typical Republican believes what they believe.

10. I find the typical Republican confusing.
- 0: The typical Republican doesn't confuse me at all.
- 6: The typical Republican is extremely confusing to me.

11. The typical Republican is incomprehensible.
- 0: I don't have any difficulty comprehending the typical Republican.
- 6: Everything about the typical Republican is completely incomprehensible.

12. **I feel distant from the typical Republican.**
- 0: I don't feel distant from the typical Republican.
- 6: I feel as if the typical Republican and I are on separate planets.

13. I have trouble understanding the typical Republican's intentions.
- 0: I have no trouble understanding the typical Republican' intentions.
- 6: I will never understand the typical Republican' intentions.

14. The typical Republican tends to handle things differently from how I would handle them.
- 0: The typical Republican rarely handles things differently from how I would handle them.
- 6: The typical Republican always handles things differently from how I would handle them.

15. **No matter how hard I try, I can't see the world the way the typical Republican does.**
- 0: I don't have any difficulty seeing the world the way the typical Republican does.
- 6: It's impossible for me to see the world the way the typical Republican does.

<u>Aversion</u>: The tendency to dislike opposing partisans.

16. I dislike the typical Republican.

- 0: I don't dislike the typical Republican at all.
- 6: I absolutely despise the typical Republican.

17. The typical Republican is irritating.
- 0: The typical Republican isn't irritating in any way.
- 6: The typical Republican is extremely irritating.

18. I feel frustrated when thinking about the typical Republican.
- 0: I don't feel any frustration when thinking about the typical Republican.
- 6: Thinking about the typical Republican fills me with extreme frustration.

19. The typical Republican is obnoxious.
- 0: There is nothing obnoxious about the typical Republican.
- 6: The typical Republican is completely obnoxious.

20. **I hate the typical Republican.**
- 0: I don't hate the typical Republican at all.
- 6: I have a fierce hatred for the typical Republican.

21. I find it unpleasant to be around the typical Republican.
- 0: I don't mind being around the typical Republican.
- 6: I feel absolutely miserable when I am around the typical Republican.

22. I feel annoyed when I have to listen to the typical Republican.
- 0: I don't feel annoyed when listening to the typical Republican.
- 6: I feel intense annoyance when listening to the typical Republican.

23. **My feelings toward the typical Republican are negative.**
- 0: My feelings toward the typical Republican aren't negative at all.
- 6: My feelings toward the typical Republican are overwhelmingly negative.

24. I see the typical Republican as an enemy.
- 0: I don't see the typical Republican as an enemy.
- 6: I see the typical Republican as my greatest enemy.

25. I feel hostility toward the typical Republican.
- 0: I don't feel any hostility toward the typical Republican.
- 6: I feel extreme hostility toward the typical Republican.

26. I feel cold toward typical Republican.
- 0: I don't feel at all cold toward the typical Republican.
- 6: I feel absolutely frigid toward the typical Republican makes me feel ice cold.

27. The typical Republican is worthless.

- 0: The typical Republican isn't at all worthless.
- 6: The typical Republican is entirely worthless.

28. **The typical Republican has lots of negative traits.**
- 0: The typical Republican has no negative traits.
- 6: The typical Republican has every negative trait in the book.

29. The typical Republican makes me miserable.
- 0: The typical Republican doesn't make me miserable at all.
- 6: The typical Republican makes me completely miserable.

30. I detest the typical Republican.
- 0: I don't detest the typical Republican.
- 6: I completely detest the typical Republican.

<u>Moralization</u>: The tendency to view opposing partisans as iniquitous.

31. The typical Republican is dishonest.
- 0: The typical Republican isn't at all dishonest.
- 6: The typical Republican is dishonest in every way.

32. The typical Republican should be ashamed of themself.
- 0: The typical Republican has nothing to be ashamed of.
- 6: Everything the typical Republican does is shameful.

33. **The typical Republican is immoral.**
- 0: There is nothing immoral about the typical Republican.
- 6: The typical Republican is completely immoral.

34. The typical Republican is corrupt.
- 0: There is nothing corrupt about the typical Republican.
- 6: The typical Republican is entirely corrupt.

35. The way the typical Republican behaves is disgraceful.
- 0: There is nothing disgraceful about the typical Republican.
- 6: The typical Republican is disgraceful in every way.

36. The typical Republican is unethical.
- 0: The typical Republican is not unethical.
- 6: The typical Republican is completely unethical.

37. The typical Republican is a hypocrite.
- 0: The typical Republican is never hypocritical.
- 6: The typical Republican is always hypocritical.

38. The typical Republican is a cheater.
- 0: The typical Republican doesn't cheat.
- 6: The typical Republican always cheats.

39. The typical Republican is heartless.
- 0: There is nothing heartless about the typical Republican.
- 6: The typical Republican is completely heartless.

40. **The typical Republican is evil.**
- 0: The typical Republican is not evil in any way.
- 6: The typical Republican is evil in every way.

41. **The typical Republican lacks integrity.**
- 0: The typical Republican does not lack integrity.
- 6: The typical Republican lacks any shred of integrity.

42. The typical Republican has bad intentions.
- 0: The typical Republican never has bad intentions.
- 6: The typical Republican always has bad intentions.

43. The typical Republican lacks a moral compass.
- 0: The typical Republican doesn't oppose anything that's morally good.
- 6: The typical Republican is opposed to everything that's morally good.

44. The typical Republican is a bad person.
- 0: The typical Republican is not a bad person.
- 6: The typical Republican is among the worst people in the world.

45. The typical Republican is unjust.
- 0: The typical Republican is not unjust.
- 6: The typical Republican is completely unjust.

Note. These are the items for Democratic participants; Republican participants saw the identical items, but with the political party information in brackets switched (e.g., "I feel distant from Republicans" became "I feel distant from Democrats"). The nine items displayed with asterisks are those that were included in the full measure of political sectarianism (see Supplemental Appendix A).

Supplemental Appendix B
The Final, 9-Item Political Sectarianism Measure

Instructions: The items below assess your reactions to [REPUBLICANS]. We are not asking about Republican politicians here. Rather we're asking about people who support the [Republican] party and tend to vote for [Republican] politicians.

Tendency	Definition	Scale Item	Low Endpoint (0)	High Endpoint (6)
Othering	The tendency to perceive opposing partisans as fundamentally different from or alien to oneself.	I feel distant from [Republicans].	I don't feel distant from [Republicans].	I feel as if [Republicans] and I are on separate planets.
		I am different from [Republicans].	There are no ways in which I am different from [Republicans].	I am as different from [Republicans] as can be.
		No matter how hard I try, I can't see the world the way [Republicans] do.	I don't have any difficulty seeing the world the way [Republicans] do.	It's impossible for me to see the world the way [Republicans] do.
Aversion	The tendency to dislike opposing partisans.	My feelings toward [Republicans] are negative.	My feelings toward [Republicans] aren't negative at all.	My feelings toward [Republicans] are overwhelmingly negative.
		I hate [Republicans].	I don't hate [Republicans] at all.	I have a fierce hatred for [Republicans].
		[Republicans] have lots of negative traits.	[Republicans] have no negative traits.	[Republicans] have every negative trait in the book.
Moralization	The tendency to view opposing partisans as iniquitous.	[Republicans] are immoral.	There is nothing immoral about [Republicans].	[Republicans] are completely immoral.
		[Republicans] are evil.	[Republicans] are not evil in any way.	[Republicans] are evil in every way.
		[Republicans] lack integrity.	[Republicans] do not lack integrity.	[Republicans] lack any shred of integrity.

Note. These are the items for Democratic participants; Republican participants saw the identical items, but with the political party information in brackets switched (e.g., "I feel distant from Republicans" became "I feel distant from Democrats"). For exploratory purposes in Study 1, we randomly assigned participants to a plural vs. a singular version of this scale (e.g., "the typical Republican" instead of "Republicans"); to illustrate the difference, Supplemental Appendix A uses the plural wording, and Supplemental Appendix B uses the singular wording. The two versions yielded essentially identical conclusions (see Supplemental Appendix C).

Supplemental Appendix C

Sectarianism Scale Construction and Psychometrics (Studies 1 and 2)

Study 1: Exploratory Psychometrics

We sought to develop a relatively brief self-report measure with equal representation of the three core features identified by Finkel et al. (2020).[32] The first two authors (Finkel and Landry) generated a large batch of candidate items. Those authors worked with the last author (Hoyle) to refine the items and select the 45 items (15 for each feature) that we included in Study 1 (Supplemental Appendix B reports the full list).

In terms of item format and response options, we followed recommendations by Tay and Jebb (2018) for continuum specification.[33] To avoid factorial complexity stemming from ambiguity regarding the opposite of sectarianism, items were unipolar in format with the low pole expressing no sectarianism and the high pole strong sectarianism. For example, a candidate othering item had as endpoints, "I have absolutely nothing in common with [Republicans]" and "I have everything in common with [Republicans]." Respondents could choose a numeric response ranging from 0 (*absolutely nothing in common*) to 6 (*everything in common*). All respondents were randomly assigned to either a singular or a plural version of the target: either "the typical [Republican]" or "[Republicans]."

The target for respondents' ratings were members of the other party except for respondents who listed their political party as Independent. These respondents were randomly assigned to see either Republican or Democrat as the target.

We used three criteria to reduce the set of 45 candidate items (15 for each feature of sectarianism) to a final set of nine items (three for each feature). We first examined univariate statistics with the goal of retaining items for which the full range of response options was used

and for which the distribution of responses was approximately normal. We then separately factor-analyzed the items tapping each feature of sectarianism, seeking the subset of items that best reflected a single factor. Finally, because more items than required satisfied these statistical criteria, we considered item wording, selecting those items we judged as most clear and understandable to a broad audience.

Respondents used the full range of response options for all candidate items. Although there was some evidence of skewness and kurtosis, none of the univariate distributions of responses to the items was sufficiently nonnormal to eliminate candidate items. Thus, the three sets of 15 candidate items were each factor-analyzed using principal axis extraction and, for exploratory purposes, oblique rotation using the Oblimin method. Although we expected a single factor for each item set, we examined two- and three-factor rotated solutions when justified, with the intent to detect potential sources of common variance beyond a single factor. For the *othering* items, communalities ranged from .51 to .71. The first eigenvalue was 8.34, substantially larger than the second eigenvalue of 1.28. Loadings on a single factor ranged from .69 to .79. A parallel analysis suggested a just-significant second factor. The obliquely-rotated two-factor solution produced a second factor indicated by six items, but the interfactor correlation was high, $r = .69$. Communalities for the *aversion* items ranged from .67 to .78; the first eigenvalue was 10.31. The small eigenvalue of .68 for the second factor and the results of the parallel analysis pointed strongly to a single factor, on which loadings ranged from .71 to .89. Factoring of the *moralization* items produce a similar result, with the first eigenvalue equaling 11.16, no evidence for a second factor based on parallel analysis, and communalities ranging from .65 to .77. Loadings on the single factor ranged from .79 to .89. Taken together, these results suggest that all candidate items met psychometric criteria for retention.

With all candidate items still in play, we next turned to more subjective criteria, including clarity, brevity, and lack of redundancy. Our goal was to select three items corresponding to each feature, yielding a relatively brief, 9-item scale with equal representation of the three construct features. From the *othering* set, three items referred to seeing outparty members as different; we selected the most straightforward item from this set. We eliminated the six candidate items that formed a coherent second factor in the two-factor solution, retaining one of two items referring to dissimilarity in worldview and an item referring to a feeling of distance from outparty members. From the *aversion* set, we selected brief and straightforwardly worded items focused on negative emotions and perceptions directed toward outparty members. From the *moralization* set, we retained items focused on general judgments of morality (e.g., immoral, lacking in integrity, evil) rather than items that referred to specific forms of immorality (e.g., cheats, has bad intentions) or were close in content to aversion (e.g., shameful, disgraceful). The resulting 9-item set, presented in Supplemental Appendix A, constitutes the Political Sectarianism Scale.

Although our item selection process focused on the specific features of the political sectarianism construct (othering, aversion, and moralization), our goal was to develop a measure that yields a single score reflecting individual differences in political sectarianism as a whole. To evaluate the degree to which responses to the selected items support the scoring of the scale in this manner, we moved to confirmatory factor analysis and fit responses to a bifactor model.[34] The advantage of this model for our purposes is that it simultaneously accounts for general and specific latent influences on item responses. Support for use of a single score based on all nine items would be a dominant, reliable general factor accompanied by weak, unreliable specific factors. The bifactor model for the Political Sectarianism Scale is shown in Supplemental Figure C.1.

We estimated the model using the maximum likelihood estimator in Mplus (version 8.6). We evaluated fit based on values of the comparative fit index (CFI),[35] the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI),[36] and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR).[37] For CFI and TLI, values above .95 indicate good fit; values between .90 and .95 indicate acceptable fit.[38] For SRMR, values of .08 or lower indicate good fit. (We did not consult the root mean square error of approximation,[39] which performs poorly with low degree of freedom models.[40])

For interpreting the bifactor model, we consulted multiple descriptive indices that characterize the relative contribution of the general and specific factors to common variance for each 3-item set and for the full, 9-item set.[41] Values of explained common variance (ECV) sum to 1.0 and partition common variance as a function of the modeled latent variables. By convention, values of .70 or higher for the general factor suggest a unidimensional structure (Rodriguez et al., 2016). Omega hierarchical (ω_h) reflects the proportion of systematic variance in a unit-weighted composite of all items attributable to the general factor. Omega hierarchical subscale (ω_{hs}) is the comparable proportion for each specific factor after variance attributable to the general factor is accounted for. With respect to the general factor, values greater than .75 are preferred.[42] For the specific factors, values less than .50 suggest caution in interpreting scores as indicating content beyond that attributable to the general factor. Finally, coefficient H is a measure of construct reliability that reflects the correlation between a factor and a composite of the items.[43] By convention, values of .80 indicate a well-defined latent variable likely to replicate across studies. Values less than .70 for specific factors raise concern about the use of their items to assess the specific domain they are assumed to reflect as opposed to general well-being.

We examined measurement equivalence for the singular and plural versions of the scale (e.g., “the typical [Republican]” vs. “[Republicans]”) and each partisan target (Republican, Democrat).

We followed the standard progression in invariance testing, moving from configural to metric to scalar invariance.[44] Our decision criterion was *change in CFI*, with CFI differences less than or equal to 0.01 with added invariance restrictions (e.g., equivalent loadings, uniquenesses, intercepts) interpreted as supporting equivalence of the relevant parameters.[45]

Estimation of the model shown in Figure 1 resulted in empirical underidentification because two of the loadings on the aversion factor were not different from zero. The correlation between the two items with zero loadings and their correlation with the third aversion item were fully accounted for by the general factor. This left only a single indicator of the aversion-specific factor, from which a latent variable cannot be estimated. We re-specified and estimated the model with no aversion-specific factor, which conforms to the bifactor-(S-1) model.[46,†††] This model estimated cleanly and fit the data well, $\chi^2(N = 1455, \text{df} = 21) = 383.98$, $p < .001$, CFI = .96, TLI = .94, SRMR = .03. Loadings on the general factor were uniformly high, ranging from .61 to .87. Loadings on the specific factors, though significant, were small in magnitude. All but one were less than .40, and that one was less than .50. This pattern of loadings suggests a dominant general factor with relatively little common variance in othering and moralization and no common variance in aversion remaining when it is accounted for.

To more formally evaluate the relative contribution of the general and specific factors to variance in responses to the items, we extracted the indices described earlier. The value of ECV

---

††† We also used bifactor exploratory structural equation modeling to estimate the model.[16] This model combines features of confirmatory and exploratory factor analysis by allowing off-loadings—which are fixed to zero in confirmatory models—to be estimated, even though the target of estimation for those loads is zero. This model fit the data well, producing results very similar to those for the bifactor model minus aversion. Loadings on the general factor were uniformly high; loadings on the specific factors, especially off loadings, were low (10 of 27 loadings were not different from zero). The value of ECV was .76 for the general factor and .17, .03, and .04 for the specific factors, respectively. The value of ω_h was .90 and values of ω_{hs} were than .06. The value of coefficient H was .94 and reliability as indexed by ω was .97.

was .89, consistent with a unidimensional structure. Values of ECV for the othering and moralization factors were .08 and .03, respectively. The value of .91 for ω_h and values of .21 (othering) and .07 (moralization) for ω_{hs} further support the inference of a dominant general factor. Finally, the value of .94 for coefficient H associated with the general factor indicates a well-defined, replicable source of common variance. The reliability of the nine-item scale as reflected in ω was .94. (As reported in the main text, coefficient alpha was .93.)

We next evaluated whether the latent structure was equivalent for the two versions of the scale (singular, plural), for the targets (Republican, Democrat), and for the three party affiliations of our participants (Republican, Democrat, Independent). The model was invariant across all of these variables. For scale version, values of CFI were .962 for the model imposing strict configural invariance, .961 for the model imposing strict metric invariance, and .961 for the model imposing strict scalar invariance. For target, the values of CFI were .963, .958, and .953 for models assuming configural, metric, and scalar invariance, respectively, suggesting equivalent latent structure across outparty targets. For participant party affiliation (i.e., excluding independents), the respective values of CFI were .961, .956, and .951.

In summary, reliable variance in scores on the 9-item Political Sectarianism Scale is primarily driven by a single, very reliable latent variable that subsumes the othering, aversion, and moralization features. This latent structure holds regardless of whether the items (1) refer to a typical outparty member or all outparty members; (2) refer to Republicans or Democrats as the outparty; or (3) are rated by Republican, Democrat, or Independent participants. These results support use of either version of the scale. The results also show that scores reflect the same latent construct regardless of respondents' political party affiliation or the outparty they are rating.

Study 2: Confirmatory Psychometrics

Harnessing this sample of partisans demographically matched to the population of partisans, we first replicated the analyses from Study 1. Items and loadings from estimating a bifactor confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model are shown in Supplemental Table C.1. As in Study 1, two of the three loadings on the specific aversion factor were near zero, resulting in empirical underidentification. As before, we respecified the model, excluding that factor. This model provided an excellent account of the data, $\chi^2(N = 894, \text{df} = 21) = 182.42$, $p < .001$, CFI = .98, TLI = .96, SRMR = .03. Loadings on the general factor exceeded .72. Loadings on the specific factor were small to moderate. (As in Study 1, we also evaluated a bifactor exploratory structural equation model. Differences in omnibus fit indices were at the cutoff of .01, indicating a trivial improvement in fit from freeing cross-loadings for the specific factors.)

Examination of the omega-based indices confirmed a single reliably measured latent influence on scores. The ECV value of .89 was identical to the value obtained in Study 1 and consistent with a unidimensional structure. Values of ECV for the othering and moralization factors were .07 and .05, respectively. The value of .93 for ω_h and values of .18 (othering) and .09 (moralization) for ω_{hs} indicate that nearly all of the systematic variance in a unit-weighted composite score can be attributed to the general factor. The very high value of coefficient H associated with the general factor ($H = .95$) lends further support to the inference of a well-defined, replicable source of common variance. The reliability of scores on the scale was high, $\omega = .96$. (As reported in the main text, coefficient alpha was .95.)

References

[32] Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., ... & Druckman, J. N. (2020). Political sectarianism in America. *Science*, *370*(6516), 533–536. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abe1715

[33] Tay, L., & Jebb, A. T. (2018). Establishing construct continua in construct validation: The process of continuum specification. *Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 1*(3), 375–388. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918775707

[34] Reise, S. P., Mansolf, M., & Haviland, M. G. (2023). Bifactor measurement models. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), *Handbook of structural equation modeling* (2nd ed., pp. 328–348). Guilford Press.

[35] Bentler, P. M. (1990). Comparative fit indexes in structural models. *Psychological Bulletin, 107*(2), 238–246. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.107.2.238

[36] Tucker, L. R., & Lewis, C. (1973). A reliability coefficient for maximum likelihood factor analysis. *Psychometrika, 38*(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02291170

[37] Bentler, P. M. (1995). *EQS structural equations program manual*. Multivariate Software.

[38] Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling, 6*(1), 1–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118

[39] Steiger, J. H., & Lind, J. C. (1980, June). *Statistically based tests for the number of factors*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Psychometric Society, Iowa City, IA.

[40] Kenny, D. A., Kaniskan, B., & McCoach, D. B. (2015). The performance of RMSEA in models with small degrees of freedom. *Sociological Methods & Research, 44*(3), 486–507.

[41] Rodriguez, A., Reise, S. P., & Haviland, M. G. (2016). Evaluating bifactor models: Calculating and interpreting statistical indices. *Psychological Methods, 21*(2), 137–150. https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000045

[42] Reise, S. P., Bonifay, W. E., & Haviland, M. G. (2013). Scoring and modeling psychological measures in the presence of multidimensionality. *Journal of Personality Assessment, 95*(2), 129–140.

[43] Hancock, G. R., & Mueller, R. O. (2001). Rethinking construct reliability within latent variable systems. In R. Cudeck, S. du Toit, & D. Sorbom (Eds.), *Structural equation modeling: Present and future* (pp. 195–216). Scientific Software International.

[44] Widaman, K. F., & Olivera-Aguilar, M. (2023). Investigating measurement invariance using confirmatory factor analysis. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), *Handbook of structural equation modeling* (2nd ed., pp. 367–384). Guilford Press.

[45] Cheung, G. W., & Rensvold, R. B. (2002). Evaluating goodness-of-fit indexes for testing measurement invariance. *Structural Equation Modeling, 9*(2), 233–255. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15328007SEM0902_5

[46] Eid, M., Geiser, C., Koch, T., & Heene, M. (2017). Anomalous results in G-factor models: Explanations and alternatives. *Psychological Methods, 22*(3), 541–562. https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000083

[16] Morin, A. J. S. (2023). Exploratory structural equation modeling. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), *Handbook of structural equation modeling* (2nd ed., 503–524). Guilford Press.

Supplemental Table C.1. Item Stems and Loading on General and Specific Factors in a Bifactor Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model (Study 2)

	Study 1		Study 2	
Item	General	Specific	General	Specific
Othering				
• I am different from [Republicans].	.61	.47	.72	.45
• I feel distant from [Republicans].	.76	.34	.79	.34
• No matter how hard I try, I can't see the world the way [Republicans] do.	.64	.36	.75	.35
Aversion				
• I hate [Republicans].	.75	.00[a]	.74	.00[a]
• My feelings toward [Republicans] are negative.	.85	.00[a]	.88	.00[a]
• [Republicans] have lots of negative traits.	.87	.00[a]	.87	.00[a]
Moralization				
• [Republicans] are immoral.	.83	.34	.85	.52
• [Republicans] are evil.	.78	.20	.84	.16
• [Republicans] lack integrity.	.85	.20	.86	.13

Note. Items were administered in random order. In place of the line was either *Democrats* or *Republicans* to reflect the respondent's outparty. Values of omnibus fit indices: CFI = .98, TLI = .86, SRMR = .03.

[a] Values fixed to address empirical underidentification due to near-zero loadings of the first two items when freely estimated.

Supplemental Figure C.1. Bifactor model of responses to the Political Sectarianism Scale. (Note. Uniquenesses are not shown to reduce clutter.)



Supplemental Appendix D
Measures of Antidemocratic Tendencies

Study 1	Study 2		Study 3
	Spring, 2022	Midterms, 2022	
1. * For the good of the country, [Democrats] should do whatever is necessary to pass policies, even if it seems undemocratic. 2. * [Democrats] should redraw districts to maximize their potential to win more seats in federal elections, even if it may be technically illegal. 3. † It is justified for [Democrats] to use violence in advocating their political goals these days.	1. * [Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Republicans]. 2. * [Democratic] governors should ignore unfavorable court rulings by [Republican]-appointed judges. 3. * [Democratic] governors should prosecute journalists who, without revealing sources, accuse [Democratic] politicians of misconduct. 4. * [Democrats] should NOT accept the results of elections if they lose. 5. * I think that [Republicans] should NOT be allowed to organize in order to influence public policy. 6. * I believe that [Republicans] should NOT be allowed to hold rallies outside of government buildings. 7. * I believe that members of [Republicans] should NOT be allowed to teach in public schools and universities. 8. † How much do you feel it is justified for [Democrats] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days? 9. † How much do you feel it is justified for [Democrats] to use violence if the [Republican] party is declared the winner of the next Presidential election? 10. † When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary [Democrat] in the public to harass an ordinary [Republican] on the Internet, in a way that makes the target feel frightened? 11. † I would be willing to tolerate some political violence if that's what it took to keep [Republicans] from winning Congress. 12. † I would be willing to tolerate some political violence if that's what it took to keep [Republicans] from winning the Presidency. 13. † I'd support extreme measures, even violence, to keep [Donald Trump] from winning the Presidency in 2024. [For Republican participants, this item asked about Joe Biden.]	1. * [Republicans] should NOT be allowed to campaign in order to increase voter turnout. 2. * [Republicans] should NOT be allowed to hold peaceful rallies to influence the opinion of voters. 3. * [Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Republicans]. 4. * If election officials declare that a [Republican] has won a given election, [Democrats] should NOT accept that result. 5. * [Democrats] should make it difficult to vote by mail in areas that support [Republicans]. 6. * How would you vote if you knew your state's [Democratic] candidate supported efforts to prevent [Republicans] from campaigning in order to increase voter turnout? 7. * How would you vote if you knew your state's [Democratic] candidate supported efforts to prevent [Republicans] from holding peaceful rallies to influence the opinion of voters? 8. * How would you vote if you knew your state's [Democratic] candidate supported efforts to reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Republicans]? 9. * How would you vote if you knew your state's [Democratic] candidate would not accept the election results if election officials declare that they lost? 10. * How would you vote if you knew your state's [Democratic] candidate tried to make it difficult to vote by mail in areas that support [Republicans]? 11. † [Democrats] should intimidate [Republicans] online to discourage them from voting. 12. † [Democrats] should gather at the polls to intimidate [Republican] voters. 13. † [Democrats] should use any means, even violence if necessary, to keep the [Republicans] from winning Congress. 14. † How would you vote if you knew your state's [Democratic] candidate supported threatening [Republicans] online to discourage them from voting? 15. † How would you vote if you knew your state's [Democratic] candidate supported [Democrats] gathering at the polls to intimidate [Republican] voters? 16. † How would you vote if you knew your state's [Democratic] candidate supported using any means, even violence if necessary, to keep the [Republicans] from winning Congress?	1. * [Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Republicans]. 2. * [Democratic] governors should ignore unfavorable court rulings by [Republican]-appointed judges. 3. * [Democratic] governors should prosecute journalists who, without revealing sources, accuse [Democratic] politicians of misconduct. 4. * [Democrats] should NOT accept the results of elections if they lose. 5. † How much do you feel it is justified for [Democrats] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days? 6. † How much do you feel it is justified for [Democrats] to use violence if the [Republican] party is declared the winner of the next Presidential election? 7. † When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary [Democrat] in the public to harass an ordinary [Republican] on the Internet, in a way that makes the target feel frightened? 8. † When, if ever, is it OK for a [Democrat] to send threatening and intimidating messages to [Republican] party leaders?

* Item assesses rigging the game
† Item assesses partisan aggression

Supplemental Appendix E
Item-level Replications of the Primary Analyses in Studies 1 and 2, Sequentially Pitting Each Sectarianism Item against Affective Polarization in 1-on-1 Analyses.

The three tables in this appendix (E.1, E.2, and E.3) replicate the analyses from Table 1 from the main document, but with the nine items from the sectarianism measure modeled separately as 1-item measures rather than as a unitary scale. Conclusions from these supplemental tables closely replicate the findings from Table 1. The only exception is the othering items in Table F.1, which did not robustly predict antidemocratic tendencies (in contrast to Tables F.2 and F.3). Our best guess for explaining this discrepancy is that the participants in Study 1 experienced the three othering items differently because they were embedded among the original 45 sectarianism items.

Table E.1 (Study 1): Associations of affective polarization and political sectarianism with antidemocratic tendencies, separately for each of the nine political sectarianism items.

	Bivariate Association		Multiple Regression			
	r	*p*	*β*	*t*	*df*	*p*
Item 1: I am different from the typical Republican.						
Affective Polarization			.01	0.25	1326	.804
Political Sectarianism	–.01	.758	–.01	–0.42	1326	.671
Item 2: I feel distant from the typical Republican.						
Affective Polarization			–.02	–0.69	1326	.492
Political Sectarianism	.03	.331	.04	1.16	1326	.247
Item 3: No matter how hard I try, I can't see the world the way the typical Republican does.						
Affective Polarization			–.04	–1.11	1326	.268
Political Sectarianism	.06	.029	.08	2.42	1326	.016
Item 4: I hate the typical Republican.						
Affective Polarization			–.19	–6.72	1326	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.33	<.001	.42	14.62	1326	<.001
Item 5: My feelings toward the typical Republican are negative.						
Affective Polarization			–.18	–4.88	1326	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.15	<.001	.27	7.43	1326	<.001
Item 6: The typical Republican has lots of negative traits.						
Affective Polarization			–.12	–3.89	1326	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.17	<.001	.23	7.31	1326	<.001
Item 7: The typical Republican is immoral.						
Affective Polarization			–.16	–5.06	1326	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.22	<.001	.30	9.78	1326	<.001
Item 8: The typical Republican is evil.						
Affective Polarization			–.16	–5.28	1326	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.27	<.001	.34	11.66	1326	<.001
Item 9: The typical Republican lacks integrity.						
Affective Polarization			–.15	–4.66	1326	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.20	<.001	.28	8.83	1326	<.001

Table E.2 (Study 2, Cross-Sectional Analyses): Associations of affective polarization and political sectarianism with antidemocratic tendencies, separately for each of the nine political sectarianism items.

	Bivariate Association		Multiple Regression			
	r	*p*	*β*	*t*	*df*	*p*
Item 1: I am different from the typical Republican.						
Affective Polarization			.14	4.05	1062	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.17	<.001	.11	3.05	1062	.002
Item 2: I feel distant from the typical Republican.						
Affective Polarization			.14	3.97	1062	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.17	<.001	.10	2.90	1062	.004
Item 3: No matter how hard I try, I can't see the world the way the typical Republican does.						
Affective Polarization			.12	3.72	1062	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.20	<.001	.15	4.39	1062	<.001
Item 4: I hate the typical Republican.						
Affective Polarization			.04	1.14	1062	.255
Political Sectarianism	.40	<.001	.38	12.35	1062	<.001
Item 5: My feelings toward the typical Republican are negative.						
Affective Polarization			.09	2.46	1062	.014
Political Sectarianism	.24	<.001	.19	5.51	1062	<.001
Item 6: The typical Republican has lots of negative traits.						
Affective Polarization			.07	2.13	1062	.033
Political Sectarianism	.28	<.001	.24	7.09	1062	<.001
Item 7: The typical Republican is immoral.						
Affective Polarization			.04	1.26	1062	.209
Political Sectarianism	.33	<.001	.31	9.29	1062	<.001
Item 8: The typical Republican is evil.						
Affective Polarization			–.00	–0.06	1062	.954
Political Sectarianism	.39	<.001	.39	12.16	1062	<.001
Item 9: The typical Republican lacks integrity.						
Affective Polarization			.04	1.14	1062	.265
Political Sectarianism	.32	<.001	.30	9.05	1062	<.001

Table E.3 (Study 2, Longitudinal Analyses): Associations of affective polarization and political sectarianism with antidemocratic tendencies, separately for each of the nine political sectarianism items.

	Bivariate Association		Multiple Regression			
	r	*p*	*β*	*t*	*df*	*p*
Item 1: I am different from the typical Republican.						
Affective Polarization			.26	6.19	683	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.22	<.001	.10	2.28	683	.023
Item 2: I feel distant from the typical Republican.						
Affective Polarization			.25	5.78	683	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.24	<.001	.11	2.62	683	.009
Item 3: No matter how hard I try, I can't see the world the way the typical Republican does.						
Affective Polarization			.24	5.98	683	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.25	<.001	.14	3.46	683	<.001
Item 4: I hate the typical Republican.						
Affective Polarization			.20	5.10	683	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.33	<.001	.24	6.10	683	<.001
Item 5: My feelings toward the typical Republican are negative.						
Affective Polarization			.21	4.75	683	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.29	<.001	.18	4.04	683	<.001
Item 6: The typical Republican has lots of negative traits.						
Affective Polarization			.21	5.04	683	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.30	<.001	.20	4.81	683	<.001
Item 7: The typical Republican is immoral.						
Affective Polarization			.16	3.88	683	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.37	<.001	.29	7.05	683	<.001
Item 8: The typical Republican is evil.						
Affective Polarization			.15	3.66	683	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.38	<.001	.30	7.45	683	<.001
Item 9: The typical Republican lacks integrity.						
Affective Polarization			.18	4.37	683	<.001
Political Sectarianism	.33	<.001	.23	6.38	683	<.001

Supplemental Appendix F
Item-level Replications of the Mediation Analyses in Studies 3a and 3b, Sequentially Pitting Each Sectarianism Item against Affective Polarization in 1-on-1 Analyses.

Table F.1 (Study 3a): Indirect effects, from simultaneous-mediation models, of the intervention (X) on antidemocratic tendencies (Y) via affective polarization (M_1) and political sectarianism (M_2), separately for each of the nine political sectarianism items.

	Indirect Effect		
	β	*SE*	*95% CI*
Item 1: I am different from the typical Republican.			
Affective Polarization	.01	.02	–.023 || .045
Political Sectarianism	–.05	.01	–.084 || –.028
Item 2: I feel distant from the typical Republican.			
Affective Polarization	.00	.02	–.032 || .041
Political Sectarianism	–.03	.01	–.055 || –.008
Item 3: No matter how hard I try, I can't see the world the way the typical Republican does.			
Affective Polarization	–.01	.02	–.041 || .030
Political Sectarianism	–.02	.01	–.048 || –.001
Item 4: I hate the typical Republican.			
Affective Polarization	.06	.02	.034 || .097
Political Sectarianism	–.10	.02	–.147 || –.061
Item 5: My feelings toward the typical Republican are negative.			
Affective Polarization	.04	.02	.003 || .082
Political Sectarianism	–.06	.02	–.095 || –.035
Item 6: The typical Republican has lots of negative traits.			
Affective Polarization	.04	.02	.004 || .077
Political Sectarianism	–.08	.02	–.120 || –.052
Item 7: The typical Republican is immoral.			
Affective Polarization	.05	.02	.013 || .087
Political Sectarianism	–.10	.02	–.137 || –.065
Item 8: The typical Republican is evil.			
Affective Polarization	.08	.02	.050 || .122
Political Sectarianism	–.12	.02	–.163 || –.072
Item 9: The typical Republican lacks integrity.			
Affective Polarization	.05	.02	.018 || .093
Political Sectarianism	–.10	.02	–.143 || –.069

Note. These multiple-mediator models were conducted using PROCESS Model 4 (Hayes, 2012), with 5,000 resamples per model. Figure 2 in the main text provides a graphical depiction of the models. X = independent variable. Y = dependent variable. M_1 = Putative Mediator 1. M_2 = Putative Mediator 2.

Table F.2 (Study 3b): Indirect effects, from simultaneous-mediation models, of the intervention (X) on antidemocratic tendencies (Y) via affective polarization (M_1) and political sectarianism (M_2), separately for each of the nine political sectarianism items.

	Indirect Effect		
	β	*SE*	*95% CI*
Item 1: I am different from the typical Republican.			
Affective Polarization	–.07	.01	–.101 || –.044
Political Sectarianism	–.02	.01	–.046 || –.000
Item 2: I feel distant from the typical Republican.			
Affective Polarization	–.08	.02	–.110 || –.048
Political Sectarianism	–.01	.01	–.036 || .011
Item 3: No matter how hard I try, I can't see the world the way the typical Republican does.			
Affective Polarization	–.06	.01	–.092 || –.036
Political Sectarianism	–.03	.01	–.052 || –.012
Item 4: I hate the typical Republican.			
Affective Polarization	.00	.01	–.024 || .027
Political Sectarianism	–.11	.02	–.150 || –.075
Item 5: My feelings toward the typical Republican are negative.			
Affective Polarization	–.04	.02	–.074 || –.006
Political Sectarianism	–.05	.02	–.079 || –.022
Item 6: The typical Republican has lots of negative traits.			
Affective Polarization	–.02	.01	–.049 || .010
Political Sectarianism	–.09	.02	–.122 || –.055
Item 7: The typical Republican is immoral.			
Affective Polarization	–.00	.01	–.026 || .025
Political Sectarianism	–.12	.02	–.159 || –.088
Item 8: The typical Republican is evil.			
Affective Polarization	.01	.01	–.019 || .031
Political Sectarianism	–.15	.02	–.193 || –.109
Item 9: The typical Republican lacks integrity.			
Affective Polarization	–.00	.02	–.031 || .028
Political Sectarianism	–.13	.02	–.168 || –.091

Note. These multiple-mediator models were conducted using PROCESS Model 4 (Hayes, 2012), with 5,000 resamples per model. Figure 2 in the main text provides a graphical depiction of the models. X = independent variable. Y = dependent variable. M_1 = Putative Mediator 1. M_2 = Putative Mediator 2.