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Megastudy Identifying Successful Interventions to Strengthen Americans' Democratic Attitudes

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Abstract

Deep partisan conflict in the mass public threatens the stability of American democracy. The researchers conducted a megastudy on a national sample of American partisans (*n* = 32,059) testing 25 interventions designed to reduce anti-democratic attitudes and partisan animosity. These interventions were selected from a pool of 252 interventions submitted by social scientists, practitioners, and activists as part of the Strengthening Democracy Challenge. Contrary to the expectations of expert forecasters, the authors find that nearly every selected intervention (23 out of 25) significantly reduced partisan animosity. They also identify several interventions that successfully reduced the other outcomes targeted in the Challenge – support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence – as well as a number of related secondary outcomes, including support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and biased evaluations of politicized facts. Furthermore, by examining the observed pattern of effect sizes, the authors also gain insight into the underlying structure of these outcomes. There is little overlap between the interventions that affect partisan animosity and those that affect support for undemocratic practices or partisan violence, suggesting that these outcomes are largely driven by separate factors. However, they do find substantial overlap between the interventions that affect partisan animosity and those that affect a number of important outcomes, including biased evaluation of politicized facts, general social distrust, and preferences for social distance from outpartisans. They also found that support for undemocratic candidates was moved by interventions that affect either partisan animosity or support for undemocratic practices, suggesting two separate causal paths. Taken together, their findings provide a toolkit of promising interventions for practitioners, and shed new theoretical light on challenges facing American democracy.

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Megastudy identifying successful interventions to strengthen Americans' democratic attitudes

American democracy is in crisis. Animosity toward political opponents, rising for decades (Boxell et al., 2020; Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018; Iyengar et al., 2019), is now so widespread that it affects ostensibly non-political aspects of life. Partisan animosity shortens family conversations on holidays (Chen & Rohla, 2018), undermines romantic connections across party lines (Huber & Malhotra, 2017), causes workplace discrimination (McConnell et al., 2018), exacerbates associated intergroup conflicts (Westwood & Peterson, 2020), and complicates coordinated responses to societal crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Druckman et al., 2021). Further, many politicians and voters violate democratic principles, for example by supporting overturning the results of the 2020 election (Morning Consult/Politico, 2021; Reuters, 2021), attempting a coup by attacking the American Capitol (NPR, 2022), and threatening violence against Democratic and Republican politicians (Greve & Gambino, 2022). Accordingly, many Americans are concerned that the country is extremely divided (Pew Research Center, 2019) and that American democracy is at risk of failing (NPR/Ipsos, 2022).

This crisis has motivated scholars from across the social sciences (Finkel et al., 2020), as well as a large network of civil society organizations, to develop "depolarization interventions" aimed at reducing political conflict among Americans (e.g., Ahler & Sood, 2018; Clayton & Willer, 2021; Hartman et al., 2022; Huddy & Yair, 2021; Landry et al., 2022; Lees & Cikara, 2020; Levendusky, 2018a; Levendusky, 2018b; Mernyk et al., 2022; Moore-Berg et al., 2020; Ruggeri et al., 2021; Santos et al., 2022; Simonsson & Marks, 2021; Voelkel et al., 2018; Voelkel et al., 2021b; Warner et al., 2020; Wojcieszak & Warner, 2020; Zoizner et al., 2021; for a list of

example organizations, see Supplementary Materials). Despite this widespread interest, however, the accumulation of systematic evidence of what is effective has been limited. First, the current state of knowledge is scattered. Insights gained by individual research teams and practitioners often are confined to disciplines, and ideas rarely spread between the social sciences and practitioners, such as those in the "bridging" community. Further, many ideas developed by practitioners have not been tested experimentally. Second, it is unclear how to best strengthen democratic attitudes. Most interventions that *have* been tested experimentally have focused on reducing partisan animosity, assuming that reducing partisan animosity would also improve anti-democratic attitudes, such as support for partisan violence, undemocratic practices, and undemocratic candidates (e.g., Finkel et al., 2020). However, recent research casts doubts on such downstream effects of interventions that reduce partisan animosity (Broockman et al., 2020; Voelkel et al., 2021a). Finally, even though the literature has identified several effective interventions, the use of different measures, research designs, and sampled populations makes it impossible to compare the effectiveness of interventions (Hameiri & Moore-Berg, 2022; Milkman et al., 2021). Research and action on these urgent problems would strongly benefit from insights into which interventions are most promising and, thus, deserve the most attention in future research.

In the current project we address these limitations by conducting a megastudy to assess, and build on, the current state of knowledge on depolarization interventions. Specifically, we used a highly powered experiment (n = 32,059) on a national sample of American partisans (see Table S6.1 for demographic information) to test the effects of 25 interventions developed by researchers and practitioners. By using an open call to crowdsource submissions, we received not only established interventions from leading scholars in the field, but also previously untested

interventions from academics and practitioners. We allowed submitters to select the target(s) of their interventions: partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and/or support for partisan violence. We also collected a variety of other outcomes relevant to America's democracy crisis. In doing this, we move beyond the standard focus on partisan animosity, common in most depolarization research. Further, we integrate a variety of research programs examining different attitudes that are potentially problematic for well-functioning democracies, allowing us to shed new theoretical light on how these issues relate to - or are distinct from - each other. By using a single experiment with consistent measures and the same sampled population for all interventions, we enable identification of not only the absolute effects of the tested interventions but also comparisons of the effectiveness of interventions relative to each other. Finally, we assess the durability of a subset of interventions in a follow-up study recontacting participants approximately two weeks after they completed the initial study. Our analysis strategy for effects on the three target outcomes were preregistered for both the main study and the durability test. In addition, we conducted several exploratory robustness checks, including different strategies to account for participant attrition and additional comparisons of treatment conditions with an active control condition. Results are robust across these different checks (Tables S19.1.1 - S20.4).

In all, we received 252 submitted interventions from 419 people in 17 countries and four continents. We received submissions from across the social sciences, including from psychologists, political scientists, sociologists, communication scholars, economists, and other fields. We also received submissions from practitioners, for whom we provided targeted workshops, and facilitated several academic-practitioner collaboration teams. From this set of submissions, we selected the 25 most promising interventions in collaboration with an expert

panel of social scientists and practitioners (see section *Members of Advisory Board* in the Supplementary Materials). Selected interventions reflected a diversity of strategies, including (a) showing or fostering cross-partisan contact, (b) portraying positive outparty exemplars, (c) invoking the views of influential leaders, (d) describing a common (i.e., cross-partisan) group identity, (e) arguing that depolarization has positive consequences for oneself or society, (f) correcting misperceptions of outpartisans, (g) portraying more pro-democracy individuals as typical, and (h) portraying undemocratic individuals as more extreme. Summaries, submitting authors, and links to view all selected interventions are in the Supplementary Materials.

Results

Participants who were not exposed to an intervention (i.e., the control group) expressed concerning levels of partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence, as well as a variety of other attitudes that are potentially problematic for democratic societies (Figure 1, Table S8.1; see Table 1 for example items for each measure, see section *Questionnaire and Procedures* in Supplementary Materials for complete lists of items). Importantly, this was true for both Democrats and Republicans. These descriptive data underscore the importance of identifying effective interventions to reduce such attitudes.

The field of depolarization research is most focused on reducing partisan animosity. For example, nearly all of the interventions in our megastudy (86% of 252 submissions and 96% of 25 selected interventions) selected partisan animosity as their target or one of their targets (Table S7.1). Thus, we begin by assessing how effectively these interventions reduced partisan animosity. In parallel with the megastudy, we ran an incentivized forecasting tournament (see section *Forecasting Intervention Effects* in Supplementary Materials for details) with 1,024 participants from the general public, 106 academics with a background in depolarization

research, and 85 practitioners working on the targeted outcomes. Overall, these groups anticipated that the interventions would significantly reduce partisan animosity about 50% of the time (specific estimates were 52%, 47%, and 56%, for the general public, academics, and practitioners, respectively).

In stark contrast to these predictions, however, the interventions were overwhelmingly successful. Out of the 25 interventions we tested, 23 significantly reduced partisan animosity (Figure 2A, Table S10.1). Many of the effects were not only statistically significant but also sizable, with the most effective interventions in our study reducing partisan animosity by more than 10 points on a 100-pt scale (maximum Cohen's d = -0.53). Importantly, interventions improved both the attitudinal (22 out of 25 effects; maximum Cohen's d = -0.52; Table S12.1) and the incentivized behavioral (22 out of 25 effects; maximum Cohen's d = -0.49; Table S12.2) components of our partisan animosity measure to a similar extent.

Two strategies stood out as most effective at reducing partisan animosity. The first strategy, used by the interventions with the largest (*Contact Project;* Cohen's d = -0.53, $p < .001$) and fourth largest (*Civity Storytelling*: Cohen's d = -0.45, $p < .001$) effect sizes, highlighted relatable, sympathetic exemplars with different political beliefs. The second effective strategy, employed by the interventions with the second (*Media Trust:* Cohen's d = -0.51, $p < .001$) and third largest (*Common Identity*: Cohen's d = -0.46, $p < .001$) effect sizes, highlighted a common cross-partisan identity. All four interventions outperformed at least 20 of the other 21 interventions (Table S13.1). From a theoretical perspective, we also found evidence supporting prominent accounts of partisan animosity as an interpersonal phenomenon. Specifically, two variables stood out as statistically mediating the effects of many interventions on partisan animosity: empathy toward, and perceived similarity to, outpartisans (Tables S14.1-S14.6).

Table 1: *Definitions and Operationalizations for All Outcome Variables*

Category	Outcome Variable	Definition	Example Item(s)
Partisan Animosity	**Partisan Animosity**	Dislike for opposing partisans	…How would you rate [Democrats / Republicans]?...Very cold or unfavorable feeling…No feeling…Very warm or favorable feeling* …How many cents (if any) will you give to the [Democratic / Republican] participant?*
Anti-Democratic Attitudes	**Support for Undemocratic Practices**	Willingness to forgo democratic principles for partisan gain	[Republicans / Democrats] should not accept the results of elections if they lose.
	Support for Partisan Violence	Willingness to use violent tactics against outpartisans	How much do you feel it is justified for [Republicans / Democrats] to use violence if the [Democratic / Republican] party wins more races in the next election?
	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Willingness to ignore undemocratic practices to elect inparty candidates	How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican / Democratic] candidate said that [Republicans / Democrats] should not accept the results of elections they lose?
Cohesion Aversion	Opposition to Bipartisanship	Resistance to cross-partisan collaboration	To what extent would you like to see Democratic and Republican elected representatives work together?
	Social Distrust	Distrust of people in general	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?
	Social Distance	Resistance to interpersonal contact with outpartisans	How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are [Democrats / Republicans]?
Politically Biased Judgments	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Skepticism of facts that favor the worldview of the other party	[Joe Biden / Donald Trump] was lawfully elected President in the [2020 / 2016] election against [Donald Trump / Hillary Clinton].

Notes. Variables specified as targets for submitters, and preregistered as primary outcome variables, indicated in bold print.
*: Text of feeling thermometer and dictator game items are excerpted. See Supplementary Materials for complete wording of these and all other items.



Figure 1. *Distributions of outcome variables in the null control condition, among Democrats (blue) and Republicans (red). All variables range from 0-100. Ranges on y-axes differ for each variable,*



Figure 2. *Panels A, B, and C show the effect of each of the 25 interventions and the active control condition, relative to the null control condition, on the three target outcomes: A) Partisan animosity, B) Support for undemocratic practices, C) Support for partisasan violence. All effects are on a 100-pt scale. Interventions are sorted in order of effect size. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals, based on OLS models (Tables S10.1-S10.3). Panel D shows the standardized effect sizes (Cohen's d) for all 25 interventions and the active control condition, relative to the null control condition, on eight outcomes.*



Figure 3: *Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes across all 25 interventions, for each pair of outcome variables. Correlations under 0.1 are not plotted for ease of interpretation. For comparison, a network diagram showing bivariate correlations of outcome variables in the null control group is shown in the SI.*

Although these analyses only offer correlational evidence (Bullock & Ha, 2011), these results are consistent with theories that highlight the role of empathy (e.g., Cikara et al., 2017: Klimecki, 2019) and perceived similarity (e.g, Brandt & Crawford, 2020) in reducing intergroup conflict. Finally, from a practical perspective, many of the interventions were durable. We observed significant reductions in partisan animosity for six of the ten interventions that were evaluated in a preregistered follow-up study two weeks later (Tables S21.1 and S21.4).

To what extent do these promising findings extend beyond partisan animosity? Encouragingly, we find interventions that yield significant improvements for each of the potentially problematic outcomes we examine - although effects on these outcomes were generally less common, smaller, and less durable than for partisan animosity. In examining these effects, here we particularly focus on support for undemocratic practices and support for political violence, the two other targets of the challenge, while effects on the other outcomes are described in the Supplementary Materials (Tables S11.1-S11.5). Although fewer submitters targeted these two outcomes, relative to partisan animosity, there was still substantial interest: roughly two-thirds of submissions (66%) and selected interventions (64%) targeted support for partisan violence and half of submissions (52%) and selected interventions (48%) targeted support for undemocratic practices (Table S7.1).

We find six interventions that led to significant reductions in support for undemocratic practices (Figure 2B, Table S10.2), with a maximum effect size of Cohen's d = -0.25, and limited evidence of durable effects (Tables S21.2 and S21.5). Interestingly, the two interventions that stood out as most effective, outperforming all other interventions on this outcome (Table S13.2), were quite different from the most effective strategies for partisan animosity. The first intervention, *Misperception Democratic* built on recent research showing that American

partisans tend to have very inaccurate views of rival partisans across a number of domains, including the latter's policy positions, demographic characteristics, support for violence, and levels of dehumanization of outpartisans (e.g., Ahler & Sood, 2018; Druckman et al., 2022; Landry et al., 2022; Mernyk et al., 2022), and, further, that correcting these misperceptions can reduce partisans' own partisan animosity and support for violence (e.g., Lees and Cikara 2020; Ruggeri 2021; Mernyk et al. 2022). This intervention – which presented participants with survey data on the levels of rival partisans' support for a number of undemocratic practices, such as rejecting the results of lost elections - led partisans themselves to report significantly lower support for undemocratic practices (Cohen's d = -0.25, $p < .001$). The other top-performing intervention – *Democratic Fear* – featured a video showing vivid imagery of societal instability and violence following democratic collapse in several countries, before concluding with imagery of the January 6 U.S. Capitol attack. The intervention encouraged participants to consider the potentially drastic and chaotic consequences of democratic collapse, resulting in significantly lower support for undemocratic practices (Cohen's d = -0.21, $p < .001$). Of the remaining 19 interventions, 15 had no statistically significant effects, and four interventions had statistically significant backfire effects that increased support for undemocratic practices.

The pattern is similar when considering support for partisan violence (Figure 2C, Table S10.3), where five interventions led to significant reductions, the maximum effect size was small (Cohen's d = -0.14) and only one durable effect was obtained (Tables S21.3 and S21.6). The most effective strategy, *Misperception Film*, significantly reduced support for partisan violence (Cohen's d = -0.14, $p < .001$), outperforming 20 of the other 24 interventions (Table S13.3). Similar to the top-performing intervention for support for undemocratic practices (*Misperception Democratic*), *Misperception Film* corrected inaccurate views of rival partisans, but also featured

video of participants reacting to corrections of their inaccurate views on outpartisans' immigration attitudes and levels of outparty dehumanization. Of the remaining 20 interventions, 19 had no statistically significant effects, and one intervention backfired. Strikingly, the intervention that backfired by increasing support for political violence (*Democratic Fear*) was one of the top performing interventions for reducing support for undemocratic practices and also reduced partisan animosity. This backfire effect was driven by Republican participants (see Table S17.1.3), and may have been caused by these participants' reactions to the intervention using footage from the January 6th riots, which many Republicans now perceive to be a legitimate protest (Blake, 2022).

We now turn to the theoretical implications of our findings. What do the results suggest about the relationships between partisan animosity, anti-democratic attitudes, and various other outcomes from research on polarization and democracy that we measured? Table 1 lists definitions and example items for all variables, including measures of anti-democratic attitudes (support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisanship), aversion to societal cohesion (opposition to bipartisanship, social distrust, social distance) and politically biased beliefs (biased evaluation of politicized facts). One line of thinking is that all these outcomes are different indicators of the same core factor of "political sectarianism" (Finkel et al., 2020). Recently, however, a different line of thinking has challenged this perspective and instead suggested that partisan animosity does not have important political consequences - and thus that it is likely distinct from outcomes like anti-democratic attitudes (Broockman et al., 2020; Voelkel et al., 2021a). As our study produced 25 effect sizes for each of the eight outcomes, we can shed unique light on the

interrelatedness - and distinctiveness - of these eight outcomes by examining the extent to which outcomes are similarly affected by each intervention.

Figure 3 is a network visualization of how intervention effect sizes are correlated between each pair of outcomes (see Table S18.1 for the correlation matrix). A strong correlation implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other. There are several lessons we can learn from this figure. First, partisan animosity is at the center of a cluster of several societally relevant outcomes, including biased evaluation of politicized facts, general social distrust, and preferences for social distance from outpartisans. This means that interventions affecting partisan animosity also affect those other outcomes. Second, however, partisan animosity is largely *unrelated* to anti-democratic attitudes, such as support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence. Third, interventions that reduce support for partisan violence do not appear to affect most other outcomes. While there is a link between support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence, suggesting that support for partisan violence can be thought of as an anti-democratic attitude (Braley et al. 2022), it is likely primarily rooted in other factors. These may include anti-establishment orientations and conspiracy beliefs (Uscinski et al. 2021; Baum et al. 2022) as well as less political variables such as trait aggression (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022: 77), and general inclinations for violence (Westwood et al., 2022).

Finally, support for undemocratic candidates is linked strongly with support for undemocratic practices but also - less strongly - with partisan animosity. Consistent with this, the two most effective interventions for reducing support for undemocratic candidates are the two best performing interventions for reducing support for undemocratic practices (*Misperception Democratic* and *Democratic Fear*), and the other four effective interventions for reducing

support for undemocratic candidates are the four most effective interventions for reducing partisan animosity (see Tables S10.1, S10.2, and S11.1). Thus, researchers who want to intervene on support for undemocratic candidates - a particularly impactful democratic attitude - can choose either or both of these two causal pathways, one via views of anti-democratic practices, the other via affective sentiments towards outpartisans, but should note that the latter pathway requires strong reductions in partisan animosity to carry over to support for undemocratic candidates.

Theoretically, this suggests that individuals' reported likelihood of voting for an inparty candidate who engaged in undemocratic practices is a joint function of (a) how bad they think those undemocratic practices are, and (b) how much they despise rival partisans. The partisan animosity component may matter because the decision not to vote for an inparty candidate would incrementally help the outparty win an election. Thus, the reason why support for undemocratic candidates is linked to partisan animosity while other anti-democratic attitudes are not might be because none of the other democratic outcomes are as zero-sum game as support for undemocratic candidates. Notably, opposition to bipartisanship exhibits a similar pattern, as effect sizes for it are correlated at high levels with both support for undemocratic practices and partisan animosity. Similar to opposing undemocratic candidates, supporting bipartisanship involves a willingness to forsake narrow partisan gain in pursuit of some other goal (such as not electing undemocratic leaders or passing bipartisan legislation). Interventions that decrease animosity toward the outparty may lead partisans to be more willing to make such sacrifices. Consistent with this, statistical mediation analyses (Tables S18.4-S18.10) also indicate that partisan animosity significantly mediates the effects of interventions on support for undemocratic candidates and opposition to bipartisanship, but not effects of interventions on support for

undemocratic practices or support for partisan violence, though these analyses only offer correlational evidence for the mediating role of partisan animosity (Bullock & Ha, 2011).

What does our study suggest about the state of the interdisciplinary field of depolarization research? First, our study reveals that the field's focus on treating partisan animosity has yielded an impressive base of knowledge for how to reduce both survey and behavioral indicators of partisan animosity reliably, sizably, and durably. We identified multiple promising strategies for designing interventions, most notably exposure to relatable, sympathetic outpartisans, and crafting a common, cross-party identity, as well as mediators with strong theoretical foundations, namely empathy and perceived similarity. Further, significant reductions in partisan animosity tended to coincide with a variety of other societally meaningful consequences, such as reduced support for undemocratic candidates and less biased evaluations of politicized facts.

Second, researchers and practitioners who are interested in reducing anti-democratic attitudes, such as support for undemocratic practices or support for partisan violence, can build on several effective interventions. However, future research is needed to examine if effects can be strengthened and made more sustainable. The lower effectiveness of interventions on anti-democratic attitudes is likely attributable to less prior focus on these outcomes, reflected in the lower percentage of submitters who reported targeting these outcomes. These outcomes may also be more difficult to treat. Researchers targeting anti-democratic attitudes had success at a lower rate than those targeting partisan animosity, and even interventions like *Misperception Democratic* and *Democratic Fear* - which were clearly designed to affect anti-democratic attitudes - had similar or greater effects on partisan animosity than any of the anti-democratic attitudes we studied. Further, none of several widely discussed potential mediating variables we

studied, including perceived similarity with outpartisans, partisanship as a social identity, empathy toward outpartisans, anger toward outpartisans, unity against a common enemy, and threat from outpartisans consistently statistically mediated the intervention effects on support for undemocratic practices (Tables S15.1-S15.6) and support for partisan violence (Tables S16.1-S16.6). This suggests these outcomes are, as yet, not well understood theoretically.

Indeed, the divergence in the effectiveness of interventions on partisan animosity and anti-democratic attitudes was not forecasted in advance, suggesting that this finding is a surprise to the field. The average predicted likelihood of each intervention having an effect on partisan animosity was 47% among academics, 56% among practitioners, and 52% among members of the general public. For support for undemocratic practices, average predictions were 42% among academics, 52% among practitioners, and 55% among members of the general public; for support for partisan violence: average predictions were 43% among academics, 52% among practitioners, and 48% among members of the general public. Thus, the researchers in this field may not realize how much more effective their interventions are in reducing partisan animosity than in reducing anti-democratic attitudes.

Comparing the effectiveness of 25 interventions suggests fruitful directions for such future research on anti-democratic attitudes. Specifically, misperception corrections appear to be the strongest interventions the field currently has to offer for treating anti-democratic attitudes and support for partisan violence (see also Mernyk et al., 2022). Highlighting the consequences of democratic collapse is another fruitful direction, but should be designed in a way that offsets potential backfiring effects on support for partisan violence. Future research should further investigate the mechanisms underlying these interventions and use them as benchmarks to identify even more effective interventions.

From a practical perspective, our results provide a toolkit for practitioners looking to effectively intervene on attitudes that are potentially problematic for well-functioning democracies. Our results also suggest that those looking to intervene on outcomes like support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence should focus on these outcomes directly to be effective. Targeting other constructs like partisan animosity cannot be assumed to be effective for reducing support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence, and sometimes can even backfire. Nonetheless, the fact that numerous interventions *were* able to reduce these outcomes provides reason for optimism that researchers and practitioners can successfully identify interventions for strengthening support for democracy in the American mass public.

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Supplementary Materials

1. List of Example "Bridging" Organizations

Here we define "bridging" organizations as organizations working on overcoming political divisions - and other social and cultural divisions associated with political divisions - in the U.S. at either an interpersonal or societal level. Below is a non-exhaustive list of several U.S.-based organizations for whom bridging political divides is a major focus:

AllSides, American Exchange Project, American Public Square, Better Arguments Project, Beyond Conflict, Bipartisan Policy Center, Braver Angels; BridgeUSA, Civi, Civic Genius, Civity, Common Ground Committee, Constructive Dialogue Institute, Convergence Center for Policy Resolution, Crossing Party Lines, Divided We Fall, FixUS, In This Together, Living Room Conversations, Millennial Action Project, More in Common, National Institute for Civil Discourse, One America Movement, ProCon, Project Divided, Resetting the Table, The Flip Side, The Village Square, Unify America, YOUnify

2. Members of Advisory Board

Mannie Ajayi, Pacific Fin Capital

Chris Bail, Duke University

Loren Bendele, Gell

Adam Berinsky, MIT

Pete Ditto, University of California, Irvine

Long Doan, University of Maryland

Corey Fields, Georgetown University

Eli Finkel, Northwestern University

Matt Gentzkow, Stanford University

Cheryl Graeve, National Institute of Civil Discourse (NICD) at the University of Arizona

Kristin Hansen, Civic Health Project

Eszter Hargittai, University of Zurich

Vincent Hutchings, University of Michigan

Lucas Johnson, On Being

Cindy Kam, Vanderbilt University

Adam Levine, Cornell University

Neil Malhotra, Stanford University

Lilliana Mason, University of Maryland

Leslie McCall, City University of New York (CUNY)

Melissa Michelson, Menlo College

Jenan Mohajir, Interfaith Youth Core

Mohammed Naeem, American Immigration Council

Mara Ostfeld, University of Michigan

Zeenat Rahman, University of Chicago

Jaime Settle, College of William & Mary

Jesse Shapiro, Brown University

Betsy Sinclair, Washington University in St Louis

Michelle Torres, Rice University

Julie Wronski, University of Mississippi

3. Information on Interventions and Control Conditions

Null Control

Participants in this condition moved on directly to the DVs.

Alternative Control

Participants read some information about the three branches of government.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/yuztjf2a

Short Title: Befriending Meditation
Submitters' Title: Befriending Meditation
Otto Simonsson
Karolinska Institute

Participants take part in an eight-minute befriending meditation. They listen to an audio that emphasizes treating yourself well and extending kindness to others. The audio discusses being safe, happy, healthy, and having ease of being. It suggests thinking of a loved one in the same way. It then asks respondents to think of a stranger this way (wishing them safety, happiness, health, and ease of being). Finally, it asks them to think of someone they find difficult in the same way. Respondents thus reflect on the importance of thinking positive thoughts about all beings.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/xfjfy2rn

Short Title: Chatbot Quiz
Submitters' Title: Reducing Partisan Animosity Through a Common Ground Discovery Chatbot Quiz
Brandyn Keating; Aaron Lyles; Jay Rosato
YOUnify; CommonAlly; CommonAlly

Participants answer questions (in a chat) about where they think the average Democrat and Republican fall on various issues (gun control, immigration, climate change). After each answer, they are given the correct answer from a credible source. They also are asked about and learn that more than 70% of Americans agree on various issues (concerning police, minimum wage, COVID). Participants learn that the parties are not nearly as far apart from each other than most people believe. Participants thus learn the parties are similar on many issues.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/3z78s4ev

Short Title: Civity Storytelling

Submitters' Title: Civity Storytelling: Expanding the Pool of People Who Matter
Malka Kopell; Palma Strand; Gina Baleria; Maya Fiorella
Civity; Civity & Creighton University; Civity & Sonoma State University; Civity & Sonoma State University

Participants watch an introductory animated video about the importance of individual stories. They then watch five videos where individuals talk about themselves and their experiences. Participants then watch another animated video about how democracy allows for different views and people, after which participants explain their takeaways. They thus are prompted to learn and think about how democracy promotes and can handle differences.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/yh64c9sk

Short Title: Common Identity
Submitters' Title: Common Identity-Based Intervention
Ali Javeed; Kim Doell; Steve Rathje; Jay Van Bavel
New York University; New York University; University of Cambridge; New York University

Participants read about how democracy has been crucial to America's success as a leader in technology (e.g., computers, cellphones) and culture (e.g., film, music). They then read that American democracy is at risk from extreme partisanship. Participants learn that, fortunately, research shows that the vast majority of Americans support democracy, and this is a common identity of Americans. Moreover, despite perceptions to the contrary, most members of both parties like each other, disdain violence, and support the rules of democracy. Participants write about their two favorite things about being American. Participants thus learn of a common American identity and that most partisans share more in common than they think.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/22nn6aaj

Short Title: Contact Project
Submitters' Title: Using Media Trades to Incentivize Engagement With a Vivid Illustration of Contact Theory
Daniel Stone; David Francis; Michael Franz; Julia Minson
Bowdoin College; Bowdoin College; Bowdoin College; Harvard Kennedy School

Participants watch a commercial from England that shows people with opposing political views bonding with one another despite learning of their political disagreements. The video shows pairs of people disagreeing on climate change, feminism, and transgender identity. It shows the pairs then working together, bonding, and deciding to spend time together (to drink a beer). They thus learn how people with different political views can get along. Before watching, participants are told that if they answer questions correctly about the video, they will get to choose an article or video to share with someone from the other party.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/2hd6zyy5

Short Title: Counterfactual Selves
Submitters' Title: The Road Not Taken: Reflection on Counterfactual Selves as a Means to Reduce Animosity and Violence
Nathan Ballantyne; Jared Celniker; Mertcan Güngör; John Michael Kelly; Shiri Spitz
Fordham University; University of California, Irvine; University of California, Irvine; University of California, Irvine; University of California, Irvine

Participants are asked about their views on various issues (e.g., abortion, gun control, immigration). They then answer the same questions but are asked to imagine their life had been different on each issue (e.g., raised in a Christian fundamentalist tradition, had a sister who was assaulted and became pregnant). Participants are then provided the results of their attitudes versus their attitudes under different circumstances. They are told that many opponents are good people with different environments. Participants thus learn about how the beliefs of those from the other side reflect valid experiences.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/239mhntr

Short Title: Democratic Fear
Submitters' Title: Appealing to Fear of Democratic Collapse
Katherine Clayton; Michael Tomz
Stanford University; Stanford University

Participants watch a video about countries where democracy collapsed (Venezuela, Turkey). It explains what the rulers tried to do to stay in power by using violence and violating electoral rights. The video shows scenes of chaos. It then asks whether democracy could collapse in the US, showing scenes from the January 6th Capitol insurrection. Participants then read about what they could do to protect democracy such as defending the separation of powers, endorsing compromise, and rejecting violence. Participants thus learn about the consequences if the rules of democracy are violated.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/45295w3u

Short Title: Economic Interests
Submitters' Title: A Common Economic Plight and a Common Economic Enemy
Joe Green; Nick Kay; Azim Shariff
The University of British Columbia; The University of British Columbia; The University of British Columbia

Participants watch a video about how economic interests unite Americans across political divides. The video points out that other than the super rich, "we are all in this together," and the super rich share little in common with other Americans. Instead, the super rich have more in

common with each other regardless of their partisanship such as life expectancy, political donations and access to elite schools. And that income inequality has increased over time. Participants then write about what they thought of the video. Participants thus learn about how they share an identity with most Americans regardless of different partisanship.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/3248k33h

Short Title: Empathy Beliefs
Submitters' Title: Beliefs About Political Empathy: A Tool for Reducing Partisan Animosity and Political Violence
Luiza Almeida Santos; Jamil Zaki
Stanford University; Stanford University

Participants read about the benefits of empathizing with people with different political beliefs. For instance, they read that empathizing with the other political side (e.g., someone with different beliefs on gun control) leads one to be more persuasive and liked, and that it builds consensus. They then write about how empathy can be useful in competitive contexts and how they could be more empathetic going forward in their own lives. They thus learn about how empathy with those from the other political side can be beneficial.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/ysjjm4re

Short Title: Epistemic Rescue
Submitters' Title: Epistemic Rescue: Leveraging Knowledge Complementaries to Reduce Political Antipathy
Evan DeFilippis; Joshua Greene
Harvard Business School; Harvard University (Psychology Department)

Participants are paired with someone from the other party and they learn a little about them. They then privately answer twelve trivia questions (e.g., about cars, food, TV). Half the questions are likely to be correctly answered by Republicans (e.g., the last name of the family on Duck Dynasty) and half are likely to be correctly answered by Democrats (e.g., Ben and Jerry ice cream flavors). After answering each privately, the participant answers again, but this time they can choose to learn what their partner from the other party answered. They thus can learn how someone from the other party can help them.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/2v22fsxp

Short Title: Harmful Experiences
Submitters' Title: Sharing Harmful Personal Experiences Reduces Partisan Animosity
Emily Kubin; Curtis Puryear; Kurt Gray
University of Koblenz-Landau; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Participants hear from real people from the other party who explain their views come from personal experiences of suffering. For example, Republicans learn about someone who is anti-gun because his friend was murdered by someone who obtained a gun without a proper background check. Or, Democrats learn about someone who is pro-gun because one of his friends was murdered in a home invasion robbery. Participants thus learn that views from the other side reflect authentic experiences of vulnerability and suffering.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/4xvd7ckr

Short Title: Inparty Elites
Submitters' Title: Strengthening Democracy With Partisan Social Norms
James Martherus
Morning Consult

Participants are asked to read a fictional op-ed with real quotes and statistics. It focuses on the other party's beliefs about democracy and violence. They learn that the leader of the other party (Biden or Trump) condemns violence and supports democratic processes (e.g., right to vote, freedom of the press). The op-ed also cites social science data about how at least 90% of the other party do not support violence or breaking the rules to help their party win. Participants are asked to summarize the argument. Participants thus learn that the other party is against violence and supportive of democracy.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/yhn7tvpk

Short Title: Learning Goals
Submitters' Title: Using Expressed Learning Goals to Overcome Partisan Animosity
Julia Minson; Hanne Collins; Charles Dorison; Molly Moore; Hayley Blunden; Kara Luo
Harvard University; Harvard University; Northwestern University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University

Participants exchange messages with someone from the other party who is seeking an open-minded exchange. The messages involve explaining why the participant and the person from the other party have the positions that they do (e.g., on taxes, income). Participants thus engage with an open-minded member of the other party to exchange views in a productive manner.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/375e7rkt

Short Title: Media Trust
Submitters' Title: Testing a 'Values Alignment' Approach to Reducing Partisan Animosity
Christopher Bryan; Cameron Hecht; Maytal Saar-Tsechansky; David Yeager; Mac Clapper
The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin

Participants read about how the news media creates political division and outrage to maximize its audience. They are provided with quotes from books along these lines. Data are provided that show the more news media one watches, the more inaccurate and exaggerated their perceptions of the other side. Instructions are provided on how to take control back from the media and participants are asked to provide advice to others on how to do this. Participants thus learn that the media has caused perceived divisions that are, in reality, much less stark. Finally, participants reflect on actions they can take in response.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/yrbk2t6e

Short Title: Misperception Competition
Submitters' Title: Correcting Inaccurate Group Meta-Perceptions Reduces Polarization
Jeffrey Lees; Mina Cikara
Clemson University; Harvard University

Participants read about actions their party might take to gain an electoral advantage (e.g., drawing voting districts to their advantage). They then estimate how much the other party would oppose those actions e. Next, they learn that the average member of the other party typically is less opposed than most would estimate. Participants thus learn that the other party is not as against their party as they may have thought.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/2p9mb4x9

Short Title: Misperception Democratic
Submitters' Title: Correcting Overestimates of Opposing Partisans' Willingness to Break Democratic Norms
Alia Braley; Gabriel Lenz; Dhaval Adjodah; Hossein Rahnama; Alex Pentland
University of California, Berkeley; University of California, Berkeley; MIT Media Lab; Toronto Metropolitan University; MIT Connection Science

Participants are told that most people do not know much about the other party. They are then asked to guess what people from the other party believe when it comes to actions that undermine how democracy works (e.g., using violence to block laws, reducing the number of polling stations to help the other party, or not accepting the results of elections if they lose). Participants answer eight such questions. After each, they receive the correct answer – that is, they are told what the other party actually believes, based on recent surveys. The answers make clear the other party does not support actions that undermine democracy. They thus learn the other party supports maintaining key elements of democracy.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/5bwtm7hz

Short Title: Misperception Film

Submitters' Title: Reducing Political Polarization by Correcting Erroneous Meta-Perceptions: A Video Intervention
Samantha Moore-Berg; Michael Pasek; Rebecca Littman; Roman Gallardo; Nour Kteily
University of Pennsylvania; Beyond Conflict; The New School for Social Research; Beyond Conflict; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University

Participants watch a video showing some Democrats and Republicans reacting to survey findings on how much Democrats and Republicans actually agree on some issues (e.g., views on how much to open borders to immigrants). The partisans in the video learn that the extent to which Democrats and Republicans agree is much more than they expected. This can help participants learn that Americans tend to overestimate the extent to which partisans disagree. The viewers thus learn that partisans are not nearly as different as they typically think.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/6rht98vc

Short Title: Misperception Suffering
Submitters' Title: Reducing False Beliefs About Outgroup Members' Willingness to Sacrifice Large-Scale Suffering for Political Gain
Charles Dorison; Nour Kteily
Kellogg School of Management; Kellogg School of Management

Participants are asked to predict how people from the other party would have responded to a series of questions (e.g., rushing the COVID-19 vaccine for political gain). They then are informed of the actual answers from the other party, and how much they mis-estimated the beliefs for the other party (i.e., making them more extreme than they actually are). They also read actual comments from those from the other party. Participants thus learn that many overestimate how people from the other party prioritize their political gains at the expense of large-scale suffering.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/4jw7t59u

Short Title: Moral Differences
Submitters' Title: Uncovering the Psychological Roots of Political Divides
Caroline Mehl; Mylien Duong; Macrina Dieffenbach; Lauren Alpert Maurer
OpenMind; OpenMind; Facebook; OpenMind

Participants read about how our brain works and how the same information can be interpreted differently by different individuals. Participants also learn about Moral Foundation Theory, which argues that we all share the same six moral foundations when interpreting information, but use them differently on different issues (i.e., some people consider "loyalty" more, while others consider "fairness" more). Participants then read conversation on abortion and gun control from two speakers who use the same set of moral foundations overall but use different foundations on each issue. Participants thus learn that we all actually share the same set of moral foundations.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/2nvp8wmk

Short Title: Outparty Friendship
Submitters' Title: Thinking of Friends From Other Party De-polarizes
Matthew Levendusky
University of Pennsylvania

Participants are asked to think about one person from the other party that they like and respect (and if none, then one they view most positively). They then are asked to reflect on and write about why they feel that way about the person. They answer a question about who the person is (e.g., friend, family member, co-worker), and how close they are to the person. Participants thus think about an individual positive example of the other party.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/3j5ceptm

Short Title: Partisan Threat
Submitters' Title: Reducing Partisan Threat Perceptions
Matthew Hall; Wayde Marsh; Levi Allen; James Kirk
University of Notre Dame; University of Notre Dame; University of Notre Dame; University of Notre Dame

Participants read about how their party is dominating American politics (e.g., controlling the three branches of government for Democrat respondents or controlling state government for Republican respondents) and their influence is likely to increase (e.g., having a growing voter base for Democrats, likely to do well in midterms for Republicans). Participants are told the country leans to their party in the foreseeable future. Participants thus may become less threatened by the other party.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/d5nmpk7e

Short Title: Party Overlap
Submitters' Title: Exploring the Nuanced Partisan Overlap Between Political Parties
Victor Allis; Erez Yoeli; Sara Gifford
ActiVote; MIT Sloan School of Management; ActiVote

Participants answer questions about views on eight policies (e.g., over the counter birth control, background checks for gun buying, legalization of marijuana). After each policy question, they are shown the high overlap in the views of Democrats and Republicans. At the end they are shown the average sizeable overlap across other issues which is 69%. They thus learn that the parties share a lot of views.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/3kx9rfvu

Short Title: System Justification
Submitters' Title: Democratic System Justification
Aaron Kay; John T. Jost; Daniela Goya-Tocchetto
Duke University; New York University; Duke University

Participants read an article about how the American system is unique in that people do not turn on one another, instead they stay faithful to the principles of civility and respect even during economic recession, a pandemic, or natural disaster. The article notes people debate and have to deal with media outlets that inflate their differences, but they retain faith in the system and trust in each other. Participants thus learn that the majority of Americans remain committed to values of mutual respect.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/bdj3u2jn

Short Title: Utah Cues
Submitters' Title: One Nation Utah Governor Race Joint PSA
Ben Lyons
University of Utah

Participants watch a video with a Democrat and a Republican candidate who were running against each other to be governor. Each candidate emphasizes that all votes will be counted and they will honor the peaceful transfer of power. They explain that is what the county is built upon. Participants thus learn that office seekers on both sides respect democratic elections.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/3fwvvhe6

Short Title: Violence Efficacy
Submitters' Title: Reducing Support for Partisan Violence by Questioning Efficacy
Peter Felsman; Colleen Seifert
Northern Michigan University; University of Michigan

Participants read a news article about how non-violent protests are much more effective in bringing about change than violent protests. They then answer questions about the article and are asked whether they would advise a political leader to use non-violent or violent tactics. Participants are then asked what they think of the video. Participants thus learn that using violent means to achieve political ends is an ineffective strategy.

Link: https://tinyurl.com/5n74a8av

4. Questionnaire and Procedure

Part A: Pre-Treatment Variables

Participants first completed the Sample Provider Demographic Survey (see items below, I.i-.vii), then proceeded to the main study. The main study involved an informed consent form (II), a page of basic instructions providing full information and offering participants the option to terminate their participation (III), the first measure of attention (IV), followed by an additional measure of party affiliation (V), followed by a measure of strength of party as a social identity (VI).

Next, participants were presented with a short neutral paragraph. This was accompanied, on the same page, by a single multiple-choice question asking what the paragraph was about (VII). Participants who failed to respond correctly to either attention item (IV or VII) were removed from the study at this point.

Participants were next presented with a short video of a beach scene with audio, accompanied by a ten-option multiple choice item asking participants to indicate what they both saw and heard (VIII). This item was a check to ensure all participants would be able to view video and listen to audio before advancing to the condition assignment stage[1]. Participants were not able to proceed until they answered the question correctly. Any combination of the ten items could be selected, making it very unlikely they would be able to guess the 1 out of 1,023 possible correct answers.

[1] Note that some, but not all, interventions required watching a video or listening to a recording. To prevent this from creating differences in the composition of participants across conditions, we required all participants to be able to view video and hear audio before assignment to condition.

(I) Sample Provider Demographics Survey

(a) Items
(The order of the items was randomized.)

(i) What is your age?
(ii) What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
(iii) Which of the following ranges includes your total annual household income from all sources?
(iv) In general, do you think of yourself as ...
(v) Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?
(vi) Are you registered to vote?
(vii) What is your zip code?

(b) Scales
(i) Number
(ii) Less than high school graduate; High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED); Some college credit, no degree; Trade/technical/vocational training; Associate degree; Bachelor's degree; Master's degree; Professional degree; Doctorate degree
(iii) Less than $25,000; $25,000 to $34,999; $35,000 to $49,999; $50,000 to $74,999; $75,000 to $99,999; $100,000 to $124,999; $125,000 to $149,999; $150,000 to $174,999; $175,000 to $199,999; $200,000 to $249,999; $250,000 or more
(iv) Extremely liberal; Liberal; Slightly liberal; Moderate, middle of the road; Slightly conservative; Conservative; Extremely conservative
(v) Strong Republican; Republican; Lean Republican; Independent/ middle of the road; Lean Democrat; Democrat; Strong Democrat
(vi) Yes; No
(vii) Number

(c) Note
The sample provider will also send us a history of attrition variable.

(II) Consent Form

(a) Item

You are invited to participate in a research study that will ask about your opinions and attitudes. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate. There are no risks associated with this study and your identity will be kept confidential. We cannot and do not guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits from this study.

Participation

If you decide to participate in this project, please understand your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time without penalty. The alternative is not to participate. You have the right to refuse to answer particular questions. Your individual privacy will be maintained in all published and written data resulting from the study.

Contact Information

If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this research, its procedures, risks and benefits, contact the Protocol Director, Robb Willer at willer@stanford.edu. If you wish to contact someone independent of the researchers, you may email the Stanford Institutional Review Board at irb2-manager@lists.stanford.edu.

If you agree to participate in this research, please click to the next screen and complete the questionnaire.

(III) Filter Item

(a) Items
You will need to qualify for this study. You will find out if you qualify shortly.

This study takes about 12-15 min to complete. It has several sections requiring attention.

Because participating until the very end of this study and answering all questions is the only way we can use your responses, it is very important to us that you help and answer the following questions honestly.

Do you agree to pay attention and participate in all sections of this study?

(b) Scales
(i) Yes; No

(IV) Demographics and Attention Check 1 Survey Items

(a) Items

(i) What is your gender?
(ii) Please select which race / ethnicity you identify as. (Please select all that apply.)
(iii) To help us keep track of who is paying attention, please select "Somewhat disagree" in the options below.
(iv) Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

(b) Scales

(i) Male; Female; Other [text box]
(ii) White / Caucasian; Black / African American; Hispanic / Latino; Asian / Asian American; Other [text box]
(iii) Strongly agree; Agree; Somewhat agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree
(iv) Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other [text box]

(V) Party Identification

(a) Items
(i.a) Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
(i.b) Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
(i.c) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?

(b) Scales
(i.a) Strong Republican; Not very strong Republican
(i.b) Strong Democrat; Not very strong Democrat
(i.c) Closer to Republican Party; Neither; Closer to Democratic Party

(VI) Strength of Party as a Social Identity

Note: On this and the following pages, text in square brackets is conditional on participants' party identification. The text before the "/" will be shown to Republican participants. The text after the "/" wil be shown to Democratic participants. If other conditions are used, this will be specifically noted.

(a) Items
(i) How important is being a [Republican/Democrat] to you?

(b) Scales
(i) 101-point scale from "Not important at all" to "Moderately important" to "Extremely important"

(c) Additional Instructions
Below is a range from 0 to 100 indicating how important this is to you. Click on any space within this range and a bar will appear. Feel free to move that bar around to the number that best represents your answer.

(VII) Attention Check Item 2

(a) Items

(i) Please read the following short article.

Officials in a midsize town have been working for four years on a plan to produce an event license to cover all of the major events that occur at the town's local stadium, which hosts concerts and home sports games. The application would be submitted each January and list all events expected to occur at the stadium over the next 12 months. If an unlisted event emerges during the year, lawmakers could hold a special hearing on the event, or accept it without a hearing and add it into the existing license. To assist with this plan, lawmakers filed legislation that would change state licensing laws so that annual event licenses will expire within one year. "This makes a minor change to current law, which provides that all licenses issued shall expire on December 31 of each year," a lawmaker said.

What was the topic of the short article you just read about?

(b) Scales

(i) Medical funding; Event licensing; Political polarization; City budgeting; Election monitoring policy; Campaign finance reform

(VIII) Video and Audio Check Items

(a) Items

(i) Please watch the following video, and make sure your sound is turned on. Please pay attention to both the visual and audio as we will ask you about them after you watch.

[Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=eu9cNZYkbMA]

Below, select the best answers to both what you see and what you hear in the video above. Note that there could be more than one visual or audio option that applies.

(b) Scales

(i) Saw rocks in sand; Saw birds flying above waves; Saw people playing on beach; Saw waves crashing; Saw a large boat; heard people speaking; heard birds calling; heard ocean waves; heard dogs barking; heard a lighthouse horn

c) Error Message

(i) Your answer was incorrect. Please rewatch the video, and make sure your sound is turned on. Note, there could be more than one visual and one audio options that apply.

Part B: Transition from Demographics to Intervention

All participants see a short transition between the demographics and filters to the next section of the study.

(a) Instructions

Congratulations, you have qualified for the full study!

As you proceed to the next section, please make sure you do not close out of this tab. You must complete the whole study to collect your payment.

I understand I must complete the full study to collect my full earnings

Part C: Interventions

At this stage participants were randomized to one of the 27 conditions (25 experimental conditions, 1 null control, 1 alternative control). All 27 conditions are explained in the above "Interventions" section.

Part D: Transition from Intervention to Dependent Variables

After their respective condition, and directly after the audio/video check for those in the Pure Control, participants proceeded to the outcome variables.

(a) Instructions

You are now moving on to a different section of the study.

Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.

Thank you.

Part E: Post-Treatment Variables

The outcome measures were asked in multiple separate sections, and orders were randomized *within* their respective section, but not between. These outcomes were organized as:

1. Primary Dependent Variables
    a. Partisan Animosity
    b. Anti Democratic Attitudes
    c. Support for Partisan Violence
2. Secondary Dependent Variables
    a. Support for Undemocratic Candidates
    b. Opposition to Democratic Reform
3. Tertiary Dependent Variables
    a. Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts
    b. Attitudinal Extremity
    c. Opposition to Bipartisanship
    d. Partisan Animosity - Voters and Politicians
    e. Voting Intentions
    f. Social Distrust
    g. Social Distance
4. Mediators
5. Quaternary Dependent Variables

Part E1: Primary Dependent Variables

The order of the DVs was randomized.

(I) Partisan Animosity

(a) Items
(The order of the items will be randomized.)

(i) We would like to get your feelings toward both Democrats and Republicans. We would like you to rate them using something we call the feeling thermometer.

Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward them. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward them and that you don't care too much for them. You would rate them at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward them.

[Add graphic]

(i.a) How would you rate Republicans?
(i.b) How would you rate Democrats?

(ii) You have been anonymously and randomly matched with another participant who identifies as a [Democrat/Republican].
You have been given 50 cents. You will now decide how to split these 50 cents between yourself and the [Democratic/Republican] participant. You can give any amount between 0 cents and 50 cents to the other participant. The other participant cannot affect the outcome you choose.

For example:
- If you give 0 cents, you will end up with 50 cents and the [Democratic/Republican] participant will end up with 0 cents.
- If you give 50 cents, you will end up with 0 cents and the [Democratic/Republican] participant will end up with 50 cents.

How many cents (if any) will you give to the [Democratic/Republican] participant?

(b) Scale
(i) 101-point scale from “Very cold or unfavorable feeling” to “No feeling at all” to “Very warm or favorable feeling”
(ii) 51-point scale from “0 cents” to “25 cents” to “50 cents”

(II) Support for Undemocratic Practices

(a) Items
(The order of the items will be randomized.)

Please indicate how much you disagree or agree with each of the following statements.
(i) [Republicans/Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Democrats/Republicans].
(ii) [Republican/Democratic] governors should ignore unfavorable court rulings by [Democrat/Republican]-appointed judges.
(iii) [Republican/Democratic] governors should prosecute journalists who accuse [Republican/Democratic] politicians of misconduct without revealing sources.
(iv) [Republicans/Democrats] should not accept the results of elections if they lose.

(b) Scale
101-point scale from "Strongly disagree" to "Neither disagree nor agree" to "Strongly agree"

(III) Support for Partisan Violence

(a) Items
(The order of the items will be randomized.)

Please answer the following questions.
(i) When, if ever, is it OK for [Republicans/Democrats] to send threatening and intimidating messages to [Democratic/Republican] party leaders?
(ii) When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary [Republican/Democrat] in the public to harass an ordinary [Democrat/Republican] on the Internet, in a way that makes the target feel frightened?
(iii) How much do you feel it is justified for [Republicans/Democrats] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?
(iv) How much do you feel it is justified for [Republicans/Democrats] to use violence if the [Democratic/Republican] party wins more races in the next election?

(b) Scale
(i-ii) 101-point scale from "Never" to "Always"
(iii - iv) 101-point scale from "Not justified at all" to "Moderately justified" to "Extremely justified"

Part E2: Secondary Dependent Variables

The order of the DVs will be randomized.

(IV) Support for Undemocratic Candidates

(a) Items
For the next series of questions, please imagine a [Republican/Democratic] candidate runs for office against a [Democratic/Republican] candidate.

(i) How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican/Democratic] candidate said that [Republicans/Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Democrats/Republicans]?
(ii) How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican/Democratic] candidate said that [Republican/Democratic] governors should ignore unfavorable court rulings by [Democratic/Republican]-appointed judges?
(iii) How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican/Democratic] candidate said that [Republican/Democratic] governors should prosecute journalists who accuse [Republican/Democratic] politicians of misconduct without revealing sources?
(iv) How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican/Democratic] candidate said that [Republicans/Democrats] should not accept the results of elections they lose?

(b) Scale
101-point scale from "Definitely vote for the [Democratic/Republican] candidate" to "Equally likely to vote for either candidate" to "Definitely vote for the [Republican/Democratic] candidate"

(V) Opposition to Democratic Reform

(a) Items
Please indicate how much you oppose or support the following policies.

(i) Automatically registering eligible Americans to vote
(ii) Requiring that voters must present a government-issued photo identification in order to vote
(iii) Allowing any eligible citizen to vote by mail
(iv) Banning "partisan gerrymandering" by creating independent commissions to draw the lines of legislative and congressional districts in all states

(b) Scale
101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Neither oppose nor support" to "Strongly support"

Part E3: Tertiary DVs

The order of the DVs will be randomized.

(VI) Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts

(a) Items
[Republicans will see items R.i - R.iv; Democrats will see items D.i - D.iv)
(The order of the items will be randomized.)

In this task, we will ask you to give us your opinion about various claims. The claims are statements that may be true or may be false. The truth or falsity of the statements has been determined by real-world sources.

What is the likelihood that the following statements are true?

Please choose a point that best describes your view on the below scale that goes from 0% (certainly false) to 100% (certainly true).

Statement:
(D.i) During Donald Trump's presidency, there was the lowest rate of Black people and Hispanics in poverty since these data began being collected in 1966.
(D.ii) The Trump administration deported fewer undocumented immigrants in its first three years than the Obama administration did in its first three years.
(D.iii) During Donald Trump's presidency, the unemployment rate reached its lowest level since 1969.
(D.iv) Donald Trump was lawfully elected President in the 2016 election against Hillary Clinton.
(R.i) The vast majority (more than 90%) of climate scientists believe that climate change is an established fact and that it is most likely caused by human-made emissions.
(R.ii) The crime rate among illegal immigrants is lower than the crime rate among American citizens.
(R.iii) White Americans own homes at a higher rate than Black Americans, and this gap is larger now than it was in the late 1960s.
(R.iv) Joe Biden was lawfully elected President in the 2020 election against Donald Trump.

(b) Scale
101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”

(VII) Attitudinal Extremity

(a) Items
(The order of the items will be randomized.)

Please indicate how much you oppose or support the following political positions.

Reducing access to abortion
Providing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants
Increasing restrictions on gun ownership
Increasing government regulations to protect the environment
Raising taxes on the wealthiest Americans
Expanding Medicaid to cover all currently uninsured Americans

(b) Scale
101-point scale from “Strongly oppose” to “Neither oppose nor support” to “Strongly support”

(VIII) Opposition to Bipartisanship

(a) Item
(i) To what extent would you like to see Democratic and Republican elected representatives work together?
(ii) To what extent would you like the Democratic and Republican parties to cooperate more, even if it means compromising on issues you care about?

(b) Scale
101-point scale from “Not at all” to “A great deal”

(IX) Partisan Animosity - Voters and Politicians

(a) Items
(The order of the items will be randomized.)

(i) We would like to get your feelings toward the following groups. We would like you to rate them using something we call the feeling thermometer.

Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward them. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward them and that you don't care too much for them. You would rate them at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward them.

[Add graphic]

(i) How would you rate [Democratic / Republican] voters?
(ii) How would you rate [Democratic / Republican] politicians?

(b) Scale
(i) 101-point scale from “Very cold or unfavorable feeling” to “No feeling at all” to “Very warm or favorable feeling”

(X) Voting Intentions

(a) Items
(i) In the general 2024 presidential election, which party's candidate do you plan to vote for?

(b) Scale
The Republican Party candidate; The Democratic Party candidate; An Independent candidate; Another candidate; I am undecided; I would not vote

(XI) Social Distrust

(a) Items
(i) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

(b) Scale
(i) 101-point scale from “Need to be very careful” to “Most people can be trusted”

(XII) Social Distance

(a) Items
(i) How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are [Democrats/Republicans]?
(ii) How comfortable are you having neighbors on your street who are [Democrats/Republicans]?

(b) Scale
(i-ii) 101-point scale from "Not comfortable at all" to "Moderately comfortable" to "Extremely comfortable"

Part E4: Mediators

After the three levels of dependent variables, participants were also asked a series of questions to get a sense of the mechanisms through which any effect (if observed) was operating.

(a) Items
(I) How similar are you to [Democrats/Republicans]?
(II) How important is being a [Republican/Democrat] to you?
(III) How much anger do you feel toward [Democrats/Republicans]?
(IV) How much empathy do you feel toward [Democrats/Republicans]?
(V) To what extent should Democrats and Republicans see themselves as united against a common enemy?
(VI) To what extent do you view [Democrats/Republicans] as a serious threat to the country's well-being?

(b) Scales
(i) 101-point scale from “Not similar at all” to “Moderately similar” to “Extremely similar”
(ii) 101-point scale from “Not important at all” to “Moderately important” to “Extremely important”
(iii) 101-point scale from “No anger at all” to “A moderate amount of anger” to “A great deal of anger”
(iv) 101-point scale from “No empathy at all” to “A moderate amount of empathy” to “A great deal of empathy”
(v) 101-point scale from “Not at all” to “A moderate amount” to “A great deal”
(vi) 101-point scale from “Not at all” to “A moderate amount” to “A great deal”

Part E5: Quaternary Dependent Variable

The last item asked was deliberately left to the end of the survey as it was least relevant to the overall focus of the project. It focused on covid vaccine intentions and was added in an explicit exploratory manner.

(a) Item
(i) If periodic booster shots are needed in the future to prevent the spread of COVID-19, how likely are you to get the booster shots?

(b) Scale
101-point scale from “0% extremely unlikely” to “100% extremely likely”

5. Reliability Estimates for Outcome Variables

Table S5.1: *Reliability Estimates of Outcome Variables*

Intervention	Full Sample	Democrats	Republicans
Partisan Animosity	0.56	0.56	0.56
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.80	0.82	0.78
Support for Partisan Violence	0.95	0.96	0.95
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.92	0.92	0.91
Opposition to Bipartisanship	0.83	0.83	0.83
Social Distrust	-	-	-
Social Distance	0.93	0.92	0.94
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-	0.69	0.65

Notes. Reliability is estimated with the Spearman-Brown coefficient for two item scales (partisan animosity, opposition to bipartisanship, and social distance) and with Cronbach's alpha for the other scales. There is no reliability estimate for social distrust because it was measured with a single item. There is no reliability estimate for biased evaluation of politicized facts for the full sample because we used different items for Democrats and Republicans.

6. Sample

The target sample for the study was 31,000 completed responses from American partisans (defined below). Partisans were defined as participants who identified as Democrats, Independents leaning Democrat, Republicans, pr Independents leaning Republican. True independents or political "others" were not included. Data collection was managed by Bovitz-Forthright, coordinating with the two additional sample providers: Luth and Dynata. Participants were recruited through three sample providers, Bovitz-Forthright (supplied 19% of the full sample), Luth (18%), and Dynata (63%) to achieve the target sample size. Data collection stopped after 31,000 participants fully completed the survey (not counting those who attrited from the study and were later recaptured, nor those who attrited and were not recaptured). Participants did not count towards the target of 31,000 if they: (i) answered any of the pre-specified attention checks incorrectly, (ii) identified as true Independents or political "other", (iii) took the survey more than once[2] (as defined by participants' IDs; keeping only the first case), (iv) are identified as using Internet Explorer (as it created technical issues with some interventions), or (v) did not complete the full survey.

The sample was designed to be representative of American partisans on key demographics. Specifically, the sample was quota-matched for: age, gender, race, education (within the groups of Democrats and Republicans; see the table below), with all demographic filtering implemented by the sample providers. With regard to partisan identity, targets were 50% Democrat (or leaning Democrat) and 50% Republican (or leaning Republican). Within each group, we targeted 45-55% identifying as strong partisans, 20-30% identifying as weak partisans,

[2] Individuals who participated on multiple platforms were identified by Bovitz-Forthright and removed using a combination of IP addresses and cookies.

and 20-30% identifying as independents who lean toward the specific parties. These numbers are based on ANES data (here).

We attempted to maximize data collection in the first 13 days to have sufficient power to estimate effect sizes for all 25 conditions and then select the interventions that would be included in the durability data collection (Wave 2). To ensure a two week period for each participant between Waves 1 and 2, we began contacting for Wave 2 before all of Wave 1 was completed . We thus aimed for 70+% data collection target in the first two weeks to best estimate top-performing interventions to study in the durability test. On Day 14 of Wave 1, we began the process of recontacting individuals from the subset of conditions selected for the ave 2 survey. These participants completed a short, follow-up survey as described below in the “Durability test” section.

Table S6.1: *Demographics - Targeted Quotas and Achieved Quotas*

	Targeted Quotas		Achieved Quotas	
Variable	Republican	Democrats	Republican	Democrats
Gender				
Female	47%	57%	51%	56%
Male	53%	43%	48%	43%
Other	-	-	0%	1%
Age				
18-24	7%	13%	4%	8%
25-34	14%	17%	12%	17%
35-44	16%	17%	16%	20%
45-54	17%	15%	18%	16%
55-64	21%	17%	23%	18%
65-75	16%	15%	21%	17%
75+	9%	5%	5%	4%
Ethnicity				
White (non-Hispanic)	82%	54%	86%	62%
Black (non-Hispanic)	3%	20%	2%	17%
Hispanic	8%	16%	7%	12%
Asian / Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander	3%	5%	2%	5%
Native American / Alaskan Native	2%	2%	1%	0%
Multiple Races (non-Hispanic)	2%	4%	2%	2%
Other	-	-	1%	1%
Education				
No high school degree	7%	7%	2%	1%
High school graduate	28%	24%	19%	16%
Some college	32%	26%	38%	36%
Bachelor's degree	23%	26%	27%	29%
Graduate degree	11%	17%	14%	18%
Strength of Partisan Identity				
Leaner	20-30%	20-30%	14%	13%
Not Strong	20-30%	20-30%	33%	31%
Strong	45-55%	45-55%	53%	56%
Sample size	15,500	15,500	15,726	16,333

Notes. The targeted quotas are based on the 2020 survey of the American National Election Study.

7. Targeted Outcomes

Table S7.1: *Targeted Outcomes by Submitter Features*

Group	n	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence
All Submissions	252	216	131	167
Practitioners	56	55	27	33
Communication	19	18	10	14
Economics	16	14	6	7
Political Science	60	47	36	38
Psychology	107	90	57	75
Sociology	22	18	15	17
Other Research	45	35	22	30
Other	30	29	16	22
Selected Submissions	25	24	12	16
Practitioners	4	4	2	3
Communication	3	2	2	3
Economics	2	2	1	1
Political Science	6	6	3	3
Psychology	15	14	4	8
Sociology	1	1	1	1
Other Research	4	3	1	3
Other	3	3	2	2

Note. A submission is counted for a subgroup if at least one member self-identified as belonging to this category. For example, a submission counts as a practitioner submission if at least one self-identified practitioner belongs to that category.

8. Descriptive Statistics

Table S8.1: *Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition*

Intervention	Partisan Animosity		Support for Undemocratic Practices		Support for Partisan Violence	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Null Control	68.07	20.46	26.51	23.20	10.85	20.26
Alternative Control	66.29	20.36	25.78	23.53	11.56	20.98
Befriending Meditation	62.45	20.15	26.65	23.84	11.27	20.90
Chatbot Quiz	64.89	19.17	27.23	22.58	10.12	18.32
Civity Storytelling	59.17	19.85	25.78	23.74	11.31	21.99
Common Identity	59.02	19.11	24.91	22.90	10.16	19.63
Contact Project	57.38	19.41	25.99	23.19	10.52	21.15
Counterfactual Selves	66.29	20.27	27.94	22.43	11.11	19.61
Democratic Fear	63.40	19.60	22.02	23.65	13.15	21.93
Economic Interest	66.95	19.86	28.29	24.22	10.89	20.07
Empathy Beliefs	60.79	18.56	27.17	22.75	11.65	21.69
Epistemic Rescue	64.00	19.53	26.83	22.62	10.70	19.38
Harmful Experiences	66.23	20.53	26.92	23.35	10.78	20.23
Inparty Elites	65.74	19.69	25.92	22.59	9.37	18.56
Learning Goals	62.69	19.85	26.35	23.30	9.62	19.60
Media Trust	57.94	18.85	27.89	23.50	11.37	20.76
Misperception Competition	65.07	19.91	27.14	23.01	9.99	19.59
Misperception Democratic	61.91	19.40	20.93	23.01	9.26	19.86
Misperception Film	60.00	19.75	24.25	21.42	7.69	16.07
Misperception Suffering	62.04	20.65	28.42	23.58	11.81	21.18
Moral Differences	62.89	19.25	27.72	22.34	11.65	19.84
Outparty Friendship	62.97	21.39	28.58	24.13	12.24	22.06
Partisan Threat	68.86	19.80	28.32	23.73	10.12	18.60
Party Overlap	64.65	19.04	27.48	22.28	11.05	19.66
System Justification	65.84	19.92	27.15	22.97	11.22	20.12
Utah Cues	66.13	20.62	24.72	22.11	9.00	17.91
Violence Efficacy	66.93	20.56	26.19	22.73	11.37	20.55

Table S8.1: *Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition (continued)*

Intervention	Support for Undemocratic Candidates		Opposition to Bipartisanship		Social Distrust	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Null Control	52.48	23.60	20.88	21.74	53.48	27.70
Alternative Control	51.99	23.55	21.68	22.42	52.81	27.81
Befriending Meditation	53.25	24.42	20.45	21.10	51.47	27.33
Chatbot Quiz	51.91	23.05	20.21	20.21	52.53	26.45
Civity Storytelling	51.41	23.76	18.68	20.54	49.50	27.56
Common Identity	49.86	23.02	19.77	21.12	49.62	27.38
Contact Project	50.49	22.50	19.64	21.02	52.10	27.23
Counterfactual Selves	55.06	23.02	21.27	22.35	53.30	27.66
Democratic Fear	48.29	24.73	19.30	21.14	50.47	27.06
Economic Interest	53.42	23.98	21.48	22.41	53.55	27.08
Empathy Beliefs	52.44	22.19	21.54	22.21	52.35	27.90
Epistemic Rescue	51.51	23.53	21.06	21.87	52.44	26.30
Harmful Experiences	52.39	23.44	19.86	21.67	53.09	28.04
Inparty Elites	51.45	23.14	20.42	20.45	52.74	26.78
Learning Goals	52.06	23.69	20.81	21.23	52.37	26.64
Media Trust	49.81	22.97	18.31	20.06	49.57	27.41
Misperception Competition	53.67	23.08	20.15	21.00	52.50	28.13
Misperception Democratic	48.35	23.74	19.94	21.4	51.20	28.58
Misperception Film	52.27	23.19	19.09	20.94	51.15	27.91
Misperception Suffering	53.58	22.93	21.49	21.85	52.36	26.63
Moral Differences	51.94	22.85	22.09	22.00	50.24	27.63
Outparty Friendship	53.24	24.43	20.57	22.21	52.49	27.62
Partisan Threat	54.07	24.59	22.63	22.41	53.16	26.95
Party Overlap	53.22	22.68	22.92	22.2	52.16	27.29
System Justification	53.08	23.57	21.36	22.50	51.50	27.22
Utah Cues	51.75	23.90	19.69	21.98	54.48	27.72
Violence Efficacy	52.87	23.39	20.57	21.63	52.28	28.11

Table S8.1: *Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition (continued)*

Intervention	Social Distance		Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Null Control	30.73	27.15	51.62	21.52
Alternative Control	30.92	27.47	51.57	21.46
Befriending Meditation	29.06	26.06	51.16	21.25
Chatbot Quiz	31.90	27.09	50.77	20.43
Civity Storytelling	27.39	26.14	50.01	21.04
Common Identity	28.42	26.65	49.06	20.57
Contact Project	29.57	26.12	51.68	20.64
Counterfactual Selves	31.54	27.25	52.14	21.16
Democratic Fear	29.01	27.33	50.83	21.39
Economic Interest	30.87	27.35	52.15	21.64
Empathy Beliefs	30.97	27.25	50.40	21.74
Epistemic Rescue	29.18	25.47	51.86	20.29
Harmful Experiences	30.86	28.59	51.87	22.12
Inparty Elites	31.82	26.73	52.01	21.52
Learning Goals	28.93	26.83	52.35	22.29
Media Trust	26.98	25.96	49.74	21.03
Misperception Competition	28.56	26.82	51.39	20.61
Misperception Democratic	27.86	26.00	49.52	21.41
Misperception Film	27.14	26.60	52.06	20.78
Misperception Suffering	29.42	26.68	51.23	21.34
Moral Differences	30.28	26.68	51.69	21.40
Outparty Friendship	30.42	27.27	51.67	22.81
Partisan Threat	30.47	26.26	51.05	21.16
Party Overlap	31.60	26.88	53.91	20.85
System Justification	30.73	27.93	52.04	21.23
Utah Cues	29.93	27.19	52.11	21.13
Violence Efficacy	30.66	26.78	50.15	21.51

9. Correlations between Outcomes

Table S9.1: *Zero-Order Correlations between Outcomes in Null Control Condition*

	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OB	SDT	SD	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	-0.05	-0.20	0.19	0.14	0.22	0.33	0.34
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	-0.05	1.00	0.60	0.42	0.27	0.00	0.21	0.07
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.20	0.60	1.00	0.30	0.23	-0.13	0.16	-0.14
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.19	0.42	0.30	1.00	0.21	0.04	0.26	0.19
Opposition to Bipartisanship (OB)	0.14	0.27	0.23	0.21	1.00	0.13	0.37	0.18
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.22	0.00	-0.13	0.04	0.13	1.00	0.19	0.18
Social Distance (SD)	0.33	0.21	0.16	0.26	0.37	0.19	1.00	0.30
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.34	0.07	-0.14	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.30	1.00

Notes. We used pairwise correlations.

10. Results of Preregistered Analyses: Interventions vs Null Control

Table S10.1: *Effects on Partisan Animosity*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	52.73	0.75	70.39	<.001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	-1.77	0.69	-2.57	0.010	-0.09
Befriending Meditation	-5.23	0.72	-7.25	<.001	-0.26
Chatbot Quiz	-3.26	0.65	-5.05	<.001	-0.16
Civity Storytelling	-9.03	0.69	-13.01	<.001	-0.45
Common Identity	-9.20	0.64	-14.34	<.001	-0.46
Contact Project	-10.47	0.70	-15.02	<.001	-0.53
Counterfactual Selves	-1.76	0.66	-2.65	0.004	-0.09
Democratic Fear	-4.76	0.67	-7.16	<.001	-0.24
Economic Interest	-1.19	0.67	-1.77	0.038	-0.06
Empathy Beliefs	-7.03	0.67	-10.45	<.001	-0.35
Epistemic Rescue	-4.05	0.66	-6.10	<.001	-0.20
Harmful Experiences	-2.06	0.66	-3.10	0.001	-0.10
Inparty Elites	-2.15	0.65	-3.33	<.001	-0.11
Learning Goals	-5.37	0.72	-7.49	<.001	-0.27
Media Trust	-10.22	0.65	-15.60	<.001	-0.51
Misperception Competition	-2.97	0.65	-4.60	<.001	-0.15
Misperception Democratic	-6.08	0.64	-9.47	<.001	-0.30
Misperception Film	-8.16	0.65	-12.46	<.001	-0.41
Misperception Suffering	-6.00	0.69	-8.72	<.001	-0.30
Moral Differences	-5.14	0.66	-7.83	<.001	-0.26
Outparty Friendship	-5.21	0.72	-7.25	<.001	-0.26
Partisan Threat	0.61	0.65	0.94	0.827	0.03

Table S10.1: *Effects on Partisan Animosity (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	-3.43	0.63	-5.42	<.001	-0.17
System Justification	-2.29	0.65	-3.53	<.001	-0.11
Utah Cues	-2.00	0.66	-3.02	0.001	-0.10
Violence Efficacy	-0.87	0.71	-1.22	0.112	-0.04
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.24	0.23	5.47	<.001	
Other	6.41	1.50	4.28	<.001	
Age	0.13	0.01	17.72	<.001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	0.74	0.68	1.09	0.276	
LatinX	1.14	0.81	1.41	0.158	
Other	0.38	0.72	0.52	0.600	
White	0.84	0.59	1.44	0.149	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	0.45	0.34	1.36	0.175	
Some college	0.19	0.27	0.69	0.492	
Postgraduate	-1.78	0.35	-5.11	<.001	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	-0.18	0.23	-0.78	0.436	
Party as a Social Identity	0.10	0.00	21.67	<.001	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	0.93	0.29	3.21	0.001	
Luth	2.11	0.36	5.89	<.001	

Table S10.2: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	22.32	0.83	27.04	<.001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	-0.50	0.76	-0.66	0.509	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.40	0.81	-0.50	0.310	-0.02
Chatbot Quiz	0.68	0.73	0.93	0.825	0.03
Civity Storytelling	-1.27	0.76	-1.67	0.048	-0.06
Common Identity	-1.63	0.72	-2.28	0.011	-0.07
Contact Project	-0.99	0.77	-1.29	0.099	-0.04
Counterfactual Selves	0.94	0.71	1.33	0.908	0.04
Democratic Fear	-4.74	0.76	-6.22	<.001	-0.21
Economic Interest	1.39	0.77	1.8	0.964	0.06
Empathy Beliefs	0.08	0.76	0.10	0.542	0.00
Epistemic Rescue	0.36	0.74	0.49	0.689	0.02
Harmful Experiences	0.09	0.71	0.12	0.548	0.00
Inparty Elites	-0.89	0.71	-1.25	0.105	-0.04
Learning Goals	-0.59	0.79	-0.75	0.228	-0.03
Media Trust	1.52	0.75	2.01	0.978	0.07
Misperception Competition	0.29	0.72	0.41	0.658	0.01
Misperception Democratic	-5.76	0.73	-7.93	<.001	-0.25
Misperception Film	-2.24	0.69	-3.25	0.001	-0.10
Misperception Suffering	1.62	0.75	2.16	0.984	0.07
Moral Differences	0.58	0.72	0.81	0.791	0.03
Outparty Friendship	1.85	0.77	2.39	0.992	0.08
Partisan Threat	1.69	0.74	2.28	0.989	0.07

Table S10.2: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	0.7	0.7	0.99	0.840	0.03
System Justification	0.43	0.71	0.61	0.730	0.02
Utah Cues	-2.17	0.69	-3.14	0.001	-0.09
Violence Efficacy	-0.33	0.74	-0.44	0.330	-0.01
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.32	0.25	5.27	<.001	
Other	-6.09	1.68	-3.63	<.001	
Age	-0.27	0.01	-33.28	<.001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.92	0.77	2.5	0.013	
LatinX	-0.69	0.91	-0.76	0.448	
Other	-3.97	0.83	-4.81	<.001	
White	-5.01	0.67	-7.52	<.001	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	5.7	0.37	15.47	<.001	
Some college	2.02	0.3	6.75	<.001	
Postgraduate	0.75	0.39	1.92	0.055	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	7.96	0.25	31.33	<.001	
Party as a Social Identity	0.21	0	45.26	<.001	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	1.87	0.32	5.91	<.001	
Luth	0.49	0.39	1.27	0.204	

Table S10.3: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	17.6	0.79	22.31	<.001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	0.71	0.68	1.04	0.300	0.04
Befriending Meditation	-0.50	0.70	-0.72	0.237	-0.02
Chatbot Quiz	-0.64	0.60	-1.06	0.145	-0.03
Civity Storytelling	0.20	0.71	0.28	0.612	0.01
Common Identity	-0.65	0.62	-1.06	0.145	-0.03
Contact Project	-0.82	0.70	-1.16	0.122	-0.04
Counterfactual Selves	-0.21	0.62	-0.34	0.366	-0.01
Democratic Fear	2.29	0.70	3.28	0.999	0.11
Economic Interest	-0.05	0.65	-0.07	0.471	0.00
Empathy Beliefs	0.30	0.72	0.41	0.660	0.01
Epistemic Rescue	-0.20	0.64	-0.31	0.378	-0.01
Harmful Experiences	-0.37	0.63	-0.59	0.277	-0.02
Inparty Elites	-1.56	0.59	-2.64	0.004	-0.08
Learning Goals	-1.49	0.67	-2.22	0.013	-0.07
Media Trust	0.60	0.66	0.90	0.815	0.03
Misperception Competition	-0.94	0.62	-1.52	0.064	-0.05
Misperception Democratic	-1.62	0.62	-2.59	0.005	-0.08
Misperception Film	-2.79	0.55	-5.10	<.001	-0.14
Misperception Suffering	0.76	0.66	1.14	0.873	0.04
Moral Differences	0.39	0.65	0.60	0.726	0.02
Outparty Friendship	1.27	0.70	1.82	0.965	0.06
Partisan Threat	-0.68	0.60	-1.14	0.127	-0.03

Table S10.3: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	0.08	0.63	0.13	0.551	0.00
System Justification	0.34	0.63	0.54	0.704	0.02
Utah Cues	-2.00	0.58	-3.46	<.001	-0.10
Violence Efficacy	0.26	0.67	0.38	0.650	0.01
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	4.50	0.22	20.22	<.001	
Other	0.37	1.54	0.24	0.808	
Age	-0.32	0.01	-42.06	<.001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.31	0.78	1.68	0.093	
LatinX	-0.51	0.91	-0.56	0.575	
Other	-4.31	0.79	-5.46	<.001	
White	-3.24	0.68	-4.78	<.001	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	0.76	0.32	2.34	0.019	
Some college	-1.10	0.26	-4.25	<.001	
Postgraduate	2.26	0.36	6.30	<.001	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	1.11	0.22	4.96	<.001	
Party as a Social Identity	0.12	0.00	29.88	<.001	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	2.04	0.27	7.44	<.001	
Luth	-0.38	0.30	-1.24	0.214	

11. Results for Other Outcomes: Interventions vs Null Control

Table S11.1: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	38.11	0.83	45.86	<.001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	-0.29	0.76	-0.39	0.698	-0.01
Befriending Meditation	0.46	0.82	0.56	0.711	0.02
Chatbot Quiz	-0.57	0.75	-0.76	0.223	-0.02
Civity Storytelling	-1.64	0.77	-2.14	0.016	-0.07
Common Identity	-2.78	0.73	-3.84	<.001	-0.12
Contact Project	-2.37	0.77	-3.08	0.001	-0.10
Counterfactual Selves	2.14	0.72	2.97	0.999	0.09
Democratic Fear	-4.49	0.80	-5.62	<.001	-0.19
Economic Interest	0.53	0.76	0.70	0.757	0.02
Empathy Beliefs	-0.35	0.76	-0.46	0.322	-0.01
Epistemic Rescue	-0.91	0.78	-1.17	0.122	-0.04
Harmful Experiences	-0.41	0.73	-0.56	0.288	-0.02
Inparty Elites	-1.04	0.74	-1.42	0.078	-0.04
Learning Goals	-0.84	0.80	-1.05	0.148	-0.04
Media Trust	-2.70	0.74	-3.64	<.001	-0.11
Misperception Competition	0.79	0.71	1.11	0.867	0.03
Misperception Democratic	-4.17	0.75	-5.60	<.001	-0.18
Misperception Film	-0.33	0.73	-0.45	0.326	-0.01
Misperception Suffering	0.78	0.74	1.06	0.856	0.03
Moral Differences	-1.13	0.75	-1.51	0.065	-0.05
Outparty Friendship	0.48	0.78	0.62	0.732	0.02
Partisan Threat	1.32	0.75	1.76	0.960	0.06

Table S11.1: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	0.57	0.72	0.80	0.788	0.02
System Justification	0.42	0.73	0.58	0.719	0.02
Utah Cues	-1.19	0.75	-1.59	0.056	-0.05
Violence Efficacy	0.38	0.77	0.49	0.689	0.02
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	0.11	0.25	0.44	0.663	
Other	4.52	1.99	2.28	0.023	
Age	-0.20	0.01	-25.09	<.001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	6.06	0.74	8.21	<.001	
LatinX	0.83	0.87	0.95	0.340	
Other	0.77	0.82	0.95	0.344	
White	0.89	0.64	1.38	0.167	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	2.61	0.37	7.09	<.001	
Some college	0.75	0.31	2.40	0.017	
Postgraduate	-0.46	0.40	-1.15	0.249	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	5.13	0.26	19.43	<.001	
Party as a Social Identity	0.30	0.01	58.67	<.001	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	-0.49	0.32	-1.52	0.129	
Luth	-0.07	0.41	-0.16	0.872	

Table S11.2: *Effects on Opposition to Bipartisanship*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	29.59	0.82	36.13	<.001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	0.97	0.76	1.28	0.202	0.05
Befriending Meditation	-0.80	0.75	-1.06	0.144	-0.04
Chatbot Quiz	-0.72	0.67	-1.07	0.142	-0.03
Civity Storytelling	-2.41	0.70	-3.46	<.001	-0.11
Common Identity	-1.08	0.68	-1.57	0.058	-0.05
Contact Project	-1.55	0.75	-2.07	0.019	-0.07
Counterfactual Selves	0.13	0.72	0.18	0.571	0.01
Democratic Fear	-1.53	0.70	-2.20	0.014	-0.07
Economic Interest	0.47	0.75	0.62	0.732	0.02
Empathy Beliefs	0.10	0.77	0.13	0.551	0.00
Epistemic Rescue	0.18	0.74	0.24	0.594	0.01
Harmful Experiences	-1.09	0.70	-1.56	0.060	-0.05
Inparty Elites	-0.75	0.67	-1.11	0.133	-0.03
Learning Goals	-0.30	0.77	-0.39	0.347	-0.01
Media Trust	-2.45	0.68	-3.59	<.001	-0.11
Misperception Competition	-0.87	0.68	-1.27	0.102	-0.04
Misperception Democratic	-1.08	0.70	-1.54	0.062	-0.05
Misperception Film	-1.69	0.69	-2.44	0.007	-0.08
Misperception Suffering	0.31	0.72	0.42	0.664	0.01
Moral Differences	0.67	0.73	0.92	0.820	0.03
Outparty Friendship	-0.22	0.75	-0.30	0.384	-0.01
Partisan Threat	1.68	0.73	2.32	0.990	0.08

Table S11.2: *Effects on Opposition to Bipartisanship (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	1.91	0.73	2.62	0.996	0.09
System Justification	0.34	0.73	0.46	0.677	0.02
Utah Cues	-1.30	0.71	-1.83	0.034	-0.06
Violence Efficacy	-0.20	0.76	-0.26	0.397	-0.01
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.56	0.24	6.38	<.001	
Other	9.84	2.39	4.12	<.001	
Age	-0.28	0.01	-36.0	<.001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	-0.48	0.71	-0.68	0.498	
LatinX	-0.44	0.87	-0.51	0.611	
Other	-2.13	0.80	-2.67	0.008	
White	-2.41	0.62	-3.87	<.001	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	1.80	0.36	4.94	<.001	
Some college	0.20	0.30	0.66	0.507	
Postgraduate	-0.13	0.36	-0.36	0.722	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	6.63	0.25	26.82	<.001	
Party as a Social Identity	0.05	0.00	10.63	<.001	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	-0.45	0.32	-1.43	0.154	
Luth	-1.08	0.39	-2.77	0.006	

Table S11.3: *Effects on Social Distrust*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	62.05	1.01	61.39	<.001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	-0.45	0.96	-0.47	0.640	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-2.37	0.99	-2.4	0.008	-0.09
Chatbot Quiz	-1.14	0.88	-1.29	0.098	-0.04
Civity Storytelling	-4.05	0.95	-4.26	<.001	-0.15
Common Identity	-3.71	0.89	-4.17	<.001	-0.14
Contact Project	-1.73	0.97	-1.78	0.037	-0.06
Counterfactual Selves	-0.31	0.90	-0.34	0.367	-0.01
Democratic Fear	-2.94	0.91	-3.23	0.001	-0.11
Economic Interest	-0.17	0.93	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Empathy Beliefs	-1.82	0.98	-1.86	0.031	-0.07
Epistemic Rescue	-1.05	0.90	-1.17	0.121	-0.04
Harmful Experiences	-0.25	0.92	-0.27	0.394	-0.01
Inparty Elites	-1.31	0.89	-1.47	0.070	-0.05
Learning Goals	-1.38	0.97	-1.43	0.076	-0.05
Media Trust	-3.83	0.92	-4.14	<.001	-0.14
Misperception Competition	-1.24	0.91	-1.36	0.087	-0.05
Misperception Democratic	-2.54	0.93	-2.75	0.003	-0.09
Misperception Film	-2.46	0.92	-2.67	0.004	-0.09
Misperception Suffering	-1.38	0.90	-1.54	0.062	-0.05
Moral Differences	-3.47	0.93	-3.72	<.001	-0.13
Outparty Friendship	-0.84	0.95	-0.89	0.187	-0.03
Partisan Threat	-0.17	0.89	-0.19	0.425	-0.01

Table S11.3: *Effects on Social Distrust (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	-1.44	0.92	-1.57	0.058	-0.05
System Justification	-2.10	0.91	-2.32	0.010	-0.08
Utah Cues	0.92	0.90	1.02	0.847	0.03
Violence Efficacy	-1.21	0.99	-1.23	0.110	-0.04
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	-3.29	0.31	-10.52	<.001	
Other	4.79	2.21	2.17	0.030	
Age	-0.18	0.01	-18.07	<.001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	5.87	0.90	6.51	<.001	
LatinX	2.40	1.06	2.27	0.023	
Other	3.27	0.98	3.32	0.001	
White	0.76	0.77	0.98	0.328	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	6.96	0.47	14.91	<.001	
Some college	4.19	0.38	11.01	<.001	
Postgraduate	-2.27	0.46	-4.91	<.001	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	4.55	0.32	14.08	<.001	
Party as a Social Identity	-0.05	0.01	-8.33	<.001	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	-0.98	0.39	-2.48	0.013	
Luth	0.14	0.50	0.28	0.783	

Table S11.4: *Effects on Social Distance*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	39.15	0.99	39.42	<.001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	0.08	0.93	0.08	0.933	0.00
Befriending Meditation	-2.80	0.91	-3.08	0.001	-0.10
Chatbot Quiz	1.21	0.90	1.35	0.911	0.04
Civity Storytelling	-3.44	0.89	-3.85	<.001	-0.13
Common Identity	-2.34	0.86	-2.73	0.003	-0.09
Contact Project	-2.05	0.92	-2.22	0.013	-0.08
Counterfactual Selves	0.19	0.87	0.22	0.587	0.01
Democratic Fear	-1.89	0.90	-2.11	0.017	-0.07
Economic Interest	-0.06	0.91	-0.07	0.473	0.00
Empathy Beliefs	-0.17	0.92	-0.19	0.424	-0.01
Epistemic Rescue	-1.53	0.86	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Harmful Experiences	-0.20	0.92	-0.22	0.412	-0.01
Inparty Elites	1.05	0.86	1.22	0.890	0.04
Learning Goals	-2.27	0.94	-2.41	0.008	-0.08
Media Trust	-3.85	0.88	-4.38	<.001	-0.14
Misperception Competition	-2.28	0.86	-2.66	0.004	-0.08
Misperception Democratic	-2.73	0.84	-3.24	0.001	-0.10
Misperception Film	-3.15	0.88	-3.60	<.001	-0.12
Misperception Suffering	-1.74	0.87	-1.99	0.023	-0.06
Moral Differences	-0.64	0.88	-0.73	0.233	-0.02
Outparty Friendship	-0.34	0.92	-0.37	0.354	-0.01
Partisan Threat	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.522	0.00

Table S11.4: *Effects on Social Distance (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	0.96	0.88	1.09	0.863	0.04
System Justification	0.22	0.89	0.25	0.600	0.01
Utah Cues	-1.25	0.86	-1.45	0.074	-0.05
Violence Efficacy	-0.27	0.92	-0.30	0.383	-0.01
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	0.57	0.30	1.89	0.059	
Other	25.2	2.37	10.65	<.001	
Age	-0.26	0.01	-27.24	<.001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	-3.00De	0.88	-3.40Het	0.001	
LatinX	-0.86	1.06	-0.81	0.417	
Other	-3.66	0.97	-3.78	<.001	
White	-4.62	0.75	-6.14	<.001	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	1.61	0.45	3.59	<.001	
Some college	-0.22	0.37	-0.59	0.556	
Postgraduate	-1.59	0.44	-3.58	<.001	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	-7.33	0.31	-23.84	<.001	
Party as a Social Identity	0.18	0.01	30.32	<.001	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	-0.47	0.39	-1.21	0.227	
Luth	0.32	0.49	0.65	0.518	

Table S11.5: *Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	38.48	0.80	48.36	<.001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	0.05	0.73	0.07	0.943	0.00
Befriending Meditation	-0.26	0.75	-0.34	0.367	-0.01
Chatbot Quiz	-0.93	0.69	-1.34	0.090	-0.04
Civity Storytelling	-1.82	0.73	-2.49	0.006	-0.09
Common Identity	-2.76	0.69	-4.03	<.001	-0.13
Contact Project	-0.11	0.74	-0.15	0.442	-0.01
Counterfactual Selves	0.42	0.69	0.61	0.728	0.02
Democratic Fear	-1.03	0.72	-1.44	0.075	-0.05
Economic Interest	0.26	0.72	0.35	0.638	0.01
Empathy Beliefs	-1.21	0.78	-1.56	0.060	-0.06
Epistemic Rescue	0.25	0.69	0.36	0.641	0.01
Harmful Experiences	0.20	0.72	0.28	0.611	0.01
Inparty Elites	0.34	0.71	0.49	0.687	0.02
Learning Goals	0.45	0.79	0.57	0.715	0.02
Media Trust	-2.03	0.71	-2.86	0.002	-0.1
Misperception Competition	-0.50	0.67	-0.75	0.228	-0.02
Misperception Democratic	-2.23	0.69	-3.22	0.001	-0.10
Misperception Film	0.13	0.68	0.18	0.573	0.01
Misperception Suffering	-0.50	0.71	-0.70	0.242	-0.02
Moral Differences	-0.06	0.72	-0.08	0.469	0.00
Outparty Friendship	-0.14	0.77	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Partisan Threat	-0.69	0.70	-0.98	0.163	-0.03

Table S11.5: *Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	2.19	0.69	3.15	0.999	0.10
System Justification	0.35	0.69	0.50	0.691	0.02
Utah Cues	0.22	0.69	0.32	0.625	0.01
Violence Efficacy	-1.35	0.75	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	-3.56	0.24	-14.74	<.001	
Other	2.72	1.84	1.48	0.140	
Age	0.09	0.01	12.09	<.001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	0.86	0.72	1.19	0.236	
LatinX	-0.21	0.84	-0.25	0.800	
Other	1.77	0.79	2.24	0.025	
White	-0.09	0.62	-0.14	0.889	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	3.14	0.35	8.90	<.001	
Some college	3.37	0.29	11.45	<.001	
Postgraduate	-3.59	0.37	-9.58	<.001	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	1.10	0.25	4.40	<.001	
Party as a Social Identity	0.13	0.00	27.77	<.001	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	-1.20	0.31	-3.87	<.001	
Luth	0.07	0.39	0.17	0.862	

12. Results for Survey and Behavioral Indicator of Partisan Animosity

Table S12.1: *Effects on Cold Feelings toward Outpartisans*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	53.75	0.87	61.57	<.001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	-1.32	0.80	-1.65	0.099	-0.06
Befriending Meditation	-5.55	0.85	-6.54	<.001	-0.24
Chatbot Quiz	-3.47	0.72	-4.79	<.001	-0.15
Civity Storytelling	-9.18	0.82	-11.18	<.001	-0.40
Common Identity	-12.01	0.77	-15.58	<.001	-0.52
Contact Project	-8.89	0.81	-11	<.001	-0.38
Counterfactual Selves	-2.05	0.75	-2.74	0.003	-0.09
Democratic Fear	-4.2	0.81	-5.21	<.001	-0.18
Economic Interest	-0.85	0.76	-1.12	0.132	-0.04
Empathy Beliefs	-7.10	0.81	-8.73	<.001	-0.30
Epistemic Rescue	-3.34	0.77	-4.36	<.001	-0.14
Harmful Experiences	-1.95	0.76	-2.57	0.005	-0.08
Inparty Elites	-1.78	0.74	-2.42	0.008	-0.08
Learning Goals	-6.15	0.83	-7.41	<.001	-0.26
Media Trust	-11.24	0.79	-14.25	<.001	-0.49
Misperception Competition	-4.29	0.75	-5.74	<.001	-0.18
Misperception Democratic	-7.50	0.76	-9.85	<.001	-0.32
Misperception Film	-10.31	0.78	-13.16	<.001	-0.45
Misperception Suffering	-6.13	0.78	-7.84	<.001	-0.26
Moral Differences	-4.82	0.78	-6.19	<.001	-0.21
Outparty Friendship	-5.34	0.82	-6.53	<.001	-0.23
Partisan Threat	0.75	0.73	1.02	0.846	0.03

Table S12.1: *Effects on Cold Feelings toward Outpartisans (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	-3.44	0.75	-4.6	<.001	-0.15
System Justification	-1.89	0.75	-2.51	0.006	-0.08
Utah Cues	-3.36	0.79	-4.28	<.001	-0.14
Violence Efficacy	-1.17	0.81	-1.43	0.076	-0.05
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.57	0.26	5.95	<.001	
Other	14.11	1.78	7.93	<.001	
Age	0.13	0.01	14.72	<.001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	0.08	0.80	0.10	0.924	
LatinX	2.49	0.94	2.64	0.008	
Other	2.73	0.86	3.17	0.002	
White	3.47	0.69	5.05	<.001	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	-0.35	0.39	-0.90	0.368	
Some college	-0.26	0.32	-0.82	0.414	
Postgraduate	-2.01	0.41	-4.95	<.001	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	-1.87	0.27	-6.85	<.001	
Party as a Social Identity	0.12	0.01	22.18	<.001	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	0.82	0.34	2.41	0.016	
Luth	2.50	0.42	5.97	<.001	

Table S12.2: *Effects on Withholding Money from Outpartisan in a Dictator Game*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	51.72	0.94	55.31	<.001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	-2.23	0.84	-2.65	0.008	-0.09
Befriending Meditation	-4.91	0.90	-5.48	<.001	-0.20
Chatbot Quiz	-3.05	0.83	-3.67	<.001	-0.12
Civity Storytelling	-8.88	0.83	-10.67	<.001	-0.36
Common Identity	-6.39	0.77	-8.29	<.001	-0.26
Contact Project	-12.04	0.88	-13.73	<.001	-0.49
Counterfactual Selves	-1.47	0.84	-1.74	0.041	-0.06
Democratic Fear	-5.33	0.82	-6.51	<.001	-0.21
Economic Interest	-1.52	0.85	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Empathy Beliefs	-6.96	0.85	-8.22	<.001	-0.28
Epistemic Rescue	-4.77	0.85	-5.58	<.001	-0.19
Harmful Experiences	-2.17	0.85	-2.57	0.005	-0.09
Inparty Elites	-2.52	0.83	-3.05	0.001	-0.10
Learning Goals	-4.58	0.91	-5.04	<.001	-0.18
Media Trust	-9.20	0.80	-11.54	<.001	-0.37
Misperception Competition	-1.65	0.82	-2.02	0.022	-0.07
Misperception Democratic	-4.67	0.81	-5.76	<.001	-0.19
Misperception Film	-6.00	0.79	-7.6	<.001	-0.24
Misperception Suffering	-5.87	0.87	-6.79	<.001	-0.24
Moral Differences	-5.46	0.83	-6.62	<.001	-0.22
Outparty Friendship	-5.08	0.89	-5.74	<.001	-0.20
Partisan Threat	0.47	0.81	0.58	0.720	0.02

Table S12.2: *Effects on Withholding Money from Outpartisan in a Dictator Game (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	-3.42	0.82	-4.18	<.001	-0.14
System Justification	-2.70	0.82	-3.28	0.001	-0.11
Utah Cues	-0.64	0.82	-0.79	0.216	-0.03
Violence Efficacy	-0.57	0.89	-0.64	0.261	-0.02
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	0.91	0.28	3.22	0.001	
Other	-1.29	2.00	-0.64	0.519	
Age	0.14	0.01	14.86	<.001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.41	0.83	1.70	0.089	
LatinX	-0.21	0.99	-0.21	0.832	
Other	-1.97	0.88	-2.24	0.025	
White	-1.78	0.72	-2.49	0.013	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	1.26	0.42	3.00	0.003	
Some college	0.64	0.35	1.84	0.066	
Postgraduate	-1.56	0.43	-3.61	<.001	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	1.50	0.29	5.13	<.001	
Party as a Social Identity	0.08	0.01	13.91	<.001	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	1.03	0.36	2.85	0.004	
Luth	1.71	0.45	3.77	<.001	

13. Results of Intervention versus Intervention Analyses

Table S13.1: *Relative Effectiveness of Interventions for Partisan Animosity*

Intervention	% Outperformed	Interventions Outperformed
Befriending Meditation	46%	Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Misperception Competition, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Chatbot Quiz	12%	Economic Interests, Partisan Threat, Violence Efficacy
Civity Storytelling	83%	Befriending Meditation, Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Democratic Fear, Economic Interests, Empathy Beliefs, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Learning Goals, Misperception Competition, Misperception Democratic, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Common Identity	83%	Befriending Meditation, Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Democratic Fear, Economic Interests, Empathy Beliefs, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Learning Goals, Misperception Competition, Misperception Democratic, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Contact Project	88%	Befriending Meditation, Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Democratic Fear, Economic Interests, Empathy Beliefs, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Learning Goals, Misperception Competition, Misperception Democratic, Misperception Film, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Counterfactual Selves	4%	Partisan Threat
Democratic Fear	38%	Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Misperception Competition, Partisan Threat, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Economic Interest	4%	Partisan Threat
Empathy Beliefs	67%	Befriending Meditation, Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Democratic Fear, Economic Interests, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Misperception Competition, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy

Epistemic Rescue	33%	Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Partisan Threat, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Harmful Experiences	4%	Partisan Threat
Inparty Elites	4%	Partisan Threat
Learning Goals	46%	Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Misperception Competition, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Media Trust	88%	Befriending Meditation, Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Democratic Fear, Economic Interests, Empathy Beliefs, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Learning Goals, Misperception Competition, Misperception Democratic, Misperception Film, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Misperception Competition	12%	Economic Interests, Partisan Threat, Violence Efficacy
Misperception Democratic	50%	Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Misperception Competition, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Misperception Film	79%	Befriending Meditation, Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Democratic Fear, Economic Interests, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Learning Goals, Misperception Competition, Misperception Democratic, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Misperception Suffering	50%	Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Misperception Competition, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Moral Differences	46%	Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Misperception Competition, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Outparty Friendship	46%	Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Misperception Competition, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Partisan Threat	0%	

Party Overlap	17%	Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Partisan Threat, Violence Efficacy
System Justification	4%	Partisan Threat
Utah Cues	4%	Partisan Threat
Violence Efficacy	0%	

Table S13.2: *Relative Effectiveness of Interventions for Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Intervention	% Outperformed	Interventions Outperformed
Befriending Meditation	12%	Misperception Suffering, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat
Chatbot Quiz	0%	
Civity Storytelling	33%	Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Media Trust, Misperception Suffering, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap
Common Identity	50%	Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Epistemic Rescue, Media Trust, Misperception Competition, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification
Contact Project	25%	Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Media Trust, Misperception Suffering, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat
Counterfactual Selves	0%	
Democratic Fear	96%	Befriending Meditation, Chatbot Quiz, Civity Storytelling, Common Identity, Contact Project, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Empathy Beliefs, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Learning Goals, Media Trust, Misperception Competition, Misperception Film, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Economic Interest	0%	
Empathy Beliefs	0%	
Epistemic Rescue	0%	
Harmful Experiences	0%	
Inparty Elites	25%	Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Media Trust, Misperception Suffering, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat
Learning Goals	17%	Misperception Suffering, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat
Media Trust	0%	

Misperception Competition	0%	
Misperception Democratic	96%	Befriending Meditation, Chatbot Quiz, Civity Storytelling, Common Identity, Contact Project, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Empathy Beliefs, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Inparty Elites, Learning Goals, Media Trust, Misperception Competition, Misperception Film, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Utah Cues, Violence Efficacy
Misperception Film	62%	Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Empathy Beliefs, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Media Trust, Misperception Competition, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Violence Efficacy
Misperception Suffering	0%	
Moral Differences	0%	
Outparty Friendship	0%	
Partisan Threat	0%	
Party Overlap	0%	
System Justification	0%	
Utah Cues	62%	Chatbot Quiz, Counterfactual Selves, Economic Interests, Empathy Beliefs, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Media Trust, Misperception Competition, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Violence Efficacy
Violence Efficacy	12%	Misperception Suffering, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat

Table S13.3: *Relative Effectiveness of Interventions for Support for Partisan Violence*

Intervention	% Outperformed	Interventions Outperformed
Befriending Meditation	4%	Democratic Fear
Chatbot Quiz	8%	Democratic Fear, Outparty Friendship
Civity Storytelling	4%	Democratic Fear
Common Identity	8%	Democratic Fear, Outparty Friendship
Contact Project	8%	Democratic Fear, Outparty Friendship
Counterfactual Selves	4%	Democratic Fear
Democratic Fear	0%	
Economic Interest	4%	Democratic Fear
Empathy Beliefs	4%	Democratic Fear
Epistemic Rescue	4%	Democratic Fear
Harmful Experiences	4%	Democratic Fear
Inparty Elites	42%	Civity Storytelling, Democratic Fear, Empathy Beliefs, Media Trust, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Party Overlap, System Justification, Violence Efficacy
Learning Goals	29%	Democratic Fear, Media Trust, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, System Justification, Violence Efficacy
Media Trust	0%	
Misperception Competition	12%	Democratic Fear, Misperception Suffering, Outparty Friendship
Misperception Democratic	42%	Civity Storytelling, Democratic Fear, Empathy Beliefs, Media Trust, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Party Overlap, System Justification, Violence Efficacy
Misperception Film	83%	Befriending Meditation, Chatbot Quiz, Civity Storytelling, Common Identity, Contact Project, Counterfactual Selves, Democratic Fear, Economic Interests, Empathy Beliefs, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Media Trust, Misperception Competition, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Partisan Threat, Party Overlap, System Justification, Violence Efficacy
Misperception Suffering	0%	

Moral Differences	4%	Democratic Fear
Outparty Friendship	0%	
Partisan Threat	8%	Democratic Fear, Outparty Friendship
Party Overlap	4%	Democratic Fear
System Justification	4%	Democratic Fear
Utah Cues	58%	Civity Storytelling, Counterfactual Selves, Democratic Fear, Economic Interests, Empathy Beliefs, Epistemic Rescue, Harmful Experiences, Media Trust, Misperception Suffering, Moral Differences, Outparty Friendship, Party Overlap, System Justification, Violence Efficacy
Violence Efficacy	4%	Democratic Fear

14. Mediation Analyses with Partisan Animosity as Outcome

Table S14.1: *Indirect Effects via Perceived Dissimilarity with Outpartisans*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-5.17	-1.35	0.26
Chatbot Quiz	-3.06	0.01	0.00
Civity Storytelling	-8.98	-2.78	0.31
Common Identity	-9.36	-3.51	0.37
Contact Project	-10.63	-1.73	0.16
Counterfactual Selves	-1.63	-0.34	0.21
Democratic Fear	-4.75	-1.17	0.25
Economic Interest	-0.92	-0.04	0.04
Empathy Beliefs	-7.07	-1.26	0.18
Epistemic Rescue	-4.04	-0.52	0.13
Harmful Experiences	-2.09	-0.21	0.10
Inparty Elites	-2.02	0.06	-0.03
Learning Goals	-5.38	-0.65	0.12
Media Trust	-10.21	-3.75	0.37
Misperception Competition	-2.95	-0.21	0.07
Misperception Democratic	-6.16	-1.64	0.27
Misperception Film	-8.04	-2.07	0.26
Misperception Suffering	-6.24	-1.00	0.16
Moral Differences	-5.15	-1.05	0.20
Outparty Friendship	-5.05	-0.49	0.10
Partisan Threat	0.69	0.08	0.12
Party Overlap	-3.45	-0.79	0.23
System Justification	-2.24	0.11	-0.05
Utah Cues	-1.83	-0.14	0.07
Violence Efficacy	-0.93	-0.55	0.59

Table S14.2: *Indirect Effects via Partisanship as a Social Identity*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-5.17	-0.08	0.02
Chatbot Quiz	-3.06	-0.02	0.01
Civity Storytelling	-8.98	-0.09	0.01
Common Identity	-9.36	-0.05	0.01
Contact Project	-10.63	-0.18	0.02
Counterfactual Selves	-1.63	0.01	-0.01
Democratic Fear	-4.75	0.13	-0.03
Economic Interest	-0.92	-0.03	0.04
Empathy Beliefs	-7.07	0.01	0.00
Epistemic Rescue	-4.04	-0.04	0.01
Harmful Experiences	-2.09	0.01	-0.01
Inparty Elites	-2.02	0.14	-0.07
Learning Goals	-5.38	0.01	0.00
Media Trust	-10.21	-0.18	0.02
Misperception Competition	-2.95	-0.02	0.01
Misperception Democratic	-6.16	-0.04	0.01
Misperception Film	-8.04	-0.02	0.00
Misperception Suffering	-6.24	-0.01	0.00
Moral Differences	-5.15	0.05	-0.01
Outparty Friendship	-5.05	0.09	-0.02
Partisan Threat	0.69	0.11	0.16
Party Overlap	-3.45	-0.10	0.03
System Justification	-2.24	0.06	-0.03
Utah Cues	-1.83	0.04	-0.02
Violence Efficacy	-0.93	0.07	-0.07

Table S14.3: *Indirect Effects via Anger toward Outpartisans*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-5.17	-0.65	0.13
Chatbot Quiz	-3.06	-0.05	0.02
Civity Storytelling	-8.98	-0.63	0.07
Common Identity	-9.36	-1.3	0.14
Contact Project	-10.63	-0.54	0.05
Counterfactual Selves	-1.63	-0.06	0.04
Democratic Fear	-4.75	-0.3	0.06
Economic Interest	-0.92	-0.1	0.11
Empathy Beliefs	-7.07	-0.13	0.02
Epistemic Rescue	-4.04	-0.45	0.11
Harmful Experiences	-2.09	-0.21	0.1
Inparty Elites	-2.02	-0.2	0.1
Learning Goals	-5.38	-0.4	0.08
Media Trust	-10.21	-0.97	0.1
Misperception Competition	-2.95	-0.48	0.16
Misperception Democratic	-6.16	-0.76	0.12
Misperception Film	-8.04	-0.88	0.11
Misperception Suffering	-6.24	-0.43	0.07
Moral Differences	-5.15	-0.34	0.07
Outparty Friendship	-5.05	-0.26	0.05
Partisan Threat	0.69	-0.1	-0.15
Party Overlap	-3.45	-0.29	0.08
System Justification	-2.24	0.12	-0.05
Utah Cues	-1.83	-0.22	0.12
Violence Efficacy	-0.93	-0.22	0.24

Table S14.4: *Indirect Effects via Lack of Empathy toward Outpartisans*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-5.17	-1.44	0.28
Chatbot Quiz	-3.06	-0.2	0.06
Civity Storytelling	-8.98	-3.17	0.35
Common Identity	-9.36	-2.65	0.28
Contact Project	-10.63	-2.37	0.22
Counterfactual Selves	-1.63	-0.39	0.24
Democratic Fear	-4.75	-1.21	0.26
Economic Interest	-0.92	0.02	-0.02
Empathy Beliefs	-7.07	-2.43	0.34
Epistemic Rescue	-4.04	-0.66	0.16
Harmful Experiences	-2.09	-0.22	0.11
Inparty Elites	-2.02	-0.25	0.12
Learning Goals	-5.38	-0.8	0.15
Media Trust	-10.21	-3.02	0.3
Misperception Competition	-2.95	-0.58	0.2
Misperception Democratic	-6.16	-1.31	0.21
Misperception Film	-8.04	-1.26	0.16
Misperception Suffering	-6.24	-1.21	0.19
Moral Differences	-5.15	-1.2	0.23
Outparty Friendship	-5.05	-0.52	0.1
Partisan Threat	0.69	-0.15	-0.21
Party Overlap	-3.45	-0.38	0.11
System Justification	-2.24	-0.35	0.16
Utah Cues	-1.83	-0.41	0.23
Violence Efficacy	-0.93	-0.68	0.73

Table S14.5: *Indirect Effects via United against Common Enemy (reverse-coded)*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-5.17	-0.04	0.01
Chatbot Quiz	-3.06	0.12	-0.04
Civity Storytelling	-8.98	-0.13	0.01
Common Identity	-9.36	-0.03	0.00
Contact Project	-10.63	-0.02	0.00
Counterfactual Selves	-1.63	0.11	-0.07
Democratic Fear	-4.75	-0.09	0.02
Economic Interest	-0.92	0.07	-0.07
Empathy Beliefs	-7.07	0.13	-0.02
Epistemic Rescue	-4.04	0.04	-0.01
Harmful Experiences	-2.09	0.00	0.00
Inparty Elites	-2.02	-0.11	0.06
Learning Goals	-5.38	-0.01	0.00
Media Trust	-10.21	-0.18	0.02
Misperception Competition	-2.95	-0.15	0.05
Misperception Democratic	-6.16	-0.15	0.03
Misperception Film	-8.04	-0.02	0.00
Misperception Suffering	-6.24	-0.10	0.02
Moral Differences	-5.15	0.13	-0.02
Outparty Friendship	-5.05	0.03	-0.01
Partisan Threat	0.69	0.05	0.07
Party Overlap	-3.45	0.16	-0.05
System Justification	-2.24	-0.04	0.02
Utah Cues	-1.83	-0.08	0.05
Violence Efficacy	-0.93	0.00	0.00

Table S14.6: *Indirect Effects via Outpartisan Threat*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-5.17	-0.64	0.12
Chatbot Quiz	-3.06	0.08	-0.03
Civity Storytelling	-8.98	-0.60	0.07
Common Identity	-9.36	-1.97	0.21
Contact Project	-10.63	-0.65	0.06
Counterfactual Selves	-1.63	-0.11	0.06
Democratic Fear	-4.75	-0.27	0.06
Economic Interest	-0.92	-0.01	0.02
Empathy Beliefs	-7.07	-0.24	0.03
Epistemic Rescue	-4.04	-0.54	0.13
Harmful Experiences	-2.09	-0.25	0.12
Inparty Elites	-2.02	-0.25	0.12
Learning Goals	-5.38	-0.24	0.04
Media Trust	-10.21	-1.36	0.13
Misperception Competition	-2.95	-0.34	0.11
Misperception Democratic	-6.16	-0.83	0.13
Misperception Film	-8.04	-0.57	0.07
Misperception Suffering	-6.24	-0.36	0.06
Moral Differences	-5.15	-0.24	0.05
Outparty Friendship	-5.05	-0.10	0.02
Partisan Threat	0.69	-0.01	-0.01
Party Overlap	-3.45	-0.65	0.19
System Justification	-2.24	0.00	0.00
Utah Cues	-1.83	-0.35	0.19
Violence Efficacy	-0.93	0.06	-0.06

15. Mediation Analyses with Support for Undemocratic Practices as Outcome

Table S15.1: *Indirect Effects via Perceived Dissimilarity with Outpartisans*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.44	0.15	-0.35
Chatbot Quiz	0.48	0.00	0.00
Civity Storytelling	-1.27	0.32	-0.25
Common Identity	-1.67	0.40	-0.24
Contact Project	-1.11	0.20	-0.18
Counterfactual Selves	0.93	0.04	0.04
Democratic Fear	-4.59	0.13	-0.03
Economic Interest	1.10	0.01	0.01
Empathy Beliefs	0.28	0.14	0.51
Epistemic Rescue	0.71	0.06	0.08
Harmful Experiences	0.21	0.02	0.11
Inparty Elites	-0.99	-0.01	0.01
Learning Goals	-0.58	0.07	-0.13
Media Trust	1.62	0.42	0.26
Misperception Competition	0.43	0.02	0.05
Misperception Democratic	-6.02	0.19	-0.03
Misperception Film	-2.24	0.24	-0.11
Misperception Suffering	1.43	0.11	0.08
Moral Differences	0.50	0.12	0.25
Outparty Friendship	2.08	0.06	0.03
Partisan Threat	1.54	-0.01	0.00
Party Overlap	0.77	0.09	0.12
System Justification	0.46	-0.01	-0.03
Utah Cues	-2.14	0.02	-0.01
Violence Efficacy	-0.39	0.06	-0.16

Table S15.2: *Indirect Effects via Partisanship as a Social Identity*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.44	-0.10	0.22
Chatbot Quiz	0.48	-0.03	-0.06
Civity Storytelling	-1.27	-0.12	0.09
Common Identity	-1.67	-0.06	0.04
Contact Project	-1.11	-0.23	0.20
Counterfactual Selves	0.93	0.01	0.01
Democratic Fear	-4.59	0.15	-0.03
Economic Interest	1.10	-0.05	-0.04
Empathy Beliefs	0.28	0.02	0.06
Epistemic Rescue	0.71	-0.05	-0.07
Harmful Experiences	0.21	0.01	0.06
Inparty Elites	-0.99	0.17	-0.17
Learning Goals	-0.58	0.01	-0.01
Media Trust	1.62	-0.23	-0.14
Misperception Competition	0.43	-0.02	-0.05
Misperception Democratic	-6.02	-0.05	0.01
Misperception Film	-2.24	-0.03	0.01
Misperception Suffering	1.43	-0.01	-0.01
Moral Differences	0.50	0.06	0.12
Outparty Friendship	2.08	0.11	0.05
Partisan Threat	1.54	0.13	0.09
Party Overlap	0.77	-0.12	-0.16
System Justification	0.46	0.07	0.15
Utah Cues	-2.14	0.04	-0.02
Violence Efficacy	-0.39	0.08	-0.21

Table S15.3: *Indirect Effects via Anger toward Outpartisans*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.44	-0.54	1.25
Chatbot Quiz	0.48	-0.04	-0.09
Civity Storytelling	-1.27	-0.53	0.42
Common Identity	-1.67	-1.08	0.65
Contact Project	-1.11	-0.45	0.41
Counterfactual Selves	0.93	-0.05	-0.05
Democratic Fear	-4.59	-0.24	0.05
Economic Interest	1.10	-0.09	-0.08
Empathy Beliefs	0.28	-0.12	-0.44
Epistemic Rescue	0.71	-0.38	-0.53
Harmful Experiences	0.21	-0.18	-0.88
Inparty Elites	-0.99	-0.18	0.18
Learning Goals	-0.58	-0.33	0.57
Media Trust	1.62	-0.81	-0.50
Misperception Competition	0.43	-0.40	-0.93
Misperception Democratic	-6.02	-0.65	0.11
Misperception Film	-2.24	-0.72	0.32
Misperception Suffering	1.43	-0.36	-0.25
Moral Differences	0.50	-0.28	-0.56
Outparty Friendship	2.08	-0.22	-0.11
Partisan Threat	1.54	-0.10	-0.06
Party Overlap	0.77	-0.23	-0.30
System Justification	0.46	0.11	0.23
Utah Cues	-2.14	-0.19	0.09
Violence Efficacy	-0.39	-0.19	0.48

Table S15.4: *Indirect Effects via Lack of Empathy toward Outpartisans*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.44	0.08	-0.18
Chatbot Quiz	0.48	0.01	0.02
Civity Storytelling	-1.27	0.17	-0.14
Common Identity	-1.67	0.15	-0.09
Contact Project	-1.11	0.13	-0.12
Counterfactual Selves	0.93	0.02	0.02
Democratic Fear	-4.59	0.07	-0.01
Economic Interest	1.10	0.00	0.00
Empathy Beliefs	0.28	0.13	0.47
Epistemic Rescue	0.71	0.04	0.05
Harmful Experiences	0.21	0.01	0.06
Inparty Elites	-0.99	0.01	-0.01
Learning Goals	-0.58	0.04	-0.08
Media Trust	1.62	0.17	0.10
Misperception Competition	0.43	0.03	0.07
Misperception Democratic	-6.02	0.07	-0.01
Misperception Film	-2.24	0.07	-0.03
Misperception Suffering	1.43	0.07	0.05
Moral Differences	0.50	0.07	0.14
Outparty Friendship	2.08	0.03	0.01
Partisan Threat	1.54	0.01	0.01
Party Overlap	0.77	0.02	0.03
System Justification	0.46	0.02	0.04
Utah Cues	-2.14	0.02	-0.01
Violence Efficacy	-0.39	0.04	-0.09

Table S15.5: *Indirect Effects via United against Common Enemy (reverse-coded)*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.44	-0.03	0.08
Chatbot Quiz	0.48	0.12	0.25
Civity Storytelling	-1.27	-0.13	0.10
Common Identity	-1.67	-0.02	0.01
Contact Project	-1.11	-0.02	0.02
Counterfactual Selves	0.93	0.11	0.12
Democratic Fear	-4.59	-0.09	0.02
Economic Interest	1.10	0.06	0.06
Empathy Beliefs	0.28	0.14	0.49
Epistemic Rescue	0.71	0.04	0.06
Harmful Experiences	0.21	0.00	0.01
Inparty Elites	-0.99	-0.11	0.11
Learning Goals	-0.58	0.00	0.00
Media Trust	1.62	-0.18	-0.11
Misperception Competition	0.43	-0.15	-0.34
Misperception Democratic	-6.02	-0.16	0.03
Misperception Film	-2.24	-0.02	0.01
Misperception Suffering	1.43	-0.09	-0.06
Moral Differences	0.50	0.13	0.26
Outparty Friendship	2.08	0.04	0.02
Partisan Threat	1.54	0.05	0.03
Party Overlap	0.77	0.17	0.23
System Justification	0.46	-0.04	-0.08
Utah Cues	-2.14	-0.09	0.04
Violence Efficacy	-0.39	0.00	-0.01

Table S15.6: *Indirect Effects via Outpartisan Threat*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.44	-0.27	0.63
Chatbot Quiz	0.48	0.03	0.07
Civity Storytelling	-1.27	-0.26	0.21
Common Identity	-1.67	-0.86	0.51
Contact Project	-1.11	-0.28	0.25
Counterfactual Selves	0.93	-0.05	-0.05
Democratic Fear	-4.59	-0.12	0.03
Economic Interest	1.10	-0.01	-0.01
Empathy Beliefs	0.28	-0.10	-0.35
Epistemic Rescue	0.71	-0.24	-0.33
Harmful Experiences	0.21	-0.12	-0.57
Inparty Elites	-0.99	-0.11	0.11
Learning Goals	-0.58	-0.10	0.17
Media Trust	1.62	-0.59	-0.36
Misperception Competition	0.43	-0.15	-0.34
Misperception Democratic	-6.02	-0.36	0.06
Misperception Film	-2.24	-0.24	0.11
Misperception Suffering	1.43	-0.15	-0.11
Moral Differences	0.50	-0.10	-0.20
Outparty Friendship	2.08	-0.04	-0.02
Partisan Threat	1.54	-0.01	-0.01
Party Overlap	0.77	-0.28	-0.36
System Justification	0.46	0.01	0.01
Utah Cues	-2.14	-0.16	0.07
Violence Efficacy	-0.39	0.03	-0.07

16. Mediation Analyses with Support for Partisan Violence as Outcome

Table S16.1: *Indirect Effects via Perceived Dissimilarity with Outpartisans*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.72	0.55	-0.76
Chatbot Quiz	-0.80	-0.01	0.01
Civity Storytelling	0.24	1.13	4.80
Common Identity	-0.80	1.42	-1.78
Contact Project	-1.02	0.68	-0.67
Counterfactual Selves	-0.23	0.14	-0.64
Democratic Fear	2.27	0.48	0.21
Economic Interest	-0.32	0.01	-0.02
Empathy Beliefs	0.47	0.50	1.07
Epistemic Rescue	-0.15	0.22	-1.52
Harmful Experiences	-0.45	0.09	-0.19
Inparty Elites	-1.58	-0.01	0.01
Learning Goals	-1.45	0.26	-0.18
Media Trust	0.63	1.52	2.44
Misperception Competition	-0.94	0.09	-0.10
Misperception Democratic	-1.75	0.66	-0.38
Misperception Film	-2.76	0.84	-0.30
Misperception Suffering	0.63	0.40	0.63
Moral Differences	0.39	0.44	1.15
Outparty Friendship	1.33	0.19	0.14
Partisan Threat	-0.82	-0.02	0.03
Party Overlap	0.08	0.33	4.09
System Justification	0.29	-0.05	-0.16
Utah Cues	-2.06	0.05	-0.03
Violence Efficacy	0.18	0.23	1.28

Table S16.2: *Indirect Effects via Partisanship as a Social Identity*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.72	-0.03	0.05
Chatbot Quiz	-0.80	-0.01	0.02
Civity Storytelling	0.24	-0.04	-0.16
Common Identity	-0.80	-0.02	0.03
Contact Project	-1.02	-0.07	0.07
Counterfactual Selves	-0.23	0.00	-0.01
Democratic Fear	2.27	0.05	0.02
Economic Interest	-0.32	-0.01	0.04
Empathy Beliefs	0.47	0.00	0.01
Epistemic Rescue	-0.15	-0.02	0.12
Harmful Experiences	-0.45	0.00	0.00
Inparty Elites	-1.58	0.06	-0.04
Learning Goals	-1.45	0.00	0.00
Media Trust	0.63	-0.08	-0.13
Misperception Competition	-0.94	-0.01	0.01
Misperception Democratic	-1.75	-0.02	0.01
Misperception Film	-2.76	-0.01	0.00
Misperception Suffering	0.63	-0.01	-0.01
Moral Differences	0.39	0.02	0.05
Outparty Friendship	1.33	0.04	0.03
Partisan Threat	-0.82	0.04	-0.05
Party Overlap	0.08	-0.04	-0.51
System Justification	0.29	0.03	0.09
Utah Cues	-2.06	0.02	-0.01
Violence Efficacy	0.18	0.03	0.15

Table S16.3: *Indirect Effects via Anger toward Outpartisans*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.72	-0.49	0.68
Chatbot Quiz	-0.80	-0.04	0.05
Civity Storytelling	0.24	-0.48	-2.02
Common Identity	-0.80	-1.00	1.25
Contact Project	-1.02	-0.41	0.40
Counterfactual Selves	-0.23	-0.04	0.19
Democratic Fear	2.27	-0.22	-0.10
Economic Interest	-0.32	-0.09	0.28
Empathy Beliefs	0.47	-0.12	-0.25
Epistemic Rescue	-0.15	-0.36	2.46
Harmful Experiences	-0.45	-0.17	0.38
Inparty Elites	-1.58	-0.17	0.11
Learning Goals	-1.45	-0.30	0.21
Media Trust	0.63	-0.75	-1.21
Misperception Competition	-0.94	-0.36	0.38
Misperception Democratic	-1.75	-0.59	0.33
Misperception Film	-2.76	-0.66	0.24
Misperception Suffering	0.63	-0.34	-0.54
Moral Differences	0.39	-0.26	-0.67
Outparty Friendship	1.33	-0.20	-0.15
Partisan Threat	-0.82	-0.08	0.10
Party Overlap	0.08	-0.21	-2.61
System Justification	0.29	0.10	0.34
Utah Cues	-2.06	-0.18	0.09
Violence Efficacy	0.18	-0.17	-0.94

Table S16.4: *Indirect Effects via Lack of Empathy toward Outpartisans*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.72	0.41	-0.57
Chatbot Quiz	-0.80	0.05	-0.06
Civity Storytelling	0.24	0.91	3.84
Common Identity	-0.80	0.75	-0.94
Contact Project	-1.02	0.68	-0.67
Counterfactual Selves	-0.23	0.12	-0.52
Democratic Fear	2.27	0.34	0.15
Economic Interest	-0.32	-0.02	0.05
Empathy Beliefs	0.47	0.69	1.47
Epistemic Rescue	-0.15	0.19	-1.32
Harmful Experiences	-0.45	0.06	-0.14
Inparty Elites	-1.58	0.08	-0.05
Learning Goals	-1.45	0.23	-0.16
Media Trust	0.63	0.86	1.38
Misperception Competition	-0.94	0.15	-0.16
Misperception Democratic	-1.75	0.37	-0.21
Misperception Film	-2.76	0.37	-0.13
Misperception Suffering	0.63	0.35	0.55
Moral Differences	0.39	0.35	0.91
Outparty Friendship	1.33	0.15	0.11
Partisan Threat	-0.82	0.04	-0.05
Party Overlap	0.08	0.12	1.42
System Justification	0.29	0.10	0.33
Utah Cues	-2.06	0.13	-0.06
Violence Efficacy	0.18	0.19	1.09

Table S16.5: *Indirect Effects via United against Common Enemy (reverse-coded)*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.72	-0.04	0.05
Chatbot Quiz	-0.80	0.09	-0.12
Civity Storytelling	0.24	-0.11	-0.44
Common Identity	-0.80	-0.03	0.04
Contact Project	-1.02	-0.02	0.02
Counterfactual Selves	-0.23	0.09	-0.40
Democratic Fear	2.27	-0.08	-0.03
Economic Interest	-0.32	0.05	-0.16
Empathy Beliefs	0.47	0.11	0.24
Epistemic Rescue	-0.15	0.02	-0.17
Harmful Experiences	-0.45	-0.01	0.02
Inparty Elites	-1.58	-0.10	0.06
Learning Goals	-1.45	-0.01	0.01
Media Trust	0.63	-0.15	-0.24
Misperception Competition	-0.94	-0.12	0.13
Misperception Democratic	-1.75	-0.13	0.07
Misperception Film	-2.76	-0.02	0.01
Misperception Suffering	0.63	-0.08	-0.13
Moral Differences	0.39	0.10	0.25
Outparty Friendship	1.33	0.03	0.02
Partisan Threat	-0.82	0.04	-0.04
Party Overlap	0.08	0.13	1.62
System Justification	0.29	-0.04	-0.14
Utah Cues	-2.06	-0.08	0.04
Violence Efficacy	0.18	0.00	0.00

Table S16.6: *Indirect Effects via Outpartisan Threat*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.72	-0.15	0.21
Chatbot Quiz	-0.80	0.02	-0.02
Civity Storytelling	0.24	-0.14	-0.61
Common Identity	-0.80	-0.47	0.59
Contact Project	-1.02	-0.16	0.15
Counterfactual Selves	-0.23	-0.03	0.11
Democratic Fear	2.27	-0.06	-0.03
Economic Interest	-0.32	-0.01	0.03
Empathy Beliefs	0.47	-0.06	-0.12
Epistemic Rescue	-0.15	-0.13	0.90
Harmful Experiences	-0.45	-0.06	0.14
Inparty Elites	-1.58	-0.06	0.04
Learning Goals	-1.45	-0.05	0.04
Media Trust	0.63	-0.33	-0.53
Misperception Competition	-0.94	-0.08	0.09
Misperception Democratic	-1.75	-0.20	0.11
Misperception Film	-2.76	-0.14	0.05
Misperception Suffering	0.63	-0.09	-0.14
Moral Differences	0.39	-0.06	-0.15
Outparty Friendship	1.33	-0.02	-0.02
Partisan Threat	-0.82	-0.01	0.01
Party Overlap	0.08	-0.16	-1.93
System Justification	0.29	0.00	0.00
Utah Cues	-2.06	-0.09	0.04
Violence Efficacy	0.18	0.01	0.08

17. Moderation Analyses

Moderator: Partisanship

Table S17.1.1: *Effects on Partisan Animosity*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Intercept	53.75	0.87	61.57	<.001
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition			
Alternative Control	-2.28	0.94	-2.43	0.015
Befriending Meditation	-4.6	0.98	-4.71	0
Chatbot Quiz	-2.9	0.88	-3.29	0.001
Civity Storytelling	-8.5	0.98	-8.65	0
Common Identity	-9.56	0.9	-10.58	0
Contact Project	-10.29	0.91	-11.29	0
Counterfactual Selves	-1.79	0.9	-1.99	0.047
Democratic Fear	-4.6	0.89	-5.18	0
Economic Interest	-1.73	0.95	-1.81	0.07
Empathy Beliefs	-7.35	0.98	-7.53	0
Epistemic Rescue	-3.64	0.93	-3.91	0
Harmful Experiences	-1.95	0.89	-2.19	0.029
Inparty Elites	-1.62	0.89	-1.81	0.07
Learning Goals	-5.08	0.99	-5.13	0
Media Trust	-9.85	0.92	-10.68	0
Misperception Competition	-3.67	0.91	-4.05	0
Misperception Democratic	-7.32	0.87	-8.43	0
Misperception Film	-8.04	0.93	-8.6	0
Misperception Suffering	-6.82	0.97	-7.05	0
Moral Differences	-4.25	0.94	-4.53	0
Outparty Friendship	-4.63	1.01	-4.6	0
Partisan Threat	-1.11	0.97	-1.15	0.252

Party Overlap	-4.62	0.9	-5.12	0
System Justification	-1.4	0.92	-1.51	0.131
Utah Cues	-2.69	0.95	-2.83	0.005
Violence Efficacy	-1.25	0.97	-1.28	0.199
Gender	Reference: Woman			
Man	1.24	0.23	5.49	<.001
Other	6.37	1.50	4.25	<.001
Age	0.13	0.01	17.71	<.001
Race	Reference: Asian			
Black	0.73	0.68	1.07	0.284
LatinX	1.12	1.12	0.81	0.165
Other	0.38	0.72	0.52	0.600
White	0.85	0.59	1.43	0.154
Education	Reference: Bachelor			
HS or less	0.47	0.34	1.41	0.158
Some college	0.20	0.27	0.71	0.477
Postgraduate	-1.79	0.35	-5.07	<.001
Party	Reference: Democrat			
Republican	-0.36	0.54	-0.65	0.514
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	0.94	0.29	3.26	0.001
Luth	2.11	0.36	5.90	<.001
Condition * Party	Reference: Null Control Condition and Democrat			
Alternative Control * Republican	1.08	1.39	0.78	0.436
Befriending Meditation * Republican	-1.46	1.45	-1.01	0.314
Chatbot Quiz * Republican	-0.73	1.29	-0.56	0.573
Civity Storytelling * Republican	-1.05	1.39	-0.76	0.448

Common Identity * Republican	0.73	1.28	0.57	0.567
Contact Project * Republican	-0.38	1.41	-0.27	0.787
Counterfactual Selves * Republican	0.05	1.33	0.04	0.967
Democratic Fear * Republican	-0.34	1.34	-0.25	0.799
Economic Interest * Republican	1.11	1.34	0.83	0.407
Empathy Beliefs * Republican	0.64	1.35	0.48	0.634
Epistemic Rescue * Republican	-0.86	1.33	-0.65	0.518
Harmful Experiences * Republican	-0.23	1.33	-0.17	0.862
Inparty Elites * Republican	-1.07	1.29	-0.83	0.406
Learning Goals * Republican	-0.6	1.43	-0.42	0.676
Media Trust * Republican	-0.78	1.31	-0.59	0.554
Misperception Competition * Republican	1.4	1.29	1.08	0.278
Misperception Democratic * Republican	2.44	1.28	1.9	0.057
Misperception Film * Republican	-0.21	1.31	-0.16	0.87
Misperception Suffering * Republican	1.66	1.38	1.21	0.228
Moral Differences * Republican	-1.7	1.31	-1.29	0.196
Outparty Friendship * Republican	-1.18	1.44	-0.82	0.413
Partisan Threat * Republican	3.35	1.3	2.58	0.01
Party Overlap * Republican	2.37	1.26	1.88	0.061

System Justification* Republican	-1.73	1.3	-1.34	0.181
Utah Cues* Republican	1.42	1.33	1.07	0.283
Violence Efficacy* Republican	0.81	1.43	0.57	0.571

Table S17.1.2: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Intercept	22.66	0.87	26.18	<.001
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition			
Alternative Control	-1.28	1.03	-1.24	0.213
Befriending Meditation	-0.81	1.10	-0.74	0.462
Chatbot Quiz	0.33	1.04	0.32	0.75
Civity Storytelling	-0.12	1.11	-0.11	0.916
Common Identity	-1.42	1.02	-1.40	0.163
Contact Project	-.82	1.03	0-1.76	0.079
Counterfactual Selves	1.04	0.98	1.06	0.288
Democratic Fear	-6.77	1.00	-6.79	<.001
Economic Interest	0.46	1.05	0.44	0.664
Empathy Beliefs	-0.08	1.09	-0.07	0.94
Epistemic Rescue	0.20	1.05	0.19	0.847
Harmful Experiences	-0.50	0.98	0.51	0.609
Inparty Elites	-1.02	1.02	-1.00	0.315
Learning Goals	-1.40	1.14	-1.23	0.218
Media Trust	2.02	1.09	-4.95	<.001
Misperception Competition	-0.09	1.03	-0.09	0.929
Misperception Democratic	-5.06	1.02	-4.95	<.001
Misperception Film	-3.55	0.99	-3.58	<.001
Misperception Suffering	2.37	1.07	2.22	0.027
Moral Differences	-0.02	1.04	-0.02	-.985
Outparty Friendship	0.675	1.08	0.61	0.544
Partisan Threat	0.91	1.05	0.87	0.387
Party Overlap	0.35	1.02	0.35	0.729
System Justification	0.68	1.00	0.68	0.498
Utah Cues	-3.14	0.97	-3.24	0.001

Violence Efficacy	-0.68	1.02	-0.67	0.506
Party	Reference: Democratic			
Republican	7.35	0.59	12.54	0.506
Gender	Reference: Female			
Male	1.32	0.25	5.27	<.001
Other	-6.20	1.68	-3.69	<.001
Age	-0.27	0.01	-33.30	<.001
Race	Reference: Asian			
Black	1.88	0.77	2.44	<.001
LatinX	-0.71	0.91	-0.78	0.435
Other	-3.97	0.83	-4.81	<.001
White	-5.04	0.67	-7.65	<.001
Education				
HS or less	5.71	0.37	15.50	<.001
Some college	2.01	0.30	6.72	<.001
Postgraduate	0.75	0.39	1.93	0.054
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	1.87	0.32	5.89	<.001
Luth	0.48	0.39	1.24	0.214
Condition * Party	Reference: Null Control Condition and Democrat			
Alternative Control * Republican	1.65	1.52	1.08	0.279
Befriending Meditation * Republican	0.85	1.63	0.52	0.601
Chatbot Quiz * Republican	0.72	1.46	0.49	0.623
Civity Storytelling * Republican	-2.3	1.53	-1.51	0.131
Common Identity * Republican	-0.42	1.43	-0.3	0.767

Contact Project * Republican	1.74	1.55	1.12	0.261
Counterfactual Selves * Republican	-0.23	1.42	-0.16	0.872
Democratic Fear * Republican	4.15	1.53	2.72	0.007
Economic Interest * Republican	1.91	1.55	1.23	0.218
Empathy Beliefs * Republican	0.34	1.53	0.22	0.824
Epistemic Rescue * Republican	0.33	1.47	0.22	0.823
Harmful Experiences * Republican	1.22	1.42	0.85	0.393
Inparty Elites * Republican	0.27	1.43	0.19	0.85
Learning Goals * Republican	1.66	1.58	1.05	0.292
Media Trust * Republican	-1.07	1.5	-0.71	0.476
Misperception Competition * Republican	0.78	1.43	0.55	0.586
Misperception Democratic * Republican	-1.36	1.45	-0.93	0.35
Misperception Film * Republican	2.56	1.38	1.85	0.064
Misperception Suffering * Republican	-1.52	1.5	-1.01	0.31
Moral Differences * Republican	1.19	1.43	0.83	0.406
Outparty Friendship * Republican	2.43	1.55	1.57	0.117
Partisan Threat * Republican	1.54	1.48	1.04	0.298
Party Overlap * Republican	0.71	1.41	0.5	0.616
System Justification* Republican	-0.46	1.41	-0.32	0.747

Utah Cues* Republican	1.99	1.38	1.45	0.148
Violence Efficacy* Republican	0.73	1.49	0.49	0.622

Table S17.1.3: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Intercept	17.91	0.82	21.73	<.001
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition			
Alternative Control	0.21	0.97	0.22	0.828
Befriending Meditation	-1.15	0.94	-1.23	0.22
Chatbot Quiz	-1.30	0.87	-1.50	0.135
Civity Storytelling	0.98	1.06	0.92	0.356
Common Identity	-0.15	0.94	-0.16	0.877
Contact Project	-1.17	0.98	-1.20	0.231
Counterfactual Selves	-0.70	0.90	-0.78	0.437
Democratic Fear	0.18	0.95	-0.19	0.852
Economic Interest	-0.35	0.95	-0.37	0.713
Empathy Beliefs	0.78	1.07	0.73	0.465
Epistemic Rescue	-0.90	0.89	01.13	0.257
Harmful Experiences	-1.30	0.90	-1.45	0.148
Inparty Elites	-1.01	0.89	-1.13	0.257
Learning Goals	-1.48	0.98	-1.51	0.130
Media Trust	0.77	0.98	0.78	0.434
Misperception Competition	-1.39	0.90	-1.55	0.122
Misperception Democratic	-1.71	0.93	-1.83	0.068
Misperception Film	-3.49	0.79	-4.40	<.001
Misperception Suffering	0.83	0.98	0.85	0.395
Moral Differences	-0.39	0.93	-0.42	0.675
Outparty Friendship	1.16	1.03	1.13	0.259
Partisan Threat	-0.93	0.91	-1.02	0.309
Party Overlap	0.12	0.92	0.13	0.898
System Justification	-0.50	0.89	-0.56	0.579
Utah Cues	-2.41	0.85	-2.83	0.005

Violence Efficacy	0.14	0.95	0.15	0.883
Party	Reference: Democratic			
Republican	0.59	0.51	1.15	0.252
Gender	Reference: Female			
Male	4.5	0.22	20.2	<.001
Other	0.30	1.54	0.19	0.847
Age	-0.32	0.01	-42.09	<.001
Race	Reference: Asian			
Black	1.25	0.78	1.61	0.108
LatinX	-0.55	0.91	-0.61	0.108
Other	-4.35	0.79	-5.51	<.001
White	-3.29	0.68	-4.85	<.001
Education	Reference: Bachelor			
HS or less	0.76	0.32	2.35	0.019
Some college	-1.10	0.26	-4.26	<.001
Postgraduate	2.26	0.36	5.29	0.054
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	2.04	0.27	7.43	<.001
Luth	-0.37	0.30	-1.22	0.224
Condition * Party	Reference: Null Control Condition and Democrat			
Alternative Control * Republican	1.04	1.36	0.76	0.445
Befriending Meditation * Republican	1.41	1.4	1.01	0.314
Chatbot Quiz * Republican	1.34	1.21	1.11	0.266
Civity Storytelling * Republican	-1.54	1.41	-1.09	0.275
Common Identity * Republican	-1.02	1.23	-0.83	0.406
Contact Project * Republican	0.73	1.41	0.52	0.606

Counterfactual Selves * Republican	1	1.24	0.81	0.417
Democratic Fear * Republican	4.35	1.39	3.12	0.002
Economic Interest * Republican	0.61	1.31	0.47	0.639
Empathy Beliefs * Republican	-0.95	1.44	-0.66	0.509
Epistemic Rescue * Republican	1.44	1.27	1.13	0.258
Harmful Experiences * Republican	1.93	1.26	1.54	0.125
Inparty Elites * Republican	-1.11	1.18	-0.94	0.347
Learning Goals * Republican	0	1.34	0	0.998
Media Trust * Republican	-0.37	1.32	-0.28	0.783
Misperception Competition * Republican	0.92	1.23	0.75	0.454
Misperception Democratic * Republican	0.2	1.25	0.16	0.876
Misperception Film * Republican	1.39	1.09	1.27	0.204
Misperception Suffering * Republican	-0.15	1.32	-0.11	0.909
Moral Differences * Republican	1.53	1.29	1.18	0.237
Outparty Friendship * Republican	0.24	1.4	0.17	0.866
Partisan Threat * Republican	0.51	1.2	0.43	0.671
Party Overlap * Republican	-0.06	1.26	-0.05	0.963
System Justification* Republican	1.64	1.26	1.31	0.191
Utah Cues* Republican	0.83	1.15	0.72	0.473

Violence Efficacy* Republican	0.22	1.33	0.17	0.866

Moderator: Strength of Partisanship as a Social Identity

Table S17.2.1: *Effects on Partisan Animosity*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Intercept	51.86	0.97	53.58	<.001
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition			
Alternative Control	-0.64	1.89	-0.34	0.736
Befriending Meditation	-5.09	1.88	-2.0	0.007
Chatbot Quiz	-2.19	1.65	-1.33	0.184
Civity Storytelling	-3.35	1.86	-1.80	0.072
Common Identity	-5.63	1.77	-3.19	0.001
Contact Project	-10.72	1.95	-.549	<.001
Counterfactual Selves	0.13	1.87	0.91	0.947
Democratic Fear	-0.95	1.86	-0.51	0.609
Economic Interest	1.17	1.84	0.64	0.524
Empathy Beliefs	-3.60	1.86	-1.93	0.053
Epistemic Rescue	-2.37	1.85	-1.28	0.200
Harmful Experiences	-3.55	1.79	-1.98	0.048
Inparty Elites	-2.23	1.75	-1.28	0.202
Learning Goals	-5.01	1.98	-2.53	0.011
Media Trust	-6.69	1.76	-3.79	<.001
Misperception Competition	-2.95	1.73	-1.70	0.089
Misperception Democratic	-4.68	1.62	-2.88	0.004
Misperception Film	-9.88	1.74	-5.67	<.001
Misperception Suffering	-5.02	1.81	-2.77	0.006
Moral Differences	-3.53	1.83	-1.93	0.053
Outparty Friendship	-4.34	2.07	-2.10	0.036
Partisan Threat	-.153	1.75	-0.88	0.382
Party Overlap	-1.61	1.77	-0.91	0.362

System Justification	-3.87	1.81	-2.14	0.032
Utah Cues	-1.13	1.96	-0.57	0.566
Violence Efficacy	-2.64	1.89	-1.40	0.162
Party	Reference: Democrat			
Republican	-0.19	0.23	3.24	0.001
Gender	Reference: Female			
Male	1.25	0.23	5.52	<.001
Other	6.38	1.50	4.27	<.001
Age	0.13	0.01	17.72	<.001
Race	Reference: Asian			
Black	0.75	0.68	1.10	0.273
LatinX	1.12	0.81	1.38	0.166
Other	0.40	0.72	0.58	0.575
White	0.85	0.58	1.46	0.144
Education	Reference: Bachelor			
HS or less	0.45	0.34	1.34	0.18
Some college	0.20	0.27	0.73	0.467
Postgraduate	-1.79	0.35	-5.12	<.001
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	0.94	0.29	3.24	0.001
Luth	2.13	0.36	5.95	<.001
Condition * Party	Reference: Null Control Condition and Democrat			
Alternative Control * Republican	-0.02	0.03	-0.62	0.536
Befriending Meditation * Republican	0	0.03	-0.08	0.939
Chatbot Quiz * Republican	-0.02	0.02	-0.66	0.509
Civity Storytelling * Republican	-0.08	0.03	-3.08	0.002
Common Identity *	-0.05	0.03	-2.04	0.041

Republican				
Contact Project * Republican	0	0.03	0.13	0.899
Counterfactual Selves * Republican	-0.03	0.03	-1.04	0.298
Democratic Fear * Republican	-0.06	0.03	-2.13	0.033
Economic Interest * Republican	-0.03	0.03	-1.31	0.19
Empathy Beliefs * Republican	-0.05	0.03	-1.86	0.063
Epistemic Rescue * Republican	-0.03	0.03	-0.96	0.337
Harmful Experiences * Republican	0.02	0.03	0.84	0.402
Inparty Elites * Republican	0	0.03	0.05	0.958
Learning Goals * Republican	-0.01	0.03	-0.19	0.848
Media Trust * Republican	-0.05	0.03	-2	0.045
Misperception Competition * Republican	0	0.03	-0.02	0.987
Misperception Democratic * Republican	-0.02	0.02	-0.86	0.389
Misperception Film * Republican	0.03	0.03	1	0.316
Misperception Suffering * Republican	-0.01	0.03	-0.55	0.583
Moral Differences * Republican	-0.02	0.03	-0.9	0.367
Outparty Friendship * Republican	-0.01	0.03	-0.43	0.664
Partisan Threat * Republican	0.03	0.03	1.23	0.218
Party Overlap * Republican	-0.03	0.03	-1.07	0.284
System Justification*	0.02	0.03	0.9	0.368

Republican				
Utah Cues* Republican	-0.01	0.03	-0.48	0.632
Violence Efficacy* Republican	0.03	0.03	0.97	0.334

Table S17.2.2: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Intercept	21.85	1.00	21.84	<.001
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition			
Alternative Control	-0.43	1.82	-0.24	0.812
Befriending Meditation	2.95	1.93	1.53	0.127
Chatbot Quiz	2.54	1.76	1.45	0.148
Civity Storytelling	0.11	1.77	0.06	0.952
Common Identity	-0.79	1.77	-0.45	0.656
Contact Project	-1.80	1.81	-1.00	0.32
Counterfactual Selves	1.57	1.80	0.87	0.384
Democratic Fear	0.35	1.91	0.19	0.853
Economic Interest	0.40	1.90	0.21	0.833
Empathy Beliefs	0.75	1.89	0.40	0.692
Epistemic Rescue	0.92	1.81	0.51	0.613
Harmful Experiences	-0.76	1.69	-0.45	0.655
Inparty Elites	1.02	1.73	0.59	0.555
Learning Goals	-2.04	1.89	-1.08	0.279
Media Trust	-1.74	1.82	-0.96	0.339
Misperception Competition	-0.37	1.82	-0.20	0.84
Misperception Democratic	-3.62	1.59	-2.28	0.023
Misperception Film	0.66	1.71	0.39	0.699
Misperception Suffering	3.07	1.86	1.65	0.098
Moral Differences	0.21	1.70	0.12	0.902
Outparty Friendship	2.17	1.95	1.11	0.266
Partisan Threat	0.88	1.96	0.45	0.653
Party Overlap	1.29	1.78	0.72	0.469
System Justification	-1.69	1.76	-0.96	0.335
Utah Cues	-0.1	1.70	-0.06	0.953

Violence Efficacy	-1.26	1.71	-0.74	0.461
Party	Reference: Democratic			
Republican	7.96	0.25	31.3	<.001
Gender	Reference: Female			
Male	1.32	0.25	5.28	<.001
Other	-6.05	1.68	-3.60	<.001
Age	-0.27	0.01	-33.25	<.001
Race	Reference: Asian			
Black	1.93	0.77	2.51	0.273
LatinX	-0.67	0.91	-0.73	0.466
Other	-3.96	0.83	-4.80	<.001
White	-4.99	0.67	-7.50	<.001
Education				
HS or less	0.45	0.34	1.34	0.180
Some college	0.20	0.27	0.73	0.467
Postgraduate	-1.79	0.35	-5.12	<.001
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	1.86	0.32	5.88	0.001
Luth	0.49	0.39	1.27	0.205
Condition * Party	Reference: Null Control Condition and Democrat			
Alternative Control * Republican	-0.00	0.03	-0.04	0.971
Befriending Meditation * Republican	-0.05	0.03	-1.69	0.091
Chatbot Quiz * Republican	-0.03	0.03	-1.05	0.295
Civity Storytelling * Republican	-0.02	0.03	-0.74	0.458
Common Identity * Republican	-0.01	0.03	-0.47	0.64
Contact Project * Republican	0.01	0.03	0.42	0.673

Counterfactual Selves * Republican	-0.01	0.03	-0.35	0.726
Democratic Fear * Republican	-0.07	0.03	-2.59	0.01
Economic Interest * Republican	0.01	0.03	0.5	0.618
Empathy Beliefs * Republican	-0.01	0.03	-0.35	0.73
Epistemic Rescue * Republican	-0.01	0.03	-0.3	0.762
Harmful Experiences * Republican	0.01	0.03	0.47	0.639
Inparty Elites * Republican	-0.03	0.03	-1.07	0.283
Learning Goals * Republican	0.02	0.03	0.74	0.461
Media Trust * Republican	0.05	0.03	1.75	0.08
Misperception Competition * Republican	0.01	0.03	0.36	0.721
Misperception Democratic * Republican	-0.03	0.03	-1.26	0.207
Misperception Film * Republican	-0.04	0.03	-1.7	0.09
Misperception Suffering * Republican	-0.02	0.03	-0.77	0.444
Moral Differences * Republican	0.01	0.03	0.21	0.836
Outparty Friendship * Republican	0	0.03	-0.16	0.87
Partisan Threat * Republican	0.01	0.03	0.4	0.687
Party Overlap * Republican	-0.01	0.03	-0.33	0.743
System Justification* Republican	0.03	0.03	1.19	0.234
Utah Cues* Republican	-0.03	0.03	-1.19	0.233

Violence Efficacy* Republican	0.01	0.03	0.52	0.606

Table S17.2.3: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Intercept	17.26	0.89	19.48	<.001
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition			
Alternative Control	0.71	1.53	0.46	0.645
Befriending Meditation	0.73	1.40	0.52	0.601
Chatbot Quiz	-0.18	1.40	-0.13	0.897
Civity Storytelling	-1.03	1.39	-0.74	0.456
Common Identity	-0.53	1.47	-0.36	0.716
Contact Project	-1.76	1.66	-1.06	0.287
Counterfactual Selves	0.89	1.54	0.58	0.562
Democratic Fear	3.42	1.70	2.01	0.045
Economic Interest	1.29	1.59	0.81	0.417
Empathy Beliefs	1.30	1.71	0.76	0.447
Epistemic Rescue	2.58	1.53	1.68	0.093
Harmful Experiences	-2.31	1.34	-1.73	0.084
Inparty Elites	0.23	1.30	0.18	0.859
Learning Goals	-2.36	1.38	-1.72	0.086
Media Trust	-2.09	1.30	-1.60	0.109
Misperception Competition	-1.30	1.31	-0.99	0.320
Misperception Democratic	-0.41	1.32	-0.31	0.757
Misperception Film	-0.32	1.14	-0.28	0.777
Misperception Suffering	-0.80	1.41	-0.57	0.572
Moral Differences	1.15	1.34	0.86	0.389
Outparty Friendship	1.16	1.58	0.74	0.461
Partisan Threat	1.38	1.38	1.00	0.319
Party Overlap	1.35	1.36	0.99	0.322
System Justification	0.15	1.33	0.12	0.908
Utah Cues	0.59	1.41	0.42	0.678

Violence Efficacy	-1.67	1.31	-1.27	0.203
Party	Reference: Democratic			
Republican	1.11	0.22	4.94	<.001
Gender	Reference: Female			
Male	4.50	0.22	20.23	<.001
Other	0.49	1.54	0.32	0.751
Age	-0.32	0.01	-42.03	<.001
Race	Reference: Asian			
Black	1.30	0.78	1.66	0.096
LatinX	-0.51	0.91	-0.56	0.573
Other	-4.29	0.79	-5.43	<.001
White	-3.23	0.68	-4.77	<.001
Education				
HS or less	0.77	0.32	2.37	0.018
Some college	-1.09	0.26	-4.23	<.001
Postgraduate	2.25	0.36	6.27	<.001
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	2.02	0.27	7.39	0.001
Luth	-0.39	0.30	-1.27	0.203
Condition * Party	Reference: Null Control Condition and Democrat			
Alternative Control * Republican	0	0.02	0	0.999
Befriending Meditation * Republican	-0.02	0.02	-0.8	0.422
Chatbot Quiz * Republican	-0.01	0.02	-0.31	0.757
Civity Storytelling * Republican	0.02	0.02	0.77	0.439
Common Identity * Republican	0	0.02	-0.08	0.936
Contact Project * Republican	0.01	0.03	0.52	0.601

Counterfactual Selves * Republican	-0.02	0.02	-0.7	0.483
Democratic Fear * Republican	-0.02	0.03	-0.64	0.525
Economic Interest * Republican	-0.02	0.02	-0.82	0.412
Empathy Beliefs * Republican	-0.02	0.03	-0.56	0.578
Epistemic Rescue * Republican	-0.04	0.02	-1.76	0.078
Harmful Experiences * Republican	0.03	0.02	1.29	0.195
Inparty Elites * Republican	-0.03	0.02	-1.29	0.197
Learning Goals * Republican	0.01	0.02	0.57	0.57
Media Trust * Republican	0.04	0.02	1.76	0.078
Misperception Competition * Republican	0.01	0.02	0.26	0.797
Misperception Democratic * Republican	-0.02	0.02	-0.85	0.395
Misperception Film * Republican	-0.04	0.02	-2.03	0.043
Misperception Suffering * Republican	0.02	0.02	0.99	0.32
Moral Differences * Republican	-0.01	0.02	-0.53	0.598
Outparty Friendship * Republican	0	0.02	0.06	0.95
Partisan Threat * Republican	-0.03	0.02	-1.42	0.154
Party Overlap * Republican	-0.02	0.02	-0.88	0.379
System Justification* Republican	0	0.02	0.12	0.901
Utah Cues* Republican	-0.04	0.02	-1.78	0.075

Violence Efficacy* Republican	0.03	0.02	1.25	0.213

18. Relationships between Outcomes

We estimated how correlated the 25 intervention effect sizes were for each pair of outcome variables. Table S18.1 presents the correlation matrix for the full sample, whereas Tables S18.2 and 18.3 present correlation matrices for Democratic and Republican participants, respectively. Figure S18.2 and S18.3 are network visualizations of Tables S18.2 and S18.3 (Table S18.1 is visualized by Figure 3 in the manuscript). The location of variables in the network is based on their relative correlations with one another. Hence, variables that are located closer are more strongly correlated. In addition to visualizations of effect size correlations, we include in Table S9.1 and Figure S18.1 direct correlations between the outcomes.

For these analyses, we included all the outcome variables we collected in our study (a) that we deemed potentially problematic for democracies, (b) whose items formed a reliable scale, and (c) for which we found at least one significant reduction. As a result, we did not include the following variables:

- attitudinal extremity and voting intentions because they are not really necessarily problematic for democracies,
- opposition to democratic reform because the items did not form a reliable scale, and
- resistance to getting the COVID vaccine because we did not find any intervention that reduced such resistance.

We also conducted statistical mediation analyses to estimate the indirect effects of the interventions via partisan animosity on the other outcomes. The results of these mediation analyses are presented in Tables S18.4 - S18.10.

Figure S18.1: *Correlations among Outcomes in Null Control Group*



Table S18.1: *Zero-Order Correlations between Effect Sizes for the Outcomes*

	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OB	SDT	SD	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1	0.25	-0.02	0.56	0.61	0.72	0.72	0.47
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.25	1	0.28	0.74	0.50	0.30	0.42	0.33
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.02	0.28	1	-0.04	0.16	-0.24	0.14	-0.15
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.56	0.74	-0.04	1	0.60	0.56	0.51	0.54
Opposition to Bipartisanship (OB)	0.61	0.50	0.16	0.60	1	0.43	0.71	0.55
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.72	0.30	-0.24	0.56	0.43	1	0.57	0.56
Social Distance (SD)	0.72	0.42	0.14	0.51	0.71	0.57	1	0.53
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.47	0.33	-0.15	0.54	0.55	0.56	0.53	1

Table S18.2: *Zero-Order Correlations between Effect Sizes for the Outcomes among Democrats*

	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OB	SDT	SD	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1	0.17	-0.16	0.49	0.48	0.74	0.72	0.64
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.17	1	0.44	0.61	0.32	0.36	0.20	0.14
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.16	0.44	1	-0.04	0.24	-0.10	0.04	-0.34
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.49	0.61	-0.04	1	0.43	0.53	0.45	0.43
Opposition to Bipartisanship (OB)	0.48	0.32	0.24	0.43	1	0.50	0.52	0.26
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.74	0.36	-0.10	0.53	0.50	1	0.65	0.50
Social Distance (SD)	0.72	0.20	0.04	0.45	0.52	0.65	1	0.56
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.64	0.14	-0.34	0.43	0.26	0.50	0.56	1

Table S18.3: *Zero-Order Correlations between Effect Sizes for the Outcomes among Republicans*

	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OB	SDT	SD	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1	0.27	0.04	0.49	0.52	0.50	0.43	0.15
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.27	1	0.24	0.75	0.45	0.14	0.50	0.40
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	0.04	0.24	1	-0.03	0.04	-0.10	0.16	0.05
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.49	0.75	-0.03	1	0.57	0.43	0.43	0.37
Opposition to Bipartisanship (OB)	0.52	0.45	0.04	0.57	1	0.40	0.59	0.51
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.50	0.14	-0.10	0.43	0.40	1	0.28	0.37
Social Distance (SD)	0.43	0.50	0.16	0.43	0.59	0.28	1	0.29
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.15	0.40	0.05	0.37	0.51	0.37	0.29	1

Figure S18.2: *Network Representation of Effect Size Correlations Among Democrats*



Figure S18.3: *Network Representation of Effect Size Correlations Among Republicans*



Table S18.4: *Indirect Effects via Partisan Animosity on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.50	0.14	-0.28
Chatbot Quiz	0.50	0.08	0.17
Civity Storytelling	-1.16	0.24	-0.21
Common Identity	-1.72	0.25	-0.15
Contact Project	-1.13	0.29	-0.25
Counterfactual Selves	0.91	0.04	0.05
Democratic Fear	-4.63	0.12	-0.03
Economic Interest	1.00	0.02	0.02
Empathy Beliefs	0.26	0.18	0.70
Epistemic Rescue	0.63	0.11	0.17
Harmful Experiences	0.25	0.06	0.22
Inparty Elites	-1.05	0.06	-0.05
Learning Goals	-0.47	0.14	-0.31
Media Trust	1.50	0.27	0.18
Misperception Competition	0.49	0.08	0.16
Misperception Democratic	-5.85	0.16	-0.03
Misperception Film	-2.23	0.21	-0.10
Misperception Suffering	1.47	0.17	0.11
Moral Differences	0.39	0.14	0.35
Outparty Friendship	2.11	0.13	0.06
Partisan Threat	1.63	-0.02	-0.01
Party Overlap	0.77	0.09	0.12
System Justification	0.51	0.06	0.12
Utah Cues	-2.15	0.05	-0.02
Violence Efficacy	-0.32	0.02	-0.08

Table S18.5: *Indirect Effects via Partisan Animosity on Support for Partisan Violence*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.69	0.78	-1.14
Chatbot Quiz	-0.72	0.47	-0.64
Civity Storytelling	0.27	1.37	5.16
Common Identity	-0.86	1.43	-1.65
Contact Project	-1.14	1.61	-1.42
Counterfactual Selves	-0.25	0.24	-0.96
Democratic Fear	2.26	0.70	0.31
Economic Interest	-0.30	0.13	-0.43
Empathy Beliefs	0.53	1.04	1.96
Epistemic Rescue	-0.12	0.62	-5.05
Harmful Experiences	-0.37	0.31	-0.84
Inparty Elites	-1.63	0.32	-0.20
Learning Goals	-1.44	0.81	-0.57
Media Trust	0.53	1.54	2.88
Misperception Competition	-1.00	0.45	-0.45
Misperception Democratic	-1.72	0.92	-0.54
Misperception Film	-2.78	1.21	-0.44
Misperception Suffering	0.70	0.94	1.34
Moral Differences	0.23	0.77	3.33
Outparty Friendship	1.34	0.75	0.56
Partisan Threat	-0.78	-0.10	0.13
Party Overlap	0.08	0.52	6.24
System Justification	0.32	0.34	1.05
Utah Cues	-2.06	0.28	-0.14
Violence Efficacy	0.19	0.14	0.73

Table S18.6: *Indirect Effects via Partisan Animosity on Support for Undemocratic Candidates*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	0.39	-1.12	-2.87
Chatbot Quiz	-0.59	-0.67	1.13
Civity Storytelling	-1.56	-1.97	1.26
Common Identity	-2.97	-2.04	0.69
Contact Project	-2.56	-2.31	0.9
Counterfactual Selves	2.07	-0.35	-0.17
Democratic Fear	-4.58	-1.01	0.22
Economic Interest	0.56	-0.18	-0.33
Empathy Beliefs	-0.35	-1.49	4.32
Epistemic Rescue	-0.77	-0.89	1.15
Harmful Experiences	-0.39	-0.45	1.14
Inparty Elites	-0.93	-0.46	0.49
Learning Goals	-0.88	-1.16	1.32
Media Trust	-2.64	-2.2	0.83
Misperception Competition	0.81	-0.64	-0.79
Misperception Democratic	-4.42	-1.32	0.3
Misperception Film	-0.38	-1.73	4.6
Misperception Suffering	0.69	-1.34	-1.94
Moral Differences	-1.2	-1.1	0.92
Outparty Friendship	0.63	-1.07	-1.7
Partisan Threat	1.3	0.14	0.11
Party Overlap	0.69	-0.74	-1.08
System Justification	0.6	-0.48	-0.81
Utah Cues	-1.22	-0.4	0.33
Violence Efficacy	0.41	-0.2	-0.47

Table S18.7: *Indirect Effects via Partisan Animosity on Opposition to Bipartisanship*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.82	-1.04	1.28
Chatbot Quiz	-0.66	-0.62	0.93
Civity Storytelling	-2.30	-1.82	0.79
Common Identity	-1.07	-1.89	1.77
Contact Project	-1.45	-2.14	1.47
Counterfactual Selves	0.20	-0.32	-1.64
Democratic Fear	-1.47	-0.93	0.64
Economic Interest	0.48	-0.17	-0.35
Empathy Beliefs	0.19	-1.38	-7.37
Epistemic Rescue	0.29	-0.82	-2.83
Harmful Experiences	-1.05	-0.42	0.40
Inparty Elites	-0.83	-0.43	0.51
Learning Goals	-0.25	-1.08	4.23
Media Trust	-2.32	-2.04	0.88
Misperception Competition	-0.77	-0.59	0.77
Misperception Democratic	-1.05	-1.22	1.16
Misperception Film	-1.65	-1.61	0.97
Misperception Suffering	0.22	-1.25	-5.63
Moral Differences	0.77	-1.02	-1.33
Outparty Friendship	-0.22	-1.00	4.62
Partisan Threat	1.70	0.13	0.08
Party Overlap	2.05	-0.69	-0.34
System Justification	0.42	-0.45	-1.07
Utah Cues	-1.28	-0.37	0.29
Violence Efficacy	-0.19	-0.18	0.93

Table S18.8: *Indirect Effects via Partisan Animosity on Social Distrust*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-2.28	-1.79	0.78
Chatbot Quiz	-0.97	-1.06	1.10
Civity Storytelling	-4.03	-3.13	0.78
Common Identity	-3.66	-3.25	0.89
Contact Project	-1.67	-3.67	2.20
Counterfactual Selves	-0.38	-0.55	1.45
Democratic Fear	-2.89	-1.60	0.56
Economic Interest	-0.02	-0.29	13.38
Empathy Beliefs	-1.71	-2.38	1.39
Epistemic Rescue	-1.06	-1.41	1.34
Harmful Experiences	-0.16	-0.72	4.44
Inparty Elites	-1.39	-0.73	0.53
Learning Goals	-1.44	-1.85	1.29
Media Trust	-3.83	-3.51	0.91
Misperception Competition	-1.28	-1.02	0.79
Misperception Democratic	-2.52	-2.10	0.83
Misperception Film	-2.50	-2.76	1.11
Misperception Suffering	-1.25	-2.14	1.72
Moral Differences	-3.29	-1.76	0.53
Outparty Friendship	-0.94	-1.71	1.83
Partisan Threat	-0.10	0.22	-2.18
Party Overlap	-1.47	-1.18	0.80
System Justification	-2.07	-0.77	0.37
Utah Cues	1.04	-0.64	-0.61
Violence Efficacy	-1.21	-0.31	0.26

Table S18.9: *Indirect Effects via Partisan Animosity on Social Distance*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-2.87	-2.48	0.87
Chatbot Quiz	1.30	-1.48	-1.13
Civity Storytelling	-3.46	-4.35	1.26
Common Identity	-2.46	-4.52	1.84
Contact Project	-1.94	-5.11	2.64
Counterfactual Selves	0.28	-0.77	-2.76
Democratic Fear	-1.80	-2.23	1.24
Economic Interest	-0.16	-0.40	2.51
Empathy Beliefs	-0.01	-3.31	307.87
Epistemic Rescue	-1.58	-1.97	1.24
Harmful Experiences	-0.02	-0.99	48.49
Inparty Elites	1.05	-1.02	-0.97
Learning Goals	-2.16	-2.58	1.19
Media Trust	-3.77	-4.87	1.29
Misperception Competition	-2.28	-1.42	0.62
Misperception Democratic	-2.56	-2.92	1.14
Misperception Film	-3.12	-3.84	1.23
Misperception Suffering	-1.58	-2.98	1.88
Moral Differences	-0.47	-2.44	5.19
Outparty Friendship	-0.32	-2.38	7.45
Partisan Threat	0.08	0.31	4.07
Party Overlap	1.09	-1.65	-1.51
System Justification	0.17	-1.07	-6.25
Utah Cues	-1.11	-0.89	0.80
Violence Efficacy	-0.32	-0.43	1.34

Table S18.10: *Indirect Effects via Partisan Animosity on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts*

Intervention	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Proportion Mediated
Befriending Meditation	-0.15	-1.76	11.55
Chatbot Quiz	-0.78	-1.05	1.34
Civity Storytelling	-1.78	-3.08	1.73
Common Identity	-2.75	-3.20	1.16
Contact Project	-0.06	-3.62	64.55
Counterfactual Selves	0.42	-0.55	-1.29
Democratic Fear	-0.96	-1.58	1.65
Economic Interest	0.33	-0.29	-0.88
Empathy Beliefs	-0.96	-2.34	2.43
Epistemic Rescue	0.28	-1.39	-4.93
Harmful Experiences	0.21	-0.71	-3.30
Inparty Elites	0.41	-0.72	-1.74
Learning Goals	0.49	-1.83	-3.72
Media Trust	-1.92	-3.46	1.80
Misperception Competition	-0.41	-1.00	2.44
Misperception Democratic	-2.18	-2.07	0.95
Misperception Film	0.15	-2.72	-17.96
Misperception Suffering	-0.49	-2.11	4.28
Moral Differences	0.11	-1.73	-15.52
Outparty Friendship	-0.19	-1.69	8.89
Partisan Threat	-0.62	0.22	-0.36
Party Overlap	2.17	-1.17	-0.54
System Justification	0.41	-0.76	-1.84
Utah Cues	0.30	-0.63	-2.12
Violence Efficacy	-1.38	-0.31	0.22

19. Robustness Checks

Below, we report the results of several robustness checks.

Check 1: Interventions vs Alternative Control

Below, we report the results of analyses in which we compare the interventions to an alternative (active) control condition.

Table S19.1.1: *Effects on Partisan Animosity*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	50.96	0.94	54.08	0	
Condition	Reference: **Alternative Condition**				
Null Control	1.77	0.69	2.57	0.01	0.09
Befriending Meditation	-3.46	0.92	-3.75	0	-0.17
Chatbot Quiz	-1.49	0.87	-1.72	0.043	-0.07
Civity Storytelling	-7.26	0.9	-8.04	0	-0.36
Common Identity	-7.42	0.86	-8.61	0	-0.37
Contact Project	-8.69	0.9	-9.62	0	-0.44
Counterfactual Selves	0.01	0.88	0.02	0.506	0
Democratic Fear	-2.99	0.88	-3.4	0	-0.15
Economic Interest	0.59	0.88	0.66	0.746	0.03
Empathy Beliefs	-5.26	0.89	-5.94	0	-0.26
Epistemic Rescue	-2.28	0.88	-2.59	0.005	-0.11
Harmful Experiences	-0.29	0.88	-0.33	0.372	-0.01
Inparty Elites	-0.38	0.87	-0.44	0.331	-0.02
Learning Goals	-3.6	0.92	-3.91	0	-0.18
Media Trust	-8.45	0.87	-9.68	0	-0.42
Misperception Competition	-1.2	0.87	-1.39	0.083	-0.06
Misperception Democratic	-4.31	0.86	-4.99	0	-0.21
Misperception Film	-6.39	0.87	-7.32	0	-0.32

Table S19.1.1: *Effects on Partisan Animosity (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Misperception Suffering	-4.23	0.9	-4.71	0	-0.21
Moral Differences	-3.37	0.87	-3.85	0	-0.17
Outparty Friendship	-3.44	0.92	-3.73	0	-0.17
Partisan Threat	2.38	0.87	2.75	0.997	0.12
Party Overlap	-1.66	0.86	-1.94	0.026	-0.08
System Justification	-0.52	0.87	-0.6	0.274	-0.03
Utah Cues	-0.23	0.88	-0.26	0.397	-0.01
Violence Efficacy	0.9	0.92	0.98	0.837	0.04
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.24	0.23	5.47	0	
Other	6.41	1.5	4.28	0	
Age	0.13	0.01	17.72	0	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	0.74	0.68	1.09	0.276	
LatinX	1.14	0.81	1.41	0.158	
Other	0.38	0.72	0.52	0.6	
White	0.84	0.59	1.44	0.149	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	0.45	0.34	1.36	0.175	
Some college	-1.78	0.35	-5.11	0	
Postgraduate	0.19	0.27	0.69	0.492	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	-0.18	0.23	-0.78	0.436	
Party as a Social Identity	0.1	0	21.67	0	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	0.93	0.29	3.21	0.001	
Luth	2.11	0.36	5.89	0	

Table S19.1.2: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept					
Condition	Reference: Alternative Condition				
Null Control	0.5	0.76	0.66	0.509	0.02
Befriending Meditation	0.1	1.03	0.1	0.538	0
Chatbot Quiz	1.18	0.97	1.22	0.889	0.05
Civity Storytelling	-0.77	0.99	-0.78	0.219	-0.03
Common Identity	-1.13	0.96	-1.18	0.119	-0.05
Contact Project	-0.49	1	-0.49	0.312	-0.02
Counterfactual Selves	1.44	0.95	1.51	0.935	0.06
Democratic Fear	-4.24	0.99	-4.27	0	-0.18
Economic Interest	1.9	1	1.89	0.971	0.08
Empathy Beliefs	0.58	0.99	0.58	0.72	0.03
Epistemic Rescue	0.86	0.97	0.89	0.813	0.04
Harmful Experiences	0.59	0.95	0.62	0.731	0.03
Inparty Elites	-0.39	0.96	-0.41	0.341	-0.02
Learning Goals	-0.09	1.02	-0.09	0.465	0
Media Trust	2.02	0.99	2.04	0.98	0.09
Misperception Competition	0.79	0.96	0.83	0.796	0.03
Misperception Democratic	-5.26	0.97	-5.45	0	-0.23
Misperception Film	-1.74	0.94	-1.86	0.032	-0.08
Misperception Suffering	2.12	0.98	2.15	0.984	0.09
Moral Differences	1.08	0.96	1.13	0.871	0.05
Outparty Friendship	2.35	1	2.35	0.991	0.1
Partisan Threat	2.19	0.98	2.24	0.987	0.09

Table S19.1.2: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	1.2	0.95	1.27	0.897	0.05
System Justification	0.93	0.95	0.98	0.837	0.04
Utah Cues	-1.66	0.94	-1.77	0.038	-0.07
Violence Efficacy	0.17	0.98	0.18	0.57	0.01
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.32	0.25	5.27	0	
Other	-6.09	1.68	-3.63	0	
Age	-0.27	0.01	-33.28	0	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.92	0.77	2.5	0.013	
LatinX	-0.69	0.91	-0.76	0.448	
Other	-3.97	0.83	-4.81	0	
White	-5.01	0.67	-7.52	0	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	5.7	0.37	15.47	0	
Some college	0.75	0.39	1.92	0.055	
Postgraduate	2.02	0.3	6.75	0	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	7.96	0.25	31.33	0	
Party as a Social Identity	0.21	0	45.26	0	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	1.87	0.32	5.91	0	
Luth	0.49	0.39	1.27	0.204	

Table S19.1.3: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept					
Condition	Reference: Alternative Condition				
Null Control	-0.71	0.68	-1.04	0.3	-0.04
Befriending Meditation	-1.2	0.9	-1.33	0.092	-0.06
Chatbot Quiz	-1.34	0.84	-1.61	0.054	-0.07
Civity Storytelling	-0.5	0.91	-0.55	0.291	-0.03
Common Identity	-1.36	0.85	-1.61	0.054	-0.07
Contact Project	-1.52	0.91	-1.67	0.047	-0.08
Counterfactual Selves	-0.92	0.85	-1.08	0.14	-0.05
Democratic Fear	1.58	0.91	1.75	0.96	0.08
Economic Interest	-0.75	0.87	-0.86	0.194	-0.04
Empathy Beliefs	-0.41	0.92	-0.44	0.328	-0.02
Epistemic Rescue	-0.9	0.86	-1.05	0.147	-0.04
Harmful Experiences	-1.08	0.85	-1.26	0.104	-0.05
Inparty Elites	-2.26	0.83	-2.74	0.003	-0.11
Learning Goals	-2.19	0.89	-2.48	0.007	-0.11
Media Trust	-0.11	0.88	-0.12	0.451	-0.01
Misperception Competition	-1.64	0.84	-1.95	0.026	-0.08
Misperception Democratic	-2.32	0.85	-2.73	0.003	-0.12
Misperception Film	-3.49	0.8	-4.39	0	-0.17
Misperception Suffering	0.05	0.88	0.06	0.523	0
Moral Differences	-0.32	0.87	-0.37	0.357	-0.02
Outparty Friendship	0.57	0.91	0.63	0.734	0.03
Partisan Threat	-1.38	0.83	-1.67	0.048	-0.07

Table S19.1.3: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	-0.62	0.85	-0.73	0.232	-0.03
System Justification	-0.37	0.85	-0.43	0.333	-0.02
Utah Cues	-2.71	0.82	-3.31	0	-0.14
Violence Efficacy	-0.45	0.88	-0.51	0.306	-0.02
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	4.5	0.22	20.22	0	
Other	0.37	1.54	0.24	0.808	
Age	-0.32	0.01	-42.06	0	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.31	0.78	1.68	0.093	
LatinX	-0.51	0.91	-0.56	0.575	
Other	-4.31	0.79	-5.46	0	
White	-3.24	0.68	-4.78	0	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	0.76	0.32	2.34	0.019	
Some college	2.26	0.36	6.3	0	
Postgraduate	-1.1	0.26	-4.25	0	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	1.11	0.22	4.96	0	
Party as a Social Identity	0.12	0	29.88	0	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	2.04	0.27	7.44	0	
Luth	-0.38	0.3	-1.24	0.214	

Check 2: Interventions vs Null Control without Weighting

Below, we report the results of unweighted regression analyses.

Table S19.2.1: *Effects on Partisan Animosity*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	52.71	0.75	70.38	0	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	-1.79	0.69	-2.59	0.01	-0.09
Befriending Meditation	-5.26	0.72	-7.31	0	-0.26
Chatbot Quiz	-3.26	0.65	-5.04	0	-0.16
Civity Storytelling	-9.02	0.7	-12.98	0	-0.45
Common Identity	-9.19	0.64	-14.35	0	-0.46
Contact Project	-10.53	0.69	-15.19	0	-0.53
Counterfactual Selves	-1.76	0.66	-2.65	0.004	-0.09
Democratic Fear	-4.78	0.67	-7.19	0	-0.24
Economic Interest	-1.2	0.67	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Empathy Beliefs	-7	0.67	-10.37	0	-0.35
Epistemic Rescue	-4.05	0.66	-6.09	0	-0.2
Harmful Experiences	-2.07	0.66	-3.12	0.001	-0.1
Inparty Elites	-2.17	0.64	-3.36	0	-0.11
Learning Goals	-5.37	0.71	-7.51	0	-0.27
Media Trust	-10.23	0.65	-15.63	0	-0.52
Misperception Competition	-2.98	0.65	-4.6	0	-0.15
Misperception Democratic	-6.06	0.64	-9.44	0	-0.3
Misperception Film	-8.17	0.65	-12.51	0	-0.41
Misperception Suffering	-6.02	0.69	-8.74	0	-0.3
Moral Differences	-5.17	0.66	-7.88	0	-0.26
Outparty Friendship	-5.24	0.72	-7.28	0	-0.26
Partisan Threat	0.61	0.65	0.95	0.828	0.03

Table S19.2.1: *Effects on Partisan Animosity (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	-3.41	0.63	-5.39	0	-0.17
System Justification	-2.31	0.65	-3.55	0	-0.11
Utah Cues	-2.01	0.66	-3.02	0.001	-0.1
Violence Efficacy	-0.92	0.72	-1.29	0.099	-0.05
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.22	0.23	5.39	0	
Other	6.41	1.49	4.29	0	
Age	0.13	0.01	17.86	0	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	0.72	0.68	1.06	0.29	
LatinX	1.11	0.81	1.38	0.168	
Other	0.4	0.72	0.55	0.582	
White	0.84	0.59	1.44	0.15	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	0.45	0.33	1.34	0.179	
Some college	-1.8	0.35	-5.14	0	
Postgraduate	0.19	0.27	0.7	0.484	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	-0.18	0.23	-0.78	0.433	
Party as a Social Identity	0.1	0	21.61	0	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	0.93	0.29	3.22	0.001	
Luth	2.11	0.36	5.91	0	

Table S19.2.2: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	22.33	0.82	27.08	0	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	-0.51	0.76	-0.67	0.504	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.41	0.81	-0.5	0.309	-0.02
Chatbot Quiz	0.66	0.73	0.91	0.818	0.03
Civity Storytelling	-1.28	0.77	-1.67	0.048	-0.06
Common Identity	-1.65	0.72	-2.3	0.011	-0.07
Contact Project	-1.04	0.77	-1.35	0.089	-0.04
Counterfactual Selves	0.92	0.71	1.31	0.904	0.04
Democratic Fear	-4.74	0.76	-6.22	0	-0.21
Economic Interest	1.39	0.77	1.8	0.964	0.06
Empathy Beliefs	0.13	0.76	0.17	0.569	0.01
Epistemic Rescue	0.32	0.74	0.44	0.67	0.01
Harmful Experiences	0.07	0.71	0.09	0.537	0
Inparty Elites	-0.89	0.71	-1.24	0.107	-0.04
Learning Goals	-0.61	0.79	-0.77	0.221	-0.03
Media Trust	1.48	0.75	1.96	0.975	0.06
Misperception Competition	0.32	0.72	0.45	0.674	0.01
Misperception Democratic	-5.77	0.73	-7.93	0	-0.25
Misperception Film	-2.24	0.69	-3.25	0.001	-0.1
Misperception Suffering	1.62	0.75	2.15	0.984	0.07
Moral Differences	0.59	0.72	0.83	0.796	0.03
Outparty Friendship	1.84	0.78	2.37	0.991	0.08
Partisan Threat	1.67	0.74	2.26	0.988	0.07

Table S19.2.2: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	0.69	0.7	0.98	0.836	0.03
System Justification	0.45	0.71	0.63	0.736	0.02
Utah Cues	-2.17	0.69	-3.15	0.001	-0.09
Violence Efficacy	-0.38	0.75	-0.51	0.304	-0.02
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.34	0.25	5.35	0	
Other	-6.04	1.68	-3.59	0	
Age	-0.27	0.01	-33.44	0	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.94	0.77	2.53	0.012	
LatinX	-0.62	0.91	-0.68	0.494	
Other	-3.96	0.82	-4.81	0	
White	-4.98	0.67	-7.47	0	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	5.67	0.37	15.39	0	
Some college	0.77	0.39	1.98	0.047	
Postgraduate	1.99	0.3	6.64	0	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	7.93	0.25	31.15	0	
Party as a Social Identity	0.21	0	45.36	0	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	1.88	0.32	5.92	0	
Luth	0.49	0.39	1.26	0.206	

Table S19.2.3: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	17.56	0.79	22.24	< .001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	0.7	0.68	1.02	0.307	0.03
Befriending Meditation	-0.5	0.71	-0.7	0.24	-0.02
Chatbot Quiz	-0.66	0.61	-1.09	0.139	-0.03
Civity Storytelling	0.18	0.71	0.25	0.598	0.01
Common Identity	-0.66	0.62	-1.06	0.145	-0.03
Contact Project	-0.83	0.71	-1.16	0.122	-0.04
Counterfactual Selves	-0.22	0.62	-0.35	0.362	-0.01
Democratic Fear	2.26	0.7	3.24	0.999	0.11
Economic Interest	-0.04	0.66	-0.06	0.476	0
Empathy Beliefs	0.32	0.73	0.44	0.669	0.02
Epistemic Rescue	-0.2	0.64	-0.31	0.377	-0.01
Harmful Experiences	-0.37	0.63	-0.59	0.278	-0.02
Inparty Elites	-1.55	0.59	-2.61	0.005	-0.08
Learning Goals	-1.49	0.68	-2.19	0.014	-0.07
Media Trust	0.58	0.67	0.87	0.807	0.03
Misperception Competition	-0.94	0.62	-1.52	0.064	-0.05
Misperception Democratic	-1.63	0.63	-2.6	0.005	-0.08
Misperception Film	-2.79	0.55	-5.1	0	-0.14
Misperception Suffering	0.74	0.67	1.12	0.868	0.04
Moral Differences	0.41	0.65	0.64	0.738	0.02
Outparty Friendship	1.33	0.71	1.87	0.969	0.07
Partisan Threat	-0.68	0.6	-1.15	0.125	-0.03

Table S19.2.3: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	0.08	0.63	0.12	0.55	0
System Justification	0.34	0.63	0.54	0.705	0.02
Utah Cues	-2	0.58	-3.45	0	-0.1
Violence Efficacy	0.27	0.67	0.4	0.656	0.01
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	4.52	0.22	20.26	0	
Other	0.36	1.54	0.23	0.817	
Age	-0.32	0.01	-42.12	0	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.39	0.78	1.78	0.075	
LatinX	-0.43	0.91	-0.47	0.637	
Other	-4.27	0.79	-5.4	0	
White	-3.2	0.68	-4.71	0	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	0.74	0.33	2.29	0.022	
Some college	2.3	0.36	6.37	0	
Postgraduate	-1.12	0.26	-4.32	0	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	1.1	0.22	4.91	0	
Party as a Social Identity	0.12	0	29.99	0	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	2.03	0.27	7.4	0	
Luth	-0.38	0.3	-1.23	0.217	

20. Attrition

Preregistered Strategy to Test for Differential Attrition Across Conditions

We define that a participant attrited for an outcome if the participant was randomly assigned to an experimental condition but did not respond to this outcome. Following standard practice in experimental design (Winston & Green, 2016), we test for differential attrition using the following procedure.

1. **Are there different rates of attrition across experimental conditions?** To answer this question, we conduct a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test (Wooldridge, 2010: 62) of the hypothesis that none of the experimental conditions affect the attrition rate (i.e. attrition rates in each of the intervention conditions is equal to the attrition rate in the control condition).
2. **Are different kinds of participants attritting within different experimental conditions?** In a linear regression, we predict a binary variable for attrition on experimental condition, with all baseline covariates pre-registered in the balance test, and all condition-covariate interactions. We then conduct a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test of the hypothesis that all the interaction coefficients are zero.

For both tests, we consider p-values below 0.05 as evidence of differential attrition. We consider our study to have differential attrition if either test yields $p<0.05$.

Preregistered Strategy to Account for Differential Attrition

To account for potential biases caused by differential attrition, we conducted inverse probability weighting (IPW). This procedure reweights the data so that individuals who completed the study but had high underlying propensities for attriting, as inferred from a model predicting attrition as a function of baseline covariates, are upweighted to counterbalance the

missing outcomes from attriting participants. The key assumption needed for this procedure to accurately estimate average treatment effects is that attrition is independent of potential outcomes, conditional on the specified baseline covariates. To calculate each participant's propensity to attrit, we use random forests to predict attrition (and to avoid over-fitting). We include all baseline covariates as predictors of attrition, including experimental condition, gender, age, race, education, party identification, strength of party identification, and the panel the participant was recruited from (e.g. Bovitz, Luth, or Dynata). The results are similar if we use a parametric approach of regressing an indicator for attrition on experimental condition indicators, all baseline covariates, and their full interactions. We calculate weights for each outcome separately, such that we do not assume that the patterns of selection that led to attrition for one dependent variable are identical for the others. Based on this model for attrition, we calculate the fitted probabilities of attrition for each participant, and we use the inverse of these probabilities as weights in our regression analyses.

Robustness Check: Accounting for Differential Attrition by Recapturing Attriters

In addition to the preregistered approach detailed above, we developed a new strategy for recapturing attriters. This involved (i) identifying participants who attrited, (ii) creating a secondary survey that included the outcome measures from the main survey, and (iii) recruiting participants into this "recapture survey" as quickly as possible to mitigate any timing differences and attempt to recover any available treatment effects.

We operationalized attrition as inactivity for at least one hour after treatment assignment (The main survey took roughly 16 min for participants to complete). We tracked participants' progress and identified participants who stopped participating for at least one hour[3]. At that

[3] This strategy implies that a participant could take repeated breaks of up to 59 min and then continue with the survey without being labeled as attrited.

point, the participant was excluded from participating further. If the participant attritted after assignment to condition[4], a series of steps were taken to recapture that participant's data.

Attriters were reinvited for a follow-up survey. Depending on the sample provider's platform, participants were either immediately invited to a follow-up study that asked the key outcomes (Bovitz-Forthright), or were invited manually to the follow-up study six times a day (Luth and Dynata). The attriter survey was explicitly *not* tied to the main survey participants had just attrited from. This attriter survey was much shorter, including only the key outcome variables, however compensation for completing it was the same as what participants would have received if they had not attrited. This increased the incentive to complete the follow-up survey. If participants did not participate in the attriter survey by the end of that calendar day, they would begin to receive daily reminder emails to encourage their participation. For this stage of the study design, all effort was focused on doing whatever was possible to obtain the last outcome data.

In total, 35,252 participants were randomly assigned to a condition. Of these participants, 3,193 completed none of the three target outcomes. The remaining 32,059 participants completed at least one of the target outcomes.

We found clear evidence of differential attrition. As an example, Table S20.1 below shows attrition rates by condition for the partisan animosity outcome variable. Attrition varied widely across conditions, ranging from 1.6% to 23.0%. Thus, we found clear evidence that some conditions resulted in significantly more participants dropping out than other conditions did.

This brings up the question of whether significant differences in attrition rates across conditions threaten the validity of causal inferences we have made from our data. For example, if participants with higher levels of partisan animosity were more likely to drop out in condition A

[4] If participants dropped out of the survey before being assigned to a condition, attrition was not driven by any feature that differed between conditions. As a result, such dropping out does not threaten internal validity.

than condition B, analyses that do not correct for differential attrition might wrongly suggest that condition A caused a reduction in partisan animosity compared to condition B. However, recapturing these dropped out participants and using their reported levels of partisan animosity should help to correct this bias. Thus, comparing the main analyses using IPW (see Tables S10.1 - S10.3) to the results from the unweighted analysis that did not control for attrition at all (see Tables S19.2.1 - 16.2.3) and the results including recaptured attriters (see Tables S20.2 - S20.4) below should help us to estimate whether, and how much, differential attrition biases our estimates of treatment effects.

Encouragingly, we find no major differences between these analyses. The numbers of effective interventions across procedures was very similar for all the outcomes we collected in the follow-up survey: partisan animosity (without correction: 23 out of 25; with IPW correction: 23 out of 25; with recaptured attriters and IPW correction: 22 out of 25), support for undemocratic practices (without correction: 6 out of 25; with IPW correction: 6 out of 25; with recaptured attriters and IPW correction: 5 out of 25), and support for partisan violence (without correction: 5 out of 25; with IPW correction: 5 out of 25; with recaptured attriters and IPW correction: 5 out of 25). Thus, these analyses suggest that while differential attrition is clearly present in our study, we find no evidence that it causes systematic bias in treatment effects.

However, we cannot rule out that attrition biased our effect estimates. Of the 3,193 attriting participants, 46.6% were recovered. Thus, the possibility remains that the non-recovered attriters were meaningfully different from the rest of the sample such that their inclusion would have affected our estimated treatment effects in meaningful ways. However, one encouraging fact is, as noted above, there was nothing apparently connecting tying this attriter survey to the main study these participants attrited from. If participants attrited from the main study due to

their reaction to the content of one or more conditions, it is unlikely that the same reaction would be prompted by the content of the attriter survey. Still, there is always some possibility that significant differential attrition persisted across conditions despite these methods, and further that the variable composition of the conditions biased our causal inferences. However, we view this as a conservative method for addressing bias from differential attrition because most of the recovered attriters we include in these analyses were only partially treated, or not treated at all, and their inclusion therefore is likely to dilute the observed impact of treatment effects in the study.

Table S20.1: *Attrition by Experimental Condition*

Condition	Assigned	Completed		Attrited & Recaptured		Attrited	
	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5691	5601	98.4%	38	0.7%	52	0.9%
Alternative Control	1133	986	87.0%	71	6.3%	76	6.7%
Befriending Meditation	1138	878	77.2%	133	11.7%	127	11.2%
Chatbot Quiz	1131	1031	91.2%	53	4.7%	47	4.2%
Civity Storytelling	1134	970	85.5%	74	6.5%	90	7.9%
Common Identity	1142	1071	93.8%	30	2.6%	41	3.6%
Contact Project	1147	899	78.4%	117	10.2%	131	11.4%
Counterfactual Selves	1133	1095	96.6%	17	1.5%	21	1.9%
Democratic Fear	1135	1030	90.7%	49	4.3%	56	4.9%
Economic Interest	1132	1012	89.4%	58	5.1%	62	5.5%
Empathy Beliefs	1139	902	79.2%	115	10.1%	122	10.7%
Epistemic Rescue	1138	1006	88.4%	73	6.4%	59	5.2%
Harmful Experiences	1126	1092	97.0%	17	1.5%	17	1.5%
Inparty Elites	1139	1077	94.6%	27	2.4%	35	3.1%
Learning Goals	1134	873	77.0%	117	10.3%	144	12.7%
Media Trust	1144	990	86.5%	72	6.3%	82	7.2%
Misperception Competition	1136	1091	96.0%	17	1.5%	28	2.5%
Misperception Democratic	1144	1091	95.4%	22	1.9%	31	2.7%
Misperception Film	1133	1054	93.0%	31	2.7%	48	4.2%
Misperception Suffering	1134	1034	91.2%	49	4.3%	51	4.5%
Moral Differences	1136	1015	89.3%	63	5.5%	58	5.1%
Outparty Friendship	1140	988	86.7%	72	6.3%	80	7.0%
Partisan Threat	1134	1086	95.8%	15	1.3%	33	2.9%
Party Overlap	1140	1057	92.7%	28	2.5%	55	4.8%
System Justification	1140	1101	96.6%	18	1.6%	21	1.8%
Utah Cues	1146	1109	96.8%	18	1.6%	19	1.7%
Violence Efficacy	1133	920	81.2%	95	8.4%	118	10.4%
Total	35252	32059	90.9%	1489	4.2%	1704	4.8%

Table S20.2: *Effects on Partisan Animosity*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	51.70	0.74	69.96	< .001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	-1.15	0.67	-1.71	0.088	-0.06
Befriending Meditation	-4.25	0.69	-6.17	< .001	-0.21
Chatbot Quiz	-2.88	0.64	-4.53	< .001	-0.14
Civity Storytelling	-8.08	0.68	-11.84	< .001	-0.4
Common Identity	-8.82	0.64	-13.81	< .001	-0.44
Contact Project	-8.96	0.67	-13.33	< .001	-0.45
Counterfactual Selves	-1.7	0.66	-2.57	0.005	-0.08
Democratic Fear	-4.5	0.65	-6.88	< .001	-0.22
Economic Interest	-0.82	0.66	-1.25	0.105	-0.04
Empathy Beliefs	-5.74	0.65	-8.8	< .001	-0.28
Epistemic Rescue	-3.59	0.65	-5.5	< .001	-0.18
Harmful Experiences	-1.99	0.66	-3.01	0.001	-0.1
Inparty Elites	-2.02	0.64	-3.17	0.001	-0.1
Learning Goals	-4.84	0.68	-7.14	< .001	-0.24
Media Trust	-9.07	0.65	-13.92	< .001	-0.45
Misperception Competition	-3	0.64	-4.66	< .001	-0.15
Misperception Democratic	-5.82	0.64	-9.11	< .001	-0.29
Misperception Film	-7.71	0.65	-11.86	< .001	-0.38
Misperception Suffering	-5.65	0.67	-8.38	< .001	-0.28
Moral Differences	-4.58	0.64	-7.13	< .001	-0.23
Outparty Friendship	-4.84	0.7	-6.89	< .001	-0.24
Partisan Threat	0.62	0.64	0.96	0.832	0.03

Table S20.2: *Effects on Partisan Animosity (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	-3.29	0.63	-5.24	0	-0.16
System Justification	-2.27	0.64	-3.54	0	-0.11
Utah Cues	-1.95	0.66	-2.96	0.002	-0.1
Violence Efficacy	-0.3	0.69	-0.43	0.334	-0.01
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.18	0.22	5.31	0	
Other	6.29	1.5	4.2	0	
Age	0.15	0.01	19.98	0	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	0.81	0.67	1.2	0.229	
LatinX	1.16	0.79	1.46	0.146	
Other	0.34	0.71	0.48	0.629	
White	0.96	0.58	1.66	0.097	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	0.42	0.33	1.29	0.196	
Some college	-1.81	0.34	-5.25	0	
Postgraduate	0.12	0.27	0.43	0.667	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	-0.08	0.23	-0.36	0.718	
Party as a Social Identity	0.1	0	22.77	0	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	0.97	0.28	3.43	0.001	
Luth	2.34	0.35	6.7	0	

Table S20.3: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept					
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	-0.41	0.73	-0.56	0.576	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.47	0.76	-0.63	0.266	-0.02
Chatbot Quiz	0.88	0.72	1.22	0.889	0.04
Civity Storytelling	-0.92	0.75	-1.22	0.112	-0.04
Common Identity	-1.62	0.71	-2.29	0.011	-0.07
Contact Project	-0.86	0.73	-1.17	0.122	-0.04
Counterfactual Selves	0.89	0.7	1.27	0.897	0.04
Democratic Fear	-4.37	0.75	-5.84	0	-0.19
Economic Interest	1.1	0.76	1.46	0.927	0.05
Empathy Beliefs	0.68	0.74	0.93	0.823	0.03
Epistemic Rescue	0.25	0.72	0.34	0.634	0.01
Harmful Experiences	0.18	0.71	0.25	0.6	0.01
Inparty Elites	-0.74	0.7	-1.05	0.146	-0.03
Learning Goals	-0.59	0.75	-0.78	0.216	-0.03
Media Trust	1.57	0.73	2.15	0.984	0.07
Misperception Competition	0.4	0.71	0.56	0.713	0.02
Misperception Democratic	-5.67	0.73	-7.81	0	-0.25
Misperception Film	-2.36	0.68	-3.48	0	-0.1
Misperception Suffering	1.55	0.74	2.1	0.982	0.07
Moral Differences	0.52	0.7	0.74	0.772	0.02
Outparty Friendship	1.5	0.75	1.99	0.977	0.06
Partisan Threat	1.59	0.73	2.17	0.985	0.07

Table S20.3: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	0.76	0.7	1.08	0.86	0.03
System Justification	0.45	0.7	0.64	0.738	0.02
Utah Cues	-2.22	0.69	-3.22	0.001	-0.1
Violence Efficacy	0.42	0.73	0.57	0.715	0.02
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.37	0.25	5.54	0	
Other	-6.03	1.68	-3.58	0	
Age	-0.27	0.01	-33.43	0	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.9	0.76	2.51	0.012	
LatinX	-0.67	0.9	-0.74	0.461	
Other	-3.98	0.81	-4.9	0	
White	-4.94	0.66	-7.55	0	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	5.63	0.36	15.62	0	
Some college	2.09	0.29	7.11	0	
Postgraduate	0.5	0.38	1.31	0.189	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	7.95	0.25	31.86	0	
Party as a Social Identity	0.21	0	46.4	0	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	1.86	0.31	5.98	0	
Luth	0.69	0.38	1.83	0.068	

Table S20.4: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	17.48	0.77	22.56	< .001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	0.47	0.65	0.73	0.468	0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.27	0.65	-0.41	0.342	-0.01
Chatbot Quiz	-0.45	0.6	-0.76	0.224	-0.02
Civity Storytelling	0.39	0.69	0.56	0.713	0.02
Common Identity	-0.56	0.61	-0.91	0.18	-0.03
Contact Project	-0.53	0.67	-0.79	0.216	-0.03
Counterfactual Selves	-0.31	0.61	-0.5	0.309	-0.02
Democratic Fear	2.32	0.68	3.39	1	0.12
Economic Interest	-0.17	0.63	-0.26	0.396	-0.01
Empathy Beliefs	0.74	0.68	1.08	0.861	0.04
Epistemic Rescue	-0.18	0.61	-0.29	0.386	-0.01
Harmful Experiences	-0.25	0.63	-0.4	0.346	-0.01
Inparty Elites	-1.55	0.58	-2.66	0.004	-0.08
Learning Goals	-1.48	0.63	-2.35	0.009	-0.07
Media Trust	0.77	0.65	1.18	0.882	0.04
Misperception Competition	-0.94	0.61	-1.54	0.062	-0.05
Misperception Democratic	-1.55	0.62	-2.51	0.006	-0.08
Misperception Film	-2.8	0.54	-5.22	< .001	-0.14
Misperception Suffering	0.73	0.65	1.12	0.868	0.04
Moral Differences	0.37	0.63	0.59	0.723	0.02
Outparty Friendship	1.23	0.68	1.8	0.964	0.06
Partisan Threat	-0.72	0.59	-1.22	0.112	-0.04

Table S20.4: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence (continued)*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Party Overlap	0.08	0.62	0.13	0.553	0
System Justification	0.25	0.62	0.4	0.657	0.01
Utah Cues	-1.95	0.58	-3.37	0	-0.1
Violence Efficacy	0.53	0.65	0.82	0.793	0.03
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	4.45	0.22	20.42	0	
Other	0.32	1.54	0.21	0.835	
Age	-0.31	0.01	-42.64	0	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.32	0.77	1.72	0.085	
LatinX	-0.28	0.9	-0.31	0.756	
Other	-4.2	0.78	-5.4	0	
White	-3.17	0.67	-4.77	0	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	0.73	0.32	2.31	0.021	
Some college	2.17	0.35	6.18	0	
Postgraduate	-1.08	0.25	-4.29	0	
Party	Reference: Democrat				
Republican	1.19	0.22	5.42	0	
Party as a Social Identity	0.12	0	30.28	0	
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz				
Dynata	1.98	0.27	7.33	0	
Luth	-0.39	0.3	-1.3	0.195	

21. Durability Test

Method

Two weeks after completing the main study (wave one), we conducted a durability test. Participants from a subset of interventions were invited back to participate in another survey (Wave 2). The subset of ten interventions was chosen to investigate the durability, or longevity, of the best performing interventions. Financial constraints prevented us from including all 25 interventions. The ten interventions were chosen based on, (i) the performance of all 25 interventions at the 70% data collection stage, with an effort to (ii) diversify the pool of interventions to be tested, as well as (iii) diversify performance on different dependent measures. The experimental conditions that were included in the durability test were: Null Control, Alternative Control, Civity Storytelling, Common Identity, Contact Project, Democratic Fear, Empathy Beliefs, Inparty Elites, Media Trust, Misperception Democratic, Misperception Film, and Utah Cues.

The durability test followed a similar but more minimal procedure as the main study. Participants first saw a consent page, then only three demographics assessing gender, race and political affiliation, with political affiliation being assessed in the same way it was in the main collection. Participants then answered the same outcome measures as in the main study. As described in the section Questionnaire and Procedure, these outcomes were the three primary dependent variables (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic candidates, support for partisan violence) as well as the other dependent variables and mediators we collected in the main study.

Retention Rates

18,227 individuals were randomly assigned to the relevant conditions to be reinvited to the durability test. Of these 18,227 participants, *n* = 16,780 participants had completed at least one of the target outcomes in the main survey. Of these 16,780 participants, *n* = 8,644 (51.5%) completed at least one of the target outcomes in the durability survey.

Preregistered Analyses

Tables 21.1 - 21.3 report the preregistered results for the durability test. Participants were included in these analyses if they completed the outcome in both the main survey and the durability survey (partisan animosity: n = 8,527; support for undemocratic practices: n = 8,521; support for partisan violence: n = 8,520). We used IPW to correct for differential attrition.

We found several durable effects. Six interventions reduced partisan animosity relative to the null control condition (maximum Cohen's *d* = -0.21). None of the interventions reduced support for undemocratic practices (maximum Cohen's *d* = -0.04). One of the interventions reduced support for partisan violence (maximum Cohen's *d* = -0.13).

Additional Analyses

Due to the unexpectedly low retention rates, the preregistered analyses suffer from relatively low power. Tables 21.4 - 21.6 report the results for the durability test when one includes all participants who completed the durability survey (independent of whether they completed the main survey. This procedure increases the sample size significantly (partisan animosity: n = 9,850; support for undemocratic practices: n = 9,845; support for partisan violence: n = 9,843). Notably, however, this increase in sample size is driven by participants dropped out of the main survey and, thus, may have experienced only part of the intervention. There was no evidence for differential attrition when one includes all participants who completed

the durability survey. This makes sense because retaking another survey a couple of weeks later is probably independent of the experimental condition participants were assigned in the main survey. Accordingly, we did not use IPW for these analyses.

These additional analyses were mostly consistent with the preregistered analyses. As in the preregistered analyses, six interventions reduced partisan animosity relative to the null control condition (maximum Cohen's d = -0.15) and one of the interventions reduced support for partisan violence (maximum Cohen's d = -0.08).. The only difference in terms of statistical significance was that one of the interventions reduced support for undemocratic practices (maximum Cohen's d = -0.08).

Table S21.1: *Effects on Partisan Animosity in Preregistered Durability Analysis*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	47.02	1.88	25.06	< .001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	0.33	1.21	0.27	0.788	0.02
Civity Storytelling	-2.67	1.29	-2.08	0.019	-0.13
Common Identity	-3.95	1.2	-3.28	0.001	-0.19
Contact Project	-4.07	1.31	-3.1	0.001	-0.19
Democratic Fear	-1.02	1.3	-0.78	0.216	-0.05
Empathy Beliefs	-0.29	1.23	-0.23	0.408	-0.01
Inparty Elites	0.1	1.15	0.09	0.535	0
Media Trust	-4.48	1.27	-3.52	< .001	-0.21
Misperception Democratic	-3.4	1.21	-2.81	0.002	-0.16
Misperception Film	-2.85	1.21	-2.36	0.009	-0.14
Utah Cues	-0.66	1.23	-0.54	0.295	-0.03
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	2.07	0.61	3.39	0.001	
Other	10.8	4.76	2.27	0.023	
Age	0.13	0.02	6.68	< .001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	2.96	1.85	1.61	0.109	
LatinX	2.05	2.04	1	0.315	
Other	1.91	1.92	1	0.319	
White	2.31	1.6	1.45	0.148	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	0.99	0.88	1.12	0.261	
Some college	1.19	0.83	1.43	0.153	
Postgraduate	1.29	0.75	1.73	0.083	
Party	Reference: Democrat				

Republican	1.03	0.62	1.67	0.095
Party as a Social Identity	0.15	0.01	12.81	< .001
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	3.22	0.61	5.31	< .001
Luth	3.84	0.63	6.08	< .001

Table S21.2: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices in Preregistered Durability Analysis*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	18.22	1.72	10.62	< .001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	1.01	1.29	0.78	0.435	0.04
Civity Storytelling	0.51	1.29	0.39	0.652	0.02
Common Identity	-0.15	1.26	-0.12	0.454	-0.01
Contact Project	1.49	1.37	1.09	0.862	0.07
Democratic Fear	-0.84	1.31	-0.64	0.26	-0.04
Empathy Beliefs	1.34	1.39	0.97	0.833	0.06
Inparty Elites	0.11	1.32	0.09	0.534	0.00
Media Trust	1.23	1.31	0.94	0.827	0.05
Misperception Democratic	-0.61	1.3	-0.47	0.32	-0.03
Misperception Film	0.64	1.22	0.52	0.7	0.03
Utah Cues	-0.8	1.18	-0.68	0.247	-0.04
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	1.67	0.63	2.65	0.008	
Other	1.93	4.96	0.39	0.698	
Age	-0.26	0.02	-12.63	< .001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	3.46	1.66	2.09	0.037	
LatinX	0.72	2.15	0.33	0.738	
Other	0.51	1.83	0.28	0.778	
White	-3.25	1.4	-2.31	0.021	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	7.67	0.95	8.11	< .001	
Some college	0.63	0.96	0.65	0.513	
Postgraduate	3.09	0.73	4.22	< .001	
Party	Reference: Democrat				

Republican	10.15	0.64	15.74	< .001
Party as a Social Identity	0.2	0.01	17.32	< .001
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	0.76	0.64	1.19	0.235
Luth	1.01	0.65	1.56	0.12

Table S21.3: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence in Preregistered Durability Analysis*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	17.38	1.71	10.14	< .001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	0.67	1.12	0.59	0.554	0.04
Civity Storytelling	0.32	1.12	0.29	0.613	0.02
Common Identity	-0.08	1.12	-0.07	0.472	< .001
Contact Project	0.92	1.28	0.72	0.765	0.05
Democratic Fear	0.81	1.16	0.7	0.757	0.04
Empathy Beliefs	0.36	1.22	0.29	0.616	0.02
Inparty Elites	-2.31	0.88	-2.62	0.004	-0.13
Media Trust	0.92	1.27	0.73	0.767	0.05
Misperception Democratic	-0.54	1.15	-0.47	0.321	-0.03
Misperception Film	-0.59	1.08	-0.54	0.294	-0.03
Utah Cues	-0.48	1.06	-0.45	0.325	-0.03
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	4.76	0.56	8.54	< .001	
Other	0.33	3.22	0.10	0.918	
Age	-0.29	0.02	-14.9	< .001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.49	1.75	0.85	0.393	
LatinX	0.32	2.17	0.15	0.882	
Other	-2.68	1.77	-1.51	0.13	
White	-2.5	1.49	-1.67	0.095	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	1.39	0.85	1.63	0.103	
Some college	2.22	0.93	2.40	0.016	
Postgraduate	-1.06	0.63	-1.68	0.094	
Party	Reference: Democrat				

Republican	1.6	0.57	2.83	0.005
Party as a Social Identity	0.1	0.01	9.61	< .001
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	0.37	0.55	0.67	0.506
Luth	-0.75	0.54	-1.38	0.167

Table S21.4: *Effects on Partisan Animosity in Additional Durability Analysis*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	49.10	1.45	33.81	< .001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	2.09	0.88	2.37	0.018	0.10
Civity Storytelling	-1.75	0.89	-1.97	0.024	-0.08
Common Identity	-3.19	0.92	-3.49	< .001	-0.15
Contact Project	-2.89	0.91	-3.18	0.001	-0.14
Democratic Fear	-1.26	0.91	-1.39	0.083	-0.06
Empathy Beliefs	-0.70	0.88	-0.80	0.212	-0.03
Inparty Elites	-0.05	0.88	-0.05	0.479	0.00
Media Trust	-3.03	0.91	-3.35	< .001	-0.14
Misperception Democratic	-2.83	0.89	-3.18	0.001	-0.13
Misperception Film	-1.79	0.91	-1.97	0.024	-0.09
Utah Cues	0.07	0.91	0.07	0.529	0.00
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	2.42	0.43	5.65	< .001	
Other	8.15	4.18	1.95	0.051	
Age	0.14	0.01	9.49	< .001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	1.15	1.44	0.8	0.424	
LatinX	0.78	1.7	0.46	0.646	
Other	0.44	1.53	0.29	0.772	
White	0.97	1.22	0.8	0.426	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	0.64	0.64	1	0.319	
Some college	0.23	0.63	0.36	0.715	
Postgraduate	1.17	0.52	2.26	0.024	
Party	Reference: Democrat				

Republican	0.48	0.44	1.09	0.275
Party as a Social Identity	0.13	0.01	15.04	< .001
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	3.87	0.53	7.36	< .001
Luth	4.03	0.57	7.05	< .001

Table S21.5: *Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices in Additional Durability Analysis*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	20.46	1.47	13.92	< .001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	0.98	0.94	1.04	0.297	0.04
Civity Storytelling	0.27	0.96	0.28	0.609	0.01
Common Identity	-0.12	0.9	-0.13	0.448	-0.01
Contact Project	0.26	0.96	0.27	0.608	0.01
Democratic Fear	-1.91	0.93	-2.04	0.021	-0.08
Empathy Beliefs	0.93	0.96	0.97	0.835	0.04
Inparty Elites	-0.26	0.96	-0.28	0.392	-0.01
Media Trust	0.66	0.97	0.69	0.755	0.03
Misperception Democratic	-0.75	1.01	-0.75	0.227	-0.03
Misperception Film	-0.26	0.93	-0.28	0.388	-0.01
Utah Cues	-0.28	0.94	-0.3	0.384	-0.01
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	0.59	0.45	1.30	0.194	
Other	-1.47	4.16	-0.35	0.725	
Age	-0.23	0.02	-15.2	< .001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	2.37	1.47	1.62	0.106	
LatinX	-0.24	1.9	-0.13	0.899	
Other	-0.74	1.61	-0.46	0.645	
White	-5.19	1.25	-4.16	< .001	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	6.87	0.68	10.11	< .001	
Some college	-0.89	0.65	-1.36	0.172	
Postgraduate	2.76	0.54	5.14	< .001	
Party	Reference: Democrat				

Republican	10.88	0.46	23.8	< .001
Party as a Social Identity	0.19	0.01	22.59	< .001
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	0.69	0.56	1.24	0.214
Luth	0.61	0.59	1.03	0.305

Table S21.6: *Effects on Support for Partisan Violence in Additional Durability Analysis*

Model Term	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Intercept	18.7	1.38	13.51	< .001	
Condition	Reference: Null Control Condition				
Alternative Control	0.00	0.75	0.00	0.998	0.00
Civity Storytelling	0.19	0.8	0.24	0.596	0.01
Common Identity	0.13	0.78	0.17	0.567	0.01
Contact Project	1.09	0.84	1.29	0.902	0.06
Democratic Fear	0.20	0.79	0.26	0.602	0.01
Empathy Beliefs	0.26	0.81	0.32	0.627	0.01
Inparty Elites	-1.57	0.70	-2.25	0.012	-0.08
Media Trust	0.87	0.81	1.07	0.859	0.05
Misperception Democratic	-0.19	0.81	-0.23	0.409	-0.01
Misperception Film	-0.18	0.76	-0.24	0.403	-0.01
Utah Cues	-0.51	0.77	-0.67	0.253	-0.03
Gender	Reference: Woman				
Man	3.99	0.38	10.49	< .001	
Other	-0.02	2.85	-0.01	0.994	
Age	-0.28	0.01	-20.33	< .001	
Race	Reference: Asian				
Black	0.35	1.44	0.24	0.809	
LatinX	-1.17	1.79	-0.66	0.511	
Other	-3.7	1.48	-2.50	0.013	
White	-3.98	1.23	-3.25	0.001	
Education	Reference: Bachelor				
HS or less	1.15	0.56	2.06	0.040	
Some college	0.74	0.56	1.32	0.187	
Postgraduate	-0.44	0.44	-0.99	0.324	
Party	Reference: Democrat				

Republican	1.97	0.38	5.24	< .001
Party as a Social Identity	0.09	0.01	13.29	< .001
Supplier	Reference: Bovitz			
Dynata	0.81	0.47	1.72	0.085
Luth	-0.45	0.49	-0.93	0.354

22. Forecasting Intervention Effects

Three cohorts of participants were invited to participate in forecasting, which we called "Forecasting for Democracy": (a) practitioners, (b) social science academics i.e. political science, psychology, sociology, economics, and (c) participants from a general panel. Existing mailing lists for the Strengthening Democracy Challenge and lists from professional groups were used to recruit practitioners and social science academics. To receive an invitation to participate as a practitioner, the individual had to self-identify as having worked in this "depolarization" or "bridging" sector (e.g. as a founder of a not-for-profit) in the past. Social science academics were invited if they identified as having studied the dependent variables of interest in the past. Hence, these two cohorts were likely to have different forms of expertise about the subject matter. In the manuscript, we focus on the expert groups as that aligns with many prior forecasting studies that evaluate academically designed interventions (e.g., Dreber et al. 2015; Munafo et al. 2015; Camerer et al. 2018; Forsell et al. 2019, Viganola et al. 2021; but see also Milkman et al. 2021; Milkman et al. 2022)

Each participant in these two groups was asked (but not required) to make 75 forecasts. To receive payment for participation (but not for accuracy), they needed to complete 25 forecasts for a given outcome. That is, they needed to finish making forecasts for each intervention for a given dependent variable (either ADA, SPV, or PA).

We also invited a diverse national sample of online participants to participate in Forecasting for Democracy. Unlike the other two groups, participants from a general panel were anonymous to us, and we could not ask them to make as many forecasts (given the amount of time it takes). Hence, we randomly assigned these participants to make predictions about one of

the three dependent variables. Then, we asked each participant to make forecasts on 8 randomly selected interventions within this dependent variable.

Intake Survey

All participants completed an intake survey that asked them about their background, such as age, race, gender, education, and experience. This survey also contained potential predictors of forecast accuracy, such as numeracy, contact with members of their political outgroup, and Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT).

Information Available to Participants

To ensure fairness, participants were all required to complete a training module on how to make forecasts prior to registering forecasts, e.g., what we meant by "statistical significance" and how they would be paid (see section on Rewards, below).

All participants had access to the following information, although the format of this information was simplified for those in the general panel sample:

1. How success of interventions would be measured, i.e., statistical significance at the .05 level using a one-tailed test from a control group;
2. How each dependent variable was measured;
3. For each intervention, a title and abstract of the intervention, and a link to the full intervention, exactly as participants in the experiment would experience it;
4. Details of the experimental sample and statistical power to detect a d=0.2 effect size;
5. In absolute terms, based on pilot studies, what a d=0.2 effect would mean for the DVs (which ranged from 0-100).

Registering Forecasts

Based on this information, each participant was asked to forecast (1) the likelihood of the intervention statistically significantly reducing one of three dependent variables; and (2) the effect size (or if there would be a backlash effect of any size). To reduce cognitive load for our participants, we collected both forecasts at the same time by asking participants to assign probabilities to the following five mutually exclusive events:

The intervention will have…

1. a statistically significant backfire effect (d>0)

2. no statistically significant effect.

3. a statistically significant small effect (d<0 & d>=-0.3)

4. a statistically significant medium effect (d<-0.3 & d>=-0.6)

5. a statistically significant large effect (d<-0.6)

A key reason for using categories was to ensure the forecasting was accessible to non-academics, who were also informed about the scale of effect sizes in absolute terms. By summing probabilities of statistically significant, non-backfire effects, we calculate the overall predicted likelihood of an intervention having a statistically significant effect.

Participants in the academic and practitioner cohorts completed forecasts on a platform called “Cultivate Forecasts.” They could return to this site to complete forecasts over a longer period of time. This site also allowed participants to share rationales.

By contrast, participants in the general panel were only asked to forecast the efficacy of 8 interventions for one of the three targets (ADA, SPV, or PA). This is because we could not ask participants to forecast for all 25 interventions and all three targets (a total of 75 possible forecasts).

Rewards

Participants in the academic and practitioner cohorts were paid $10 for completing an intake survey at least one month prior to the start of forecasting. This intake survey collected information about their experience and background. Participants in these three cohorts were paid an additional $10 for forecasting the effects of 25 interventions in each dependent variable. Participants were paid an additional $15 bonus for completing all 75 possible forecasts. They thus could earn up to $45 for making forecasts.

If the corresponding intervention had an effect in the predicted direction, participants were further paid 20 cents and $0 otherwise. They were additionally paid 20 cents for selecting the correct effect size category (scaled by the likelihood they placed on that category, so 20% likelihood would result in 0.2*20 = 4 cents). To ensure people would freely share their rationales and ideas, these rewards were not zero-sum (competitive). Participants received accuracy pay regardless of the number of interventions they forecasted. Participants in the general panel were paid a fixed rate for completion as determined by the survey vendor.

Descriptive Analysis

In the manuscript, we calculate the average predicted likelihood of each intervention having an effect. To do so, for each respondent we first sum the predicted likelihood that the intervention would have a small, medium, or large statistically significant effect on reducing a given outcome. This is each respondent's predicted likelihood that the intervention would be successful. Then, we take the average of this predicted likelihood across all respondents in that group (academics, practitioners, or among the general public).

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