

**Affective Polarization, Local Contexts, and Public Opinion
in America**

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ABSTRACT

Affective polarization has become a defining feature of 21st century American politics, but we do not know how it relates to citizens' policy opinions. Answering this question has fundamental implications not only for understanding the political consequences of polarization, but also for understanding how citizens form preferences. Under most political circumstances this is a difficult question to answer, but the novel coronavirus pandemic allows us to understand how partisan animus contributes to opinion formation. Using a two-wave panel that spans the outbreak of COVID-19, the researchers find a strong association between citizens' levels of partisan animosity and their attitudes about the pandemic, as well as the actions they take in response to it. This relationship, however, is more muted in areas with severe outbreaks of the disease. The authors' results make clear that narrowing issue divides requires not just policy discourse but also addressing affective partisan hostility.

Main

The rise of affective polarization—most notably, the tendency for partisans to dislike and distrust those from the other party¹—is one of the most striking developments of 21st century American politics.^{2,3} Affective polarization has wide-ranging implications for our social and economic lives. It plays a role in how much time we spend with our families, where we want to work and shop, and whom we want to date and marry.⁴ But what does it mean for our politics? The answer is surprisingly unclear, as Iyengar and his colleagues note (p.139): “little has been written on this topic [i.e., the political effects], as most studies have focused on the more surprising apolitical ramifications.”⁴ Here, we take up a crucial dimension of that question: how are individuals’ issue positions related to their level of affective polarization?

We argue that the two are strongly connected in ways not addressed in previous research. Partisans with high levels of animus toward the other party are more motivated to distinguish themselves from their political opponents. They do so by taking positions on new issues that differ from the other (disliked) party and match those of their own preferred party. While this argument—that prior levels of partisan animus play a role in subsequent issue positions—is straightforward, testing it is difficult given the inherent endogeneity between policy beliefs, affective polarization, and elite issue positions: if scholars find that those who harbor the most animus toward the other party also hold more extreme beliefs, is that due to animus driving those particular beliefs, to policy beliefs driving animus,⁵ or due to elite issue polarization simultaneously driving both the public’s out-party animus⁶ and policy beliefs⁷?

The emergence of the novel COVID-19 pandemic in the winter of 2020 presents us with the conditions needed to overcome some of the endogeneity that limits existing work. We collected data on respondents’ levels of affective polarization in 2019, prior to the emergence of

the coronavirus. We therefore have a measure of affective polarization that is exogenous to the pandemic: we can examine how pre-existing levels of partisan animus correlate with subsequent responses to COVID-19 without concern that the responses to the pandemic are, in fact, shaping affective polarization (and more directly, out-party animus). Put another way, this design allows us to rule out the aforementioned possibilities that individuals' or elites' policy beliefs drive affective polarization (and hence any relationships between polarization and beliefs). Although our approach cannot isolate causal effects—given that we use observational data without a clear causal identification strategy—it does allow us to overcome the endogeneity identified above, which has been the key limitation encountered in previous work.

We find a strong association between out-party animus and subsequent responses to the pandemic, offering evidence that policy beliefs reflect affective feelings toward the other party, rather than just the issues at hand. That said, however, our findings also highlight how local context matters, as this relationship is muted among those who live in areas with particularly severe outbreaks of COVID-19. In these locations, even those with high levels of partisan animus have good reason to be concerned about the virus—it is personally salient to them. This highlights how real-world conditions condition citizens' issue positions, and suggests a potential limit to the types of partisan motivated reasoning that likely underlie our results. The implications of our work go beyond political ramifications; we demonstrate that partisan hostility combined with conflicting elite cues can intersect with national efforts and can, quite literally, mean the difference between life and death.⁸

To explicate our argument, we start conceptually by connecting affective polarization with partisanship.¹ Partisanship is a type of social identity and by identifying with one party, individuals divide the world into two groups: their liked in-group (our own party) and a disliked

out-group (the other party).⁹ This process gives rise to two of the underlying components of affective polarization: in-group favoritism and out-group animosity.⁴

Over-time shifts in affinity for one's own party and animosity toward the other party have not been symmetric.^{2,4,10,11} Indeed, out-party animus has increased dramatically in recent years,^{2,4} while in-party warmth has, if anything, slightly declined over the same time period.¹⁰ Consistent with evidence of increasing out-party animosity, individuals report that they are less likely to date those from the other party,¹² they would pay out-partisans less for the same work,¹³ and they would prefer not to have out-partisans as roommates.¹⁴ Further, those with higher levels of out-party animosity report engaging in more discriminatory behavior against those from the other party (e.g., they do not want to work with those from the other party).¹⁵ Out-party animus, rather than in-party favoritism, is key to these associations in the literature.¹¹

Partisan identity alone, however, is not enough to explain out-group animus;^{2,16} one must also account for other changes in the political and media environment.^{2,4} The partisan-ideological sorting of liberals to the Democratic Party and conservatives to the Republican Party,⁷ as well as the social sorting that has led to more demographically homogenous parties,¹⁷ have both contributed to partisan animosity. Also at work are other changes in elite behaviors¹⁸ and increasing elite polarization.^{6,19} Moreover, changes in the information environment, such as the rise of partisan media,^{20,21} increasingly negative campaigns²² and new social media outlets contribute to out-party animosity.²³

Given that out-party animus has elevated the partisan cue in social contexts, it may also have affected people's responses to elite political cues. As Pierce and Lau argue, for example, "strong affective reactions to a politician may themselves engender awareness of and like or dislike for certain policies. For instance, a visceral aversion to a candidate may lead a voter to

reject positions associated with that politician” (page 9).²⁴ To this end, people are motivated to do the opposite of what the other, disliked party endorses.^{25,26,27} They do this because the out-party animus is so strong that they want to differentiate themselves from that disliked party. And, importantly, it follows that those with greater out-party animus (i.e., stronger affective reactions) will be most motivated to hold distinctive views,^{28,29} taking positions opposite of those put forth by out-party elites (e.g., elected officials) and in line with those of their own party’s elites. This response to cues may be especially apparent when the difference between in-party and out-party cues is stark³⁰ as it is in the case of COVID-19.^{31,32}

Demonstrating that affective polarization (and its key underlying component out-party animus) relates to policy beliefs, however, is surprisingly complicated.³³ There is an empirical relationship between alignment in issue positions and partisan animus but it is difficult to identify the original source of this relationship.³⁴ Indeed, theoretically, the relationship between issue beliefs and out-party animus could stem from three possible scenarios: (1) animus driving cue-taking on issues (as just explained), (2) issue position extremity causing greater partisan animus,^{5,34} or (3) elite issue polarization leading separately to both public issue divides⁷ and to out-party animus among the public.^{6,35} As a result, it is difficult to determine how animus connects to political views—i.e., whether policy positions are undergirded by affective dislike beyond substantive considerations.

Although it is difficult to address this issue fully without manipulating affective polarization, one approach that would allow us to address a part of this problem is a measure of out-party animus taken prior to the emergence of an issue. This allows us to record levels of animus (at time $t-1$) prior to the existence of those issue positions (at time t). This means that elite polarization on the issue at time t cannot have affected earlier measures of partisan animus

taken at time $t-1$, or that attitudes measured at time t are the cause of this time $t-1$ animus. Yet, the persistence of existing issues on the policy agenda, and the unpredictability of new issues emerging onto the agenda, makes it extremely difficult to use an *ex ante* measure (and, to our knowledge, has not been done). The COVID-19 pandemic, however, allows us to consider an issue as it emerges.

To do this, we need measures of partisan animus taken before COVID-19 began to spread in the United States. If we instead used a measure taken after COVID-19 entered the agenda, the issue itself—and politicians' reactions to it—could shape those recorded levels of partisan animus. For example, Democrats' levels of partisan animus might reflect not only their underlying hostility toward President Trump, but also how he specifically responded to COVID-19 (i.e., downplaying its severity, refusing to acknowledge its existence in the U.S. for several weeks, etc.). If we see that this measure of animus is related to attitudes about the pandemic, then, it could simply reflect politicians' reactions to it. We therefore use pre-pandemic measures of partisan animus (from August 2019)—paired with attitudes toward the pandemic measured once it emerged (from April 2020)—to study the relationship between the two.

The partisan difference in elite responses to the pandemic suggests why affective polarization, and specifically out-party animus, may play a key role in driving issue positions here. From the beginning of the outbreak, Democratic politicians, relative to Republican ones, expressed greater concern about the virus, implored the public to take more precautions, and supported more restrictive policies.³⁶ President Trump—with his dismissal of the virus, demands to reopen the economy, and refusal to wear a mask—is the apotheosis of this trend, but is far from the only example of it, as Democratic governors typically took swifter and more public actions to combat the virus than did most Republican governors.³⁷ Moreover, these partisan

debates and polarization on the issue were reflected in the media coverage.³⁸ The fact that the two parties behaved as mirror opposites in response to the pandemic is especially notable here as it means that citizens simultaneously received distinct information about how members of both partisan groups should behave, making the elite cues especially clear.⁷ This makes for clear cues, but it also means we cannot empirically differentiate the relative impact of in-party versus out-party cues. Future work would benefit from looking at situations with cues from only one party,³² although it is a situation that is increasingly rare.³⁹ We would expect that, in such situations, animus would drive reactions from the out-party cue alone and (possibly) the in-party cue alone since partisans want to distinguish themselves.

In line with the aforementioned theoretic logic that affective polarization—and especially its key ingredient out-party partisan animus—may increase the motivation to follow cues, we expect the following pattern: as out-party animus increases, Democrats will express more concern about the virus, be more willing to take actions to prevent its spread (e.g., wash their hands more, avoid large crowds, cancel travel, etc.), and be more supportive of policies to stop the virus (e.g., stay-at-home orders) (hypothesis 1a). Conversely, among Republicans we expect that as out-party animus increases, worries about COVID-19 will decrease, there will be a lower likelihood of taking actions to prevent its spread, and less support for policies to stop the spread of the virus (hypothesis 1b). Our argument is not simply that partisan gaps have emerged; that point has been thoroughly documented elsewhere.^{8,40,41} Instead, our argument is that it is the animus component of affective polarization, at least partially, that drives these gaps.

Our argument implicitly invokes partisan motivated reasoning since we posit partisans have a directional motivation in forming opinions.⁴² Partisan motivated reasoning means partisans process information and form attitudes with the goal of confirming their partisan

identities and differentiating themselves from the other party (this contrasts with issue based motivated reasoning where the goal is to confirm a standing issue belief).⁴³ While directional partisan reasoning predominates highly political situations,⁴⁴ it can shift when particular issues rise in salience.⁴⁵ Of particular relevance are conditions that prompt partisans to shift from having a directional motivation to an accuracy motivation. In this latter case, individuals assess information based on the “best” available evidence rather than to affirm an identity.^{46,47,48}

In the case of COVID-19, this will occur as the direct threat of the virus increases, and is captured by the number of cases in one’s local area. An increase in cases can alter personal experiences (for e.g., increasing the likelihood that someone you know personally has been infected) which, in turn, vitiates partisan reasoning.⁴⁷ We thus predict that as the number of COVID-19 cases in one’s area increases, the impact of out-party animus will decrease, and the partisan gap will similarly decrease (hypothesis 2). In short, partisan animus matters, but so too does the geography of the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S. Broadly, then, our study suggests the possibility that partisan motivated reasoning is conditional, and may be shaped by context. Following a similar logic, we also might expect the partisan animus effect to decline among those who have had or are vulnerable to COVID-19, but at the time of our data collection, the number of such individuals in our sample was too small to test that possibility.

We use a multi-wave, nationally representative survey. In the summer of 2019, 3,345 respondents answered a set of questions (for an unrelated survey) which provide our pre-COVID-19 measure of partisan animosity. These participants were re-interviewed in April 2020, as the coronavirus spread throughout the nation; a total of 2,484 respondents who answered our 2019 questionnaire completed our re-interview, for a re-contact rate of 74 percent (more details on the sample are in the Supplementary Information-1). In this re-interview, we measured

participant reactions to the COVID-19 outbreak focusing on three relevant dimensions: (1) how worried they are about the virus, both for themselves and for the nation as a whole, measured by a range of items put into an index ($\alpha = 0.89$); (2) which behaviors (from a list of 14) they are taking to avoid becoming infected with COVID-19 (i.e., washing their hands more, cancelling travel, etc.); and (3) their support for various policies to limit the spread of COVID-19 (i.e., stay-at-home orders, business closures, etc.) again analyzed as an index ($\alpha = 0.73$). All analyses treat these three measures as dependent variables, and the pre-pandemic measure of animosity is our key explanatory variable. More information on the survey is provided in the Methods section, as well as in the Supplementary Information.

Results

Figure 1 shows Kernel density plots (separately for Democrats and Republicans) for each of the three dependent variables: worry about COVID-19, behaviors they are taking to avoid becoming infected with COVID-19, and their support for various policies to limit the spread of COVID-19; see the methods section for details on the coding of these and all other variables.

The plots show the average Democrat is more worried, is more likely to have changed behaviors, and is more supportive of policies to stop the spread of infections, consistent with other analyses showing partisan gaps in these areas.^{40,41} There is, however, significant overlap in the attitudes of Republicans and Democrats, which suggests the possibility that something moderates the relationship between partisanship and COVID-19 attitudes.

[Insert Figure 1 About Here]

Figure 2 contains scatter plots for each of the dependent variables (on the y-axes) along with the number of cases in the respondent's county (on the x-axes), as well as a loess smoother to show the non-parametric, bivariate relationship between the two variables. It is clear that as

cases increase values on all dependent variables also increase. Because the relationship is non-linear, especially for low-infection areas, and there is a long right-tail of cases (i.e., a small number of areas, primarily New York City, with extremely high rates of infection), we use the natural log of cases in all of our models.

[Insert Figure 2 About Here]

We next turn to our quantities of interest: the relationship between partisanship, partisan animosity and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic—and estimates of uncertainty around those effects. To ensure the robustness of our results, we estimate a series of models with an increasing set of controls (detailed in the Methods section and the Supplementary Information). The results we present are robust to changes in estimation approach, and robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls including a measure of partisan affect and strength of identity.

We present the results of our main models in Figures 3-7. We present plots since our models rely on interactions and the coefficient estimates on interactions and their constitutive terms do not easily translate to our quantities of interest; as a result, the significance levels of these coefficients may not be informative in terms of testing our hypotheses.^{49,50,51} Relevant here is the slope of the outcome variable at various levels of other covariates, a quantity termed the “marginal effect”; this term is not intended to signal a causal relationship.⁵² By definition, all tests of the statistical significance of this effect are two-tailed.

We begin with plots from a model which includes an interaction between partisanship and partisan animosity, while controlling for the number of cases. The top of Figure 3 presents the marginal effect of out-party animus for Democrats and Republicans for each dependent variable, while the bottom of Figure 3 presents the marginal effect of Republican partisanship for various levels of animus.

Hence, the top figure directly tests H1a and H1b for each dependent variable while the bottom figure plots the partisan gap as out-party animus increases.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

Beginning with worry, we see a decline in worry about COVID-19 among Republicans as out-party animus increases, but do not see a similar relationship between partisan animus and how worried Democrats are about COVID-19. When we move to the middle panel examining behaviors, here we see that Democrats with high levels of animus report engaging in more behaviors to combat COVID-19 than do Democrats who do not hold as much animus. With this dependent variable, however, there is no similar, statistically significant result among Republicans. Finally, with regards to policy, we see that out-party animus is associated with greater support for policies to combat COVID-19 among Democrats while Republicans with high levels of animus are less supportive of the same policies than Republicans with less animus. Hence, we see support for the partisan animus hypothesis for at least one party across all three variables.

As the bottom figure shows, there is a partisan gap for each dependent variable and the size of that gap grows as out-party animus increases. Since the model controls for the number of cases in the respondent's county, the partisan gaps are not the result of areas with many Democrats having more severe outbreaks than areas with many Republicans. Recall, however, we argue that severe outbreaks might mitigate the role of partisan animosity. The next figures will look at the models with the triple interaction including cases.

In Figures 4-6, we present the marginal effect of the Republican dummy variable at different levels of out-party animus—that is, the difference in the expected value in the dependent variable for Republicans minus the expected value in the dependent variable for

Democrats. For each dependent variable, we include separate plots for a low number of cases (the 25th percentile) and a high number of cases (the 75th percentile). If our argument is correct, then we should find that as out-party animus increases, the gap between the parties increases as well (i.e., the marginal effect of partisanship increases; this is the test of hypothesis 1). But we should also find that this relationship is muted in areas with large numbers of cases, as all citizens are more concerned about the virus. Simply put, we should see a steeper slope (larger marginal effect) in areas with low cases relative to high cases if hypothesis 2 is correct.

In Figure 4, we present the marginal effect of being a Republican (as opposed to a Democrat) on worry, as partisan animus increases. In the first panel, which presents the relationship between partisanship and out-party animus in areas with few cases, we see that as partisan animus increases, the partisan gap emerges: when animus is low, partisans are indistinguishable from one another, but when animus is high, partisans significantly diverge. In contrast, the second panel, depicting the pattern in areas with high levels of cases, there no significant partisan gap among those with high levels of animus (i.e., the confidence interval overlaps zero). We do see small partisan differences for moderate levels of out-party animus (likely because the majority of our respondents have moderate levels of animus), but these gaps are distinctly smaller than the partisan gaps among those who live in areas with few cases.

[Insert Figures 4-6 about here]

Figure 5 presents the same analysis for the behavior dependent variable. Partisan animus again has a clear correlation with political outcomes, as we observe partisan divides on COVID-19 behaviors. The difference, however, is that we see the same increasing partisan gap regardless of the number of cases in the county. Higher numbers of cases correlate with more preventative behaviors overall, but higher partisan gaps in behavior emerge alongside animus regardless of

the number of cases. The reason for this is that, while individuals with low or moderate levels of animus are responsive to the number of cases, Democrats and Republicans with high levels of animus are not.

Why do those with such animus not change their behavior as the number of cases increases? The answer is likely different for Republicans and Democrats. Republicans with high animus took low-cost actions (for example, handwashing) in low-case areas and were forced to avoid certain behaviors (like going to restaurants) due to local restrictions. As cases increased, they may have believed they were already doing enough. Democrats with high levels of animus are likely less responsive because they are engaging in more behaviors even in counties with few cases. Yet because the group is already changing behaviors in low-case areas, they are unlikely (or perhaps, even unable) to take on more behaviors in areas with more severe outbreaks.

Turning next to Figure 6, we see that when it comes to policy support, there is once again a relationship between partisan animus and opinions. Here, much like with worry, the number of cases moderates the relationship. Although there is a significant partisan difference among partisans with high animus when cases are low, there is no statistically significant difference between Republicans and Democrats in the counties with high numbers of cases regardless of the level of animus. We note that support for policies to prevent the spread of infections is high; among both Democrats and Republicans, a majority supported these policies at the time of the re-interview. As a result, it probably should not be a surprise that in areas with a significant outbreak of COVID-19 infections, partisan gaps disappear. Otherwise, like worry but unlike behaviors, expressing policy support is not a costly behavior per se. It is worth noting that Republicans with high animus and in high case areas appear to be more supportive of

government policy intervention than of engaging in relevant behaviors, and this is an area for future work to explore more carefully.

In Figure 7, we use the same models to present a different perspective on the results, now focusing on the marginal effect of out-party animus for Democrats and Republicans in low and high case counties. The goal here is to see which party is the root of the partisan gaps at higher levels of partisan animus by considering the relationship between a unit increase in animus and the likelihood of worrying, changing behavior, and supporting policy.

[Insert Figure 7 About Here]

For worry about COVID-19 and support for COVID-19 policies, the marginal effect of animus is significant and negative for Republicans in counties with few cases; the confidence intervals for the other marginal effects overlap with 0. Increases in animus are only statistically significant for Republicans in counties with low cases, suggesting that, for worry and support, partisan gaps are largely a function of Republicans with considerable animus towards Democrats.

When it comes to behaviors, however, the only statistically significant marginal effect for partisan animus is among Democrats in counties with few cases—these individuals are engaging in preventative behaviors despite the low community-spread of COVID-19. At the same time, however, in counties with large outbreaks, the absolute size of the marginal effects for both Democrats and Republicans are still equivalent to a full behavior in both cases—even if the confidence intervals overlap zero. That might explain why the partisan gap remains in those counties: the difference within parties between those with high animus is smaller, but since the parties move in opposite directions, the partisan gap remains the same.

Overall, the results make clear that the partisan gaps observed in the data are at least partially a function of partisan animus, suggesting that it is cue-taking that divides the parties on this issue. This type of partisan reasoning, however, is blunted when real-world threats become salient: in areas with substantial numbers of infections, the role of animus is more muted, as all citizens respond to the outbreak.

Further, we see that with regards to worry and policy support, the correlation with partisan animus in counties with low cases is most pronounced among Republicans. Given the messaging from the President, this pattern makes sense. It is understandable why Democrats, regardless of animus and (to a lesser extent) Republicans who do not have high animus worried about the virus's impact on public health and the economy and supported shutdowns and stay-at-home orders even when the local severity was low. On the other hand, Republicans with high animus attuned to a Republican President saying, counter to the clear Democratic message, that it will all just disappear,⁵³ needed an active, local outbreak to increase their concerns to the level that Democrats were feeling.

Discussion

While scholars, pundits, and citizens invoke affective polarization as a factor in driving issue positions, there has, to date, been no direct evidence that it actually does. We leveraged a unique data opportunity to track the association between affective polarization, and, more directly, out-party animus, and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Rhetorical differences between party elites help to produce our results: not only were Democratic elites much more likely to emphasize the threat of the virus to public health and the importance of taking appropriate precautions,⁵⁴ but President Trump downplayed the danger and advocated for

treatment approaches shown to be ineffective.⁵⁵ Other Republican elected officials were similarly dismissive of the virus at the time of our study.

These rhetorical divisions are associated with mass partisan divisions: as animus increases, Republicans become less concerned about COVID-19 and less willing to support policies to mitigate the threat of the virus. Real-world threat—here, a high level of infections in one’s county—tempers that relationship, since, as theories of reasoning suggest, it pushes individuals away from directional partisan motivations towards an accuracy motivation – that is, a desire to rely on the best available evidence to which they have access. Still, we note that even in counties with high numbers of cases, Democrats and Republicans with high levels of animus differ in how likely they are to report engaging in actual, costly behaviors. This is because Democrats with high levels of out-party animus are already engaging in a high number of mitigating behaviors, and Republicans with high levels of out-party animus remain resistant to costly behaviors as case-levels increase.

These findings have implications for understanding how to best combat COVID-19. Since affective polarization (particularly partisan animus) underlies partisan gaps, policymakers will need to devise different strategies to bring the parties together on these issues. Simply highlighting areas of commonality, scientific directives, or economic forecasts is not enough; instead, they will need to ameliorate partisan animus to shrink the gaps. This would require, for example, correcting misperceptions about the parties,^{56,57} priming superordinate identities,⁵⁸ and/or fostering inter-party contact and dialogue.⁵⁹ The results also offer novel insights for theories of partisan reasoning insofar as they show how such thinking can drive opinions but also how real-world threats can alter motivations.

More broadly, our findings suggest that policy differences between the parties are not simply a function of different information,^{60,61} or different values,⁶² but possibly of partisan animus as well. This is a substantial finding insofar as a large literature documents correlations between partisan animosity and social and economic behaviors (e.g., on friendships, romantic relationships, business transactions, and so forth),⁴ but there is much less work examining the association between animus and political attitudes, due to the data difficulties we highlighted earlier in the paper. We show clear political consequences with respect to perhaps the most important of policies: government directives for preventing a public health and economic crisis.

That we find these patterns in response to a global pandemic is notable. Months after our initial study, new polls showed a declining partisan gap on the use of masks; the closing of this gap was due to increasing mask-use by Republicans.⁶³ These shifts in public behavior follow changing rhetoric by Republican elites—including President Trump—to follow the Democratic perspective on mask-wearing.^{64,65} Our results offer a context to these shifts. If affective polarization—and most importantly partisan animus—is associated with greater responsiveness to party cues, then elite behaviors could have tremendous capacity to change mass response to the pandemic. In other words, the contrasting decisions Democratic and Republican elites made during the early days of the pandemic may have carried profound implications for the spread of COVID-19 in America.

Methods

Measuring Partisan Animosity

The study followed all ethical guidelines and was reviewed by Northwestern University's Institutional Review Board and deemed to be exempt (#STU00212339). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Participants were offered remuneration for their time in

accordance to the survey company's agreement with participants. The data include measures of out-party animus taken prior to the emergence of COVID-19 in the U.S., which occurred in early 2020. These measures are from a nationally representative survey conducted (for an unrelated study) in the summer of 2019. We provide details about the survey in Supplementary Information-1 and Supplementary Information-2. All subjects were compensated for our study by the vendor in accordance with their guidelines. The key variables for our purposes are a large battery of items designed to tap out-party animus: feeling thermometer ratings of the other party (i.e., on a scale of 0 to 100 how cold or warm partisans feel towards the other party), a trait battery (i.e., how well terms like honest, intelligent, selfish etc. describe the other party), trust in the other party, and a set of social distance items that measure how comfortable respondents are with interacting with those from the other party in various social settings.⁶⁶ As argued, our focus is on the out-party animus piece of affective polarization; however, we do, in additional analyses, account for in-party favoritism, finding, much like previous work, that it is out-party animus that plays the key role in the outcomes we observe.

A total of 3,345 respondents answered these questions, which provide our pre-COVID-19 measure of partisan animosity. We combine these four measures of out-party animus into an index ($\alpha=.88$), rescaled to lie between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating increased levels of out-party animus. As in earlier work on similar topics,⁶⁶ we exclude pure Independents from our study, but retain Independents who lean toward a party. The distribution of the variable by party is in Supplementary Information-3; we also demonstrate that the variable is related to, but distinct from, in-party affect and the strength of partisan identity in Supplementary Information-3. Data analysis was not performed blind to the conditions (e.g., number of cases in a given

area), but the core analyses were pre-registered prior to data collection at <https://aspredicted.org/tp99f.pdf> on 3 April 2020.

COVID-19-Related Variables

Once the coronavirus spread throughout the country, and states began responding by shutting down their economies, we re-interviewed respondents in early to mid-April, 2020. We contacted all individuals who answered our partisan animosity questionnaire in 2019, and thus the final sample size of 2,484 was determined by the 74 percent response rate to the re-interview. Just over fifty percent of sample reported being female, and the median participant fell in the 35 to 50 age range. We provide more details on our sample, including comparisons to census benchmarks, in Supplementary Information-1.

In the re-interview survey, we asked respondents about their reactions toward the COVID-19 outbreak, focusing on three relevant dimensions: (1) how worried they are about the virus, both for themselves and for the nation as a whole, measured by a range of items put into an index ($\alpha = 0.89$); (2) which behaviors (from a list of 14) they are taking to avoid becoming infected with COVID-19; and (3) their support for various policies to limit the spread of COVID-19 again analyzed as an index ($\alpha = 0.73$). The worry and policies variables are recoded to a 0 to 1 scale; the behavior variable is treated as a count. Full wording for all items is provided in Supplementary Information-2 with descriptive statistics for all variables (including all control variables) in Supplementary Information-4. Also, the re-interview survey included one out-party animus item that was in the earlier wave, asking respondents to rate the other party on the feeling thermometer scale. The correlation in out-party animus between the waves is 0.76, suggesting a high degree of over-time stability.⁶⁷

To capture threat from the disease, we use counts of cases in each respondent's county, as reported by the *New York Times* (<https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data>); specifically, the three-day moving average of cases. Since case counts are measured at the county level, in the models including this variable, we cluster standard errors at the county level to account for this dependence in our data. Also, because cases and deaths are correlated at 0.99, using deaths as the measure of local outbreak severity yields substantively identical results.

Models of COVID-19 Attitudes

Our hypotheses rely on a set of dependent variables—worry, behavior, and policy support—and three main independent variables: (1) a dummy variable for partisanship (coded 1 if the respondent is a Republican and 0 if the respondent is a Democrat); (2) the respondent's level of out-party animus; and (3) the logged cases in the respondent's county. We also control for the population of the respondent's county (i.e., a per-capita adjustment).

Our surveys included variables that shape partisan animosity including partisan identity strength, ideology, demographics (e.g., gender, race and ethnic identity, income, education), exposure to partisan media (e.g., Fox News, MSNBC), and elite leadership (e.g., partisanship of the state governor, exposure to Trump press briefings). These and other measures such as age, other media exposure, cultural and economic issue attitudes, etc. appeared on the first wave of the survey. The re-interview wave included measures of pre-existing health conditions relevant to COVID-19. We include all of these measures as control variables in our models; the full list of control items appears in the Supplementary Information-2. Absent a clear identification strategy, an observational analysis such as ours cannot claim to identify a causal effect, but we note that we attempted to control for as many of the potential confounds, including those previously shown to affect out-party animus, as possible.

Moreover, we take a host of additional steps to ensure robustness. For each of the dependent variables, we run a series of models. We begin by estimating a model that includes an interaction between partisan animus and partisanship while controlling for cases. This interaction directly addresses the first set of hypotheses. In our second hypothesis, we theorize that this relationship should be conditional on the number of cases in a respondent's county; thus, our second step is to interact all three variables. We then increase the restrictiveness of the model by including progressively more controls. An additional model includes demographic controls, the respondent's COVID-19-related health risks, and a dummy variable if the respondent lives in a state with a Republican governor. Another model brings in political controls including the strength of the respondent's partisan social identity,⁶⁸ political interest, issue positions, as well as a measure of county partisanship (measured here by Trump 2016 vote share)—each interacted with the Republican dummy variable. The inclusion of a measure capturing identity strength in particular allows us to ensure that the results we observe are not a proxy for partisan identity. The next and final model adds measures related to the respondent's news sources and social media use. Figure 3 is based on a model with only the interaction between animus and party with only a few controls (model 1 in Supplementary Information-5, Supplementary Information-6, and Supplementary Information-7), while Figures 4-7 are based on models with all the control variables and a three-way interaction including logged cases (model 6 in Supplementary Information-5, Supplementary Information-6, and Supplementary Information-7).

We also estimated a model in which we include a triple interaction with in-party affect, cases, and partisanship. This tests the possibility that in-party affect—not out-party animus (as we theorize)—is the aspect of affective polarization that is most correlated to responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that the inclusion of in-party affect does not change our out-party

animus results, and the in-party affect variable itself does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. These results reinforce not only previous research on affective polarization,⁴ but also the approach in this manuscript. All of these models are available in Supplementary Information-5 (worry), Supplementary Information-6, (behaviors), and Supplementary Information-7 (policy).

We run different estimation approaches for the behavior and policy variables. Although the behavior variable is normally distributed, we estimate models using both OLS and a negative binomial approach since the measure is technically a count of behaviors. The figures in the main text present results from the OLS model while the negative binomial results are in Supplementary Information-8. For the policies dependent variable, we present the results of the OLS model. However, the majority of the values of the dependent variable—for both Democrats and Republicans—are clustered at the most supportive values. For this reason, in the supplemental information, we show that the results are robust to a Tobit model (Supplementary Information-8). Our goal with these steps is to show that the results are robust to numerous different model specifications. Happily, our results are consistent across these different models.

In Supplementary Information-9, Supplementary Information-10, and Supplementary Information-11, we present figures for each of the questions that make up the dependent variable scales individually. Finally, because the key variables in the analyses are not randomly assigned, there always remains the possibility the findings are the result of unmeasured confounding variables. For this reason, in Supplementary Information-12, we conducted sensitivity analyses to determine the likelihood of this.⁶⁹ Based on published benchmarks,⁷⁰ it is unlikely that the findings are the result of an unmeasured confounding variable. However, these types of analyses are not commonly used in the analysis of political surveys like this one and the proper

benchmarks are not clear in this case. One should be careful, therefore, concluding too much based on the sensitivity analysis.

Data availability. The data that support the findings of this study are available via Dataverse at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/H7AT3N>

Code availability. All code that supports the findings of this study are available via Dataverse at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/H7AT3N>

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Author Contributions

J.D. fielded the study and provided the de-identified data. J.D., S.K., Y.K., M.L., and J.R. designed the research, did preliminary analyses, and wrote the manuscript. J.R. performed the final analyses and constructed the figures and the analyses in the Supplementary Information.

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
Competing Interests

The authors declare no financial or non-financial competing interests.

Summary (250 characters, including spaces)


Affective polarization, measured pre-pandemic, relates to COVID-19 policy positions, concerns and behaviors. Partisan gaps in these responses are largest among those with the highest out-party animus, but are muted in areas with severe outbreaks.

Figure 1. COVID-19 attitudes and behaviors by party.




Kernel density plots. For Worry about COVID, Republican N=733 and Democratic N=1,387; for Changes in Behavior, Republican N=735 and Democratic N=1,389; for Support for COVID Policies, Republican N=734 and Democratic N=1388.


Figure 2. COVID-19 attitudes and behaviors by number of cases in a county.



Dots represent respondents with jitter added to make cases at same coordinates visible. Black line represents a Lowess smoother with a smoother span of 0.5. For Worry about COVID, $N=2,423$; for Changes in Behavior, $N=2,423$; for Support for COVID Policies, $N=2,421$.


Figure 3. The relationship between partisan animosity and partisanship for all three dependent variables in a restricted model with only the interaction between partisan animosity and partisanship controlling for logged cases in the county. **a.** The marginal effect of partisan animosity for Democrats and Republicans. **b.** The effect of Republican partisanship for different levels of partisan animosity.






For Worry about COVID-19, results from OLS model 1 in Supplementary Information-5 (N=2,062). For Changes in Behavior, results from OLS model 1 in Supplementary Information-6 (N=2,066). For Support for COVID-19 Policies, results from OLS model 1 in Supplementary Information-7 (N=2,064). Thicker lines represent 90% confidence intervals with thinner lines indicating 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4. Republicans with high partisan animosity are less worried about COVID-19 if there are few cases in the county.




Results from OLS model 6 in Supplementary Information-5 (N=2,003). Light grey shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals with darker grey areas indicating 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5. Republicans with high partisan animosity change fewer behaviors in response to COVID-19.




Results from OLS model 6 in Supplementary Information-6 (N=2,006). Light grey shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals with darker grey areas indicating 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6. Republicans with high partisan animosity are less supportive of policies combatting COVID-19 if there are few cases in the county.



Results from OLS model 6 in Supplementary Information-7 (N=2,005). Light grey shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals with darker grey areas indicating 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 7. Marginal effect of high partisan animosity by party and number of cases.



For Worry about COVID-19, results from OLS model 6 in Supplementary Information-5 (N=2,003). For Changes in Behavior, results from OLS model 6 in Supplementary Information-6 (N=2,006). For Support for COVID-19 Policies, results from OLS model 6 in Supplementary Information-7 (N=2,005). Thicker lines represent 90% confidence intervals with thinner lines indicating 95% confidence intervals.

Supplementary Information for “Affective Polarization, Local Contexts, and Public Opinion in America”

This Version: 31 October 2020

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Supplementary Information 1: Sample

The survey was conducted using Bovitz Inc. (<http://bovitzinc.com/index.php>). They provide an online panel of approximately one million respondents recruited through random digit dialing and empanelment of those with internet access. As with most internet survey samples, respondents participate in multiple surveys over time and receive compensation for their participation. Bovitz Inc. has been used extensively in other political science research (e.g., Howat 2019, Druckman and Levendusky 2019) including pilot data collection for the American National Election Studies.

The pre-COVID-19 survey was implemented over 3 waves in July and early August, 2019. The second wave included our main affective polarization measures to which 3,345 responded. (The three distinct waves were for reasons unrelated to this project. Also, the affective polarization measures in the survey varied the target such that some answered the conventional items asking about the Democratic and Republican parties, while others were asked about partisans who varied in terms of the amount they discussed politics (rarely, occasionally, frequently) and/or their ideology (liberal, moderate, conservative). As shown below, these variations do not affect the results we present here. That is, when we include variables for the experimental conditions they do not change our findings.)

The re-contact occurred in April, 2020, for the COVID-19 items. Of the 3,345 who had answered all of the affective polarization questions, a total of 2,484 responded in the re-contact, for a re-contact rate of 74% (in terms of those analyzed in our main models). (Of these, 360 are pure Independents and thus excluded from our main analyses.) While response to the COVID-19 wave is correlated with various respondent characteristics (e.g., higher income, older age, political interest), the composition of our final sample used here matches benchmarks well. This is shown in the below tables that presents the demographics of our COVID-19 sample to 2018 benchmarks from the U.S. Census Bureau, via the American Community Survey.

Age

Age Category	Our Sample (%)	Census Benchmark
18-24	9.42%	12.08
25-34	19.61%	17.87
35-50	35.04%	24.54
51-65	24.96%	24.88
Over 65	10.97%	20.65

Gender Identity

Gender Identity	Our Sample (%)	Census Benchmark
Female	50.82%	50.8
Male	48.19%	49.2
Transgender/None	0.99%	--*

*The U.S. Census Bureau does not currently ask about transgender identity, so there is no government-provided benchmark for that quantity. Flores et al. (2016) estimate that less than 1 percent of Americans identify as transgender, consistent with our estimates here.

Education Level

Educational Attainment	Our Sample (%)	Census Benchmark (%)
Did not complete high school	2.12%	12
High school graduate	20.84%	27.1
Associates Degree/Some College	41.98%	28.9
Bachelor's Degree	25.80%	19.7
Advanced Degree	9.27%	12.3

Annual Family Income before Taxes

Income Category	Our Sample (%)	Census Benchmark (%)*
\$30,000 or less	27.28%	29.4
\$30,000 - \$69,999	38.14%	30.3
\$70,000 - \$99,999	16.86%	12.5
\$100,000 - \$200,000	15.51%	20.9
Above \$200,000	2.22%	6.9

*The Census categories for income are slightly different than the ones we use. They record income as: \$34,999 or below, \$35,000 - \$74,999, \$75,000 - \$99,999, \$100,000 - \$199,999, and \$200,000 or greater.

Primary Racial Group

Primary Race	Our Sample (%)	Census Benchmark
Caucasian (White)	69.66%	72.2
African-American	14.47%	12.7
Hispanic or Latino	9.36%	18.3
Asian-American	4.13%	5.6
Native American	0.87%	< 1
Other	1.52%	5

Across categories, our sample matches the Census benchmarks fairly well. Our biggest discrepancies are that (1) we under-estimate senior citizens, (2) we under-estimate the least well-educated (and over-estimate those with some college or a bachelor's degree), and (3) under-estimate the top quarter of the income distribute. These are well-known limitations of any survey sampling procedure, not just our own—problems #1 and #2 are linked in that those populations are not online, and those with high incomes are also typically under-represented across all survey modes. The other significant gap is that we under-estimate the fraction of the population that is Hispanic or Latino, but this is in part a methodological difference. The Census asks about ethnicity (Hispanic/Latino) separately from race, whereas we combine them into one question. As a result, our estimates for Hispanic/Latino citizens are measuring a different construct from the Census benchmark. Overall, however, our sample does fairly well in matching the Census benchmarks across these different categories.

The next table presents respondent's answer to the seven point partisanship scale question for the survey's Wave 1 (when most of the non-COVID control variables are measures), Wave 2 (when the affective polarization questions are asked), and Wave 4 (when the questions about COVID are asked).

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 4
Strong Dem.	27.0%	28.6%	29.6%
Weak Dem.	15.5%	15.9%	16.6%
Lean Dem	12.2%	11.5%	9.9%
Pure Ind.	15.8%	14.4%	14.1%
Lean Rep.	9.5%	8.5%	8.9%
Weak Rep.	9.4%	9.7%	8.9%
Strong Rep.	10.6%	11.4%	12.0%

Obviously, there is no census benchmark for partisanship. We instead can use other political surveys as benchmarks. We use the weighted data from two YouGov studies to establish partisan benchmarks. The first is the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study—a 50 thousand respondent study that has become the gold standard in Congressional election research (e.g., Adams et al. 2017, Dancy and Sheagley 2013, Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013). The other is a smaller study YouGov conducted for some of the paper’s co-authors in summer of 2020. The 2020 study took place during the pandemic and as a result might better reflect any changes in party identification caused by the pandemic. As in the Gallup poll of the same time period, we see a decline in the percentage of respondents identifying as Republican.

	CCES 2018	YouGov 2020
Strong Dem.	23.2%	26.4%
Weak Dem.	11.8%	9.1%
Lean Dem	9.2%	9.2%
Pure Ind.	17.4%	20.3%
Lean Rep.	9.8%	8.4%
Weak Rep.	10.0%	7.8%
Strong Rep.	18.6%	18.8%

We can see that our sample over-represents weak Democrats under-represents strong Republicans and pure independents (who are excluded from the main analysis).

While every segment of the public is represented in the dataset, the sample does not match the population on all measures. It is likely that this not a problem for the purpose we are using the data here – regression modelling – as they are unbiased and consistent (Winship and Radbill 1994). Given the nature of the data it is unclear how best to calculate the survey weights as the inclusion (or exclusion) of individual level or county level variables in the calculation can make a difference but the decision to include or exclude is fairly arbitrary and there is little guidance about how to proceed (Gelman 2007). Hence, while we can be confident about the relationships observed in the analysis, the means of the variables (including the predicted estimates of the dependent variable one could calculate from the regression models) should not be seen as estimates of the population means of those variables.

Supplementary Information 2: Full question wordings and coding for measures

Dependent Variables

- Worry about COVID-19
The variable is built using 2 different grids with six items each. Each has the same four response options.

For each of the following areas, how worried are you about the long-term impact of the coronavirus on the country in general?

Public Health
National Economy
Education
Social Relations
Entertainment/Sports
The 2020 Election

For each of the following areas, how worried are you about the long-term impact of the coronavirus on you and your family personally?

Physical Health
Mental Health
Finances
Education
Friendships
Personal interests/hobbies

<0> Not at all worried; <.3333> Not too worried; <.6667> Somewhat worried;
<1> Very worried.

The final variable is the mean response to the twelve items.

- Changed Behaviors
The variable is built as a count of the number of items checked based on the following question.

We're interested in how people are responding to the coronavirus. In the past few days, which of the following, if any, have you done to protect yourself from getting the coronavirus, also known as COVID-19? Please check all that apply.

Washed your hands more frequently
Worked from home
Used hand sanitizer
Cancelled planned travel
Avoided gatherings of more than 10 people
Tried to stay at least 6 feet away from other people
Worn a face mask
Worn gloves
Did not go to a grocery store to avoid contact with others

Ordered grocery delivery to avoid going to the grocery store
Cooked at home to avoid ordering food handled by others
Went outside less frequently to avoid contact with others
Stayed at home entirely
Bought extra food

- Policies to Fight COVID-19
Many states have required non-essential businesses to close to help prevent the spread of the coronavirus. Do you disagree or agree that this is a necessary policy to combat the spread of the coronavirus?

<0> Strongly disagree; <.3333> Somewhat disagree; <.6667> Somewhat agree;
<1> Strongly agree

Many states and localities have issued rules requiring that residents stay at home to help prevent the spread of the coronavirus. Some say that such stay-at-home orders should be kept in effect until it is certain that the coronavirus will no longer pose a significant public health threat. Others think that the stay at home orders should end as soon as possible to help the economy recover. What do you think?

<0> Strongly support lifting the stay-at-home orders as soon as possible to help the economy; <.3333> Somewhat support lifting the stay-at-home orders as soon as possible to help the economy; <.6667> Somewhat support stay-at-home orders remaining in place until the coronavirus will no longer pose a significant health threat; <1> Strongly support stay-at-home orders remaining in place until the coronavirus will no longer pose a significant health threat

To what extent do you oppose or support local governments fining individuals for violating social distancing rules?

<0> Strongly oppose; <.3333> Somewhat oppose; <.6667> Somewhat support;
<1> Strongly support

The final variable is the mean response to the three items.

Main Independent Variables

- Republican (Pre-Covid-19 Wave)
Generally speaking do you consider yourself a...
<0> Strong Democrat; <0> Weak democrat <0> Independent leans Democrat
<1> Independent leans Republican; <1> Weak Republican; <1> Strong Republican
Pure independents are excluded from the analysis.
- Partisan Animosity (Pre-Covid-19 Wave)
Participants read the following introduction prior to answering the affective polarization questions. “We are next going to ask you a set of questions about ordinary people (e.g.,

voters) who are *[Republicans and Democrats / Democrats and Republicans]*. Please take your time, and do your best to answer the questions about these people.”

The participants were then asked the following questions. Where the word “[CONDITION]” currently is placed, the participants saw one of the following options depending on which randomly assigned (experimental) treatment group they were placed in (as noted below these variations do not affect our results here):

1. [Republicans/Democrats]
2. [Republicans/Democrats] who rarely talk about politics.
3. [Republicans/Democrats] who occasionally talk about politics.
4. [Republicans/Democrats] who frequently talk about politics.
5. Moderate [Republicans/Democrats]
6. Moderate [Republicans/Democrats] who rarely talk about politics.
7. Moderate [Republicans/Democrats] who occasionally talk about politics.
8. Moderate [Republicans/Democrats] who occasionally talk about politics.
9. [Conservative Republicans/Liberal Democrats]
10. [Conservative Republicans/Liberal Democrats] who rarely talk about politics.
11. [Conservative Republicans/Liberal Democrats] who occasionally talk about politics.
12. [Conservative Republicans/Liberal Democrats] who frequently talk about politics.

Respondents were then asked our questions to measure affective polarization both out-party animosity and in-party affect (as follows).

Feeling Thermometer

We’d like you to rate how you feel towards [CONDITION] on a scale of 0 to 100, which we call a “feeling thermometer.” On this feeling thermometer scale, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel unfavorable and cold (with 0 being the most unfavorable/coldest). Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm (with 100 being the most favorable/warmest). A rating of 50 means you have no feelings one way or the other. How would you rate your feeling toward these groups? Remember we are asking you to rate ordinary people (e.g., voters) and *not* elected officials or candidates.

It was recoded to a 0 to 1 scale.

(As mentioned in the text, we also asked the feeling thermometer item again in the COVID-19 wave.)

Trait Questions

We’d like to know more about what you think about [CONDITION]. Below, we’ve given a list of words that some people might use to describe them. For each item, please indicate how well you think it applies to [CONDITION]: not at all well; not too well; somewhat well; very well; or extremely well.

Terms: Patriotic, Intelligent, Honest, Open-minded, Generous, Hypocritical, Selfish, Mean

Responses: <0> Not at all well, <.25> Not too well, <.50> Somewhat well, <.75> Very well, <1> Extremely well

Trust

How much of the time do you think you can trust [CONDITION] to do what is right for the country?

Responses: <0> Almost never, <.25> Once in a while, <.50> About half the time, <.75> Most of the time, <1> Almost always

Social Distance

How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are [CONDITION]?

Responses: <0> Not at all comfortable, <.3333> not too comfortable, <.6667> somewhat comfortable, <1> extremely comfortable.

How comfortable are you having neighbors on your street who are [CONDITION]?

Responses: <0> Not at all comfortable, <.3333> not too comfortable, <.6667> somewhat comfortable, <1> extremely comfortable.

Suppose a son or daughter of yours was getting married. How would you feel if he or she married someone who is a [CONDITION]?

Responses: <0> Not at all upset, <.3333> Not too upset, <.6667> Somewhat upset, <1> Extremely upset

The final variable is the mean response to all the items asked about the respondent's out-party. The in-party affect variable is constructed analogously but for answers with regard to one's own party.

The models control for all 12 conditions through dummy variables indicating the frequency of discussion condition and the ideology condition and the interactions for those conditions. *These experimental variations in the measure of affective polarization do not affect the results.*

COVID-19 and Demographic Control Variables

- Household COVID-19 Infection (COVID-19 Wave)
The variable is constructed using the following questions.
Have you personally contracted the coronavirus, as known as COVID-19?
No
I am not sure
Yes, but I have not been tested
Yes, and I have tested positive
I had all the symptoms, but tested negative

(If I am not sure) How unlikely or likely do you think it is that you have caught the coronavirus?

Very unlikely
Somewhat unlikely
Somewhat likely

Very likely

Has someone in your household (i.e., someone that you live with) contracted the coronavirus?

I live alone

No

I am not sure

Yes, but they have not been tested

Yes, and they have been tested positive

They had all the symptoms, but tested negative

(If I am not sure) How unlikely or likely do you think it is that someone in your household has caught the coronavirus?

Very unlikely

Somewhat unlikely

Somewhat likely

Very likely

Variable is coded 1 if the respondent answered they or someone in their house contracted the coronavirus (regardless of the test outcome) or if they said they were not sure, but it was likely that they or someone in their house had the coronavirus. It is coded 0 if they said neither they nor anyone in their house had the coronavirus or said it was unlikely anyone had it.

- Risk of Illness (COVID-19 Wave)

Variable is coded 0 if respondent answered “no” to the following three questions and coded 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to any of the questions.

Do you have children under 4 years old living with you?

Are you or your spouse currently pregnant?

Do you currently have any health conditions that would make the coronavirus especially risk for you, such as asthma, emphysema, or difficulty breathing?

- Work Out of the House (COVID-19 Wave)

Does any of your work currently require you to leave home?

<0> No

<1> Yes, for a little of my work.

<1> Yes, for some of work.

<1> Yes, for all my work.

- Future Income (COVID-19 Wave)

In the coming year, do you think your household income will decrease, stay the same, or increase due to the coronavirus?

<0> Significantly decrease

- <.25> Somewhat decrease
- <.5> Stay the same
- <.75> Somewhat increase
- <1> Significantly increase

- **Difficulty Having No Contact (COVID-19 Wave)**
Has it been enjoyable or difficult for you to have less, or even no, in-person contact with people outside of your household? Please use the following scale from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates you enjoy reduced in-person contact, 50 indicates you are indifferent, and 100 indicates that is extremely difficult to have less in-person contact.
Variable recoded to a 0 to 1 scales.
- **Age (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)**
A series of dummy variables with 18-24 as the reference category.
Categories: 25-34; 35-50; 51-65; Older than 65
- **White (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)**
<1> Respondent's primary race is white; <0> Respondent's primary race is African American, Asian American, Hispanic or Latino, or something else.
- **African American (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)**
<1> Respondent's primary race is African American; <0> Respondent's primary race is White, Asian American, Hispanic or Latino, or something else.
- **Asian American (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)**
<1> Respondent's primary race is Asian American; <0> Respondent's primary race is White, African American, Hispanic or Latino, or something else.
- **Hispanic/Latino (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)**
<1> Respondent's primary race is Hispanic or Latino; <0> Respondent's primary race is White, African American, Asian American, or something else.
- **Education (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)**
<0> Less than High school; <.25> High school graduate; <.50> Some college; <.50> Associates degree/2-year degree; <.75> 4 year college degree; <1> Advanced degree
- **Income (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)**
<0> <\$30,000; <.25> \$30,000 - \$69,999; <.50> \$70,000 - \$99,999; <.75> \$100,000 - \$200,000; <1> >\$200,000

Partisan and Ideological Control Variables

- **Strength of Partisan Identity (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)**
Respondent is asked the following four questions about their own political parties.

Importance of being a [PARTY] to the survey participant

Responses <0> Not at all important; <.25> Not very important; <.5> Somewhat important; <.75> Very important; <1> Extremely important

How well the term [PARTY] describes the survey participant

Responses: <0> Not at all well; <.25> Not very well; <.5> Somewhat well; <.75> Very well; <1> Extremely well

Frequency with which survey participant uses “we” instead of “they”, when referring to [PARTY]

Responses: <0> Never; <.25> Rarely; <.5> Some of the time; <.75> Most of the time; <1> All of the time

The extent to which the survey participant believes themselves to be a [PARTY]

Responses: <0> Not at all; <.25> Not too much; <.5> Somewhat; <.75> A good deal; <1> A great deal

Final variable is the mean of these items.

- Ideology (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)

Respondent’s reported political ideology

<0> Very liberal; <.1667> Mostly liberal; <.3333> Somewhat liberal; <.5> Moderate; <.6667> Somewhat conservative; <.8333> Mostly conservative; <1> Very conservative

- Issue Positions (Pre-COVID-19 Wave))

The respondent is asked the following eight questions.

Belief on if federal spending on Social Security should be changed or kept the same

Responses: <0> Decreased; <.5> Kept about the same; <1> Increased

Belief on whether there should be public government healthcare plans, private healthcare plans, or some combination

Responses: <0> Only private insurance; <.1667> Mostly private insurance; <.3333> Slightly more private insurance; <.5> Half private insurance and half public insurance; <.6667> Slightly public insurance; <.8333> Mostly public insurance; <1> Only public insurance

Belief on whether the government should provide fewer services to cut spending, or increase spending to provide more services

Responses: <0> Definitely reduce spending/cut services; <.16667> Probably reduce spending/cut services; <.3333> Maybe reduce spending/cut services; <.5> Keep services and spending the same; <.6667> Maybe increase services/raise spending; <.8333> Probably increase services/raise spending; <1> Definitely increase services/raise spending

Belief on whether or not the government has a responsibility to ensure job/standing of living for each person

Responses: <0> Government should definitely leave it to each person; <.1667> Government should probably leave it to each person; <.3333> Government should maybe leave it to each person; <.5> Unsure; <.6667> Government should maybe ensure standard of living; <.8333> Government should probably ensure standard of living; <1> Government should definitely ensure standard of living

Views on abortion

Responses: <0> By law, abortion should never be permitted.; <.25> The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger.; <.5> The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established.; <.75> By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice, but only until a certain point in her pregnancy; <1> By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

Whether homosexuals should be legally protected against discrimination

Responses: <0> Definitely should not be protected; <.25> Maybe should not be protected; <.5> Unsure; <.75> Maybe should be protected; <1> Definitely should be protected;

Belief of whether rate of immigration into the US should change, or be kept the same

Responses: <0> Definitely decrease; <.1667> Probably decrease; <.3333> Maybe decrease; <.5> Keep at present level; <.6667> Maybe increase; <.8333> Probably increase; <1> Definitely increase

Whether transgender individuals should be legally protected against discrimination

Responses: <0> Definitely should not be protected; <.25> Maybe should not be protected; <.5>– Unsure; <.75> Maybe should be protected; <1> Definitely should be protected

- Political Interest (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)
<0> Not at all interested;<.25> Not too interested; <.5> Somewhat interested; <.75> Very interested; <1> Extremely interested
- Political Knowledge (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)

The respondent was asked the following five questions.

Majority in Senate and House required to override President's Veto

<0> Cannot override; <0> 1/3; <0> 1/2; <1> 2/3; <0> 3/4; <0> Don't know

Party that has the most members in the House of Representatives

<1> Democrats; <0> Republicans; <0> Tie; <0> Don't know

Branch that determines if a law is constitutional

<0> President; <0> Congress; <1> Supreme Court; <0> Don't know

Current U.S. Vice President

<0> Rex Tillerson; <0> James Mattis; <1> Mike Pence; <0> Paul Ryan; <0> Don't know

Party that is more conservative at national level

<0> The Democratic Party; <1> The Republican Party; <0> Neither; <0> Don't know


The final variable is the proportion of correct answers.

News Source Control Variables

- Media: Fox News (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)
<1> Respondent reports watching Fox News at least once a month; <0> Respondent does not watch Fox News at least once a month
- Media: CNN (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)
<1> Respondent reports watching CNN at least once a month; <0> Respondent does not watch CNN at least once a month
- Media: MSNBC (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)
<1> Respondent reports watching MSNBC at least once a month; <0> Respondent does not watch MSNBC at least once a month
- NY Times or Washington Post (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)
<1> Respondent reports reading either the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*; <0> Respondent does not read either the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*
- Network News (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)
<1> Respondent reports watching ABC, CBS, or NBC news at least once a month; <0> Respondent does not watch ABC, CBS, or NBC news at least once a month
- Local News (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)
<1> Respondent reports watching any local newscast at least once a month; <0> Respondent does not watch any local newscast at least once a month
- Social Media Use (Pre-COVID-19 Wave)
<0> Respondent does not use social media; <0> Respondent does not see news related social media content; <.3333> Respondent sees news related social media content once a day; <.6667> Respondent sees news related social media content 2-4 times a day; <1> Respondent sees news related social media content five or more times a day

Supplementary Information 3 Distribution of the partisan animosity measure by party.

Higher values mean more out-party animus.



Out-party animus is related both in-party affect and strength of Strength of Partisan Identity. They are not, however, all substitutes for one another as the table below demonstrates.

Out-party animus across partisan strength

	Partisan Identity Measure		
	Mean out-party animus	% Low out-party animus (≤ 0.3)	% High out-party animus (≥ 0.7)
Leaners	0.54	8%	19%
Weak Partisans	0.51	10%	14%
Strong Partisans	0.59	4%	29%

	Identity Strength Measure		
	Mean out-party animus	% Low out-party animus (≤ 0.3)	% High out-party animus (≥ 0.7)
Partisan Identity: 0.00-.3499	0.521	8.8%	19.0%
Partisan Identity: .35-.65	0.542	6.1%	20.0%
Partisan Identity: .6501-1.00	0.605	5.9%	36.2%

The following OLS model shows that both variables are correlated with out-party animus (controlling for the experimental treatment in Wave 2 of the original survey). However, the R^2 for the model is 0.115 suggesting that a good deal of variation in the dependent variable is explained by other variables.


Variable	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% C.I.	
					Lower	Upper
Strength of Partisan Identity	0.128	0.014	9.07	0.00	0.100	0.156
In-Party Affect	0.060	0.025	2.40	0.02	0.011	0.109
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.004	0.014	-0.32	0.75	-0.032	0.023
Experiment (Occasionally)	0.016	0.014	1.13	0.26	-0.012	0.044
Experiment (Frequently)	-0.090	0.014	-6.28	0.00	-0.119	-0.062
Experiment (Moderate)	-0.011	0.014	-0.74	0.46	-0.039	0.017
Experiment (Sorted)	0.045	0.014	3.19	0.00	0.017	0.072
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	-0.040	0.022	-1.82	0.07	-0.082	0.003
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	-0.029	0.022	-1.33	0.18	-0.072	0.014
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.038	0.021	-1.77	0.08	-0.080	0.004
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	-0.002	0.022	-0.08	0.93	-0.045	0.041
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.009	0.022	-0.42	0.68	-0.051	0.033
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	-0.023	0.022	-1.04	0.30	-0.065	0.020
Constant	0.469	0.018	25.76	0.00	0.433	0.504

N=2,854; $R^2=0.115$

Supplementary Information 4 Descriptive statistics for all variables.

Dependent Variables					
Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
<i>All Respondents in all counties</i>					
Worry	2,970	0.582	0.209	0	1
Behavior	2,979	7.033	2.954	0	14
Policy	2,973	0.742	0.245	0	1
<i>Democrats in all counties</i>					
Worry	1,682	0.618	0.199	0	1
Behavior	1,684	7.469	2.829	0	14
Policy	1,682	0.796	0.207	0	1
<i>Republicans in all counties</i>					
Worry	859	0.523	0.203	0	1
Behavior	863	6.577	2.981	0	14
Policy	861	0.673	0.270	0	1
<i>Democrats in counties at the 25th percentile of cases or lower</i>					
Worry	346	0.609	0.196	0	1
Behavior	346	7.087	2.567	0	14
Policy	346	0.793	0.206	0	1
<i>Republicans in counties at the 25th percentile of cases or lower</i>					
Worry	250	0.509	0.213	0	1
Behavior	250	6.024	2.743	0	14
Policy	250	0.629	0.281	0	1
<i>Democrats in counties in the interquartile range of cases</i>					
Worry	835	0.618	0.200	0	1
Behavior	836	7.425	2.807	0	14
Policy	835	0.794	0.211	0	1
<i>Republicans in counties in the interquartile range of cases</i>					
Worry	408	0.517	0.201	0	1
Behavior	411	6.762	3.041	0	14
Policy	409	0.691	0.262	0	1
<i>Democrats in counties at the 75th percentile of cases or higher</i>					
Worry	501	0.626	0.200	0	1
Behavior	502	7.807	2.999	0	14
Policy	501	0.800	0.202	0	1
<i>Republicans in counties at the 75th percentile of cases or higher</i>					
Worry	201	0.552	0.195	0	1
Behavior	202	6.886	3.062	0	14
Policy	202	0.694	0.267	0	1

Dependent variable by perceived personal risk of illness.



Each item used in the dependent variables

Worry

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>All Respondents</i>					
Public Health	2,973	0.7418	0.2659	0	1
National Economy	2,973	0.7952	0.2616	0	1
Country's Education	2,974	0.6491	0.2994	0	1
Social Relations	2,973	0.5950	0.3047	0	1
Entertainment/Sports	2,972	0.4757	0.3465	0	1
The 2020 Election	2,972	0.5842	0.3340	0	1
Personal Physical Health	2,974	0.6116	0.3043	0	1
Personal Mental Health	2,973	0.5776	0.3261	0	1
Personal Finances	2,971	0.6663	0.3122	0	1
Personal Education	2,972	0.4485	0.3556	0	1
Personal Friendships	2,972	0.3956	0.3266	0	1
Personal Interests/Hobbies	2,973	0.4461	0.3303	0	1
<i>Democrats</i>					
Public Health	1,683	0.7930	0.2419	0	1
National Economy	1,683	0.8124	0.2542	0	1
Country's Education	1,683	0.6859	0.2820	0	1
Social Relations	1,683	0.6241	0.2999	0	1
Entertainment/Sports	1,683	0.5027	0.3445	0	1
The 2020 Election	1,683	0.6686	0.3125	0	1
Personal Physical Health	1,683	0.6516	0.2899	0	1
Personal Mental Health	1,683	0.6168	0.3159	0	1
Personal Finances	1,682	0.6958	0.2998	0	1
Personal Education	1,683	0.4781	0.3565	0	1
Personal Friendships	1,683	0.4240	0.3317	0	1
Personal Interests/Hobbies	1,683	0.4692	0.3322	0	1
<i>Republicans</i>					
Public Health	861	0.6651	0.2728	0	1
National Economy	861	0.7786	0.2627	0	1
Country's Education	861	0.5881	0.3069	0	1
Social Relations	861	0.5428	0.3035	0	1
Entertainment/Sports	860	0.4407	0.3442	0	1
The 2020 Election	860	0.4872	0.3147	0	1
Personal Physical Health	861	0.5327	0.3060	0	1
Personal Mental Health	861	0.5002	0.3245	0	1
Personal Finances	860	0.6089	0.3195	0	1
Personal Education	860	0.3853	0.3395	0	1
Personal Friendships	860	0.3473	0.3065	0	1
Personal Interests/Hobbies	861	0.4034	0.3193	0	1

Behavior

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>All Respondents</i>					
Washed Hands More	2,979	0.8990	0.3014	0	1
Worked from Home	2,979	0.3347	0.4720	0	1
Used Hand Sanitizer	2,979	0.7123	0.4528	0	1
Canceled Planned Travel	2,979	0.3129	0.4637	0	1
Avoided Gathers of More Than 10	2,979	0.7825	0.4126	0	1
Stayed 6 Feet Away from Others	2,979	0.8191	0.3850	0	1
Worn a Face Mask	2,979	0.4408	0.4966	0	1
Worn Gloves	2,979	0.3760	0.4845	0	1
Did Not Go to Grocery	2,979	0.3001	0.4584	0	1
Ordered Grocery Delivery	2,979	0.1920	0.3939	0	1
Cooked at Home	2,979	0.5925	0.4915	0	1
Went Outside Less Frequently	2,979	0.4642	0.4988	0	1
Stayed Home Entirely	2,979	0.3135	0.4640	0	1
Bought Extra Food	2,979	0.4931	0.5000	0	1
<i>Democrats</i>					
Washed Hands More	1,684	0.9204	0.2707	0	1
Worked from Home	1,684	0.3593	0.4799	0	1
Used Hand Sanitizer	1,684	0.7375	0.4401	0	1
Canceled Planned Travel	1,684	0.3409	0.4741	0	1
Avoided Gathers of More Than 10	1,684	0.8124	0.3905	0	1
Stayed 6 Feet Away from Others	1,684	0.8426	0.3643	0	1
Worn a Face Mask	1,684	0.5048	0.5001	0	1
Worn Gloves	1,684	0.4151	0.4929	0	1
Did Not Go to Grocery	1,684	0.3213	0.4671	0	1
Ordered Grocery Delivery	1,684	0.2162	0.4117	0	1
Cooked at Home	1,684	0.6110	0.4877	0	1
Went Outside Less Frequently	1,684	0.5202	0.4997	0	1
Stayed Home Entirely	1,684	0.3468	0.4761	0	1
Bought Extra Food	1,684	0.5208	0.4997	0	1
<i>Republicans</i>					
Washed Hands More	863	0.8795	0.3257	0	1
Worked from Home	863	0.3291	0.4702	0	1
Used Hand Sanitizer	863	0.6871	0.4639	0	1
Canceled Planned Travel	863	0.2920	0.4549	0	1
Avoided Gathers of More Than 10	863	0.7486	0.4341	0	1
Stayed 6 Feet Away from Others	863	0.8053	0.3962	0	1
Worn a Face Mask	863	0.3627	0.4811	0	1
Worn Gloves	863	0.3279	0.4697	0	1
Did Not Go to Grocery	863	0.2723	0.4454	0	1
Ordered Grocery Delivery	863	0.1703	0.3761	0	1
Cooked at Home	863	0.5724	0.4950	0	1
Went Outside Less Frequently	863	0.3963	0.4894	0	1
Stayed Home Entirely	863	0.2561	0.4367	0	1
Bought Extra Food	863	0.4774	0.4998	0	1

Policy

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>All Respondents</i>					
Close Non-Essential Businesses	2974	0.8263	0.2637	0	1
Lift Stay at Home Orders (Reversed)	2975	0.7658	0.3101	0	1
Fine Individuals Who Don't Social Distance	2974	0.6337	0.3356	0	1
<i>Democrats</i>					
Close Non-Essential Businesses	1682	0.8753	0.2262	0	1
Lift Stay at Home Orders (Reversed)	1683	0.8285	0.2694	0	1
Fine Individuals Who Don't Social Distance	1683	0.6825	0.3146	0	1
<i>Republicans</i>					
Close Non-Essential Businesses	861	0.7696	0.2825	0	1
Lift Stay at Home Orders (Reversed)	861	0.6756	0.3396	0	1
Fine Individuals Who Don't Social Distance	861	0.5749	0.3477	0	1

Independent Variables All Respondents

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Partisan Animosity	2,124	0.5592	0.1835	0	1
In-Party Affect	2,131	0.6793	0.1442	0	1
Household COVID Infection	2,189	0.0950	0.2933	0	1
Risk of Illness	2,187	0.4001	0.4900	0	1
Out of Work	2,192	0.2746	0.4464	0	1
Future Income	2,191	0.4081	0.2242	0	1
Difficulty Having no Contact	2,190	0.5053	0.2648	0	1
Strength of Party Identity	2,188	0.5248	0.2506	0	1
Ideology	2,191	0.4342	0.2782	0	1
Issue Positions	2,187	0.6404	0.2090	0	1
Political Interest	2,172	0.5671	0.2808	0	1
Political Knowledge	2,192	0.6947	0.2883	0	1
Trump Press Conferences	2,188	0.4557	0.4036	0	1
Media: Fox News	2,185	0.4302	0.4952	0	1
Media: CNN	2,188	0.5005	0.5001	0	1
Media: MSNBC	2,181	0.3806	0.4856	0	1
NY Times or Washington Post	2,192	0.3599	0.4801	0	1
Network News	2,191	0.6728	0.4693	0	1
Local News	2,190	0.7890	0.4081	0	1
Social Media Use	2,186	0.4625	0.3635	0	1

Independent Variables Democrats

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Partisan Animosity	1389	0.5764	0.1870	0.0392	1
In-Party Affect	1395	0.6889	0.1459	0	1
Household COVID Infection	1430	0.0979	0.2973	0	1
Risk of Illness	1427	0.3938	0.4888	0	1
Out of Work	1431	0.2530	0.4349	0	1
Future Income	1431	0.4050	0.2297	0	1
Difficulty Having no Contact	1429	0.4954	0.2666	0	1
Strength of Party Identity	1430	0.5507	0.2540	0	1
Ideology	1431	0.3090	0.2186	0	1
Issue Positions	1429	0.7230	0.1732	0.0938	1
Political Interest	1419	0.5816	0.2829	0	1
Political Knowledge	1431	0.6861	0.2931	0	1
Trump Press Conferences	1430	0.3667	0.3852	0	1
Media: Fox News	1427	0.3427	0.4748	0	1
Media: CNN	1429	0.5969	0.4907	0	1
Media: MSNBC	1425	0.4428	0.4969	0	1
NY Times or Washington Post	1431	0.4326	0.4956	0	1
Network News	1431	0.7086	0.4546	0	1
Local News	1431	0.7987	0.4011	0	1
Social Media Use	1426	0.4766	0.3649	0	1

Independent Variables Republicans

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Partisan Animosity	735	0.5267	0.1722	0	1
In-Party Affect	736	0.6610	0.1390	0.2008	1
Household COVID Infection	757	0.0872	0.2823	0	1
Risk of Illness	758	0.4116	0.4925	0	1
Out of Work	759	0.3149	0.4648	0	1
Future Income	758	0.4146	0.2136	0	1
Difficulty Having no Contact	759	0.5235	0.2604	0	1
Strength of Party Identity	757	0.4760	0.2368	0	1
Ideology	759	0.6708	0.2181	0	1
Issue Positions	757	0.4841	0.1795	0	0.9583
Political Interest	752	0.5396	0.2749	0	1
Political Knowledge	759	0.7115	0.2775	0	1
Trump Press Conferences	757	0.6244	0.3833	0	1
Media: Fox News	757	0.5958	0.4911	0	1
Media: CNN	758	0.3179	0.4660	0	1
Media: MSNBC	755	0.2636	0.4409	0	1
NY Times or Washington Post	759	0.2227	0.4163	0	1
Network News	759	0.6047	0.4892	0	1
Local News	758	0.7704	0.4208	0	1
Social Media Use	759	0.4352	0.3594	0	1

County Level Variables (For Respondents in Models Only)

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Logged Cases (3 Day Avg.)	724	3.8952	1.9713	0	11.1697
County Population (Million)	723	0.3387	0.6843	0.0044	10
Trump Vote Percentage	723	0.5734	0.1686	0.0425	0.8996

Due to the way the New York Times organizes case data, New York City is 1 county in our data instead of 5 counties.

Supplementary Information 5 OLS Models for Worry about COVID-19

Model 1

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	-0.005	0.028	-0.16	0.871	-0.060	0.051
Partisan Animosity	0.019	0.028	0.68	0.499	-0.036	0.074
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.157	0.053	-2.95	0.003	-0.262	-0.052
Logged Cases (County)	0.004	0.003	1.39	0.166	-0.001	0.008
County Population (Millions)	0.002	0.002	1.09	0.275	-0.002	0.006
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	0.007	0.018	0.42	0.676	-0.028	0.043
Experiment (Occasionally)	0.003	0.019	0.14	0.888	-0.035	0.040
Experiment (Frequently)	-0.019	0.019	-0.98	0.329	-0.057	0.019
Experiment (Moderate)	0.003	0.020	0.14	0.892	-0.037	0.042
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.014	0.019	-0.76	0.445	-0.052	0.023
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.017	0.029	0.60	0.548	-0.039	0.073
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.043	0.027	1.63	0.103	-0.009	0.096
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.035	0.030	-1.19	0.235	-0.094	0.023
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.013	0.028	0.47	0.635	-0.041	0.067
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	0.005	0.028	0.18	0.854	-0.049	0.059
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.065	0.032	2.00	0.046	0.001	0.128
Constant	0.577	0.024	24.50	0.000	0.531	0.623
	N=2062		Counties=723		R ² =0.06	

In all models standard errors are adjusted for clustering on counties.

Model 2

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.137	0.069	1.97	0.049	0.001	0.273
Partisan Animosity	-0.002	0.066	-0.04	0.970	-0.133	0.128
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.435	0.120	-3.61	0.000	-0.672	-0.199
Logged Cases (County)	0.001	0.006	0.14	0.892	-0.012	0.013
Republican X Cases	-0.027	0.011	-2.59	0.010	-0.048	-0.007
Animosity X Cases	0.004	0.010	0.37	0.710	-0.015	0.022
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.054	0.019	2.81	0.005	0.016	0.092
County Population (Millions)	0.002	0.002	1.03	0.302	-0.002	0.006
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	0.008	0.018	0.43	0.667	-0.027	0.042
Experiment (Occasionally)	0.002	0.019	0.12	0.903	-0.035	0.039
Experiment (Frequently)	-0.018	0.019	-0.94	0.347	-0.056	0.020
Experiment (Moderate)	0.003	0.020	0.13	0.894	-0.036	0.041
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.016	0.019	-0.83	0.405	-0.054	0.022
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.016	0.028	0.58	0.562	-0.039	0.071
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.046	0.027	1.74	0.083	-0.006	0.098
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.034	0.030	-1.16	0.247	-0.092	0.024
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.015	0.027	0.55	0.583	-0.039	0.069
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	0.005	0.027	0.18	0.859	-0.049	0.059
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.064	0.032	1.98	0.048	0.001	0.127
Constant	0.593	0.044	13.45	0.000	0.506	0.679
	N=2062		Counties=723		R ² =0.07	

Model 3

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.126	0.067	1.89	0.060	-0.005	0.256
Partisan Animosity	0.006	0.067	0.10	0.923	-0.125	0.138
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.399	0.116	-3.43	0.001	-0.627	-0.170
Logged Cases (County)	0.000	0.007	0.01	0.993	-0.013	0.013
Republican X Cases	-0.025	0.010	-2.40	0.017	-0.045	-0.005
Animosity X Cases	0.003	0.010	0.30	0.762	-0.017	0.023
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.050	0.019	2.58	0.010	0.012	0.088
County Population (Millions)	0.002	0.002	1.05	0.295	-0.002	0.006
Household COVID Infection	0.022	0.013	1.62	0.106	-0.005	0.048
Risk of Illness	0.037	0.008	4.49	0.000	0.021	0.053
Out of Work	0.010	0.010	0.97	0.335	-0.010	0.029
Future Income	-0.101	0.020	-4.94	0.000	-0.141	-0.061
Difficulty Having No Contact	0.141	0.017	8.26	0.000	0.108	0.175
Age (25-34)	0.016	0.018	0.88	0.379	-0.019	0.051
Age (35-50)	0.034	0.017	1.94	0.053	0.000	0.068
Age (51-65)	-0.003	0.017	-0.17	0.862	-0.036	0.030
Age (Older than 65)	-0.054	0.018	-2.96	0.003	-0.090	-0.018
Female	0.011	0.008	1.26	0.209	-0.006	0.027
White	-0.039	0.036	-1.11	0.269	-0.109	0.031
African American	0.006	0.036	0.15	0.879	-0.065	0.076
Asian American	-0.030	0.038	-0.78	0.436	-0.105	0.045
Hispanic/Latino	0.003	0.038	0.09	0.928	-0.072	0.079
Education	-0.025	0.021	-1.20	0.231	-0.067	0.016
Income	-0.015	0.017	-0.86	0.390	-0.049	0.019
Republican Governor	-0.006	0.009	-0.64	0.525	-0.023	0.012
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	0.003	0.018	0.14	0.887	-0.032	0.037
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.002	0.018	-0.14	0.892	-0.038	0.033
Experiment (Frequently)	-0.019	0.019	-1.03	0.305	-0.056	0.017
Experiment (Moderate)	0.006	0.018	0.31	0.758	-0.030	0.041
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.017	0.019	-0.91	0.361	-0.054	0.020
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.023	0.027	0.84	0.400	-0.030	0.076
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.054	0.027	2.02	0.044	0.001	0.106
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.020	0.029	-0.72	0.474	-0.077	0.036
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.026	0.026	0.99	0.324	-0.026	0.078
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	0.007	0.026	0.27	0.787	-0.044	0.059
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.060	0.031	1.94	0.052	-0.001	0.121
Constant	0.579	0.058	9.90	0.000	0.464	0.693
	N=2054		Counties=723		R ² =0.15	

Model 4

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.086	0.098	0.87	0.383	-0.107	0.279
Partisan Animosity	-0.014	0.068	-0.21	0.834	-0.148	0.119
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.325	0.116	-2.80	0.005	-0.552	-0.097
Logged Cases (County)	-0.003	0.006	-0.41	0.680	-0.015	0.010
Republican X Cases	-0.022	0.010	-2.21	0.027	-0.041	-0.002
Animosity X Cases	0.001	0.011	0.12	0.905	-0.020	0.022
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.048	0.019	2.54	0.011	0.011	0.086
County Population (Millions)	0.004	0.002	1.81	0.070	0.000	0.008
Household COVID Infection	0.018	0.013	1.37	0.173	-0.008	0.044
Risk of Illness	0.034	0.008	4.17	0.000	0.018	0.050
Out of Work	0.009	0.010	0.91	0.363	-0.010	0.028
Future Income	-0.116	0.020	-5.82	0.000	-0.156	-0.077
Difficulty Having No Contact	0.122	0.017	7.30	0.000	0.089	0.155
Age (25-34)	-0.002	0.018	-0.10	0.919	-0.037	0.034
Age (35-50)	0.018	0.017	1.04	0.300	-0.016	0.052
Age (51-65)	-0.015	0.017	-0.91	0.362	-0.048	0.018
Age (Older than 65)	-0.064	0.017	-3.68	0.000	-0.099	-0.030
Female	0.003	0.008	0.35	0.727	-0.014	0.020
White	-0.036	0.035	-1.04	0.301	-0.104	0.032
African American	-0.017	0.036	-0.46	0.643	-0.087	0.054
Asian American	-0.031	0.039	-0.80	0.424	-0.108	0.046
Hispanic/Latino	-0.009	0.038	-0.25	0.806	-0.083	0.065
Education	-0.012	0.022	-0.55	0.580	-0.054	0.030
Income	-0.012	0.018	-0.65	0.513	-0.048	0.024
Republican Governor	0.000	0.009	-0.05	0.963	-0.018	0.017
Trump Vote Share (County)	-0.052	0.030	-1.77	0.078	-0.110	0.006
Republican X Trump Vote	0.051	0.049	1.04	0.299	-0.045	0.148
Strength of Partisan Identity	0.132	0.026	5.06	0.000	0.081	0.184
Republican X Partisan Identity	-0.018	0.042	-0.42	0.675	-0.100	0.065
Ideology	0.021	0.030	0.70	0.487	-0.038	0.080
Republican X Ideology	-0.107	0.051	-2.09	0.037	-0.206	-0.007
Issue Positions	0.027	0.039	0.69	0.490	-0.050	0.103
Republican X Issue Positions	0.138	0.065	2.12	0.035	0.010	0.266
Political Interest	0.077	0.026	2.90	0.004	0.025	0.128
Republican X Political Interest	-0.031	0.041	-0.74	0.461	-0.112	0.051
Political Knowledge	-0.087	0.023	-3.72	0.000	-0.132	-0.041
Republican X Political Knowledge	0.000	0.038	0.00	0.999	-0.075	0.074

(Model 4 Continued)

Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.001	0.017	-0.07	0.943	-0.034	0.032
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.005	0.018	-0.29	0.772	-0.040	0.029
Experiment (Frequently)	-0.019	0.018	-1.08	0.281	-0.054	0.016
Experiment (Moderate)	0.006	0.018	0.37	0.713	-0.028	0.041
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.023	0.019	-1.20	0.232	-0.061	0.015
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.019	0.026	0.76	0.449	-0.031	0.070
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.049	0.026	1.91	0.057	-0.001	0.100
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.021	0.028	-0.74	0.461	-0.075	0.034
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.024	0.027	0.90	0.370	-0.029	0.077
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	0.001	0.025	0.04	0.971	-0.048	0.050
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.055	0.030	1.82	0.069	-0.004	0.114
Constant	0.583	0.069	8.44	0.000	0.447	0.719

N=2034

Counties=716

R²=0.21

Model 5

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.096	0.100	0.97	0.334	-0.099	0.292
Partisan Animosity	-0.002	0.069	-0.03	0.977	-0.138	0.134
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.315	0.116	-2.73	0.007	-0.542	-0.088
Logged Cases (County)	-0.004	0.006	-0.68	0.494	-0.017	0.008
Republican X Cases	-0.020	0.010	-2.00	0.046	-0.039	0.000
Animosity X Cases	0.002	0.011	0.22	0.827	-0.019	0.024
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.045	0.019	2.33	0.020	0.007	0.082
County Population (Millions)	0.004	0.002	2.05	0.041	0.000	0.009
Household COVID Infection	0.014	0.013	1.07	0.283	-0.011	0.039
Risk of Illness	0.030	0.008	3.66	0.000	0.014	0.046
Out of Work	0.007	0.010	0.75	0.452	-0.012	0.026
Future Income	-0.114	0.020	-5.75	0.000	-0.153	-0.075
Difficulty Having No Contact	0.118	0.017	7.10	0.000	0.085	0.150
Age (25-34)	-0.005	0.018	-0.28	0.783	-0.040	0.030
Age (35-50)	0.012	0.017	0.68	0.496	-0.022	0.046
Age (51-65)	-0.017	0.017	-1.03	0.305	-0.049	0.016
Age (Older than 65)	-0.064	0.018	-3.63	0.000	-0.099	-0.029
Female	0.004	0.008	0.42	0.674	-0.013	0.020
White	-0.026	0.035	-0.75	0.456	-0.095	0.043
African American	-0.015	0.036	-0.41	0.685	-0.086	0.057
Asian American	-0.028	0.039	-0.73	0.464	-0.104	0.047
Hispanic/Latino	0.001	0.038	0.01	0.988	-0.074	0.075
Education	-0.003	0.022	-0.15	0.881	-0.046	0.039
Income	-0.021	0.018	-1.15	0.250	-0.057	0.015
Republican Governor (State)	-0.002	0.009	-0.24	0.807	-0.019	0.015
(Model 5 Continued)						
Trump Vote Share (County)	-0.056	0.032	-1.76	0.078	-0.118	0.006
Republican X Trump Vote	0.049	0.049	1.01	0.312	-0.046	0.145
Strength of Partisan Identity	0.110	0.026	4.17	0.000	0.058	0.162
Republican X Partisan Identity	-0.033	0.043	-0.76	0.446	-0.117	0.052
Ideology	0.002	0.032	0.07	0.942	-0.060	0.064
Republican X Ideology	-0.064	0.052	-1.22	0.223	-0.166	0.039
Issue Positions	0.032	0.042	0.75	0.451	-0.051	0.114
Republican X Issue Positions	0.101	0.066	1.52	0.128	-0.029	0.231
Political Interest	0.037	0.029	1.28	0.199	-0.020	0.094
Republican X Political Interest	-0.029	0.042	-0.70	0.486	-0.112	0.053
Political Knowledge	-0.072	0.024	-3.06	0.002	-0.119	-0.026
Republican X Political Knowledge	-0.011	0.038	-0.29	0.768	-0.087	0.064
Trump Press Conference	0.021	0.016	1.27	0.206	-0.011	0.053
Republican X Trump Press	-0.014	0.025	-0.58	0.563	-0.063	0.034

(Model 5 Continued)

Media: Fox News	0.017	0.010	1.67	0.095	-0.003	0.037
Media: CNN	0.019	0.010	1.80	0.072	-0.002	0.039
Media: MSNBC	0.017	0.012	1.38	0.169	-0.007	0.041
NY Times or Washington Post	-0.012	0.010	-1.18	0.237	-0.032	0.008
Network News	0.010	0.012	0.85	0.398	-0.013	0.033
Local News	0.014	0.014	1.01	0.311	-0.013	0.041
Social Media Use	0.042	0.014	3.09	0.002	0.015	0.069
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.007	0.017	-0.41	0.681	-0.040	0.026
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.006	0.018	-0.31	0.755	-0.040	0.029
Experiment (Frequently)	-0.024	0.018	-1.37	0.170	-0.059	0.010
Experiment (Moderate)	0.005	0.017	0.27	0.790	-0.030	0.039
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.024	0.019	-1.24	0.215	-0.062	0.014
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.033	0.026	1.27	0.203	-0.018	0.083
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.058	0.026	2.22	0.027	0.007	0.108
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.015	0.028	-0.55	0.582	-0.071	0.040
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.020	0.027	0.75	0.452	-0.032	0.073
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	0.005	0.025	0.18	0.856	-0.045	0.054
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.058	0.030	1.91	0.056	-0.002	0.117
Constant	0.543	0.072	7.59	0.000	0.403	0.684
	N=2011		Counties=711		R ² =0.23	

Model 6

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.190	0.127	1.51	0.133	-0.058	0.439
Partisan Animosity	-0.004	0.070	-0.05	0.959	-0.141	0.134
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.301	0.116	-2.59	0.010	-0.530	-0.073
Logged Cases (County)	-0.004	0.009	-0.45	0.651	-0.023	0.014
Republican X Cases	-0.031	0.017	-1.83	0.067	-0.064	0.002
Animosity X Cases	0.003	0.011	0.23	0.818	-0.020	0.025
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.042	0.019	2.16	0.031	0.004	0.080
In-Party Affect	0.010	0.091	0.11	0.910	-0.169	0.190
Republican X In-Party Affect	-0.182	0.145	-1.25	0.210	-0.466	0.103
In-Party Affect X Cases	-0.001	0.012	-0.05	0.964	-0.024	0.023
Republican X In-Party Affect X Cases	0.020	0.023	0.90	0.366	-0.024	0.065
County Population (Millions)	0.004	0.002	2.02	0.044	0.000	0.008
Household COVID Infection	0.012	0.013	0.90	0.367	-0.014	0.037
Risk of Illness	0.031	0.008	3.79	0.000	0.015	0.048
Out of Work	0.009	0.010	0.90	0.367	-0.010	0.028
Future Income	-0.116	0.020	-5.81	0.000	-0.155	-0.077
Difficulty Having No Contact	0.120	0.017	7.25	0.000	0.088	0.153
Age (25-34)	-0.005	0.018	-0.29	0.770	-0.041	0.030
Age (35-50)	0.011	0.017	0.63	0.530	-0.023	0.045
Age (51-65)	-0.018	0.016	-1.09	0.275	-0.050	0.014
Age (Older than 65)	-0.062	0.018	-3.51	0.000	-0.097	-0.027
Female	0.003	0.009	0.29	0.772	-0.015	0.020
White	-0.027	0.035	-0.76	0.445	-0.096	0.042
African American	-0.015	0.037	-0.42	0.673	-0.087	0.056
Asian American	-0.029	0.039	-0.76	0.448	-0.105	0.046
Hispanic/Latino	0.000	0.038	-0.01	0.990	-0.075	0.074
Education	-0.005	0.022	-0.24	0.810	-0.048	0.038
Income	-0.022	0.018	-1.22	0.223	-0.059	0.014
Republican Governor (State)	-0.004	0.009	-0.42	0.674	-0.021	0.013
Trump Vote Share (County)	-0.056	0.030	-1.85	0.065	-0.116	0.004
Republican X Trump Vote	0.052	0.049	1.07	0.286	-0.044	0.148
Strength of Partisan Identity	0.109	0.029	3.74	0.000	0.052	0.166
Republican X Partisan Identity	-0.017	0.047	-0.36	0.717	-0.109	0.075
Ideology	0.001	0.031	0.04	0.967	-0.059	0.062
Republican X Ideology	-0.058	0.053	-1.11	0.269	-0.162	0.045
Issue Positions	0.029	0.043	0.67	0.505	-0.055	0.113
Republican X Issue Positions	0.105	0.067	1.55	0.121	-0.028	0.237
Political Interest	0.034	0.029	1.17	0.243	-0.023	0.092
Republican X Political Interest	-0.029	0.042	-0.68	0.498	-0.112	0.055
Political Knowledge	-0.069	0.024	-2.88	0.004	-0.116	-0.022

(Model 6 Continued)

Republican X Political Knowledge	-0.011	0.039	-0.29	0.774	-0.087	0.065
Trump Press Conference	0.022	0.017	1.30	0.192	-0.011	0.054
Republican X Trump Press	-0.014	0.025	-0.58	0.565	-0.063	0.034
Media: Fox News	0.016	0.010	1.58	0.114	-0.004	0.036
Media: CNN	0.019	0.011	1.80	0.072	-0.002	0.040
Media: MSNBC	0.016	0.012	1.34	0.179	-0.008	0.040
NY Times or Washington Post	-0.012	0.010	-1.17	0.243	-0.032	0.008
Network News	0.010	0.012	0.84	0.403	-0.013	0.033
Local News	0.014	0.014	1.01	0.313	-0.013	0.042
Social Media Use	0.043	0.014	3.17	0.002	0.017	0.070
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.009	0.017	-0.52	0.605	-0.042	0.024
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.008	0.018	-0.43	0.670	-0.042	0.027
Experiment (Frequently)	-0.026	0.018	-1.44	0.151	-0.061	0.009
Experiment (Moderate)	0.004	0.017	0.24	0.811	-0.030	0.038
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.025	0.020	-1.26	0.207	-0.063	0.014
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.034	0.026	1.33	0.185	-0.016	0.084
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.056	0.026	2.20	0.028	0.006	0.107
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.017	0.028	-0.60	0.547	-0.072	0.038
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.021	0.027	0.79	0.432	-0.032	0.074
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	0.005	0.025	0.19	0.852	-0.045	0.055
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.058	0.030	1.93	0.055	-0.001	0.118
Constant	0.544	0.081	6.69	0.000	0.385	0.704
	N=2003		Counties=710		R ² =0.23	

Supplementary Information 6 OLS Models for Changes in Behavior DV

Model 1

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.372	0.447	0.83	0.405	-0.506	1.250
Partisan Animosity	1.454	0.461	3.16	0.002	0.549	2.358
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-1.916	0.763	-2.51	0.012	-3.415	-0.418
Logged Cases (County)	0.172	0.033	5.24	0.000	0.107	0.236
County Population (Millions)	-0.032	0.031	-1.02	0.308	-0.093	0.029
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	0.581	0.288	2.02	0.044	0.015	1.147
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.010	0.277	-0.04	0.970	-0.555	0.534
Experiment (Frequently)	0.599	0.248	2.41	0.016	0.111	1.086
Experiment (Moderate)	0.336	0.285	1.18	0.238	-0.223	0.895
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.198	0.292	-0.68	0.498	-0.770	0.375
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	-0.863	0.403	-2.14	0.033	-1.655	-0.072
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	-0.780	0.444	-1.76	0.080	-1.653	0.092
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.725	0.394	-1.84	0.066	-1.498	0.048
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.155	0.426	0.36	0.716	-0.681	0.991
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.914	0.393	-2.32	0.020	-1.686	-0.142
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	-0.084	0.405	-0.21	0.836	-0.879	0.711
Constant	5.579	0.382	14.61	0.000	4.829	6.329
	N=2066		Counties=723		R ² =0.05	

Model 2

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	-0.009	1.014	-0.01	0.993	-2.000	1.981
Partisan Animosity	2.177	1.205	1.81	0.071	-0.189	4.543
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-1.455	1.660	-0.88	0.381	-4.713	1.803
Logged Cases (County)	0.230	0.136	1.69	0.092	-0.037	0.497
Republican X Cases	0.079	0.164	0.48	0.631	-0.243	0.400
Animosity X Cases	-0.122	0.216	-0.57	0.571	-0.546	0.301
Republican X Animosity X Cases	-0.102	0.260	-0.39	0.695	-0.613	0.409
County Population (Millions)	-0.028	0.032	-0.89	0.372	-0.091	0.034
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	0.580	0.291	1.99	0.047	0.008	1.151
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.007	0.279	-0.03	0.980	-0.555	0.541
Experiment (Frequently)	0.595	0.248	2.40	0.016	0.109	1.082
Experiment (Moderate)	0.337	0.284	1.18	0.237	-0.221	0.895
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.194	0.292	-0.66	0.508	-0.767	0.380
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	-0.864	0.407	-2.12	0.034	-1.663	-0.065
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	-0.793	0.447	-1.77	0.077	-1.672	0.085
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.736	0.394	-1.87	0.062	-1.510	0.037
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.136	0.427	0.32	0.751	-0.703	0.974
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.921	0.392	-2.35	0.019	-1.690	-0.152
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	-0.075	0.407	-0.18	0.854	-0.874	0.724
Constant	5.231	0.740	7.07	0.000	3.778	6.684
	N=2066		Counties=723		R ² =0.05	

Model 3

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	-0.221	1.061	-0.21	0.835	-2.305	1.862
Partisan Animosity	2.265	1.392	1.63	0.104	-0.467	4.997
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.856	1.745	-0.49	0.624	-4.283	2.570
Logged Cases (County)	0.202	0.159	1.27	0.205	-0.111	0.515
Republican X Cases	0.103	0.181	0.57	0.567	-0.251	0.458
Animosity X Cases	-0.113	0.265	-0.43	0.670	-0.634	0.408
Republican X Animosity X Cases	-0.198	0.289	-0.68	0.495	-0.765	0.370
County Population (Millions)	-0.008	0.027	-0.32	0.752	-0.061	0.044
Household COVID Infection	-0.514	0.233	-2.21	0.028	-0.971	-0.056
Risk of Illness	0.493	0.116	4.25	0.000	0.265	0.720
Out of Work	-0.353	0.137	-2.57	0.010	-0.623	-0.083
Future Income	-1.484	0.262	-5.67	0.000	-1.998	-0.971
Difficulty Having No Contact	0.108	0.233	0.46	0.642	-0.350	0.567
Age (25-34)	0.164	0.266	0.62	0.536	-0.357	0.686
Age (35-50)	0.802	0.262	3.05	0.002	0.286	1.317
Age (51-65)	0.739	0.260	2.85	0.005	0.229	1.249
Age (Older than 65)	0.950	0.272	3.50	0.000	0.417	1.483
Female	0.500	0.121	4.13	0.000	0.262	0.739
White	-0.578	0.529	-1.09	0.275	-1.617	0.461
African American	-0.558	0.537	-1.04	0.299	-1.612	0.496
Asian American	-0.191	0.596	-0.32	0.749	-1.361	0.979
Hispanic/Latino	0.021	0.551	0.04	0.970	-1.062	1.103
Education	1.123	0.307	3.65	0.000	0.520	1.727
Income	1.077	0.254	4.23	0.000	0.577	1.576
Republican Governor	0.168	0.132	1.28	0.201	-0.090	0.427
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	0.613	0.298	2.06	0.040	0.028	1.197
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.135	0.278	-0.48	0.628	-0.681	0.412
Experiment (Frequently)	0.469	0.246	1.91	0.057	-0.014	0.953
Experiment (Moderate)	0.351	0.268	1.31	0.191	-0.176	0.878
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.110	0.281	-0.39	0.695	-0.661	0.441
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	-0.740	0.391	-1.89	0.059	-1.509	0.028
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	-0.878	0.445	-1.97	0.049	-1.752	-0.004
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.542	0.380	-1.42	0.155	-1.288	0.205
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.312	0.409	0.76	0.446	-0.491	1.115
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.835	0.363	-2.30	0.022	-1.547	-0.124
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	-0.064	0.391	-0.16	0.871	-0.832	0.704
Constant	4.359	1.015	4.29	0.000	2.366	6.352
	N=2057		Counties=723		R ² =0.12	

Model 4

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	-0.374	1.416	-0.26	0.792	-3.154	2.406
Partisan Animosity	1.802	1.417	1.27	0.204	-0.979	4.584
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-1.227	1.726	-0.71	0.477	-4.616	2.162
Logged Cases (County)	0.202	0.151	1.34	0.180	-0.094	0.499
Republican X Cases	0.083	0.170	0.49	0.625	-0.250	0.416
Animosity X Cases	-0.142	0.270	-0.52	0.600	-0.671	0.388
Republican X Animosity X Cases	-0.099	0.279	-0.36	0.721	-0.646	0.448
County Population (Millions)	-0.006	0.025	-0.22	0.824	-0.056	0.044
Household COVID Infection	-0.505	0.226	-2.24	0.026	-0.949	-0.062
Risk of Illness	0.480	0.117	4.11	0.000	0.251	0.709
Out of Work	-0.302	0.138	-2.19	0.029	-0.572	-0.031
Future Income	-1.494	0.269	-5.55	0.000	-2.022	-0.966
Difficulty Having No Contact	0.038	0.230	0.17	0.868	-0.412	0.489
Age (25-34)	0.160	0.265	0.60	0.546	-0.359	0.679
Age (35-50)	0.680	0.256	2.66	0.008	0.178	1.183
Age (51-65)	0.455	0.255	1.78	0.075	-0.046	0.956
Age (Older than 65)	0.628	0.270	2.32	0.020	0.097	1.158
Female	0.568	0.127	4.46	0.000	0.318	0.818
White	-0.530	0.515	-1.03	0.303	-1.541	0.480
African American	-0.449	0.522	-0.86	0.390	-1.474	0.576
Asian American	0.016	0.574	0.03	0.978	-1.111	1.142
Hispanic/Latino	0.071	0.545	0.13	0.897	-1.000	1.141
Education	0.698	0.311	2.24	0.025	0.087	1.308
Income	0.934	0.252	3.70	0.000	0.439	1.430
Republican Governor	0.194	0.129	1.50	0.133	-0.059	0.446
Trump Vote Share (County)	-0.460	0.417	-1.10	0.271	-1.279	0.359
Republican X Trump Vote	0.570	0.776	0.73	0.463	-0.953	2.093
Strength of Partisan Identity	0.526	0.343	1.54	0.125	-0.146	1.199
Republican X Partisan Identity	1.100	0.624	1.76	0.078	-0.126	2.326
Ideology	0.362	0.434	0.83	0.404	-0.490	1.214
Republican X Ideology	0.068	0.721	0.09	0.925	-1.347	1.482
Issue Positions	0.921	0.602	1.53	0.126	-0.260	2.102
Republican X Issue Positions	0.274	0.920	0.30	0.766	-1.533	2.081
Political Interest	0.774	0.414	1.87	0.062	-0.038	1.586
Republican X Political Interest	-0.996	0.603	-1.65	0.099	-2.180	0.188
Political Knowledge	0.962	0.411	2.34	0.019	0.155	1.768
Republican X Political Knowledge	-0.138	0.603	-0.23	0.819	-1.323	1.046

(Model 4 Continued)						
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	0.496	0.296	1.67	0.095	-0.086	1.077
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.241	0.285	-0.85	0.397	-0.801	0.318
Experiment (Frequently)	0.459	0.248	1.85	0.065	-0.028	0.946
Experiment (Moderate)	0.364	0.266	1.37	0.172	-0.158	0.885
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.032	0.284	-0.11	0.911	-0.589	0.526
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	-0.773	0.387	-2.00	0.046	-1.533	-0.013
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	-0.933	0.435	-2.15	0.032	-1.786	-0.079
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.497	0.379	-1.31	0.190	-1.241	0.247
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.293	0.424	0.69	0.489	-0.538	1.125
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.828	0.347	-2.38	0.017	-1.511	-0.146
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	-0.188	0.400	-0.47	0.639	-0.973	0.597
Constant	3.148	1.083	2.91	0.004	1.021	5.275
N=2037			Counties=716		R ² =0.15	

Model 5

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	-0.361	1.377	-0.26	0.793	-3.064	2.343
Partisan Animosity	1.979	1.416	1.40	0.163	-0.801	4.758
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-1.043	1.723	-0.61	0.545	-4.425	2.339
Logged Cases (County)	0.175	0.149	1.18	0.240	-0.117	0.468
Republican X Cases	0.108	0.160	0.67	0.501	-0.207	0.423
Animosity X Cases	-0.124	0.271	-0.46	0.647	-0.655	0.407
Republican X Animosity X Cases	-0.160	0.270	-0.59	0.553	-0.690	0.370
County Population (Millions)	-0.001	0.026	-0.04	0.971	-0.053	0.051
Household COVID Infection	-0.548	0.231	-2.37	0.018	-1.001	-0.095
Risk of Illness	0.448	0.114	3.92	0.000	0.224	0.673
Out of Work	-0.318	0.139	-2.28	0.023	-0.591	-0.044
Future Income	-1.432	0.263	-5.44	0.000	-1.949	-0.915
Difficulty Having No Contact	-0.035	0.234	-0.15	0.880	-0.495	0.424
Age (25-34)	0.183	0.266	0.69	0.493	-0.340	0.706
Age (35-50)	0.711	0.263	2.70	0.007	0.194	1.228
Age (51-65)	0.557	0.263	2.12	0.035	0.041	1.072
Age (Older than 65)	0.807	0.276	2.92	0.004	0.265	1.348
Female	0.562	0.126	4.46	0.000	0.314	0.809
White	-0.320	0.515	-0.62	0.535	-1.332	0.692
African American	-0.340	0.521	-0.65	0.514	-1.363	0.683
Asian American	0.081	0.550	0.15	0.883	-0.999	1.161
Hispanic/Latino	0.244	0.535	0.46	0.648	-0.805	1.294
Education	0.736	0.308	2.39	0.017	0.131	1.340
Income	0.705	0.253	2.79	0.005	0.209	1.202
Republican Governor (State)	0.151	0.130	1.16	0.246	-0.104	0.406
Trump Vote Share (County)	-0.507	0.428	-1.18	0.237	-1.348	0.334
Republican X Trump Vote	0.642	0.768	0.84	0.403	-0.866	2.150
Strength of Partisan Identity	0.333	0.345	0.97	0.335	-0.344	1.011
Republican X Partisan Identity	0.727	0.632	1.15	0.250	-0.513	1.967
Ideology	0.269	0.447	0.60	0.547	-0.609	1.147
Republican X Ideology	0.658	0.724	0.91	0.364	-0.764	2.080
Issue Positions	0.923	0.629	1.47	0.143	-0.312	2.158
Republican X Issue Positions	-0.291	0.934	-0.31	0.756	-2.124	1.542
Political Interest	-0.006	0.452	-0.01	0.989	-0.893	0.881
Republican X Political Interest	-0.946	0.621	-1.52	0.128	-2.165	0.272
Political Knowledge	1.025	0.417	2.46	0.014	0.207	1.844
Republican X Political Knowledge	-0.285	0.601	-0.47	0.636	-1.464	0.895
Trump Press Conference	0.235	0.180	1.30	0.193	-0.119	0.588
Republican X Trump Press	0.214	0.353	0.61	0.544	-0.480	0.908
Media: Fox News	0.068	0.142	0.48	0.634	-0.212	0.347

(Model 5 Continued)

Media: CNN	0.329	0.168	1.96	0.051	-0.001	0.659
Media: MSNBC	-0.078	0.160	-0.49	0.624	-0.393	0.236
NY Times or Washington Post	0.437	0.137	3.18	0.002	0.167	0.707
Network News	0.281	0.163	1.73	0.085	-0.039	0.600
Local News	0.320	0.178	1.80	0.072	-0.029	0.668
Social Media Use	0.446	0.174	2.56	0.011	0.103	0.788
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	0.396	0.290	1.37	0.172	-0.173	0.964
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.294	0.282	-1.04	0.298	-0.848	0.260
Experiment (Frequently)	0.347	0.249	1.39	0.164	-0.142	0.837
Experiment (Moderate)	0.335	0.273	1.23	0.221	-0.202	0.872
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.104	0.283	-0.37	0.715	-0.659	0.452
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	-0.616	0.389	-1.58	0.114	-1.379	0.148
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	-0.755	0.421	-1.79	0.074	-1.582	0.072
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.369	0.380	-0.97	0.332	-1.116	0.378
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.326	0.418	0.78	0.436	-0.495	1.148
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.752	0.356	-2.11	0.035	-1.451	-0.054
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	-0.113	0.400	-0.28	0.777	-0.899	0.672
Constant	2.492	1.066	2.34	0.020	0.399	4.584
	N=2014		Counties=711		R ² =0.17	

Model 6

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.670	1.784	0.38	0.707	-2.833	4.173
Partisan Animosity	2.118	1.437	1.47	0.141	-0.703	4.940
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.933	1.728	-0.54	0.590	-4.326	2.461
Logged Cases (County)	0.074	0.168	0.44	0.658	-0.255	0.404
Republican X Cases	-0.078	0.259	-0.30	0.762	-0.586	0.430
Animosity X Cases	-0.150	0.275	-0.54	0.587	-0.690	0.390
Republican X Animosity X Cases	-0.172	0.274	-0.63	0.530	-0.709	0.365
In-Party Affect	-0.277	1.274	-0.22	0.828	-2.778	2.223
Republican X In-Party Affect	-1.881	2.069	-0.91	0.363	-5.943	2.180
In-Party Affect X Cases	0.161	0.212	0.76	0.449	-0.256	0.578
Republican X In-Party Affect X Cases	0.299	0.342	0.87	0.383	-0.373	0.971
County Population (Millions)	0.002	0.026	0.09	0.928	-0.048	0.053
Household COVID Infection	-0.534	0.235	-2.27	0.024	-0.996	-0.072
Risk of Illness	0.445	0.114	3.92	0.000	0.222	0.668
Out of Work	-0.320	0.138	-2.32	0.021	-0.591	-0.049
Future Income	-1.443	0.266	-5.42	0.000	-1.966	-0.920
Difficulty Having No Contact	-0.059	0.233	-0.25	0.800	-0.517	0.399
Age (25-34)	0.184	0.268	0.69	0.493	-0.343	0.710
Age (35-50)	0.720	0.263	2.73	0.006	0.203	1.236
Age (51-65)	0.556	0.262	2.12	0.034	0.041	1.071
Age (Older than 65)	0.819	0.275	2.98	0.003	0.279	1.358
Female	0.561	0.124	4.51	0.000	0.317	0.805
White	-0.310	0.514	-0.60	0.546	-1.319	0.698
African American	-0.341	0.518	-0.66	0.510	-1.359	0.676
Asian American	0.082	0.547	0.15	0.882	-0.993	1.156
Hispanic/Latino	0.262	0.532	0.49	0.622	-0.781	1.306
Education	0.755	0.307	2.46	0.014	0.153	1.358
Income	0.713	0.255	2.80	0.005	0.213	1.213
Republican Governor (State)	0.151	0.129	1.17	0.243	-0.103	0.405
Trump Vote Share (County)	-0.563	0.431	-1.31	0.191	-1.409	0.282
Republican X Trump Vote	0.675	0.769	0.88	0.381	-0.836	2.186
Strength of Partisan Identity	0.176	0.387	0.45	0.650	-0.584	0.936
Republican X Partisan Identity	0.854	0.675	1.27	0.206	-0.470	2.179
Ideology	0.263	0.450	0.58	0.559	-0.621	1.147
Republican X Ideology	0.663	0.724	0.92	0.360	-0.758	2.085
Issue Positions	0.830	0.628	1.32	0.187	-0.404	2.064
Republican X Issue Positions	-0.168	0.937	-0.18	0.857	-2.008	1.671
Political Interest	-0.016	0.460	-0.03	0.973	-0.918	0.887
Republican X Political Interest	-0.965	0.625	-1.54	0.123	-2.192	0.263
Political Knowledge	1.014	0.424	2.39	0.017	0.181	1.847

(Model 6 Continued)

Republican X Political Knowledge	-0.300	0.607	-0.49	0.622	-1.491	0.892
Trump Press Conference	0.245	0.181	1.36	0.176	-0.110	0.600
Republican X Trump Press	0.229	0.354	0.65	0.518	-0.467	0.925
Media: Fox News	0.066	0.146	0.45	0.652	-0.221	0.352
Media: CNN	0.348	0.168	2.07	0.038	0.018	0.677
Media: MSNBC	-0.073	0.161	-0.45	0.651	-0.388	0.243
NY Times or Washington Post	0.450	0.139	3.23	0.001	0.177	0.723
Network News	0.268	0.162	1.65	0.099	-0.051	0.586
Local News	0.331	0.179	1.85	0.064	-0.020	0.681
Social Media Use	0.461	0.177	2.60	0.009	0.114	0.808
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	0.408	0.287	1.42	0.155	-0.154	0.971
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.266	0.284	-0.94	0.349	-0.823	0.291
Experiment (Frequently)	0.377	0.255	1.48	0.140	-0.124	0.878
Experiment (Moderate)	0.342	0.275	1.25	0.213	-0.197	0.881
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.109	0.283	-0.38	0.701	-0.665	0.447
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	-0.620	0.389	-1.60	0.111	-1.383	0.143
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	-0.734	0.421	-1.74	0.082	-1.560	0.093
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.355	0.381	-0.93	0.352	-1.104	0.393
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.309	0.420	0.74	0.462	-0.516	1.134
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.777	0.358	-2.17	0.030	-1.480	-0.074
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	-0.115	0.406	-0.28	0.776	-0.912	0.681
Constant	2.766	1.369	2.02	0.044	0.078	5.454
	N=2006		Counties=710		R ² =0.17	

Supplementary Information 7 OLS Models for Policy Support

Model 1

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.020	0.038	0.53	0.598	-0.054	0.094
Partisan Animosity	0.066	0.030	2.19	0.029	0.007	0.126
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.248	0.072	-3.46	0.001	-0.388	-0.107
Logged Cases (County)	0.008	0.003	2.53	0.012	0.002	0.015
County Population (Millions)	-0.002	0.004	-0.59	0.559	-0.010	0.005
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.021	0.025	-0.85	0.397	-0.071	0.028
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.009	0.020	-0.44	0.661	-0.049	0.031
Experiment (Frequently)	0.012	0.019	0.63	0.531	-0.026	0.050
Experiment (Moderate)	-0.015	0.021	-0.71	0.478	-0.057	0.027
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.044	0.023	-1.95	0.051	-0.088	0.000
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.051	0.035	1.44	0.150	-0.018	0.120
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.064	0.035	1.84	0.066	-0.004	0.133
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.030	0.033	-0.89	0.373	-0.094	0.035
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.054	0.033	1.66	0.096	-0.010	0.118
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.030	0.033	-0.91	0.363	-0.094	0.034
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.068	0.031	2.19	0.029	0.007	0.129
Constant	0.725	0.026	27.44	0.000	0.673	0.777
	N=2064		Counties=723		R ² =0.08	

Model 2

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.162	0.091	1.78	0.076	-0.017	0.340
Partisan Animosity	0.013	0.076	0.17	0.863	-0.137	0.163
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.636	0.160	-3.98	0.000	-0.950	-0.323
Logged Cases (County)	-0.002	0.008	-0.21	0.835	-0.017	0.014
Republican X Cases	-0.029	0.016	-1.84	0.066	-0.060	0.002
Animosity X Cases	0.009	0.011	0.78	0.433	-0.013	0.031
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.078	0.027	2.86	0.004	0.024	0.131
County Population (Millions)	-0.001	0.004	-0.34	0.732	-0.009	0.006
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.021	0.024	-0.86	0.392	-0.069	0.027
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.010	0.020	-0.51	0.611	-0.050	0.029
Experiment (Frequently)	0.013	0.019	0.66	0.508	-0.025	0.050
Experiment (Moderate)	-0.016	0.021	-0.76	0.448	-0.056	0.025
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.047	0.022	-2.08	0.038	-0.091	-0.003
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.048	0.034	1.41	0.158	-0.019	0.115
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.068	0.034	1.97	0.049	0.000	0.136
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.027	0.033	-0.82	0.413	-0.092	0.038
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.057	0.032	1.76	0.079	-0.007	0.120
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.030	0.032	-0.92	0.356	-0.094	0.034
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.067	0.031	2.19	0.029	0.007	0.127
Constant	0.783	0.051	15.42	0.000	0.684	0.883
	N=2064		Counties=723		R ² =0.09	

Model 3

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.153	0.093	1.64	0.101	-0.030	0.335
Partisan Animosity	0.026	0.080	0.32	0.748	-0.131	0.182
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.608	0.162	-3.77	0.000	-0.926	-0.291
Logged Cases (County)	-0.001	0.008	-0.07	0.942	-0.017	0.016
Republican X Cases	-0.027	0.016	-1.65	0.099	-0.059	0.005
Animosity X Cases	0.008	0.012	0.69	0.490	-0.015	0.032
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.071	0.028	2.54	0.011	0.016	0.125
County Population (Millions)	-0.001	0.003	-0.32	0.753	-0.008	0.006
Household COVID Infection	-0.022	0.016	-1.37	0.171	-0.053	0.009
Risk of Illness	0.040	0.010	4.10	0.000	0.021	0.058
Out of Work	-0.017	0.013	-1.37	0.172	-0.042	0.008
Future Income	0.012	0.022	0.56	0.575	-0.031	0.056
Difficulty Having No Contact	-0.028	0.017	-1.62	0.105	-0.062	0.006
Age (25-34)	-0.007	0.020	-0.33	0.739	-0.047	0.033
Age (35-50)	0.038	0.020	1.92	0.055	-0.001	0.076
Age (51-65)	0.045	0.020	2.27	0.024	0.006	0.085
Age (Older than 65)	0.035	0.022	1.60	0.110	-0.008	0.078
Female	0.047	0.011	4.37	0.000	0.026	0.068
White	0.019	0.046	0.40	0.689	-0.072	0.110
African American	-0.007	0.048	-0.14	0.887	-0.100	0.087
Asian American	0.070	0.048	1.46	0.143	-0.024	0.164
Hispanic/Latino	0.036	0.051	0.70	0.482	-0.064	0.135
Education	0.011	0.023	0.50	0.619	-0.034	0.056
Income	0.023	0.019	1.21	0.228	-0.015	0.061
Republican Governor	-0.002	0.012	-0.18	0.858	-0.025	0.021
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.017	0.024	-0.73	0.468	-0.065	0.030
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.010	0.021	-0.46	0.645	-0.050	0.031
Experiment (Frequently)	0.008	0.019	0.41	0.679	-0.029	0.045
Experiment (Moderate)	-0.015	0.021	-0.73	0.465	-0.056	0.025
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.043	0.023	-1.90	0.058	-0.088	0.001
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.044	0.034	1.31	0.191	-0.022	0.110
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.062	0.034	1.83	0.067	-0.004	0.129
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.021	0.034	-0.63	0.528	-0.087	0.045
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.051	0.033	1.56	0.120	-0.013	0.115
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.028	0.031	-0.89	0.375	-0.089	0.034
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.067	0.031	2.20	0.028	0.007	0.127
Constant	0.690	0.078	8.82	0.000	0.536	0.843
	N=2056		Counties=723		R ² =0.12	

Model 4

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.136	0.110	1.25	0.213	-0.079	0.351
Partisan Animosity	-0.043	0.076	-0.56	0.577	-0.193	0.107
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.436	0.159	-2.75	0.006	-0.748	-0.124
Logged Cases (County)	0.000	0.008	0.00	0.998	-0.016	0.016
Republican X Cases	-0.027	0.015	-1.76	0.078	-0.057	0.003
Animosity X Cases	0.007	0.012	0.58	0.563	-0.016	0.030
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.068	0.027	2.56	0.011	0.016	0.120
County Population (Millions)	-0.002	0.003	-0.51	0.609	-0.008	0.005
Household COVID Infection	-0.031	0.016	-1.92	0.056	-0.062	0.001
Risk of Illness	0.041	0.009	4.39	0.000	0.023	0.059
Out of Work	-0.014	0.012	-1.19	0.235	-0.037	0.009
Future Income	0.022	0.022	1.00	0.319	-0.021	0.066
Difficulty Having No Contact	-0.029	0.018	-1.67	0.096	-0.064	0.005
Age (25-34)	-0.006	0.019	-0.31	0.754	-0.044	0.032
Age (35-50)	0.035	0.019	1.86	0.064	-0.002	0.072
Age (51-65)	0.045	0.020	2.27	0.023	0.006	0.083
Age (Older than 65)	0.041	0.022	1.90	0.058	-0.001	0.084
Female	0.041	0.011	3.71	0.000	0.019	0.063
White	0.008	0.046	0.18	0.857	-0.082	0.098
African American	-0.006	0.046	-0.13	0.895	-0.097	0.085
Asian American	0.076	0.047	1.61	0.109	-0.017	0.169
Hispanic/Latino	0.030	0.050	0.60	0.550	-0.068	0.127
Education	-0.010	0.025	-0.42	0.675	-0.059	0.038
Income	0.034	0.020	1.74	0.083	-0.004	0.072
Republican Governor	0.000	0.011	0.02	0.981	-0.022	0.022
Trump Vote Share (County)	0.007	0.024	0.29	0.774	-0.041	0.055
Republican X Trump Vote	-0.043	0.063	-0.69	0.491	-0.166	0.080
Strength of Partisan Identity	0.049	0.027	1.82	0.069	-0.004	0.101
Republican X Partisan Identity	0.081	0.057	1.43	0.154	-0.030	0.193
Ideology	-0.070	0.033	-2.11	0.035	-0.136	-0.005
Republican X Ideology	-0.033	0.061	-0.54	0.592	-0.153	0.087
Issue Positions	0.149	0.040	3.73	0.000	0.070	0.227
Republican X Issue Positions	0.142	0.072	1.99	0.047	0.002	0.283
Political Interest	0.005	0.023	0.21	0.834	-0.040	0.049
Republican X Political Interest	-0.111	0.046	-2.43	0.016	-0.201	-0.021
Political Knowledge	0.050	0.026	1.89	0.059	-0.002	0.101
Republican X Political Knowledge	-0.013	0.044	-0.30	0.767	-0.099	0.073

(Model 4 Continued)						
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.021	0.023	-0.88	0.379	-0.067	0.025
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.023	0.020	-1.15	0.249	-0.062	0.016
Experiment (Frequently)	0.005	0.019	0.24	0.807	-0.032	0.042
Experiment (Moderate)	-0.015	0.020	-0.73	0.465	-0.055	0.025
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.042	0.023	-1.83	0.068	-0.088	0.003
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.033	0.033	1.01	0.314	-0.031	0.097
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.055	0.034	1.63	0.105	-0.012	0.122
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.010	0.032	-0.32	0.749	-0.073	0.053
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.055	0.032	1.72	0.086	-0.008	0.119
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.029	0.031	-0.92	0.357	-0.090	0.032
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.061	0.031	1.96	0.050	0.000	0.122
Constant	0.599	0.082	7.31	0.000	0.438	0.760
N=2036			Counties=716		R ² =0.17	

Model 5

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.130	0.112	1.16	0.245	-0.089	0.350
Partisan Animosity	-0.037	0.078	-0.48	0.633	-0.190	0.116
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.409	0.159	-2.57	0.010	-0.721	-0.097
Logged Cases (County)	0.000	0.008	0.04	0.970	-0.016	0.016
Republican X Cases	-0.025	0.015	-1.66	0.097	-0.055	0.005
Animosity X Cases	0.007	0.012	0.58	0.563	-0.017	0.030
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.064	0.027	2.40	0.017	0.012	0.116
County Population (Millions)	-0.001	0.003	-0.45	0.656	-0.008	0.005
Household COVID Infection	-0.034	0.017	-2.03	0.043	-0.067	-0.001
Risk of Illness	0.041	0.010	4.31	0.000	0.022	0.060
Out of Work	-0.016	0.012	-1.30	0.192	-0.039	0.008
Future Income	0.020	0.022	0.94	0.350	-0.022	0.063
Difficulty Having No Contact	-0.031	0.018	-1.71	0.088	-0.066	0.005
Age (25-34)	-0.007	0.019	-0.36	0.717	-0.045	0.031
Age (35-50)	0.035	0.019	1.85	0.064	-0.002	0.071
Age (51-65)	0.039	0.020	1.93	0.054	-0.001	0.078
Age (Older than 65)	0.037	0.023	1.65	0.099	-0.007	0.081
Female	0.038	0.011	3.32	0.001	0.015	0.060
White	0.013	0.045	0.30	0.767	-0.075	0.102
African American	-0.003	0.046	-0.06	0.955	-0.094	0.088
Asian American	0.083	0.048	1.71	0.087	-0.012	0.177
Hispanic/Latino	0.035	0.049	0.73	0.465	-0.060	0.131
Education	-0.002	0.025	-0.10	0.921	-0.051	0.046
Income	0.031	0.020	1.56	0.119	-0.008	0.070
Republican Governor (State)	0.002	0.011	0.15	0.879	-0.020	0.023
Trump Vote Share (County)	0.004	0.025	0.16	0.871	-0.044	0.052
Republican X Trump Vote	-0.030	0.062	-0.48	0.629	-0.152	0.092
Strength of Partisan Identity	0.055	0.027	2.02	0.044	0.001	0.108
Republican X Partisan Identity	0.045	0.058	0.76	0.445	-0.070	0.159
Ideology	-0.073	0.034	-2.12	0.034	-0.140	-0.005
Republican X Ideology	-0.021	0.062	-0.34	0.735	-0.144	0.102
Issue Positions	0.138	0.041	3.33	0.001	0.057	0.219
Republican X Issue Positions	0.127	0.073	1.73	0.085	-0.017	0.271
Political Interest	-0.010	0.025	-0.40	0.688	-0.059	0.039
Republican X Political Interest	-0.105	0.047	-2.24	0.025	-0.198	-0.013
Political Knowledge	0.048	0.027	1.78	0.076	-0.005	0.102
Republican X Political Knowledge	-0.026	0.044	-0.60	0.546	-0.112	0.060
Trump Press Conference	0.020	0.016	1.21	0.226	-0.012	0.051
Republican X Trump Press	0.025	0.031	0.82	0.410	-0.035	0.086
Media: Fox News	-0.033	0.013	-2.56	0.011	-0.058	-0.008

(Model 5 Continued)

Media: CNN	-0.009	0.012	-0.73	0.466	-0.033	0.015
Media: MSNBC	-0.020	0.012	-1.68	0.094	-0.043	0.003
NY Times or Washington Post	0.014	0.011	1.24	0.214	-0.008	0.036
Network News	0.031	0.014	2.20	0.028	0.003	0.058
Local News	0.020	0.015	1.28	0.200	-0.010	0.050
Social Media Use	0.012	0.016	0.76	0.447	-0.019	0.044
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.016	0.024	-0.69	0.488	-0.063	0.030
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.020	0.021	-0.96	0.340	-0.060	0.021
Experiment (Frequently)	0.001	0.019	0.08	0.938	-0.036	0.039
Experiment (Moderate)	-0.012	0.021	-0.56	0.576	-0.053	0.029
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.043	0.024	-1.80	0.073	-0.089	0.004
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.028	0.033	0.84	0.403	-0.037	0.092
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.054	0.035	1.56	0.120	-0.014	0.123
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.015	0.033	-0.46	0.646	-0.079	0.049
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.055	0.033	1.66	0.097	-0.010	0.120
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.027	0.031	-0.87	0.384	-0.089	0.034
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.061	0.031	1.98	0.048	0.000	0.122
Constant	0.574	0.085	6.79	0.000	0.408	0.739
	N=2013		Counties=711		R ² =0.18	

Model 6

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.123	0.172	0.71	0.476	-0.215	0.460
Partisan Animosity	-0.027	0.078	-0.34	0.733	-0.180	0.127
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.415	0.159	-2.60	0.009	-0.728	-0.102
Logged Cases (County)	-0.003	0.014	-0.21	0.837	-0.030	0.024
Republican X Cases	-0.029	0.026	-1.10	0.273	-0.081	0.023
Animosity X Cases	0.005	0.012	0.40	0.686	-0.019	0.028
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.067	0.027	2.51	0.012	0.014	0.119
In-Party Affect	0.050	0.109	0.45	0.649	-0.164	0.264
Republican X In-Party Affect	0.015	0.192	0.08	0.936	-0.361	0.392
In-Party Affect X Cases	0.006	0.017	0.34	0.734	-0.027	0.038
Republican X In-Party Affect X Cases	0.003	0.032	0.10	0.921	-0.059	0.065
County Population (Millions)	-0.001	0.003	-0.36	0.721	-0.007	0.005
Household COVID Infection	-0.030	0.017	-1.76	0.078	-0.064	0.003
Risk of Illness	0.040	0.010	4.19	0.000	0.021	0.059
Out of Work	-0.016	0.012	-1.31	0.189	-0.039	0.008
Future Income	0.018	0.022	0.84	0.400	-0.024	0.061
Difficulty Having No Contact	-0.032	0.018	-1.77	0.077	-0.067	0.003
Age (25-34)	-0.006	0.019	-0.33	0.743	-0.045	0.032
Age (35-50)	0.035	0.019	1.84	0.066	-0.002	0.071
Age (51-65)	0.036	0.020	1.80	0.073	-0.003	0.075
Age (Older than 65)	0.036	0.023	1.59	0.113	-0.009	0.081
Female	0.037	0.011	3.25	0.001	0.014	0.059
White	0.015	0.045	0.33	0.742	-0.073	0.103
African American	-0.002	0.046	-0.04	0.969	-0.092	0.088
Asian American	0.084	0.048	1.76	0.079	-0.010	0.178
Hispanic/Latino	0.036	0.049	0.74	0.457	-0.059	0.131
Education	0.001	0.025	0.02	0.983	-0.048	0.049
Income	0.030	0.020	1.53	0.128	-0.009	0.069
Republican Governor (State)	0.001	0.011	0.13	0.900	-0.020	0.023
Trump Vote Share (County)	-0.001	0.025	-0.06	0.952	-0.051	0.048
Republican X Trump Vote	-0.030	0.064	-0.47	0.636	-0.157	0.096
Strength of Partisan Identity	0.036	0.029	1.22	0.222	-0.022	0.094
Republican X Partisan Identity	0.048	0.061	0.78	0.438	-0.073	0.168
Ideology	-0.069	0.034	-2.00	0.046	-0.137	-0.001
Republican X Ideology	-0.031	0.063	-0.50	0.620	-0.154	0.092
Issue Positions	0.128	0.041	3.15	0.002	0.048	0.208
Republican X Issue Positions	0.135	0.073	1.85	0.065	-0.008	0.278
Political Interest	-0.012	0.025	-0.45	0.650	-0.061	0.038
Republican X Political Interest	-0.105	0.047	-2.21	0.027	-0.197	-0.012
Political Knowledge	0.047	0.027	1.70	0.090	-0.007	0.101

(Model 6 Continued)

Republican X Political Knowledge	-0.025	0.044	-0.56	0.573	-0.111	0.061
Trump Press Conference	0.021	0.016	1.29	0.197	-0.011	0.053
Republican X Trump Press	0.021	0.031	0.67	0.503	-0.040	0.082
Media: Fox News	-0.035	0.013	-2.69	0.007	-0.060	-0.009
Media: CNN	-0.008	0.013	-0.62	0.535	-0.032	0.017
Media: MSNBC	-0.019	0.012	-1.59	0.113	-0.043	0.005
NY Times or Washington Post	0.014	0.011	1.25	0.213	-0.008	0.036
Network News	0.031	0.014	2.24	0.025	0.004	0.058
Local News	0.019	0.015	1.22	0.224	-0.011	0.049
Social Media Use	0.013	0.016	0.82	0.410	-0.019	0.046
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.010	0.024	-0.44	0.663	-0.057	0.036
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.014	0.021	-0.67	0.504	-0.055	0.027
Experiment (Frequently)	0.009	0.020	0.48	0.631	-0.029	0.048
Experiment (Moderate)	-0.009	0.021	-0.42	0.674	-0.049	0.032
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.040	0.024	-1.69	0.092	-0.087	0.007
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.023	0.033	0.70	0.487	-0.042	0.087
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.050	0.035	1.42	0.156	-0.019	0.119
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.017	0.033	-0.52	0.602	-0.083	0.048
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.052	0.033	1.56	0.120	-0.014	0.117
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.032	0.031	-1.02	0.309	-0.094	0.030
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.057	0.031	1.80	0.072	-0.005	0.118
Constant	0.551	0.115	4.79	0.000	0.325	0.777
	N=2005		Counties=710		R ² =0.19	

Supplementary Information 8 Alternative Models for Behavior and Policy


Negative Binomial Regression for Behavior

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	-0.011	0.151	-0.07	0.943	-0.307	0.285
Partisan Animosity	0.318	0.166	1.92	0.055	-0.007	0.643
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.214	0.247	-0.87	0.386	-0.699	0.270
Logged Cases (County)	0.034	0.018	1.83	0.067	-0.002	0.070
Republican X Cases	0.012	0.023	0.51	0.612	-0.034	0.057
Animosity X Cases	-0.021	0.029	-0.72	0.474	-0.077	0.036
Republican X Animosity X Cases	-0.011	0.037	-0.30	0.762	-0.084	0.062
County Population (Millions)	-0.004	0.004	-0.99	0.322	-0.013	0.004
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	0.079	0.039	2.04	0.041	0.003	0.154
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.001	0.039	-0.03	0.979	-0.077	0.075
Experiment (Frequently)	0.081	0.033	2.44	0.015	0.016	0.146
Experiment (Moderate)	0.046	0.039	1.19	0.235	-0.030	0.122
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.027	0.042	-0.66	0.511	-0.109	0.054
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	-0.118	0.055	-2.14	0.032	-0.226	-0.010
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	-0.110	0.063	-1.75	0.080	-0.233	0.013
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.105	0.056	-1.88	0.061	-0.214	0.005
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.020	0.060	0.32	0.746	-0.099	0.138
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	-0.126	0.053	-2.37	0.018	-0.230	-0.022
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	-0.009	0.056	-0.16	0.875	-0.118	0.100
Constant	1.691	0.104	16.21	0.000	1.487	1.896
	N=2064		Counties=723			


Tobit Model for Policy

	Coef.	S.E.	T-Value	P-Value	95% LB	95% UB
Republican	0.193	0.114	1.69	0.09	-0.031	0.417
Partisan Animosity	0.012	0.117	0.10	0.92	-0.218	0.241
Republican X Partisan Animosity	-0.760	0.196	-3.88	0.00	-1.144	-0.376
Logged Cases (County)	-0.005	0.011	-0.47	0.64	-0.028	0.017
Republican X Cases	-0.036	0.019	-1.88	0.06	-0.073	0.002
Animosity X Cases	0.017	0.018	0.94	0.35	-0.019	0.053
Republican X Animosity X Cases	0.095	0.033	2.88	0.00	0.030	0.160
County Population (Millions)	-0.001	0.004	-0.30	0.76	-0.009	0.007
Experiment (Rarely Talk)	-0.026	0.030	-0.86	0.39	-0.084	0.033
Experiment (Occasionally)	-0.021	0.029	-0.73	0.47	-0.078	0.036
Experiment (Frequently)	-0.008	0.029	-0.28	0.78	-0.064	0.048
Experiment (Moderate)	-0.035	0.029	-1.20	0.23	-0.092	0.022
Experiment (Sorted)	-0.058	0.029	-2.01	0.04	-0.115	-0.001
Experiment (Rarely X Moderate)	0.077	0.045	1.70	0.09	-0.012	0.166
Experiment (Rarely X Sorted)	0.081	0.044	1.82	0.07	-0.006	0.168
Experiment (Occasionally X Moderate)	-0.019	0.045	-0.42	0.68	-0.108	0.070
Experiment (Occasionally X Sorted)	0.064	0.044	1.46	0.15	-0.022	0.150
Experiment (Frequently X Moderate)	0.000	0.044	0.01	0.99	-0.086	0.086
Experiment (Frequently X Sorted)	0.111	0.046	2.40	0.02	0.020	0.201
Constant	0.844	0.074	11.44	0.00	0.699	0.988
	N=2064		Counties=723			


Supplementary Information 9 Partisan gap for each of the worry variables



Supplementary Information 10 Partisan gap for each of the behavior variables



Supplementary Information 11 Partisan gap for each of the policy questions



Supplementary Information 12 Sensitivity Analysis

Because the key variables in the analysis are not randomly assigned, there always remains the possibility the findings are the result of unmeasured confounding variables. To conduct sensitivity analyses to determine the likelihood of this, we relied on statistical software in Linden et al. (2020) and consulted VanderWeele and Ding (2017) for interpretation.

The main difficulty in conducting the sensitivity analysis is that the key variable of interest, affective polarization, is not continuous and the e-value method, as well as the Imbens (2003) method, requires a dichotomous independent variable. We address this in two ways. First, we examine whether the party gaps are likely robust to confounders because the partisanship variable is dichotomous. Second, we dichotomize the partisan animosity variable – the variable is coded 0 if the respondents is below the 75th percentile in partisan animosity and 1 if the respondent is at or above the 75th percentile (the cutoff value is 0.679). The decision to dichotomize at this point is obviously somewhat arbitrary, but we see the largest effects at the highest values of partisan animosity.

We see partisan gaps in four situations in Figures 4 through 6. We note these four situations below with the calculated e-values for the partisan effect. (E-values calculated with the method suggested by Linden et al. (2020) for standardized mean differences.)

- Worry (DV) in low case counties among those high on animosity: 2.492
- Behavior (DV) in low case counties among those high on animosity: 2.395
- Behavior (DV) in high case counties among those high on animosity: 2.513
- Policy (DV) in low case counties among those high on animosity: 2.317

We see an effect of partisan animosity in three situations in Figure 7. Those three situations and the calculated e-values for those situations are as follows.

- Worry (DV) among Republicans in low case counties: 2.880
- Behavior (DV) among Democrats: 1.599*
- Policy (DV) among Republicans in low case counties: 2.025

*In Figure 7, we only see the statistically significant effect in the low case counties but the post-regression analysis suggests that the effect of partisan animosity among Democrats is not conditioned on the number of cases. For this reason, in the sensitivity analysis, we did not include the interaction with cases. As you can see, even with this change the e-value produced is the smallest.

VanderWeele and Ding (2017) write, “E-value is the minimum strength of association, on the risk ratio scale, that an unmeasured confounder would need to have with both the treatment and outcome, conditional on the measured covariates, to explain away a treatment-outcome association.” This raises the question of how large of an e-value is needed to feel confident that our results are robust and that it is unlikely that our results are spurious. They continue, “In the context of biomedical and social sciences research, effect sizes ≥ 2 - or 3-fold occasionally occur but are not particularly common; a variable that affects both treatment and outcome each by 2- or 3-fold would likely be even less common.”

Hence, perhaps we should be confident that the contexts with e-values greater than 2 suggest are likely robust. But what of the case where the e-value is 1.6? We do not have guidance with this value. In Appendix A4 of Bonica, Chilton, and Sen (2020), the authors calculate e-values of 1.4 and 1.5 for their variable of interest which they say suggests that it is “unlikely” that an unmeasured confounder exists.

In sum, we think the calculated e-values suggest that the statistically significant results we observe are robust. Though, because of the novel nature of the e-value method, we encourage the reader to remain careful and not assume causality.

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