Econometrics for Decision Making: Building Foundations Sketched by Haavelmo and Wald

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In the early 1940s, Haavelmo proposed a probabilistic structure for econometric modeling, aiming to make econometrics useful for public decision making. His fundamental contribution has become thoroughly embedded in subsequent econometric research, yet it could not fully answer all the deep issues that the author raised. Notably, Haavelmo struggled to formalize the implications for decision making of the fact that models can at most approximate actuality. In the same period, Wald initiated his own seminal development of statistical decision theory. Haavelmo favorably cited Wald, but econometrics subsequently did not embrace statistical decision theory. Instead, it focused on study of identification, estimation, and statistical inference. This paper proposes statistical decision theory as a framework for evaluation of the performance of models in decision making. Manski particularly considers the common practice of as-if optimization: specification of a model, point estimation of its parameters, and use of the point estimate to make a decision that would be optimal if the estimate were accurate. A central theme is that one should evaluate as-if optimization or any other model-based decision rule by its performance across the state space, not the model space. I use prediction and treatment choice to illustrate. Statistical decision theory is conceptually simple, but application is often challenging. Advancement of computation is the primary task to continue building the foundations sketched by Haavelmo and Wald.
1. Introduction: Joining Haavelmo and Wald

Early in the modern development of econometrics, Trygve Haavelmo compared astronomy and planning to differentiate two objectives for econometric modeling: to advance science and to inform decision making. He wrote (Haavelmo, 1943, p. 10):

“The economist may have two different purposes in mind when he constructs a model . . . . First, he may consider himself in the same position as an astronomer; he cannot interfere with the actual course of events. So he sets up the system . . . . as a tentative description of the economy. If he finds that it fits the past, he hopes that it will fit the future. On that basis he wants to make predictions, assuming that no one will interfere with the game. Next, he may consider himself as having the power to change certain aspects of the economy in the future. If then the system . . . . has worked in the past, he may be interested in knowing it as an aid in judging the effect of his intended future planning, because he thinks that certain elements of the old system will remain invariant.”

Jacob Marschak, supporting Haavelmo’s work, made a related distinction between meteorological and engineering types of econometric inference; see Bjerkholt (2010) and Marschak and Andrews (1944).

Comparing astronomy and planning provides a nice metaphor for two branches of econometrics. In 1943, before the advent of space flight, an astronomer might model a solar system or galaxy to advance physical science, but the effort could have no practical impact on decision making. An economist might similarly model a local or national economy to advance social science. However, an economist might also model to inform society about the consequences of contemplated public or private decisions that would change aspects of the economy.

Haavelmo’s seminal doctoral thesis (Haavelmo, 1944), initiated when he worked as an assistant to Ragnar Frisch, proposed a formal probabilistic structure for econometric modeling that aimed to make econometrics useful for public decision making. To conclude, he wrote (p. 114-115):

“In other quantitative sciences the discovery of “laws,” even in highly specialized fields, has moved from the private study into huge scientific laboratories where scores of experts are engaged, not only in carrying out actual measurements, but also in working out, with painstaking precision, the formulae to be tested and the plans for crucial experiments to be made. Should we expect less in
economic research, if its results are to be the basis for economic policy upon which might depend billions of dollars of national income and the general economic welfare of millions of people?”

Haavelmo’s thesis made fundamental contributions that became thoroughly embedded in subsequent econometric research. Nevertheless, it is unsurprising to find that it did not fully answer all the deep issues that the author raised. Notably, Haavelmo struggled to formalize the implications for decision making of the fact that models can at most seek to approximate actuality. He called attention to the broad issue in his opening chapters on “Abstract Models and Reality” and “The Degree of Permanence of Economic Laws,” but the later chapters did not resolve the matter.

Haavelmo devoted a long chapter to “The Testing of Hypotheses,” expositing the then recent work of Neyman-Pearson and considering its potential use to evaluate the consistency of models with observed sample data. Testing models subsequently became widespread in economics, both as a topic of study in econometric theory and as a practice in empirical research. However, Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing does not provide satisfactory guidance for decision making. See Section 2.3 below.

While Haavelmo was writing his thesis, Abraham Wald was initiating his own seminal development of statistical decision theory in Wald (1939, 1945) and elsewhere, which later culminated in his own treatise (Wald, 1950). Wald’s work has broad potential application. Indeed, it implicitly provides an appealing formal framework for evaluation of the use of models in decision making. I say that Wald “implicitly” provides this framework because, writing in an abstract mathematical manner, he appears not to have explicitly examined decision making with models. Yet it is conceptually straightforward to use statistical decision theory in this way. Explaining this motivates the present paper.

I find it intriguing to join the contributions of Haavelmo and Wald because these pioneering econometrician and statistician interacted to a considerable degree in the United States during the wartime period when both were developing their ideas. Wald came to the U.S. in 1938 as a refugee from Austria. Haavelmo did so in 1939 for what was intended to be a short-term professional visit, but which lasted the entire war when he was unable to return to occupied Norway. Bjerkholt (2007, 2015), in biographical essays on Haavelmo’s period in the United States, describes the many interactions of Haavelmo and Wald, not
only at professional conferences but also in hiking expeditions in Colorado and Maine. Bjerkholt observes that Haavelmo visited Neyman as well, the latter being in Berkeley by then.

Haavelmo’s appreciation of Wald is clear. In the preface of Haavelmo (1944), he wrote (p. v):

“My most sincere thanks are due to Professor Abraham Wald of Columbia University for numerous suggestions and for help on many points in preparing the manuscript. Upon his unique knowledge of modern statistical theory and mathematics in general I have drawn very heavily. Many of the statistical sections in this study have been formulated, and others have been reformulated, after discussions with him.”

The text of the thesis cites several of Wald’s papers. Most relevant is the final chapter on “Problems of Prediction,” where Haavelmo suggests application of the framework in Wald (1939) to choose a predictor of a future random outcome. I discuss this in Section 3.3 below.

Despite Haavelmo’s favorable citations of Wald’s ideas, econometrics in the period following publication of Haavelmo (1944) did not embrace statistical decision theory. Instead, it focused on study of identification, estimation, and statistical inference. None of the contributions in the seminal Cowles Monograph 10 (Koopmans, 1950) mentions statistical decision theory. Only one does so briefly in Cowles Monograph 14 (Hood and Koopmans, 1953). This appears in a chapter by Koopmans and Hood (1953), who refer to estimates of structural parameters as “raw materials, to be processed further into solutions of a wide variety of prediction problems.” See Section 3.3 for further discussion.

Modern econometricians continue to view parameter estimates as “raw materials” that may be used to solve prediction and other decision problems. A widespread practice has been as-if optimization: specification of a model, point estimation of its parameters, and use of the point estimate to make a decision that would be optimal if the estimate were accurate. As-if optimization has heuristic appeal when a model is known to be correct, less so when the model may be incorrect.

A huge hole in econometric theory has been the absence of a well-grounded mechanism to evaluate the performance of as-if optimization and other uses of possibly incorrect econometric models in decision making. This paper proposes statistical decision theory as a framework for evaluation of the performance of models in decision making. I set forth the general idea and give illustrative applications.
Section 2 reviews the core elements of statistical decision theory and uses choice between two actions to illustrate. The basic idea is simple, although it may be challenging to implement. One specifies a state space, listing all the states of nature that one believes feasible. One considers alternative statistical decision functions (SDFs), which map potentially observed data into decisions. In the frequentist statistics manner, one evaluates an SDF in each state of nature ex ante, by its mean performance across repeated samples. The true state of nature is not known. Hence, one evaluates the performance of an SDF across all the elements of the state space.

I discuss three decision criteria that have drawn much attention: maximization of subjective expected welfare (aka minimization of Bayes risk), the maximin criterion, and the minimax-regret criterion. Minimization of Bayes risk and conditional Bayes decision making are mathematically equivalent in some contexts, but it is important not to conflate the two ideas. The maximin and minimax-regret criteria coincide in special cases, but they are generally distinct.

Section 3 shows how the Wald framework may be used to evaluate decision making with models. One specifies a model space, which simplifies or approximates the state space in some manner. A model-based decision uses the model space as if it were the state space. I particularly consider the use of models to perform as-if optimization. A central theme is that one should evaluate as-if optimization or any other model-based decision rule by its performance across the state space, not the model space. In this way, statistical decision theory embraces use of both correct and incorrect models to make decisions. I use prediction of a real-valued outcome to illustrate, summarizing recent work in Dominitz and Manski (2017) and Manski and Tabord-Meehan (2017).

To illustrate further, Section 4 considers use of the empirical success (ES) rule in treatment choice. Recent econometric research has shown that this application of as-if optimization is well-grounded in statistical decision theory when the data are generated by an ideal randomized trial; see Manski (2004, 2005), Hirano and Porter (2009, 2019), Stoye (2009, 2012), Manski and Tetenov (2016, 2019), and Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018). When the ES rule is used with observational data, it exemplifies a controversial modeling practice, wherein one assumes without good justification that realized treatments
are statistically independent of treatment response. Decision-theoretic analysis shows when use of the ES rule with observational data does and does not yield desirable treatment choices.

Although statistical decision theory is conceptually simple, application is computationally challenging in many contexts. Section 5 cites advancement of computation as the primary task to continue building the foundations sketched by Haavelmo and Wald.

Considered broadly, this paper adds to the argument that I have made beginning in Manski (2000, 2004, 2005) and then in a sequence of subsequent articles for application of statistical decision theory to econometrics. A small group of other econometricians have made their own recent contributions towards this objective. I have already cited some work on prediction and treatment choice. Athey and Wager (2019) make further contributions on treatment choice. Chamberlain (2000, 2007) and Chamberlain and Moreira (2009) have used statistical decision theory to study estimation of various linear econometric models.

The new contributions made here are varied. Interpretative discussion of the history of econometric thought permeates the paper. The general idea proposed in Section 3 --- evaluation of model-based decision rules by their performance across the state space rather the model space --- may be thought obvious in retrospect. Yet it appears not to have been studied previously. Earlier work using statistical decision theory to evaluate model-based decisions has generally assumed that the model is correct, so the model space is the state space. The paper also contributes some new analysis of treatment choice in Section 4.

2. Statistical Decision Theory: Concepts and Practicalities

The Wald development of statistical decision theory directly addresses decision making with sample data. Wald began with the standard decision theoretic problem of a planner (equivalently, decision maker or agent) who must choose an action yielding welfare that depends on an unknown state of nature. The planner specifies a state space listing the states that he considers possible. He must choose an action without knowing the true state.
Wald added to this standard problem by supposing that the planner observes sample data that may be informative about the true state. He studied choice of a statistical decision function (SDF), which maps each potential data realization into a feasible action. He proposed evaluation of SDFs as procedures, chosen prior to observation of the data, specifying how a planner would use whatever data may be realized. Thus, Wald's theory is frequentist.

I describe general decision problems without sample data in Section 2.1 and with such data in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 examines the important special case of decisions that choose between two actions. Section 2.4 discusses the practical issues that challenge application of statistical decision theory.

2.1. Decisions Under Uncertainty

Consider a planner who must choose an action yielding welfare that varies with the state of nature. The planner has an objective function and beliefs about the true state. These are considered primitives. He must choose an action without knowing the true state.

Formally, the planner faces choice set $C$ and believes that the true state lies in set $S$, called the state space. The objective function $w(\cdot, \cdot): C \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ maps actions and states into welfare. The planner ideally would maximize $w(\cdot, s^*)$, where $s^*$ is the true state. However, he only knows that $s^* \in S$.

The choice set is commonly considered to be predetermined. The welfare function and the state space are subjective. The former formalizes what the planner wants to achieve and the latter expresses the states of nature he believes could possibly occur.

As far as I am aware, Wald did not address how a planner might formalize a welfare function and state space in practice. I find it interesting to mention that Frisch proposed late in his career that econometricians wanting to help planners make policy decisions might perform what is now called stated-preference elicitation; see, for example, Ben-Akiva, McFadden, and Train (2019). In a lecture titled “Cooperation between Politicians and Econometricians on the Formalization of Political Preferences,” Frisch (1971) proposed that an econometrician could elicit the “preference function” of a politician by
posing a sequence of hypothetical policy-choice scenarios and asking the politician to choose between the policy options specified in each scenario.

While the state space ultimately is subjective, its structure may use observed data that are informative about features of the true state. This idea is central to econometric analysis of identification. Haavelmo’s formalization of econometrics initially considers the state space to be a set of probability distributions that one thinks may possibly describe the economic system under study. The Koopmans (1949) formalization of identification contemplates unlimited data collection that enables one to shrink the state space, eliminating distributions that are inconsistent with the information revealed by observation. Koopmans put it this way (p. 132):

"we shall base our discussion on a hypothetical knowledge of the probability distribution of the observations . . . . Such knowledge is the limit approachable but not attainable by extended observation. By hypothesizing nevertheless the full availability of such knowledge, we obtain a clear separation between problems of statistical inference arising from the variability of finite samples, and problems of identification in which we explore the limits to which inference even from an infinite number of observations is suspect.”

In modern econometric language, the true state of nature is point identified if the contemplated observational process eliminates all but one probability distribution for the economic system. It is partially identified if observation eliminates some but not all the distributions initially deemed possible.

Given a welfare function and state space, a close to universally accepted prescription for decision making is that choice should respect dominance. Action \( c \in C \) is weakly dominated if there exists a \( d \in C \) such that \( w(d, s) \geq w(c, s) \) for all \( s \in S \) and \( w(d, s) > w(c, s) \) for some \( s \in S \). Even though the true state \( s^* \) is unknown, choice of \( d \) is certain to weakly improve on choice of \( c \).

There is no clearly best way to choose among undominated actions, but decision theorists have not wanted to abandon the idea of optimization. So they have proposed various ways of using the objective function \( w(\cdot, \cdot) \) to form functions of actions alone, which can be optimized. In principle one should only consider undominated actions, but it may be difficult to determine which actions are undominated. Hence, it is common to optimize over the full set of feasible actions. I define decision criteria accordingly in this
paper. I also use max and min notation, without concern for the mathematical subtleties that sometime make it necessary to suffice with sup and inf operations.

One broad idea is to place a subjective probability distribution on the state space, average state-dependent welfare with respect to this distribution and maximize the resulting function. This yields maximization of subjective average welfare. Let $\pi$ be the specified distribution on $S$. For each feasible action $c$, $\int w(c, s)d\pi$ is the mean of $w(c, s)$ with respect to $\pi$. The criterion solves the problem

$$\max_{c \in C} \int w(c, s)d\pi.$$  

Another broad idea is to seek an action that, in some well-defined sense, works uniformly well over all elements of $S$. This yields the maximin and minimax-regret (MMR) criteria. The maximin criterion maximizes the minimum welfare attainable across the elements of $S$. For each feasible action $c$, consider the minimum feasible value of $w(c, s)$; that is, $\min_{s \in S} w(c, s)$. A maximin rule chooses an action that solves the problem

$$\max_{c \in C} \min_{s \in S} w(c, s).$$  

The MMR criterion chooses an action that minimizes the maximum loss to welfare that can result from not knowing the true state. An MMR choice solves the problem

$$\min_{c \in C} \max_{s \in S} \left[ \max_{d \in C} w(d, s) - w(c, s) \right].$$

Here $\max_{d \in C} w(d, s) - w(c, s)$ is the regret of action $c$ in state of nature $s$; that is, the welfare loss associated with choice of $c$ relative to an action that maximizes welfare in state $s$. The true state being unknown, one evaluates $c$ by its maximum regret over all states and selects an action that minimizes maximum regret. The
maximum regret of an action measures its maximum distance from optimality across all states. Hence, an MMR choice is uniformly nearest to optimal among all feasible actions.

A planner who asserts a partial subjective distribution on the states of nature could maximize minimum subjective average welfare or minimize maximum average regret. These hybrid criteria combine elements of averaging across states and concern with uniform performance across states. Hybrid criteria have drawn attention in decision theory. However, I will confine discussion to the polar cases in which the planner asserts a complete subjective distribution or none.

2.2. Statistical Decision Problems

Statistical decision problems add to the above structure by supposing that the planner observes finite-sample data generated by some sampling distribution. Sample data may be informative but, unlike the unlimited data contemplated in identification analysis, they do not enable one to shrink the state space.

In practice, knowledge of the sampling distribution is generally incomplete. To express this, one extends the concept of the state space $S$ to list the set of feasible sampling distributions, denoted $(Q_s, s \in S)$. Let $\Psi_s$ denote the sample space in state $s$; that is, $\Psi_s$ is the set of samples that may be drawn under sampling distribution $Q_s$. The literature typically assumes that the sample space does not vary with $s$ and is known. I maintain this assumption and denote the known sample space as $\Psi$, without the $s$ subscript. Then a statistical decision function $c(\cdot): \Psi \rightarrow C$ maps the sample data into a chosen action.

Wald’s concept of a statistical decision function embraces all mappings of the form [data $\rightarrow$ action]. An SDF need not perform inference; that is, it need not use data to draw conclusions about the true state of nature. None of the prominent decision criteria that have been studied from Wald’s perspective — maximin, minimax-regret, and maximization of subjective average welfare — refer to inference. The general absence of inference in statistical decision theory is striking and has been noticed; see Neyman (1962) and Blyth (1970).
Although SDFs need not perform inference, some do so. That is, some have the sequential form [data → inference → action], first performing some form of inference and then using the inference to make a decision. There seems to be no accepted term for such SDFs, so I will call them inference-based.

SDF $c(\cdot)$ is a deterministic function after realization of the sample data, but it is a random function ex ante. Hence, the welfare achieved by $c(\cdot)$ is a random variable ex ante. Wald’s central idea was to evaluate the performance of $c(\cdot)$ in state $s$ by $Q_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}$, the ex-ante distribution of welfare that it yields across realizations $\psi$ of the sampling process.

It remains to ask how a planner might compare the welfare distributions yielded by different SDFs. The planner wants to maximize welfare, so it seems self-evident that he should prefer SDF $d(\cdot)$ to $c(\cdot)$ in state $s$ if $Q_s\{w[d(\psi), s]\}$ stochastically dominates $Q_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}$. It is less obvious how he should compare SDFs whose welfare distributions do not stochastically dominate one another.

Wald proposed measurement of the performance of $c(\cdot)$ in state $s$ by its expected welfare across samples; that is, $E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\} = \int w[c(\psi), s]dQ_s$. An alternative that has drawn only slight attention is to measure performance by quantile welfare (Manski and Tetenov, 2014). Writing in a context where one wants to minimize loss rather than maximize welfare, Wald used the term risk to denote the mean performance of an SDF across samples.

In practice, one does not know the true state. Hence, one evaluates $c(\cdot)$ by the state-dependent expected welfare vector $(E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}, s \in S)$. Using the term inadmissible to denote weak dominance when evaluating performance by risk, Wald recommended elimination of inadmissible SDFs from consideration. As in decision problems without sample data, there is no clearly best way to choose among admissible SDFs. Ferguson (1967) nicely put it this way (p. 28):

“It is a natural reaction to search for a ‘best’ decision rule, a rule that has the smallest risk no matter what the true state of nature. Unfortunately, situations in which a best decision rule exists are rare and uninteresting. For each fixed state of nature there may be a best action for the statistician to take. However, this best action will differ, in general, for different states of nature, so that no one action can be presumed best overall.”

He went on to write (p. 29): “A reasonable rule is one that is better than just guessing.”
Statistical decision theory has mainly studied the same decision criteria as has decision theory without sample data. Let $\Gamma$ be a specified set of feasible SDFs, each mapping $\Psi \rightarrow C$. The statistical versions of decision criteria (1), (2), and (3) are

(4) \[ \max_{c() \in \Gamma} \int E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\} \, d\pi, \]

(5) \[ \max_{c() \in \Gamma} \min_{s \in S} E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}, \]

(6) \[ \min_{c() \in \Gamma} \max_{s \in S, d \in C} (\max_{s \in S} w(d, s) - E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}). \]

I discuss these criteria below, focusing on (4) and (6).

2.2.1. Bayes Decisions

Considering contexts where one wants to minimize loss rather than maximize welfare, research in statistical decision theory often refers to criterion (4) as minimization of Bayes risk. This term may seem odd given the absence of any reference in (4) to Bayesian inference. Criterion (4) simply places a subjective distribution on the state space and optimizes the resulting subjective average welfare.

Justification for use of the word Bayes when considering (4) rests on an important mathematical result relating this criterion to conditional Bayes decision making. The conditional Bayes approach calls on one to first perform Bayesian inference, which uses the likelihood function for the observed data to transform the prior distribution on the state space into a posterior distribution, without reference to a decision problem. One then chooses an action that maximizes posterior subjective average welfare. See, for example, the classic text of DeGroot (1970) or more recent discussions of applications to randomized trials in articles such as Spiegelhalter, Freedman, and Parmar (1994) and Scott (2010).

As described above, conditional Bayes decision making is unconnected to Wald’s frequentist statistical decision theory. However, suppose that the set of feasible statistical decision functions is
unconstrained and that certain regularity conditions hold. Then it follows from Fubini’s Theorem that the conditional Bayes decision for each possible data realization solves Wald’s problem of maximization of subjective average welfare. See Berger (1985, Section 4.4.1) for general analysis and Chamberlain (2007) for application to a linear econometric model with instrumental variables. On the other hand, Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) and Athey and Wager (2019) study important classes of treatment-choice problems in which the set of feasible decision functions is constrained. Hence, Wald’s criterion (4) need not yield the same actions as conditional Bayes decision making in these settings.

The equivalence of Wald’s decision criterion (4) and conditional Bayes decisions is a mathematical result that holds under specified conditions. Philosophical advocates of the conditional Bayes paradigm go beyond the mathematics. They assert as a self-evident axiom that decision making should condition on observed data and should not perform frequentist thought experiments that contemplate how statistical decision functions perform in repeated sampling; see, for example, Berger (1985, Chapter 1).

Considering the mathematical equivalence of minimization of Bayes risk and conditional Bayes decisions, Berger asserts that that the conditional Bayes perspective is normatively “correct” and that the Wald frequentist perspective is “bizarre.” He states (p. 160):

“Note that, from the conditional perspective together with the utility development of loss, the correct way to view the situation is that of minimizing $\rho(\pi(\theta|x), a)$. One should condition on what is known, namely $x$ . . . . and average the utility over what is unknown, namely $\theta$. The desire to minimize $r(\pi, \delta)$ would be deemed rather bizarre from this perspective.”

In this passage, $a$ is an action, $x$ is data, $\theta$ is a state of nature, $\pi(\theta|x)$ is the posterior distribution on the state space, $\rho$ is posterior loss with choice of action $a$, $\delta$ is a statistical decision function, $\pi$ is the prior distribution on the state space, and $r(\pi, \delta)$ is the Bayes risk of $\delta$.

I view Berger’s normative statement to be overly enthusiastic for two distinct reasons. First, the statement does not address how decisions should be made when part of the decision is choice of a procedure for collection of data, as in experimental or sample design. Such decisions must be made ex ante, before collecting the data. Hence, frequentist consideration of the performance of decision functions across
possible realizations of the data is inevitable. Berger recognizes this later, in his chapter on “Preposterior and Sequential Analysis.”

Second, the Bayesian prescription for conditioning decision making on sample data presumes that the planner feels able to place a credible subjective prior distribution on the state space. However, Bayesians have long struggled to provide guidance on specification of priors and the matter continues to be controversial. See, for example, the spectrum of views regarding Bayesian analysis of randomized trials expressed by the authors and discussants of Spiegelhalter, Freedman, and Parmar (1994). The controversy suggests that inability to express a credible prior is common in actual decision settings.

When one finds it difficult to assert a credible subjective distribution, Bayesians may suggest use of some default distribution, variously called a “reference” or “conventional” or “objective” prior; see, for example, Berger (2006). However, there is no consensus on the prior that should play this role. The chosen prior matters for decision making.

2.2.2. Focus on Maximum Regret

Concern with specification of priors motivated Wald (1950) to study the minimax criterion. He wrote (p. 18): “a minimax solution seems, in general, to be a reasonable solution of the decision problem when an a priori distribution . . . . does not exist or is unknown to the experimenter.”

I similarly am concerned with decision making in the absence of a subjective distribution on the state space. However, I have mainly measured the performance of SDFs by maximum regret rather than by minimum expected welfare. The maximin and MR criteria are sometimes confused with one another, but they are equivalent only in special cases, particularly when the value of optimal welfare is invariant across states of nature. The criteria obviously differ more generally. Whereas maximin considers only the worst outcome that an action may yield across states, MR considers the worst outcome relative to what is achievable in a given state of nature.

Practical and conceptual reasons motivate focus on maximum regret. From a practical perspective, it has been found that MMR decisions behave more reasonably than do maximin ones in the important
context of treatment choice. In common settings of treatment choice with data from randomized trials, it has been found that the MMR rule is well approximated by the empirical success rule, which chooses the treatment with the highest observed average outcome in the trial; see Section 4 for further discussion. In contrast, the maximin criterion commonly ignores the trial data, whatever they may be. This was recognized verbally by Savage (1951), who stated that the criterion is “ultrapessimistic” and wrote (p. 63): “it can lead to the absurd conclusion in some cases that no amount of relevant experimentation should deter the actor from behaving as though he were in complete ignorance.” Savage did not flesh out this statement, but it is easy to show that this occurs with trial data. Manski (2004) provides a simple example.

The conceptual appeal of using maximum regret to measure performance is that maximum regret quantifies how lack of knowledge of the true state of nature diminishes the quality of decisions. While the term “maximum regret” has become standard in the literature, this term is a shorthand for the maximum sub-optimality of a decision criterion across the feasible states of nature. An SDF with small maximum regret is uniformly near-optimal across all states. This is a desirable property.

In a literature distinct from statistical decision theory, minimax regret has drawn diverse reactions from axiomatic decision theorists. In a famous early critique, Chernoff (1954) observed that MMR decisions are not always consistent with the choice axiom known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). He considered this a serious deficiency, writing (p. 426):

“A third objection which the author considers very serious is the following. In some examples, the min max regret criterion may select a strategy d₃ among the available strategies d₁, d₂, d₃, and d₄. On the other hand, if for some reason d₄ is made unavailable, the min max regret criterion will select d₂ among d₁, d₂, and d₃. The author feels that for a reasonable criterion the presence of an undesirable strategy d₄ should not have an influence on the choice among the remaining strategies.”

This passage is the totality of Chernoff’s argument. He introspected and concluded that any reasonable decision criterion should always adhere to the IIA axiom, but he did not explain why he felt this way. Chernoff’s view has been endorsed by some modern axiomatic decision theorists, such as Binmore (2009). On the other hand, Sen (1993) argued that adherence to axioms such as IIA does not per se provide a sound
basis for evaluation of decision criteria. He asserted that consideration of the context of decision making is essential.

Manski (2011) also argues that adherence to the IIA axiom is not a virtue per se. What matters is how violation of the axiom affects welfare. I observed that the MMR violation of the IIA axiom does not yield choice of a dominated SDF. The MMR decision is always undominated when it is unique. There generically exists an undominated MMR decision when the criterion has multiple solutions. Hence, I concluded that violation of the IIA axiom is not a sound rationale to dismiss minimax regret.

2.3. Binary Choice Problems

SDFs for binary choice problems are simple and interesting. They can always be viewed as hypothesis tests. Yet the Wald perspective on testing differs considerably from that of Neyman-Pearson.

Let choice set C contain two actions, say C = \{a, b\}. A SDF c(·) partitions Ψ into two regions that separate the data yielding choice of each action. These regions are $\Psi_{c(a)} = \{\psi \in \Psi : c(\psi) = a\}$ and $\Psi_{c(b)} = \{\psi \in \Psi : c(\psi) = b\}$.

A hypothesis test motivated by the choice problem partitions state space S into two regions, say $S_a$ and $S_b$, that separate the states in which actions a and b are uniquely optimal. Thus, $S_a$ contains the states $[s \in S: w(a, s) > w(b, s)]$ and $S_b$ contains $[s \in S: w(b, s) > w(a, s)]$. The choice problem does not provide a rationale for allocation of states in which the two actions yield equal welfare. The standard practice in testing is to give one action, say a, a privileged status and to place all states yielding equal welfare in $S_a$. Then $S_a \equiv [s \in S: w(a, s) \geq w(b, s)]$ and $S_b \equiv [s \in S: w(b, s) > w(a, s)]$.

In the language of hypothesis testing, SDF c(·) performs a test with acceptance regions $\Psi_{c(a)}$ and $\Psi_{c(b)}$. When $\psi \in \Psi_{c(a)}$, c(·) accepts the hypothesis $\{s \in S_a\}$ by setting $c(\psi) = a$. When $\psi \in \Psi_{c(b)}$, c(·) accepts the hypothesis $\{s \in S_b\}$ by setting $c(\psi) = b$. I use the word “accepts” rather than the traditional term “does not reject” because choice of a or b is an affirmative action.
Although all SDFs for binary choice are interpretable as tests, Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing and statistical decision theory evaluate tests in fundamentally different ways. Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 contrast the two paradigms in general terms. Section 2.3.3 illustrates.

2.3.1. Neyman-Pearson Testing

Let us review the basic practices of classical hypothesis testing, developed by Neyman and Pearson (1928, 1933). These tests view the hypotheses \( \{s \in S_a\} \) and \( \{s \in S_b\} \) asymmetrically, calling the former the null hypothesis and the latter the alternative. The sampling probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is correct is called the probability of a Type I error. A longstanding convention has been to restrict attention to tests in which the probability of a Type I error is no larger than a predetermined value \( \alpha \), usually 0.05, for all \( s \in S_a \). In the notation of statistical decision theory, one restricts attentions to SDFs \( c(\cdot) \) for which \( Q_s[c(\psi) = b] \leq \alpha \) for all \( s \in S_a \).

Among tests that satisfy this restriction, Neyman-Pearson testing seeks ones that give small probability of rejecting the alternative hypothesis when it is correct, the probability of a Type II error. However, it generally is not possible to attain small probability of a Type II error for all \( s \in S_b \). Letting \( S \) be a metric space, the probability of a Type II error typically approaches \( 1 - \alpha \) as \( s \in S_b \) nears the boundary of \( S_a \). See, for example, Manski and Tetenov (2016), Figure 1. Given this, the convention has been to restrict attention to states in \( S_b \) that lie at least a specified distance from \( S_a \).

Let \( \rho \) be the metric measuring distance on \( S \). Let \( \rho_a > 0 \) be the specified minimum distance from \( S_a \).

In the notation of statistical decision theory, Neyman-Pearson testing seeks small values for the maximum value of \( Q_s[c(\psi) = a] \) over \( s \in S_b \) s.t. \( \rho(s, S_a) \geq \rho_a \).

2.3.2. Expected Welfare of Tests

Decision theoretic evaluation of tests does not restrict attention to tests that yield a predetermined upper bound on the probability of a Type I error. Nor does it aim to minimize the maximum value of the
probability of a Type II error when more than a specified minimum distance from the null hypothesis.

Wald’s central idea, for binary choice as elsewhere, is to evaluate the performance of SDF $c(\cdot)$ in state $s$ by the distribution of welfare that it yields across realizations of the sampling process. He first addressed hypothesis testing this way in Wald (1939).

The welfare distribution in state $s$ in a binary choice problem is Bernoulli, with mass points max $[w(a, s), w(b, s)]$ and min $[w(a, s), w(b, s)]$. These mass points coincide if $w(a, s) = w(b, s)$. When $s$ is a state where $w(a, s) \neq w(b, s)$, let $R_{c(s)}$ denote the probability that $c(\cdot)$ yields an error, choosing the inferior treatment over the superior one. That is,

$$R_{c(s)} = Q_s[c(\psi) = b] \quad \text{if} \quad w(a, s) > w(b, s),$$
$$= Q_s[c(\psi) = a] \quad \text{if} \quad w(b, s) > w(a, s).$$

The former and latter are the probabilities of Type I and Type II errors. Whereas Neyman-Pearson testing treats these error probabilities differently, statistical decision theory views them symmetrically.

The probabilities that welfare equals max $[w(a, s), w(b, s)]$ and min $[w(a, s), w(b, s)]$ are $1 - R_{c(s)}$ and $R_{c(s)}$. Hence, expected welfare in state $s$ is

$$E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\} = R_{c(s)} \cdot \min\{w(a, s), w(b, s)\} + [1 - R_{c(s)}] \cdot \max\{w(a, s), w(b, s)\}$$
$$= \max\{w(a, s), w(b, s)\} - R_{c(s)} \cdot |w(a, s) - w(b, s)|.$$ 

The expression $R_{c(s)} \cdot |w(a, s) - w(b, s)|$ is the regret of $c(\cdot)$ in state $s$. Thus, regret is the product of the error probability and the magnitude of the welfare loss when an error occurs.

Evaluation of hypothesis tests by expected welfare constitutes a fundamental difference between the perspectives of Wald and of Neyman-Pearson. A planner should care about more than the probabilities of Type I and II error. He should care as well about the magnitudes of the losses to welfare that arise when
errors occur. A given error probability should be less acceptable when the welfare difference between actions is larger. The Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing does not recognize this.

Computation of regret in a specified state is usually practical. The welfare magnitudes $w(a, s)$ and $w(b, s)$ are usually easy to compute. The error probability $R_{c(\psi)}$ typically does not have a simple explicit form, but it can be approximated to any desired precision by Monte Carlo integration. That is, one draws repeated pseudo-realizations of $\psi$ from the distribution $Q_s$, computes the fraction of cases in which the resulting $c(\psi)$ selects the inferior action, and uses this to estimate $R_{c(\psi)}$.

Whereas computation of regret in one state is not problematic, computation of maximum regret across all feasible states may be burdensome. The state space commonly is uncountable in applications. A pragmatic process for coping with uncountable state spaces is to discretize the space, computing regret on a finite subset of states that reasonably approximate the full state space.

2.3.3. Illustration: Comparing a Neyman-Pearson Test with an MMR Decision

Manski and Tetenov (2016) compare a Neyman-Pearson test with a decision that minimizes maximum regret, in a simple context where the MMR decision is known. The context is choice between two treatments, say $t = a$ and $t = b$, when the outcome of interest is binary, with $y(t) = 1$ denoting success and $y(t) = 0$ failure. State $s$ indexes a possible value for the pair of outcome probabilities $\{P_s[y(a) = 1], P_s[y(b) = 1]\}$. The welfare yielded by treatment $t$ in state $s$ is $w(t, s) = P_s[y(t) = 1]$. The sample data are the findings of a balanced randomized trial, assigning the same number $N$ of subjects to each treatment. In this setting, a widely used test is a one-sided two-sample $z$-test, which asymptotically makes the probability of a Type I error equal to 0.05. See Fleiss (1973) for details.

The regret of any test $c(\cdot)$ in any state $s$ is $R_{c(\psi)}|P_s[y(a) = 1] - P_s[y(b) = 1]|$. In the language of analysis of treatment response, $|P_s[y(a) = 1] - P_s[y(b) = 1]|$ is the absolute value of the average treatment effect comparing the two treatments. We suppose that the planner has no a priori knowledge of the outcome probabilities. Hence, the state space is the rectangle $[0, 1]^2$. We approximate maximum regret by computing regret over a finite grid of states, thus discretizing the state space. Stoye (2009) shows that the MMR
decision is the empirical success (ES) rule. This rule, which will be discussed more fully in Section 4, chooses a treatment that maximizes the average sample outcome in the trial.

Figure 1 of Manski and Tetenov (2016) shows how the regret incurred by the ES rule and the z-test rule varies across states for a sample size of $N = 145$ per treatment arm. With this sample size, maximum regret is 0.01 for the ES rule and 0.05 for the z-test. Maximum regret for each test occurs at an intermediate value of the effect size. Regret is necessarily small for small effect sizes. Regret is also small for large effect sizes, because the probability of error declines with the effect size. The intermediate effect sizes at which regret is maximized differ for the two tests, reflecting the differences in their state-specific error probabilities.

2.4. Practicalities

Statistical decision theory has breathtaking generality. It enables comparison of all SDFs whose risk functions exist. It applies to any sample size, without asymptotic approximations.

The state space may take any form. In Haavelmo’s formalization of econometrics, $S$ is a space of probability distributions that may describe the economic system under study. The state space may be finite dimensional or larger. The theory is applicable when unlimited data collection would point or partially identify the true state.

Given these features, one might anticipate that statistical decision theory would play a central role in modern statistics and econometrics. Notable contributions by statisticians emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, as described in the monographs of Ferguson (1967) and Berger (1985). However, the early period of development of statistical decision theory largely closed by the 1970s, except for the conditional Bayes version of Bayesian theory. Conditional Bayes analysis has continued to develop, but as a self-contained field of study disconnected from Wald’s frequentist idea of maximization of subjective average welfare.

Why did statistical decision theory lose momentum? One reason may have been diminishing interest in decision making as the motivation for analysis of sample data. Many modern statisticians and
econometricians view the objective of empirical research as inference for scientific understanding, rather than use of data in decision making. Another reason may have been the technical difficulty of the subject. Wald’s ideas are easy to describe abstractly, but they can be difficult to apply in practice.

Consider the mathematical problems (4) through (6). These problems are generally well-posed in principle, but they may not be solvable in practice. Each problem requires performance of three nested operations. The most basic inner operation integrates across the sampling distribution of the data to determine expected welfare when a specified SDF $c(\cdot)$ is used in each feasible state of nature $s \in S$. The result is evaluation of $c(\cdot)$ by the state-dependent expected welfare vector $(E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}, s \in S)$. The middle operation averages or finds an extremum of the result of the inner operation across the state space. The outer operation finds an extremum of the result of the middle operation across all SDFs.

Analytical arguments and numerical computation sometimes yield tractable solutions to these problems. Early analytical work in the conditional Bayes paradigm studied **conjugate priors**, which pair certain prior distributions on the state space with certain state-dependent sampling distributions for the data to yield simple posterior distributions.

An important early analytical solution of an MMR problem was the study by Hodges and Lehmann (1950) of point prediction of a bounded outcome under square loss, with data from a random sample. Recently, Dominitz and Manski (2017, 2019) have derived analytical findings on the maximum regret of certain tractable point predictors of bounded outcomes with data from random samples when some outcomes are missing. See Section 3.4 below for further discussion.


Numerical computation often was infeasible when statistical decision theory developed in the 1940s, but it has become increasingly possible since then. Modern conditional Bayes analysis has increasingly moved away from use of conjugate priors to numerical computation of posterior distributions.
Numerical determination of some maximin and MMR decisions has also become feasible. For example, Manski and Tetenov (2016, 2019) present in tabular form the MMR solutions to certain treatment choice problems with data from a randomized experiment. Computation of state-dependent expected welfare, the inner operation in problems (4) through (6), can now be accomplished numerically by Monte Carlo integration methods. Manski and Tabord-Meehan (2017) do this in the context of point prediction with random-sample data when some outcomes are missing; see Section 3.4 for further discussion.

3. Decision Making with Models

3.1. Basic Ideas

I stated at the outset that standard decision theory begins with a planner who “specifies a state space listing the states that he considers possible.” Thus, the state space should include all states that the planner believes feasible and no others. The state space may be a large set that is difficult to contemplate in its entirety. Hence, it is common to make decisions using a model.

The word “model” is commonly used informally to connote a simplification or approximation of reality. Formally, a model specifies an alternative to the state space. Thus, model m replaces S with a model space $S_m$. A planner using a model acts as if the model space is the state space. For example, the planner might solve problem (4), (5), or (6) with $S_m$ replacing S. Section 3.2 discusses other possibilities.

The states contained in a model space may or may not be elements of the state space. The statistician George Box famously wrote (Box, 1979): “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” The phrase “all models are wrong” indicates that Box was thinking of models that simplify or approximate reality in a way that one believes could not possibly be correct; then $S_m \cap S = \emptyset$. On the other hand, researchers often use models that they believe could possibly be correct but that are not necessarily so; then $S_m \subset S$. 
Economists have long used models of the second type, ones they believe could be correct but are not necessarily so. A persistent concern of econometric theory has been to determine when such models have implications that may potentially be inconsistent with observable data. These models are called testable, refutable, or over-identified.

Working within the paradigm of Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing, econometricians have developed *specification tests* which take the null hypothesis to be that the model is correct and the alternative to be that it is incorrect. Formally, the null is \( \{s^* \in S_m\} \) and the alternative is \( \{s^* \not\in S_m\} \). However, econometricians have struggled to answer persuasively a central question raised by Haavelmo (1944) in his opening chapter on “Abstract Models and Reality” and restated succinctly in a recent paper by Masten and Poirier (2019). The latter authors write (p. 1): “What should researchers do when their baseline model is refuted?” They discuss the many ways that econometricians have sought to answer the question, and they offer some new suggestions of their own.

The literature on specification testing has not sought to evaluate the performance of models in decision making. Statistical decision theory accomplishes this in a straightforward way. What matters is the SDF, say \( c_m(\cdot) \), that one chooses using a model. As with any SDF, one measures the performance of \( c_m(\cdot) \) by its vector of state-dependent expected welfares \( (E_s\{w[c_m(\psi), s]\}, s \in S) \). Importantly, the relevant states for evaluation of performance are those in the state space \( S \), not those in the model space \( S_m \).

Thus, statistical decision theory enables one to operationalize Box’s assertion that some models are useful. Useful model-based decision rules yield acceptably high state-dependent expected welfare across the state space, relative to what is possible in principle. From this perspective, one should not make an abstract assertion that a model is or is not useful. Usefulness depends on the decision context.

3.1.1. Research on Robust Decisions

The remainder of this paper fleshes out the above basic ideas on evaluation of model-based decisions. Before then, I juxtapose these ideas with those expressed in research on *robust decisions*. This
includes, for example, the econometric work of Hansen, Sargent, and collaborators on robust macroeconomic modeling (e.g., Hansen and Sargent, 2001, 2008).

The idea that the usefulness of a model depends on the decision context has been formalized in research on robust decisions, but in a different manner than I do here. The broad idea is well-stated in a review article by Watson and Holmes (2016), who write (p. 466):

“Statisticians are taught from an early stage that “essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful” (Box and Draper, 1987). By “wrong” we will take to mean misspecified and by “useful” we will take to mean helpful for aiding actions (taking decisions), or rather a model is not useful if it does not aid any decision.”

However, research on robust decisions proceeds in a different manner than the application of statistical decision theory in the present paper.

Work on robustness begins with specification of an initial model rather than a state space. Typically, the initial model is relatively simple and convenient; hence, the initial model space is relatively small. After specifying an initial model, a researcher may be concerned that it is only an approximation rather than completely correct. To recognize this possibility, the researcher enlarges the initial model space locally, using a specified metric to generate a neighborhood of the initial space. He then acts as if the locally enlarged model space is correct. Watson and Holmes write (p. 465): “We then consider formal methods for decision making under model misspecification by quantifying stability of optimal actions to perturbations to the model within a neighbourhood of [the] model space.”

It has been common to study maximin and Bayesian decision making, where minimum and subjective expected welfare are computed across the specified neighborhood of the model space. Thus, research on robust decisions effectively considers the locally enlarged model space to be the state space. It does not entertain the possibility that the locally enlarged model space may itself not contain the true state of nature.
3.2. As-If Optimization

A familiar econometric practice specifies a model space, typically called the parameter space. The parameter space is often finite-dimensional in applied research, but this is not essential. Sample data are used to select a point in the parameter space, called a point estimate of the parameter. The econometric method used to compute the point estimate typically is motivated by reference to desirable statistical properties that hold if the model is correct; that is, if the true state of nature lies within the parameter space. *As-if optimization* chooses an action that optimizes welfare as if the estimate is the true state.

As-if optimization is a type of inference-based SDF. Whereas Wald supposed that a planner both performs research and makes a decision, in practice there commonly is an institutional separation between research and decision making. Researchers report inferences and planners use them to make decisions. Thus, planners perform the mapping [inference \(\rightarrow\) decision] rather than the more basic mapping [data \(\rightarrow\) decision]. Having researchers report point estimates and planners use them as if they are accurate exemplifies this process.

Formally, a point estimate is a function \(s(\cdot): \Psi \rightarrow S_m\) that maps data into a point in a model space. As-if optimization means solution of the problem \(\max_{c \in C} w[c, s(\psi)]\). When as-if optimization yields multiple solutions, one may use some auxiliary rule to select one. The result is an SDF \(c[s(\cdot)]\), where

\[
(9) \quad c[s(\psi)] \in \arg\max_{c \in C} w[c, s(\psi)], \quad \psi \in \Psi.
\]

Solving problem (9) is often simpler than solving problems (4) through (6). Selecting a point estimate and using it to maximize welfare is easier than performing the nested operations requires to solve problems (4) through (6). However, computational appeal does not suffice to justify this approach to decision making.

To motivate as-if optimization, econometricians often cite limit theorems of asymptotic theory that hold if the model is correct. They hypothesize a sequence of sampling processes indexed by sample size \(N\).
and a corresponding sequence of point estimates $s_N(\cdot): \Psi_N \to S_m$. They show that the sequence is consistent when specified assumptions hold. That is, $s_N(\psi) \to s'$ as $N \to \infty$, in probability or almost surely. They may prove further results regarding rate of convergence and the limiting distribution of the estimate.

These asymptotic arguments may be suggestive, but they do not prove that as-if optimization provides a well-performing SDF in practice. Statistical decision theory evaluates as-if optimization in state $s$ by the expected welfare $E_s\{w[c[s(\psi)], s]\}$ that it yields across samples of size $N$, not asymptotically. It calls for study of expected welfare across the state space, not the model space.

3.2.1. As-If Optimization with Analog Estimates

Econometric research from Haavelmo onward has focused to a considerable degree on a class of problems that connect the state space and the sampling distribution in a simple way. These are problems in which states are probability distributions and the data are a random sample drawn from the true distribution. In such problems, a natural form of as-if optimization is to act as if the empirical distribution of the data is the true population distribution. Thus, one specifies the model space as the set of all possible empirical distributions and uses the observed empirical distribution as the point estimate of the true state.

Goldberger (1968) called this the analogy principle. He wrote (p. 4): “The analogy principle of estimation . . . proposes that population parameters be estimated by sample statistics which have the same property in the sample as the parameters do in the population.” The empirical distribution consistently estimates the population distribution and has further desirable asymptotic properties. This suggests decision making using the empirical distribution as if it were the true population distribution.

3.2.2. As-If Decisions with Set Estimates

As-if optimization uses data to compute a point estimate of the true state of nature and chooses an action that optimizes welfare as if this estimate is accurate. An obvious, but rarely applied, extension is to use data to compute a set-valued estimate of the true state and then act as if the set estimate is accurate.
Whereas a point estimate $s(\cdot)$ maps data into an element of $S_m$, a set estimate $S(\cdot)$ maps data into a subset of $S_m$. For example, $S(\cdot)$ could be a confidence set reported by researchers.

Given data $\psi$, one could act as if the state space is $S(\psi)$ rather than the larger set $S$. Specifically, one could solve these data-dependent versions of problems (1) through (3):

\begin{align*}
(1') \quad & \max_{c \in C} \int w(c, s) d\pi(\psi), \\
(2') \quad & \max_{c \in C} \min_{s \in S(\psi)} w(c, s), \\
(3') \quad & \min_{c \in C} \max_{s \in S(\psi)} [\max_{d \in C} w(d, s) - w(c, s)].
\end{align*}

In the case of (1'), $\pi(\psi)$ is a subjective distribution on the set $S(\psi)$.

These as-if problems are generally easier to solve than are problems (4) to (6). The as-if problems fix $\psi$ and select one action $c$, whereas problems (4) to (6) require one to consider all potential samples and choose a decision function $c(\cdot)$. The as-if problems compute welfare values $w(c, s)$, whereas (4) to (6) compute more complex expected welfare values $E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}$. Section 3.4.1 provides an example.

An alternative type of as-if approach replaces $S$ by $S(\psi)$ in the middle operations of (4) through (6), but it does not replace $E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}$ by $w(c, s)$ in the innermost part of each criterion. This approach simplifies (4) through (6) by shrinking the state space over which the middle operations are performed. However, it is more complex than (1') through (3') for two reasons. It requires choice of a decision function $c(\cdot)$ rather than a single action $c$, and it must compute $E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}$ rather than $w(c, s)$. Chamberlain (2000) uses asymptotic considerations to suggest this type of as-if decision making and presents an application.
3.3. Prediction with Sample Data

A familiar case of as-if optimization occurs when states are distributions for a real random variable and the decision problem is to predict the value of a realization drawn from the true distribution. When welfare is measured by square and absolute loss, the best predictors are well-known to be the population mean and median. When the true distribution is not known but data from a random sample are observed, the analogy principle suggests use of the sample average and median as predictors.

In his final chapter on “Problems of Prediction,” Haavelmo (1944) questioned this common application of as-if optimization and instead recommended application of the Wald theory. This final chapter was added by Haavelmo after his distribution, in 1941, of an early version of the thesis. In his section on “General Formulation of the Problem of Prediction,” he wrote (p. 109): “We see therefore that the seemingly logical ‘two-step’ procedure of first estimating the unknown distribution of the variables to be predicted and then using this estimate to derive a prediction formula for the variables may not be very efficient.” Citing Wald (1939), he next proposed computation of the state-dependent risk for any proposed predictor function.

Letting $E_2$ denote a predictor function and $(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N)$ the sample data, he wrote (p. 109): “We have to choose $E_2$ as a function of $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N$, and we should, naturally, try to choose $E_2(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N)$ in such a way that $r$ (the ‘risk’) becomes as small as possible.” But he immediately recognized that there generally does not exist a predictor function that minimizes risk across all states of nature. Hence, he went on to suggest a feasible approach. I quote in full this key passage, which uses the notation $\Omega_1$ to denote the state space (p. 116):

“In general, however, we may expect that no uniformly best prediction function exists. Then we have to introduce some additional principles in order to choose a prediction function. We may then, first, obviously disregard all those prediction functions that are such that there exists another prediction function that makes $r$ smaller for every member of $\Omega_1$. If this is not the case we call the prediction function considered an admissible prediction function. To choose between several admissible prediction functions we might adopt the following principle, introduced by
Wald: For every admissible prediction function $E_2$ the ‘risk’ $r$ is a function of the true distribution $p$. Consider that prediction function $E_2$, among the admissible ones, for which the largest value of $r$ is at a minimum (i.e., smaller than or at most equal to the largest value of $r$ for any other admissible $E_2$). Such a prediction function, if it exists, may be said to be the least risky among the admissible prediction functions.”

Thus, following Wald, Haavelmo suggested elimination of inadmissible predictors followed by choice of a minimax predictor among those that are admissible.

It may be that econometrics would have progressed to make productive use of statistical decision theory if Haavelmo had been able to pursue the above idea further. However, in his next section on “Some Practical Suggestions for the Derivation of Prediction Formulae,” he cautioned regarding the practicality of the idea, writing (p. 111): “The apparatus set up in the preceding section, although simple in principle, will in general involve considerable mathematical problems and heavy algebra.”

Aiming for tractability, Haavelmo went on to sketch an example of as-if optimization that chooses an action using a maximum likelihood estimate of a specific finite-dimensional parametric model. He noted that one could study the state-dependent risk of the resulting SDF, but he did not provide any analysis. With this, his chapter on prediction ended. Thus, Haavelmo initiated econometric consideration of statistical decision theory but, stymied by computational intractability, he found himself unable to follow through.

Nor did other econometricians apply statistical decision theory to prediction in the period after publication of Haavelmo (1944). I observed earlier that no contribution in Cowles Monograph 10 mentioned statistical decision theory and only one did so briefly in Cowles 14. Cowles 10 and 14 contain several chapters by Haavelmo and by Wald, but these concern different subjects. The only mention in Cowles 14 appeared in Koopmans and Hood (1953). Considering “The Purpose of Estimation,” they wrote (p. 127):

“if a direct prediction problem . . . . can be isolated and specified, the choice of a method of estimation should be discussed in terms of desired properties of the joint distribution of the prediction(s) made and the realized values(s) of the variables(s) predicted. In particular, in a precisely defined prediction problem of this type, one may know the consequence of various possible errors of prediction and would then be able to use predictors minimizing the mathematical
expectation of losses due to such errors. Abraham Wald [1939, 1945, 1950c], among others, has proposed methods of statistical decision-making designed to accomplish this.”

However, they immediately went on to state that neither they nor the other contributors to Cowles 14 apply statistical decision theory to prediction. They wrote (p. 127):

“The more classical methods of estimation applied in this volume are not as closely tailored to any one particular prediction problem. Directed to the estimation of structural parameters rather than values of endogenous variables, they yield estimates that can be regarded as raw materials, to be processed further into solutions of a wide variety of prediction problems---in particular, problems involving prediction of the effects of known changes in structure.”

This passage expresses the broad thinking that econometricians have used to motivate as-if optimization.

3.4. Prediction under Square Loss

Haavelmo discussed application of statistical decision theory to prediction briefly and abstractly. Subsequent research has focused on the special case of square loss. In this case, the risk of a candidate predictor using sample data is the sum of the population variance of the outcome and the mean square error (MSE) of the predictor as an estimate of the mean outcome. The regret of a predictor is its MSE as an estimate of the mean. An MMR predictor minimizes maximum mean square error. MMR prediction of the outcome is equivalent to minimax estimation of the population mean.

Among the earliest important practical findings of statistical decision theory was reported by Hodges and Lehman (1950). They derived the MMR predictor under square loss with data from a random sample, when the outcome has known bounded range and all sample data are observed. They assumed no knowledge of the outcome distribution beyond its bounded support. Normalizing the support to be the interval [0, 1], they proved that the MMR predictor is \((\bar{X}_N \sqrt{N} + \frac{1}{2})/(\sqrt{N} + 1)\), where \(N\) is sample size and \(\bar{X}_N\) is the sample average outcome.
3.4.1. Prediction with Missing Data

Dominitz and Manski (2017, 2019) have recently extended study of prediction of a bounded outcome under square loss to settings in which a random sample is drawn but some realized outcomes are unobserved. It is challenging to determine the MMR predictor when some data are missing. Seeking an approach that is both tractable and reasonable, the paper studies as-if MMR prediction. The analysis assumes knowledge of the fraction of the population with missing data, but it assumes no knowledge of the distributions of observed and missing outcomes beyond their bounded support. It uses the empirical distribution of the observed sample data as if it were the population distribution of observable outcomes.

In the absence of knowledge of the distribution of missing outcomes, the population mean outcome is partially identified when the outcome is bounded. Its identification region is an easy-to-compute interval derived in Manski (1989). If this interval were known, the MMR predictor would be its midpoint. The identification interval is not known with sample data, but one can compute its sample analog and use the midpoint of the sample-analog interval as the predictor.

This midpoint predictor is easy to compute. Its maximum regret is shown to have a simple form. Let $\delta$ indicate the observability of an outcome. Let $P(\delta = 1)$ and $P(\delta = 0)$ denote the fractions of the population whose outcomes are and are not observable. Let $N$ be the number of observed sample outcomes, which is fixed rather than random under the assumed survey design. The paper proves that the maximum regret of the midpoint predictor is $\frac{1}{4}[P(\delta = 1)^2/N + P(\delta = 0)^2]$.

The analysis in Dominitz and Manski (2017) presumes a state space that places no restrictions on the distributions of observable and unobservable outcomes. Researchers often assume that data are missing at random. That is, they invoke a model space in which the distributions of observable and unobservable outcomes are the same. They then use the sample average of observed outcomes as the predictor. Dominitz and Manski caution against this application of modeling when the distributions of observable and unobservable outcomes may differ arbitrarily. They show that the maximum regret of the model-based predictor necessarily exceeds that of the midpoint predictor, in some cases substantially so.
3.4.2. Numerical Computation of Maximum Regret in Prediction with Missing Data

The analytical finding on the maximum regret of the midpoint predictor described above assumes knowledge of the fraction of the population with missing data. A midpoint predictor remains easy to compute when \(P(\delta = 0)\) is not known and instead is estimated by its sample analog. In this case, derivation of an analytical expression for maximum regret does not seem possible, but numerical computation is tractable. I summarize here. This demonstrate how advances in numerical analysis now enable applications of statistical decision theory that were impractical when Haavelmo and Wald made their contributions.

Manski and Tabord-Meehan (2017) describe an algorithm coded in STATA for numerical computation of the maximum regret of the midpoint predictor and other user-specified predictors in the setting of Dominitz and Manski (2017). The program, named *wald_mse*, does not require knowledge of the population fraction of missing data. Instead, \(P(\delta = 0)\) may be estimated by its sample analog.

Letting \(y\) denote the outcome of interest, the state space has the form \([P_s(y|\delta = 1), P_s(y|\delta = 0), P_s(\delta = 0)]\), \(s \in S\). An important feature of *wald_mse* is that the user can specify the state space flexibly. For example, the user may assume that nonresponse will be no higher than 80% or that the mean value of the outcome for nonresponders will be no lower than 0.5. The user may impose no restrictions connecting the two outcome distributions \(P_s(y|\delta = 1)\) and \(P_s(y|\delta = 0)\), or he may bound the difference between these distributions.

In any given state \(s\), the algorithm uses Monte Carlo integration to approximate the MSE of the user-specified predictor. The quality of the approximation is controlled by user specification of the number of pseudo realizations of \((y, \delta)\) that are drawn. Increasing the number yields a better approximation at the cost of longer computation time.

The algorithm embodies two approaches to maximize MSE across the state space, one applicable when the outcome is binary and the other when the outcome has a continuous distribution. When \(y\) is binary, \(P_s(y|\delta = 1), P_s(y|\delta = 0),\) and \(P_s(\delta = 0)\) are all Bernoulli distributions. The algorithm approximates the state space by a finite grid over the possible Bernoulli parameters for each distribution. It then maximizes MSE
over the grid. The user controls the quality of the approximation to the state space by specifying the density of the grid. Increasing the density yields a better approximation at the cost of longer computation time.

When $y$ is continuous, the algorithm presumes that $P_s(y|\delta = 1)$ and $P_s(y|\delta = 0)$ are Beta distributions, while $P_s(\delta = 0)$ is a Bernoulli distribution. Supposing that the two outcome distributions are Beta is a substantive restriction, aiming to provide a relatively flexible and tractable approximation to the state space that a user of the program may perceive. The algorithm computes mean square error on a finite grid over the possible shape parameters of the Beta distributions and over the possible values of the Bernoulli parameter. As before, the user specifies the density of the grid and the algorithm maximizes mean square error over the grid.

4. Maximum Regret of the Empirical Success Rule for Treatment Choice

4.1. Background

To further flesh out the abstract discussion of Section 3, this section provides decision-theoretic analysis of an important instance of as-if optimization, summarizing findings to date and adding new ones.

A large body of empirical research performed by econometricians, statisticians, and others has studied treatment response in randomized trials and observational settings. The objective of some of this research has been to perform so-called *causal inference*, without reference to an explicit decision problem. However, much of the research has aimed to inform treatment choice by planners acting in public health or public policy settings. I am concerned with the latter.

I discuss a standard formalization studied in many sources; see, for example, Manski (2004). States of nature are possible distributions of treatment response for the members of a population of observationally identical persons who are subject to treatment. The term “observationally identical” means that these
persons share the same observed covariates. Groups of persons with different observed covariates are considered as separate populations.

The decision problem is to choose treatments for the members of a population. It is assumed that treatment response is individualistic, meaning that each person’s outcome may depend on the treatment he receives but not on the treatments received by others. Welfare is measured by the mean outcome of treatment across the population. In this setting, optimal treatment choice maximizes the mean outcome.

In practice, optimal treatment is infeasible because the true distribution of treatment response is not known. Decision making may use data on the outcomes realized by a sample of the population. Some research studies data from randomized trials, and some studies observational data. Either way, statistical decision theory may be used to evaluate the performance of SDFs, which have been called statistical treatment rules in this context.

A simple way to use sample data to make treatment choices is as-if optimization. Applying the analogy principle, one acts as if the empirical outcome distribution for each treatment equals the population distribution of outcomes for this treatment. Emulating the fact that it is optimal to choose a treatment that maximizes the mean population outcome, one chooses a treatment that maximizes the average sample outcome. This has been called the empirical success (ES) rule in Manski (2004) and elsewhere.

When analyzing data from randomized trials, econometricians and statisticians have long used asymptotic arguments to motivate the ES rule, citing laws of large numbers and central limit theorems for convergence of sample averages to population means. In contrast, a small but growing recent econometric literature studies the maximum regret of the ES rule with trial data. Maximum regret quantifies how lack of knowledge of the true state of nature diminishes the quality of decisions. An SDF with small maximum regret is uniformly near-optimal across all states.

Section 4.2 summarizes findings on the performance of the ES rule with trial data. Section 4.3 provides new analysis of its performance with observational data. In both cases, the analysis assumes that treatment outcomes have known bounded range but otherwise places no restrictions on the distribution of treatment response. Section 4.4 relates the analysis to the early literature in econometrics.
4.2. Maximum Regret of the ES Rule with Trial Data

Consider a classical randomized trial, where all subjects comply with assigned treatments and all sample realized outcomes are observed. Then the only feasible states of nature are ones in which, for each treatment, the population distribution of counterfactual outcomes equals that of realized outcomes.

Study of the regret performance of the ES rule with trial data was initiated by Manski (2004), who used a large-deviations inequality for sample averages of bounded outcomes to derive an upper bound on maximum regret in problems of choice between two treatments. Subsequently, Stoye (2009) showed that in trials with moderate sample size, the ES rule either exactly or approximately minimizes maximum regret in cases with two treatments and a balanced design. Hirano and Porter (2009) showed that the ES rule is asymptotically optimal in a formal decision-theoretic sense.

Considering problems with multiple treatments or unbalanced designs, Manski and Tetenov (2016) use large deviations inequalities for sample averages of bounded outcomes to obtain upper bounds on the maximum regret of the ES rule. Their Proposition 1 extends the early finding of Manski (2004) from two to multiple treatments. Proposition 2 derives a new large-deviations bound for multiple treatments.

Let \( L \) be the number of treatment arms and let \( V \) be the range of the bounded outcome. When the trial has a balanced design, with \( n \) subjects per treatment arm, the bounds on maximum regret proved in Propositions 1 and 2 have particularly simple forms, being

\[
(10) \quad (2e)^{-\frac{3}{8}} V(L - 1)n^{-\frac{1}{6}}
\]

\[
(11) \quad V(\ln L)^{\frac{3}{8}} n^{-\frac{1}{6}}.
\]

Result (10) provides a tighter bound than (11) for two or three treatments. Result (11) gives a tighter bound for four or more treatments.
4.3. Maximum Regret of the ES Rule with Observational Data

In observational studies of treatment response, distributions of counterfactual and realized outcomes need not coincide. A researcher might nevertheless apply the ES rule, viewing equality of counterfactual and realized outcome distributions as a model that may or may not be correct. I consider this practice here, determining when use of the ES rule does and does not yield a desirable treatment choice from the perspective of maximum regret.

Consider an observational study with two treatments, say \{a, b\}, and bounded outcomes taking values in the interval \([0, 1]\). The planner’s problem is to choose between the two treatments. Each member of the study population has potential outcomes \([y(a), y(b)]\). Binary indicators \(\delta(a), \delta(b)\) denote whether these outcomes are observable. Realized outcomes are observed, but counterfactual outcomes are not. Hence, the possible values for the observability indicators are \(\delta(a) = 1, \delta(b) = 0\) and \(\delta(a) = 0, \delta(b) = 1\).

Each element \(s\) of the state space denotes a possible distribution \(P_s[y(a), y(b), \delta(a), \delta(b)]\) of outcomes and observability.

As shown in Section 2.3, in states of nature where treatment \(a\) is better, the regret of any SDF is the product of the sampling probability that the rule commits a Type I error (choosing \(b\)) and the magnitude of the loss in welfare that occurs when choosing \(B\). Similarly, in states where \(b\) is better, regret is the probability of a Type II error (choosing \(a\)) times the magnitude of the loss in welfare when choosing \(a\). Thus, regret in state \(s\) is \(R_{\alpha(\gamma)} |E_s[y(b)] - E_s[y(a)]|\), where \(R_{\alpha(\gamma)}\) denotes the error probability. Regret is zero in states where \(E_s[y(b)] = E_s[y(a)]\). Hence, it suffices to consider states where \(E_s[y(b)] \neq E_s[y(a)]\).

With finite sample data, the state-dependent error probabilities for the ES rule do not have simple explicit forms, but they may be computed numerically by Monte Carlo integration. The maximum regret of the ES rule can be approximated by computing regret on a grid that discretizes the state space. An algorithm akin to that of Manski and Tabord-Meehan (2017) can be developed to perform the computations.
Rather than pursue numerical computation here, I derive analytical results that hold in the limit, when all population realized outcomes are observed. Given that realized outcomes are observed while counterfactual ones are not, \( P[\delta(a) = 1] + P[\delta(b) = 1] = 1 \). I suppose that \( P[\delta(a) = 1] > 0 \) and \( P[\delta(b) = 1] > 0 \).

Then the data reveal the true values of \( P[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] \), \( P[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] \), \( P[\delta(a) = 1] \), and \( P[\delta(b) = 1] \). This setting has long been studied in partial identification analysis of treatment response, as in Manski (1990). I proceed likewise here.

4.3.1. MMR Treatment Choice

The data do not reveal the counterfactual outcome distributions \( P[y(a)|\delta(a) = 0] \) and \( P[y(b)|\delta(b) = 0] \). Outcomes have bounded domain \([0, 1]\), hence \( 0 \leq E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 0] \leq 1 \) and \( 0 \leq E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 0] \leq 1 \). By the Law of Iterated Expectations, the feasible values of \( E[y(a)] \) and \( E[y(b)] \) are

\[
(12a) \quad E[y(a)] \in [E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(a) = 1], E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(a) = 1] + P[\delta(a) = 0]],
\]

\[
(12b) \quad E[y(b)] \in [E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(b) = 1], E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(b) = 1] + P[\delta(b) = 0]].
\]

Consider choice of treatment \( a \) or \( b \). With choice of \( a \), the error probability \( R_{as} = 0 \) in states where \( E_a[y(b)] < E_a[y(a)] \) and \( R_{as} = 1 \) in states where \( E_a[y(b)] > E_a[y(a)] \). Maximum regret occurs in the state where \( E_a[y(a)|\delta(a) = 0] = 0 \) and \( E_a[y(b)|\delta(b) = 0] = 1 \). In this state, regret is

\[
(13a) \quad R_{as} |E_a[y(b)] - E_a[y(a)]| = E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(b) = 1] + P[\delta(b) = 0]
\]

\[
\quad - E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(a) = 1].
\]

With choice of \( b \), maximum regret is

\[
(13b) \quad R_{bs} |E_a[y(b)] - E_a[y(a)]| = E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(a) = 1] + P[\delta(a) = 0]
\]
The difference between these maximum-regret expressions is

\[
E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(b) = 1] - E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(a) = 1] - E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(a) = 0] + E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(b) = 1] - 2 \cdot \{E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(b) = 1] - E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] \cdot P[\delta(a) = 1]\} + P[\delta(b) = 0] - P[\delta(a) = 0].
\]

Treatment b (a) uniquely minimizes maximum regret if the value of (14) is positive (negative). The treatments yield the same maximum regret if the value of (14) is zero.

4.3.2. Maximum Regret of the ES Rule

Now consider treatment choice with the ES rule. I show below that this rule minimizes maximum regret for some but not all values of the observable quantities. It selects the inferior treatment for other values.

The ES rule chooses treatment a if \(E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] > E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]\) and chooses b if \(E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] < E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]\). The ES rule does not prescribe a treatment if \(E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] = E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]\). Then some auxiliary criterion must be used. I henceforth consider the cases where the ES rule yields a determinate choice.

The ES rule yields the MMR choice when the ordering of \(E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1]\) and \(E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]\) reverses the ordering of maximum regret across the two treatments. This necessarily occurs when \(P[\delta(a) = 1] = P[\delta(b) = 1] = \frac{1}{2}\). Then (14) reduces to \(E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] - E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1]\).

When \(P[\delta(a) = 1] \neq P[\delta(b) = 1]\), the ES rule may minimize or maximize maximum regret, depending on the values of the observable quantities \(E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1], E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1], P[\delta(a)],\) and \(P[\delta(b)]\). I consider
here cases in which treatment b has greater empirical success than a, so the ES rule chooses b. Analysis of the contrary case is symmetric.

To simplify notation, let $E[y(b) | \delta(b) = 1] = m$ and $E[y(a) | \delta(a) = 1] = m - \epsilon$, where $0 < \epsilon \leq m \leq 1$.

First consider cases where $P[\delta(b) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + k$ and $P[\delta(a) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} - k$, where $0 < k < \frac{1}{2}$. Then the value of (14) is

$$2[m(\frac{1}{2} + k) - (m - \epsilon)(\frac{1}{2} - k) - k] = 2[2mk + \epsilon(\frac{1}{2} - k) - k] = 2[\epsilon(\frac{1}{2} - k) - k(1 - 2m)].$$

Hence, treatment b uniquely minimizes maximum regret if $\epsilon > k(1 - 2m)/(\frac{1}{2} - k)$ and treatment a does so if $\epsilon < k(1 - 2m)/(\frac{1}{2} - k)$. A sufficient condition for the former result is that $m \geq \frac{1}{2}$. The latter result occurs if $m < \frac{1}{2}$, $k$ is sufficiently large, and $\epsilon$ is sufficiently small.

Now consider cases where $P[\delta(b) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} - k$ and $P[\delta(a) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + k$, where $0 < k < \frac{1}{2}$. Then the value of (14) is

$$2[m(\frac{1}{2} - k) - (m - \epsilon)(\frac{1}{2} + k) + k] = 2[-2mk + \epsilon(\frac{1}{2} + k) + k] = 2[\epsilon(\frac{1}{2} + k) - k(2m - 1)].$$

Hence, treatment b uniquely minimizes maximum regret if $\epsilon > k(2m - 1)/(\frac{1}{2} + k)$ and treatment a does so if $\epsilon < k(2m - 1)/(\frac{1}{2} + k)$. A sufficient condition for the former result is that $m \leq \frac{1}{2}$. The latter result occurs if $m > \frac{1}{2}$, $k$ is sufficiently large, and $\epsilon$ is sufficiently small.

Recall Box’s statement that a model may be wrong but useful. The above derivation shows that using the model of random treatment selection to motivate the ES rule minimizes maximum regret when similar fractions of the population receive each treatment and/or the treatments differ greatly in empirical success. However, it maximizes maximum regret when treatment shares are sufficiently different and the treatments have sufficiently similar empirical success. Thus, the model is useful for treatment choice in some contexts but is harmful in others.
4.3.3. Illustration: Sentencing and Recidivism

To illustrate, I use the Manski and Nagin (1998) analysis of sentencing and recidivism of juvenile offenders in the state of Utah. The feasible treatments are alternative sentencing options. Judges in Utah have had the discretion to order varying sentences for juvenile offenders. Some offenders have been sentenced to residential confinement (treatment a) and others have been given sentences with no confinement (treatment b). A possible policy would be to replace judicial discretion with a mandate that all offenders be confined. Another would be to mandate that no offenders be confined.

To compare these alternative mandates, we took the outcome of interest to be recidivism in the two-year period following sentencing. Let \( y = 1 \) if an offender commits no new offense and \( y = 0 \) otherwise. No new offense was interpreted as treatment success, and commission of a new offense was interpreted as failure.

We obtained data on the sentences received and the recidivism outcomes realized by all male offenders in Utah who were born from 1970 through 1974 and who were convicted of offenses before they reached age 16. The Utah data reveal that 11 percent of the offenders were sentenced to confinement and that 23 percent of these persons did not offend again in the two years following sentencing. The remaining 89 percent were sentenced to non-confinement and 41 percent of these persons did not offend again. Thus, \( P[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] = 0.23 \), \( P[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] = 0.41 \), \( P[\delta(a) = 1] = 0.11 \), and \( P[\delta(b) = 1] = 0.89 \).

Reviewing the criminology literature on sentencing and recidivism, we found little research on sentencing practices and disparate predictions of treatment response. Hence, we deemed it relevant to perform partial identification analysis of treatment response, assuming no knowledge of counterfactual outcomes. This makes the analysis of Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 applicable.

Equation (13a) show that the maximum regret of treatment a is \((0.41)(0.89) + 0.11 - (0.23)(0.11) = 0.45\). Equation (13b) shows that the maximum regret of b is \((0.23)(0.11) + 0.89 - (0.41)(0.89) = 0.55\). Hence, treatment a minimizes maximum regret.

One might assume that Utah judges have sentenced offenders randomly to treatments a and b. One consequently might use the ES rule to choose between the two. Given that 0.41 > 0.23, the result is choice
of treatment b. Thus, in this setting, the ES rule selects the treatment that is inferior from the minimax-regret perspective.

4.4. Analysis of Treatment Response and Study of Systems of Jointly Determined Variables

The terminology “analysis of treatment response” has become widespread in empirical microeconomics since the 1990s, but it does not appear in early writing on econometrics. At time of Haavelmo (1944), a central focus was identification and estimation of models of systems of jointly determined variables. An important objective was to use estimated models to predict the impacts of contemplated public policies. Using further notation to denote realized treatments and outcomes, it is easy to see that analysis of treatment response lies within this longstanding concern of econometrics.

Let $z$ denote the treatment that a person in the study population receives; thus, $z = 1$ if $\delta(b) = 1$ and $z = 0$ if $\delta(b) = 0$. Let $y$ denote the outcome that a person realizes; thus, $y = y(b)$ if $z = 1$ and $y = y(a)$ if $z = 0$. Realizations of $(y, z)$ are observable. Random sampling of the study population asymptotically reveals the distribution $P(y, z)$.

Early econometricians analyzed data on realized treatments and outcomes in settings where treatments are chosen purposefully rather than randomly. Haavelmo (1944) put it this way (p. 7): “the economist is usually a rather passive observer with respect to important economic phenomena; he usually does not control the actual collection of economic statistics. He is not in a position to enforce the prescriptions of his own designs of ideal experiments.”

Analyzing settings with passive observation of treatments and outcomes, econometricians found it sensible to model $y$ and $z$ as jointly determined variables. When treatment selection is random, $E(y|z = 1) = E[y(b)]$ and $E(y|z = 0) = E[y(a)]$. Among the central contributions of early econometrics was to show that these equalities do not generally hold when $y$ and $y$ are jointly determined. Haavelmo (1943), Section 1 showed this in a simple context.
Viewing random treatment selection as implausible in settings with passive observation, econometricians have long studied other models that point-identify $E[y(b)]$ and $E[y(a)]$, given empirical knowledge of $P(y, z)$. The early literature mainly studied linear models and distributional assumptions involving instrumental variables. Recent research weakens the assumption that relations are linear but continues to use instrumental variables. Throughout all this long period, econometricians have struggled to measure model performance in decision making. Statistical decision theory provides a coherent framework for model evaluation.

4.4.1. Illustration: Classical Linear Models

Consider classical linear models that assume homogeneous treatment response and use a binary instrumental variable to point-identify the treatment effect. In settings with two treatments, the model assumes that $y_j(t) = \beta \cdot 1[t = b] + \varepsilon_j$ for each $t \in \{a, b\}$ and each member $j$ of the study population. The homogeneous treatment effect is the parameter $\beta = y_j(b) - y_j(a)$, whose value does not vary with $j$.

Let $v_j$ denote the binary instrumental variable, whose value varies across $j$. The earliest econometric literature assumed that $\text{Cov}(v, \varepsilon) = 0$ and $\text{Cov}(v, z) \neq 0$. This implies that $\beta = \text{Cov}(v, y) / \text{Cov}(v, z)$. Later econometricians assumed that $E(\varepsilon|v = 1) = E(\varepsilon|v = 0)$ and $E(z|v = 1) \neq E(z|v = 0)$. This implies that $\beta = [E(y|v = 1) - E(y|v = 0)]/[E(z|v = 1) - E(z|v = 0)]$.

Whichever version of the model is assumed, it has been common to use the resulting value of $\beta$ to recommend a treatment, namely treatment $a$ if $\beta < 0$ and $b$ if $\beta > 0$. Applied researchers have long recognized that the assumed model may be incorrect, but the econometric literature has not shown how to evaluate the consequences of using incorrect models to make decisions. Statistical decision theory does so.
5. Conclusion

To reiterate the central theme of this paper, use of statistical decision theory to evaluate econometric models is conceptually coherent and simple. A planner specifies a state space listing all the states of nature deemed feasible. One evaluates the performance of any contemplated SDF by the state-dependent vector of expected welfare that it yields. Decisions made using models are evaluated in this manner. Statistical decision theory evaluates model-based decision rules by their performance across the state space, not across the model space.

The primary challenge to use of statistical decision theory in practice is computational. Recall that, in his discussion sketching application of statistical decision theory to prediction, Haavelmo (1944) remarked that such application (p. 111): “although simple in principle, will in general involve considerable mathematical problems and heavy algebra.”

Many mathematical operations that were infeasible in 1944 are tractable now, as a result of advances in analytical methods and numerical computation. Hence, it has increasingly become possible to use statistical decision theory when performing econometric research that aims to inform decision making. Future advances in analysis and numerical computation should continue to expand the scope of applications.
References


