What Do We Measure When We Measure Affective Partisanship?

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ABSTRACT

Affective polarization—the tendency of Democrats and Republicans to dislike and distrust one another—has become an important phenomenon in American politics. Yet despite scholarly attention to this topic, two important measurement lacunae remain. First, what items—of the many previously employed—should be used to measure this concept? Second, these items all ask respondents about the parties. When individuals answer them, do they think of voters, elites, or both? The researchers demonstrate that most of the previously used items tap affective polarization, with the exception being the popular social distance measures. Second, they show that when answering questions about the other party, individuals think about elites more than voters, and express more animus when the questions focus on elites. This suggests that increased affective polarization reflects, to some extent, growing animus towards politicians more than ordinary voters. They conclude by discussing the consequences for both measuring this concept and understanding its ramifications.

For nearly two decades, scholars have debated whether the mass public is, in fact, polarized by analyzing voters' issue positions (see Fiorina 2017). In recent years, however, there is a growing awareness that this does not fully capture partisan conflict in the contemporary United States. Regardless of where they stand on the issues, Americans increasingly dislike, distrust, and do not want to interact with those from the other party, a tendency known as affective polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). This divisiveness vitiates political trust (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015), hampers inter-personal relations (Huber and Malhotra 2017), and hinders economic exchanges (McConnell et al. 2018).

Yet, two significant measurement lacunae remain. First, scholars use a wide-ranging assortment of items to measure affective polarization, but there is little sense of how these items relate to one another. Are some measures better than others? Second, these measures ask respondents to evaluate "The Democratic Party" or "The Republican Party." But whom do voters imagine when they answer such questions: ordinary voters or elected officials?

In what follows, we address these questions with an original survey experiment. We document how different measures relate to one another, finding that nearly all of them are strongly interrelated, with exception being the commonly used social distance measures. Further, we show that when people think about the other party, they think primarily about political elites, rather than voters. They also express significantly more animus towards other party elites than other party voters. This finding reveals why trust in government plummets so sharply when the other party is in power (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015): affective polarization is largely about disliking the other party's elites,

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more so than their voters. In turn, this lessens feelings of representation, and harms overall legitimacy.

What Is Affective Polarization, and How Do We Measure It?

Affective polarization stems from an individual's identification with a political party. Identifying with a party divides the world into a liked in-group (one's own party), and a disliked out-group (the opposing party; Tajfel and Turner 1979). This identification gives rise to in-group favoritism and bias, which is the heart of affective polarization: the tendency of people identifying as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans positively (Iyengar and Westwood 2015, 691).

When scholars measure this affective polarization, they typically use survey items.[1] The most common measure is a feeling thermometer rating that asks respondents to rate how cold (0) or warm (100) they feel toward the Democratic Party and the Republican Party (Lelkes and Westwood 2017, 489). A second measure asks respondents to rate how well various traits describe the parties. Positive traits include patriotic, intelligent, honest, open-minded, and generous; negative traits include hypocritical, selfish, and mean (Iyengar et al. 2012, Garrett et al. 2014). A third approach is to ask citizens to rate the extent to which they trust the parties do to what is right (Levendusky 2013). A final set of measures gauge how comfortable people are having close friends from the other party, having neighbors from the other party, and having their children marry someone from the other party (Iyengar et al. 2012, Levendusky and Malhotra 2016). These items are known as social distance measures, as they tap the level of

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[1] Some authors use other techniques such as implicit attitudinal measures or behavioral measures (see the discussion in Iyengar et al. 2018). That said, survey measures have been by the most common by far, hence our attention to them here.

intimacy (distance) individuals are comfortable having with those from the other party. How do these various measures of affective polarization relate to one another? Are they interchangeable? Previous studies are unclear since they mostly include only one or two measures, and do not explicitly compare them.

Even setting that issue aside, there is the question of when someone rates "The Democratic Party" on a feeling thermometer, or rates whether "Democrats" are selfish, who are they considering? Is it ordinary voters who support the Democrats—that is, Democratic voters—or elected officials like Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer? As Iyengar et al. (2012: 411) acknowledge, the existing measures are ambiguous on this point: "we will not be able to clarify whether respondents were thinking of partisan voters or party leaders when providing their thermometer scores." The same is true for any of the other items; if someone says Republicans are untrustworthy, is that their Republican neighbor (or a Republican voter they saw or TV), or is that an assessment of President Trump? This distinction is not only crucial to understanding what people affectively envision when asked about the "party," but it also underlines that people might feel very differently toward other voters than they do toward elites.

Data and Measures

We conducted a survey in late 2017 with a nationally representative sample of 2,224 respondents (see the appendix for details). We asked each respondent to assess the parties on the four measures mentioned above: feeling thermometers for each party, trait ratings for each party, trust scores for each party, and the three social distance items (comfort with the other party as friends, neighbors, or as a son/daughter-in-law). The trait ratings included the 8 previously mentioned characteristics; we aggregated them so as to

make a net rating of positive minus negative traits ($\alpha = 0.9$ for both parties). We also merged the 3 social distance measures ($\alpha = 0.8$). Analyzing the trait or social distance items separately yield similar results to those reported below.

To understand who respondents think about when answering questions about parties, we included an experimental component for three of our affective polarization measures—the thermometers, trait ratings, and trust measures. We randomly assigned participants to versions that asked them to evaluate "Democratic (Republican) Party voters," "Democratic (Republican) Party candidates and elected officials," or "the Democratic (Republican) Party." So, for example, someone assigned to the voter condition would rate Democratic (Republican) Party voters on the feeling thermometer score, state whether they thought the voters were selfish, mean, etc. and so forth. Treatment assignment was held constant within individuals to avoid alerting subjects to the purpose of our study.

The experiment allows us see how explicitly priming different foci change answers (do subjects feel differently about elites vs. voters?), and to see which one is more closely related to the version where they rate "the party" (i.e., the standard version used in the literature). We did not include experimental variations for the social distance items as pilot testing suggested people were incredulous when asked about living near elected officials of the other party or having their children marry such people (i.e., they thought such scenarios were extremely unlikely). The full question wording for all items is given in the appendix.

Results

Given our interest in affective polarization, we restrict our analysis to partisans (including partisan leaners), consistent with earlier studies. To begin, consider the correlation matrix of the measures of affective polarization, presented in Table 1. Here, we pool across the different experimental conditions, but analyzing the data separately by condition yields largely similar results (see the appendix). The correlations are calculated in two different ways, both of which have been used in the previous literature. In the top panel, we show the correlations between the various measures looking only at out-party evaluations (i.e., how Democrats rate Republicans). In the bottom panel, we present the items looking at the difference between in-party and out-party ratings (i.e., Democrats evaluations of Democrats minus their evaluations of Republicans).[2]

[Insert Table 1 about here]

What is most striking in Table 1 is that all of the items are strongly correlated with one another, with one exception: the social distance items. This holds for both versions of this calculation. Indeed, the correlation between the social distance items and the other measures are less than ½ of the correlations between the other measures. Digging into the data, this is because the mass public is much less affectively polarized according to these items. Fully 80% of our sample is "somewhat comfortable" or "extremely comfortable" with being friends or neighbors with those from the other party. While comfort with inter-party marriage is lower, even here, there is less anger than one would expect, with only 5% of the sample being "extremely upset" by this. This underlines that while people might feel negatively about the other party in the abstract, they are still comfortable interacting with them in ordinary situations.

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[2] The reason to use a difference score is to remove inter-personal differences in how people use the different items, especially the feeling thermometer (see Iyengar et al. 2012).

These findings suggest one of two possibilities. It could be that the other items are poor measures of affective polarization, and we should use the social distance measures. Alternatively, it could be that the other items tap affective polarization, and we should be skeptical of social distance measures. We argue for the second conclusion. First, from a theoretical perspective, Allport's (1954) classic characterization of prejudice states that the first step is negative out-group sentiments and the second is an aversion to interaction (see also Lelkes and Westwood 2017). The feeling thermometer, trait ratings, and trust measures all tap that first step of sentiments, whereas the social distance measures speak to the distinctive second step of interactions. One could have qualms about the other party but still be willing to interact with them. This coheres with finding of a negative but modest correlation between social distance and the other measures. Second, Klar, Krupnikov, and Ryan (Forthcoming) show that the social distance measures not only encapsulate dislike of the other party but also a general distaste with politics (e.g., respondents presume the hypothetical friend is not only from the other party but also would want to discuss politics). It is thus an imperfect measure of partisan animus. In sum, while the social distance items measure an important dimension of affective discord, they are perhaps not good general-purpose measures of affective polarization.[3]

We have thus far answered the first question posed above about which items measure affective polarization. We now turn to the second question about whether individuals think of the party as voters, elites, or some combination of the two. We do so analyzing the impact of the experimental conditions. Table 2 presents regression results

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[3] We also explored the convergent validity of each affective polarization measure by correlating each with the four commonly used predictive variables: partisan importance, partisan social identity, partisan ambivalence, and negative partisanship. We find all measures strongly relate to these variables, suggesting that they all meaningfully capture variation in partisan animosity. See the appendix for details.

where we regress each outcome measure on indicators for the experimental conditions. We use assessments of the other party, rather than differences between the parties, as our dependent variable here. Our goal is to understand whether people think of voters or elites when assessing the party, so focusing on evaluations of one party—rather than the difference between parties—is the more sensible quantity of interest here. Analyzing the difference in the context of the experiment is essentially analyzing a difference-in-difference, which is not analytically useful here.

[Insert Table 2 About Here]

Table 2 shows a clear and consistent pattern of results: on every measure, respondents are considerably more negative toward the elites of the other party than they are toward voters or the parties. For example, on the feeling thermometer rating item, individuals rate the opposing party's voters at 28.8 degrees, but they rate the other party's candidates and elected officials at 24.7 degrees, fully 15 percent lower. The same is true on every other measure: they rate them more negatively on traits, and they trust them less. Our findings highlight that Americans are particularly negative toward partisan elites (Fiorina 2017).

Further, our results show that when people evaluate the other party—as the standard measures of affective polarization ask them to do—they think of elites more than ordinary voters. While the ratings of elites and parties are always significantly less than the ratings of voters, the ratings of elites and parties typically cannot be differentiated from one another (see the bottom section of Table 2). Perhaps not surprisingly, people think of the opposing party in terms of those most often associated with those labels: the president (when from the other party), members of Congress, and

other elected officials. Part of what scholars have called affective polarization, then, is not simply dislike of the opposing party, but is dislike of the opposing party's *elites*.

Conclusion

This research note addresses two lacunae in the literature on affective polarization. First, it compares the various measures of affective polarization, and finds that they all are strongly related to one another, with the exception of social distance items. These items do capture an important dimension of partisan animus, but it is more than simply negative sentiment toward the other party (it is also a desire to avoid them). Combined with other recent findings (Klar et al. Forthcoming), this suggests that these items are not good general-purpose measures of affective polarization. Second, when scholars measure feelings toward "parties," they are capturing attitudes towards elites more than towards voters. Moreover, people may not like voters from the other party, but they intensely dislike the other party's elites. So part of what our measures of affective polarization capture is not simply dislike of the other party, but dislike of its elected leaders.

This displeasure with elites helps us better understand why people are unhappy with—and feel poorly represented by—the political system (Fiorina 2017). Not only that, this also underlines what Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) find: affective polarization drives down trust in government in part because it reflects trust in the other party's elites. For example, in our study, nearly ½ of subjects in the elite condition (47%) "almost never" trust the other party to do what is right, so little wonder that they think government does not work when the other party is in power.

Yet despite that relatively pessimistic depiction, we can end on a more positive point. Even with high levels of affective polarization, Americans are still—by and large—willing to interact with those from the other party, suggesting partisan animus is not as pronounced as the press might suggest (see also Lelkes and Westwood 2017). Further, partisanship is still not an especially important identity for most voters. In our survey, we also asked people how important 6 different identities were to them: their national (American) identity, their racial identity, their religious identity, their gender identity, their class identity, and their partisan identity. Of these, partisanship ties for *last* place with class, significantly below *all of* the others (see the appendix). This is a stark message for political scientists who study how party shapes non-political decisions—it is critically important in such studies to simultaneously consider other identities that ostensibly dwarf partisanship. This further suggests, somewhat ironically, that because people see the parties as primarily elite vehicles, they feel more distant from them, and hence attach less identity to their partisanship. So while affective polarization might be a negative force in American politics, this does help to limit its reach.

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Correlation Matrix, Out-Party Affect Items:

	Feeling Thermometer	Trait Ratings	Trust Ratings	Social Distance Items
Feeling Thermometer	1.0			
Trait Ratings	0.52	1.0		
Trust Rating	0.57	0.63	1.0	
Social Distance Items	-0.21	-0.19	-0.25	1.0

Correlation Matrix, Party Difference (In-Party – Out-Party) Items:

	Feeling Thermometer	Trait Ratings	Trust Ratings	Social Distance Items
Feeling Thermometer	1.0			
Trait Ratings	0.44	1.0		
Trust Rating	0.64	0.54	1.0	
Social Distance Items	0.22	0.12	0.21	1.0

Table 1: Correlation Matrix, Measures of Affective Polarization

Note: Cell entries are the pairwise polychoric correlations between the various measures of affective polarization. The top half of the table presents the correlations between the items measuring affect toward the other party (i.e., Democrats rating of Republicans). The bottom half presents the correlation between the differenced versions of the items (e.g., Democrat's FT rating of Democrats minus their FT rating of Republicans).

	(1) Out-Party Feeling Thermometer	(2) Trait Ratings of the Other Party	(3) Trust in the Other Party
Elites Condition	-4.11*** (1.34)	-0.26*** (0.10)	-0.09 (0.06)
Parties Condition	-5.36*** (1.35)	-0.30*** (0.10)	-0.11* (0.06)
Constant	28.79*** (0.95)	-1.30*** (0.07)	1.89*** (0.04)
Significant Difference between Elite/Party Conditions?	N (p=0.35)	N (p=0.67)	N (p=0.76)
Observations	1,703	1,660	1,662
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.00

Table 2: Differences in Affective Polarization by Target for Other Party Items

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. The models regress indicator variables for the experimental conditions on each of the measures of affective polarization. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix

1. Survey details and Demographics

We hired the firm Bovitz Inc. to conduct the survey. They collected the data from a non-probability-based, but representative (on all key census demographics), sample of the United States. The survey was administered via the Internet. Table A1 below compares our sample to the 2016 American Community Survey, the Census Bureau's most recent estimate of the characteristics of the U.S. population.[4]

	Our Survey (%)	ACS Benchmark (%)
Income $100,000 or more	20%	25%
Female	50%	51%
Aged 65+	14%	15%
Caucasian	68%	73%
African-American	12%	13%
College Graduate or Higher Education	37%	31%

Table A1: Comparison of our survey data to benchmarks from the 2016 American Community Survey

As Table A1 reveals, our data tracks the ACS benchmarks (unsurprising given that Bovitz Inc., our firm, uses them to construct its sample). Our sample diverges from the ACS in only a few ways, most notably in under-representing high-income individuals and over-representing college graduates. But overall, our sample closely matches the U.S. population along most key dimensions.

We conducted the survey in two waves. The first occurred from December 6, 2017 to December, 12, 2017. Respondents were re-contacted 7 days after completing the first wave, and thus the wave 2 data were collected from December 13 to December 20th.[5] The experimental items all appeared on wave 2 of the survey, as did our measure of partisan ambivalence which too experimentally varied the target. The other items—including demographics, partisan social identity, partisan importance, negative partisanship, and the social distance questions (see appendix section on convergent validity) —appeared on wave 1. The separating ensured that asking about partisan identity did not prime subsequent affective evaluations. Also, for all items, respondents were first asked about the other party and then about their own party.

2. Correlations By Experimental Condition

In the paper, we merged experimental conditions when presenting the correlational relationships between affective polarization measures. In Tables A2-A4 we present those correlations separately for each experimental condition. As can be seen, the results are

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[4] Data from the ACS is available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data.html.

[5] Our wave 1 N was 2,784 and thus our response rate at wave 2, in light of wave 1 responding, is roughly 80% (2,224/2,784).

analogous across condition with one exception. That exception is the trait ratings in the "party" condition. This stems from respondents provided notably low in-party trait ratings in that condition. We are not entirely clear on why this is the case.

Correlation Matrix, Out-Party Affect Items:

	Feeling Thermometer	**Trait Ratings**	**Trust Ratings**	**Social Distance Items**
Feeling Thermometer	1.0			
Trait Ratings	0.46	1.0		
Trust Rating	0.57	0.65	1.0	
Social Distance Items	-0.19	-0.21	-0.25	1.0

Correlation Matrix, Party Difference (In-Party – Out-Party) Items:

	Feeling Thermometer	**Trait Ratings**	**Trust Ratings**	**Social Distance Items**
Feeling Thermometer	1.0			
Trait Ratings	0.60	1.0		
Trust Rating	0.66	0.66	1.0	
Social Distance Items	0.24	0.20	0.20	1.0

Table A-2: Correlation Matrix, Measures of Affective Polarization for the Voter Condition

Note: Cell entries are the pairwise polychoric correlations between the various measures of affective polarization for the voter experimental condition. The top half of the table presents the correlations between the items measuring affect toward the other party (i.e., Democrats rating of Republicans). The bottom half presents the correlation between the differenced versions of the items (e.g., Democrat's FT rating of Democrats minus their FT rating of Republicans).

Correlation Matrix, Out-Party Affect Items:

	Feeling Thermometer	Trait Ratings	Trust Ratings	Social Distance Items
Feeling Thermometer	1.0			
Trait Ratings	0.57	1.0		
Trust Rating	0.54	0.66	1.0	
Social Distance Items	-0.21	-0.13	-0.24	1.0

Correlation Matrix, Party Difference (In-Party – Out-Party) Items:

	Feeling Thermometer	Trait Ratings	Trust Ratings	Social Distance Items
Feeling Thermometer	1.0			
Trait Ratings	0.64	1.0		
Trust Rating	0.62	0.70	1.0	
Social Distance Items	0.18	0.13	0.17	1.0

Table A-3: Correlation Matrix, Measures of Affective Polarization for the Elite Condition

Note: Cell entries are the pairwise polychoric correlations between the various measures of affective polarization for the elite experimental condition. The top half of the table presents the correlations between the items measuring affect toward the other party (i.e., Democrats rating of Republicans). The bottom half presents the correlation between the differenced versions of the items (e.g., Democrat's FT rating of Democrats minus their FT rating of Republicans).

Correlation Matrix, Out-Party Affect Items:

	Feeling Thermometer	Trait Ratings	Trust Ratings	Social Distance Items
Feeling Thermometer	1.0			
Trait Ratings	0.52	1.0		
Trust Rating	0.59	0.57	1.0	
Social Distance Items	-0.24	-0.23	-0.26	1.0

Correlation Matrix, Party Difference (In-Party – Out-Party) Items:

	Feeling Thermometer	Trait Ratings	Trust Ratings	Social Distance Items
Feeling Thermometer	1.0			
Trait Ratings	0.18	1.0		
Trust Rating	0.63	0.23	1.0	
Social Distance Items	0.23	0.03	0.24	1.0

Table A-4: Correlation Matrix, Measures of Affective Polarization for the Party Condition

Note: Cell entries are the pairwise polychoric correlations between the various measures of affective polarization for the party experimental condition. The top half of the table presents the correlations between the items measuring affect toward the other party (i.e., Democrats rating of Republicans). The bottom half presents the correlation between the differenced versions of the items (e.g., Democrat's FT rating of Democrats minus their FT rating of Republicans).

3. Convergent validity results

We explored the convergent validity of each affective polarization measures by regressing each on four commonly used predictive variables: partisan importance (Klar 2014), partisan social identity (Huddy et al. 2015), partisan univalence (which indicates a lack of partisan ambivalence; see Lavine et al. 2012), and negative partisanship (Pew Research Center 2016) (all question wordings appear later in the appendix.) Consistent with the paper, we focus on out-party versions of the measures; we also present individual bi-variate regressions, rather than multiple regressions because collinearity between the predictive variables is severe (e.g., the correlation between party identity importance and partisan social identity is .81). As shows in Tables A5-A8, we find all measures all strongly related to these variables, suggesting that they all meaningfully capture variation in partisan animosity.

	(1) Out-Party Feeling Therm.	(2) Trait Ratings of the Other Party	(3) Trust in the Other Party	(4) Social Distance Items
Partisan Identity Importance	-1.89***	-0.10***	-0.05***	0.13***
	(0.46)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	31.60***	-1.19***	1.98***	1.38***
	(1.56)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Observations	1,699	1,656	1,658	2,655
R-squared	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.05

Table A-5: Impact of Partisan Identity Importance

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	(1) Out-Party Feeling Therm.	(2) Trait Ratings of the Other Party	(3) Trust in the Other Party	(4) Social Distance Items
Partisan Social Identity	-3.93***	-0.20***	-0.08***	0.15***
	(0.59)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	38.41***	-0.83***	2.07***	1.30***
	(2.00)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Observations	1,700	1,657	1,659	2,656
R-squared	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.04

Table A-6: Impact of Partisan Social Identity

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	(1) Out-Party Feeling Therm.	(2) Trait Ratings of the Other Party	(3) Trust in the Other Party	(4) Social Distance Items
Partisan Univalence	-15.79***	-1.20***	-0.66***	0.17***
	(0.71)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	37.69***	-0.56***	2.33***	1.70***
	(0.74)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,661	1,660	1,662	1,671
R-squared	0.23	0.25	0.23	0.03

Table A-7: Impact of Partisan Univalence

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	(1) Out-Party Feeling Therm.	(2) Trait Ratings of the Other Party	(3) Trust in the Other Party	(4) Social Distance Items
Negative Partisanship	-5.97***	-0.49***	-0.22***	0.10***
	(1.16)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Constant	33.52***	-0.84***	2.11***	1.64***
	(1.66)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Observations	1,662	1,619	1,621	2,284
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00

Table A-8: Impact of Negative Partisanship

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4. Identity Importance Results

We asked respondents, on wave 1 of the survey, to rate the importance of six distinct identities on 5 point scales, with higher scores indicating importance. Table A-9 displays the results. The Ns are larger since we include all respondents who participated at wave 1 even if they did not respond at Wave 2. The results reveal that partisan identity ties for last in importance, with class. It also is significantly less important than all other identities apart from class (e.g., comparing partisan identity to racial identity gives $t_{2590} = 5.80, p<.01$).

Identity	Mean (Std. Dev.; N)
American Identity	4.10 (1.10; 2,662)
Gender Identity	3.93 (1.18; 2.662)
Religious Identity	3.54 (1.28; 2,660)
Racial Identity	3.16 (1.43; 2,593)
Partisan Identity	2.98 (1.25; 2,660)
Class Identity	2.98 (1.22; 2,662)

Table A-9: Identity Importance Ratings

6. Question Wordings

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?

_____   _____   _____   _____
Democrat   *Republican*   *Independent*   *Some other party*

PROGRAMING INSTRUCTION: IF ANSWERED DEMOCRAT OR REPUBLICAN, ASK, PUTTING IN THE APPROPRIATE PARTY:

Would you call yourself a strong [**Democrat / Republican**] or a not very strong [**Democrat / Republican**]?

_____   _____
Strong   *Not very strong*

PROGRAMING INSTRUCTION: IF ANSWERED INDEPENDENT OR SOME OTHER PARTY, ASK:

If you had to choose, do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?

_____   _____   _____
Closer to   *Closer to*   *Neither*
Democratic Party *Republican Party*

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

_____   _____   _____   _____   _____
Less than   *High*   *Some*   *4 year college*   *Advanced*
High school   *school graduate*   *college*   *degree*   *degree*

What is your estimate of your family's annual household income (before taxes)?

_____   _____   _____   _____   _____
< $30,000   *$30,000 - $69,999*   *$70,000-$99,999*   *$100,000-$200,000*
        >$200,000

Which of the following do you consider to be your primary racial or ethnic group? **PROGRAMMING INSTRUCTION – IF CHOOSE "OTHER" OFFER AN OPEN ENDED OPTION TO WRITE IT IN, ASKING "HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR PRIMARY RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP_____?"**

White	*African American*	*Asian American*	*Hispanic or Latino*	*Native American*	*Other*

Which of the following best describes your gender identity?

Male	*Female*	*Transgender*	*None of the categories offered*

What is your age?

Under 18	*18-24*	*25-34*	*35-50*	*51-65*	*Over 65*

How important is your identity as a $RELIGION to you? **PROGRAMMING INSTRUCTION -- $RELIGION = THE ANSWER TO RELIGION QUESTION, EDITED IF NECESSARY (E.G., USE "JEW" AND NOT "JEWISH"). IF SUBJECTS PUT OTHER, THEN USE THEIR ANSWER FROM THE TEXT BOX. IF CHOOSE NON-RELIGIOUS" PUT IN "AS A NON-RELIGIOUS PERSON." IF DID NOT ANSWER, ASK "HOW IMPORTANT IS YOUR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY TO YOU?"**

Not at all important	*Not very important*	*Somewhat important*	*Very important*	*Extremely important*

How important is your identity as a $CLASS person to you? **PROGRAMMING INSTRUCTION -- $CLASS = THE ANSWER TO CLASS QUESTION. IF DID NOT ANSWER, ASK "HOW IMPORTANT IS YOUR CLASS IDENTITY TO YOU?"**

Not at all important	*Not very important*	*Somewhat important*	*Very important*	*Extremely important*

How important is your identity as a $RACE to you? **PROGRAMMING INSTRUCTION -- $RACE = THE ANSWER TO RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUP QUESTION, EDITED WHEN NECESSARY AND SO IF HISPANIC OR LATINO, WRITE "HISPANIC/LATINO". IF SUBJECTS PUT OTHER, THEN USE THEIR ANSWER FROM THE TEXT BOX. IF THEY DID NOT ANSWER, ASK "HOW IMPORTANT IS YOUR RACIAL IDENTITY TO YOU?"**

Not at all important	*Not very important*	*Somewhat important*	*Very important*	*Extremely important*

How important is your identity as a $GENDER to you? **PROGRAMMING**

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Not at all
important   _Not very_
important   _Somewhat_
important   _Very_
important   _Extremely_
important

How important is your identity as an American to you?

Not at all
important   _Not very_
important   _Somewhat_
important   _Very_
important   _Extremely_
important

How important is your identity as a $PARTY to you?

Not at all
important   _Not very_
important   _Somewhat_
important   _Very_
important   _Extremely_
important

How important is being a $PARTY to you?

Not at all
important   _Not very_
important   _Somewhat_
important   _Very_
important   _Extremely_
important

How well does the term $PARTY describe you?

Not at all
well   _Not very_
well   _Somewhat_
well   _Very_
well   _Extremely_
well

When talking about $PARTYs, how often do you use "we" instead of "they"?

Never   _Rarely_   _Some of_
the time   _Most of_
the time   _All of_
the time

To what extent do you think of yourself as being a $PARTY?

Not at all   _Not too much_   _Somewhat_   _A good deal_   _A great deal_

How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are $OUTPARTY?

Not at all comfortable	*Not too comfortable*	*Somewhat comfortable*	*Extremely comfortable*

How comfortable are you having neighbors on your street who are $OUTPARTY?

Not at all comfortable	*Not too comfortable*	*Somewhat comfortable*	*Extremely comfortable*

Suppose a son or daughter of yours was getting married. How would you feel if he or she married a supporter of the $OUTPARTY?

Not at all upset	*Not too upset*	*Somewhat upset*	*Extremely upset*

Would you say that you are a $PARTY because you are for what the $PARTY represent, or are you more against what the $OUTPARTY represents?
- For what $PARTY represent
- Against what $OUTPARTY represent

We'd like you to rate how you feel towards Republican and Democratic Party voters/Republican and Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic and Republican parties on a scale of 0 to 100, which we call a "feeling thermometer." On this feeling thermometer scale, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel unfavorable and cold (with 0 being the most unfavorable/coldest). Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm (with 100 being the most favorable/warmest). A rating of 50 means you have no feelings one way or the other. How would you rate your feeling toward Republican and Democratic Party voters/Republican and Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic and Republican parties?**[Use sliders from 0 to 100; SET IT TO HAVE NO DEFAULT IN QUALTRICS SO WOULD NOT BE AT A VALUE:]**

Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party

_____

Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party

_____

You might have some favorable thoughts or feelings about Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party. Or you might have unfavorable thoughts or feelings about Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party. Or you might have some of each. We would like to ask you first about any about any favorable thoughts and feelings you might have about Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party. Then, we'll ask you some separate questions about any unfavorable thoughts and feelings you might have.

Do you have any favorable thoughts or feelings about Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party or do you not have any?

No favorable thoughts or feelings	*Yes at least one favorable thought or feeling*

IF AT LEAST ONE, ASK (IF Said no skip the next question):
How favorable are your favorable thoughts and feelings about Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party?

Slightly favorable	*Moderately favorable*	*Very favorable*	*Extremely favorable*

Do you have any unfavorable thoughts or feelings about Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party, or do you not have any?

No unfavorable thoughts of feelings	*Yes at least one unfavorable thought or feeling*

IF AT LEAST ONE, ASK (IF Said no skip the next question):
How unfavorable are your unfavorable thoughts and feelings about Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party?

Slightly Unfavorable	*Moderately Unfavorable*	*Very Unfavorable*	*Extremely Unfavorable*

You might have some favorable thoughts or feelings about Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party. Or you might have unfavorable thoughts or feelings about Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party. Or you might have some of each. We would like to ask you first about any favorable thoughts and feelings you might have about Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party. Then, we'll ask you some separate questions about any unfavorable thoughts and feelings you might have.

Do you have any favorable thoughts or feelings about Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party, or do you not have any?

_____   _____
No favorable   *Yes at least one favorable thought or feeling*
thoughts or feelings

How favorable are your favorable thoughts and feelings about Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party?

_____   _____   _____   _____
Slightly   *Moderately*   *Very*   *Extremely*
favorable   *favorable*   *favorable*   *favorable*

Do you have any unfavorable thoughts or feelings about Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party, or do you not have any?

_____   _____
No unfavorable   *Yes at least one unfavorable thought or feeling*
thoughts of feelings

How unfavorable are your unfavorable thoughts and feelings about Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party?

_____   _____   _____   _____
Slightly   *Moderately*   *Very*   *Extremely*
unfavorable   *unfavorable*   *unfavorable*   *unfavorable*

Now we'd like to know more about what you think about Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party. Below, we've given a list of words that some people might use to describe them.
For each item, please indicate how well you think it applies to Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party: not at all well; not too well; somewhat well; very well; or extremely well.

	Not at all well	Not too well	Somewhat well	Very well	Extremely well
Patriotic					
Intelligent					
Honest					
Open-minded					
Generous					
Hypocritical					
Selfish					
Mean					

Now we'd like to know more about what you think about Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party. Below, we've given a list of words that some people might use to describe them.
For each item, please indicate how well you think it applies to Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party: not at all well; not too well; somewhat well; very well; or extremely well.

	Not at all well	Not too well	Somewhat well	Very well	Extremely well
Patriotic					
Intelligent					
Honest					
Open-minded					
Generous					
Hypocritical					
Selfish					
Mean					

How much of the time do you think you can trust Republican Party voters/Republican Party candidates and elected officials/the Republican Party to do what is right for the country?

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Almost never	*Once in a while*	*About half the time*	*Most of the time*	*Almost always*

How much of the time do you think you can trust Democratic Party voters/Democratic Party candidates and elected officials/the Democratic Party to do what is right for the country?

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Almost never	*Once in a while*	*About half the time*	*Most of the time*	*Almost always*

Appendix References

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