Institute for Policy Research
Northwestern University
Working Paper Series

WP-13-01

Compromise vs. Compromises: Conceptions of Bipartisanship in the American Electorate

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Version: January 2013

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Abstract

Public opinion surveys regularly assert that Americans want political leaders to work together and to engage in bipartisan compromise. If so, why has Congress become increasingly acrimonious even though the American public wants it to be "bipartisan"? Many scholars claim that this is simply a breakdown of representation. This working paper offers another explanation: although people profess support for "bipartisanship" in an abstract sense, what they desire procedurally out of their party representatives in Congress is to not compromise with the other side. To test this argument, the researchers conduct three experiments in which they alter aspects of the political context to see how people respond to parties (not) coming together to achieve broadly popular public policy goals. They find that citizens' proclaimed desire for bipartisanship in actuality reflects self-serving partisan desires. Consequently, members of Congress do not have electoral incentives to reach across to aisle to build costly bipartisan coalitions.

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One of the most copiously documented and studied trends in American politics has been the partisan polarization of elected representatives, particularly in the U.S. Congress (e.g., McCarty et al. 2006; Theriault 2008). Closely tied to increased elite polarization is a decline in legislative cooperation. Recent decades—and recent years in particular—have been characterized by Congress becoming increasingly dysfunctional and unable to craft bipartisan agreements on important legislation (Mann and Ornstein 2006; 2012). For instance, the crisis over the U.S. government's inability to compromise and raise the debt ceiling, a routine procedure in previous years, resulted in the unprecedented downgrading of the United States' credit rating in 2011 (Appelbaum and Dash 2011). Some commentators even feel that the inability of political elites to compromise and complete the basic business of government such as passing budgets and appropriations bills threaten the "system of constitutional democracy" (Mann and Ornstein 2012). Guttman and Thompson (2012) argue that while campaigning requires politicians to focus on principles, governing requires compromise. As such, the disappearance of this ability to negotiate across the aisle may have tremendous social costs. These concerns raise the question of why elected officials behave in this manner and whether such behavior is grounded in electoral motivations. Accordingly, this paper addresses the following question: To what extent is the partisan conflict of congressional politics incongruent with public preferences and the electoral incentives of members, particularly given that Americans profess a general desire for bipartisanship among their representatives?

While the presence of partisan conflict in recent years is apparent, the causes are unclear. Further, many scholars have implied that this level of disagreement is normatively undesirable. Partisan conflict may not only be the result of policy disagreement (which may be rooted in constituency preferences) but of long-term strategic considerations to deny the opposing party victories (over even commonly-agreed upon legislation) that may be used for electoral benefit later on. For example, in their discussion of the health-care debate in 2009, Gutmann and Thompson (2012, 113) note how Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina urged his fellow Republicans to work

against compromise on the legislation and even against a bipartisan reform so that Democrats would suffer political losses. They quote DeMint as saying, "If we're able to stop Obama on this, it will be his Waterloo. It will break him." Further, the comity and friendliness of members has declined over time. Whereas norms sustained reciprocity in Congress in the 1960s, Congress has become much less cordial in recent decades. Uslaner (1993, 1) suggests that "without reciprocity, policy-making becomes more difficult and some of the most pressing problems facing the nation go unresolved." A textual analysis by Gary King found that 27% of communication of members of Congress in floor speeches consists of taunting the opposition (Fahrenthold 2011). *PS: Political Science* devoted a symposium in the summer of 2012 to the issue of political civility and its connection to partisanship, compromise, representation, and governing (Strachan and Wolf 2012; Maisel 2012; Shea and Sproveri 2012; Geer 2012; Wolf et al. 2012; Jamieson and Hardy 2012). In nearly all cases, the assessment of Congress in this arena is negative.

Given its perceived dysfunctionality, it is unsurprising that Congress suffers from the lowest approval figures of any American political institution, with ratings in the 20s since at least 2005 and in the teens more recently (Polling Report 2012). An *NBC News/Wall Street Journal* poll conducted in December 2011 found that only 3% of Americans rated the 112th Congress as "above average" while 75% rated it as "below average" or "one of the worst ever" (NBC News/Wall Street Journal 2011). The majority of Americans overwhelmingly disapprove of the performance of both parties in Congress, under both Republican and Democratic control.

The partisan acrimony in Congress appears to be at odds with Americans' stated desires. National poll after national poll asserts that Americans want political leaders to work together and to engage in bipartisan compromise. For example, a CBS poll (2009) asked, "Looking ahead, which comes closer to your view? The Democrats won a majority in Congress and should generally try to pass legislation that they think is right for the country, even if Republicans don't support it. The Democrats should generally try to pass legislation that receives bipartisan support from Republicans

in Congress." 60% of respondents chose the bipartisan option while 32% said they wanted Democrats to pass their own legislation. Similarly, a 2006 poll conducted by National Public Radio found that 71% of survey respondents preferred that Democrats and Republicans work together in a bipartisan way instead of sticking to the policies they committed to in the election (NPR 2006).[1]

These trends raise the question: Why has Congress become increasingly acrimonious and polarized even though the American public wants it to be "bipartisan"? Some scholars claim that this is simply a breakdown of representation. Fiorina and Abrams (2009) suggest that there is a "disconnect" between the median voter and political elites. Although the cause of this breakdown is unknown, scholars have pointed to myriad factors to explain congressional partisanship, including pressures in party primaries (e.g., Brady et al. 2007; Burden 2001, 2004), competition for majority control (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2005; Lee 2009; Hacker and Pierson 2005), and the influence of special interest money (e.g., Sinclair 2006; Rae 2007; Wand 2012). More generally, Fiorina and colleagues have pointed to changes in political institutions and procedures as well as social change during the past half century that have magnified the importance of the political class relative to the average citizen (Fiorina and Abrams 2009, 75; Fiorina et al. 2005).

We offer another explanation: although people profess support for "bipartisanship" in an abstract sense, what they desire procedurally out of their party representatives in Congress is to not compromise with the other side. In other words, there may not be a breakdown of representation at all. Members of Congress do not have electoral incentives to reach across to aisle to build costly bipartisan coalitions, especially on important floor votes or in other activities where the partisan alternatives are clear. Working across party lines may not only be costly in terms of the time and effort involved but also in terms of the potential threats members face from primary constituencies as

[1] These results are not atypical. A CBS News Poll (2011) found that about 80% of respondents preferred that President Obama, the Democrats in Congress, and the Republicans in Congress compromise some of their positions to pass a budget. Similarly, a 2011 poll conducted by Pew Research found that 68% of respondents reported wanting lawmakers being "willing to compromise, even if it means they strike a deal you disagree with" in the context of the debt ceiling negotiations (Pew 2011).

well as opposition from interest groups far outside the mainstream.

Our goal is to go beyond existing studies that have sought to assess people's preferences for bipartisanship in an abstract sense and to better understand what they mean by that term concretely. This will allow us to better assess the degree of representation in contemporary politics. In doing so, we build on extant research that has attempted to understand Americans' views towards gridlock, polarization, and procedure in Congress.

While most previous studies of partisan acrimony in Congress have addressed it at an institutional level (e.g., Theriault 2008; McCarty et al. 2006; Lee 2009), surprisingly less research has attempted to unpack the "electoral connection" by assessing mass opinions toward Congressional polarization. Much of the research on public preferences focuses on a general unhappiness with partisan discord in Congress (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Durr et al. 1997). In terms of electoral incentives, Carson et al. (2010) observe that members are punished for excessive partisanship and Ramirez (2009) finds that partisan conflict in Congress affects institutional approval. In contrast, Wolf et al. (2012) suggest that heightened political interest and mobilization among those who want politicians to stick to their principles exacerbates political conflict and incivility. Accordingly, Harbridge and Malhotra (2011) offer a paradox: although people might prefer that Congress as a whole be more bipartisan, strong partisans approve of individual members *more* when they engage in partisanship.

We build on this research agenda by unpacking how Americans think about bipartisanship. To do so, we conduct three experiments in which we alter aspects of the political context to see how people respond to parties (not) coming together to achieve broadly popular public policy goals. Specifically, we investigate preferences for bipartisanship and attitudes toward Congress and its output by portraying bipartisanship as either an equal compromise or a capitulation by one side; by altering the partisan distribution of roll call votes on specific pieces of legislation; and by examining how partisan control of a chamber affects preferences for bipartisanship. We do not argue that public

preference for partisanship has been the main factor driving elite polarization. Rather, we suggest that partisan conflict is consistent with the electoral incentives of members and that citizen preferences may reinforce elite polarization.

This paper is organized as follows. The first section provides a theoretical framework on the different conceptions of bipartisanship that might be held by the public and how citizens might react to different institutional conditions. The following section provides an overview of our experimental approach to unpacking the abstruse concept of bipartisanship. We then present the designs and findings of our three studies. We conclude by summarizing the results of our experiments and their implications for how to interpret public sentiment toward bipartisanship as well as political elites' incentives to pursue compromise and expend the costs to construct bipartisan coalitions in Congress.

Theoretical Framework

Consider the two contrasting views of bipartisanship laid out by Indiana Senator Richard Lugar (often described as conservative but willing to reach across the aisle in a bipartisan fashion to pass policies) and Richard Mourdock, who defeated Lugar in the 2012 Republican primary:

> Bipartisanship is not the opposite of principle. One can be very conservative or very liberal and still have a bipartisan mindset. Such a mindset acknowledges that the other party is also patriotic and may have some good ideas. It acknowledges that national unity is important, and that aggressive partisanship deepens cynicism, sharpens political vendettas, and depletes the national reserve of good will that is critical to our survival in hard times (Lugar quoted in Zapler 2012).

> I have a mindset that says bipartisanship ought to consist of Democrats coming to the Republican point of view (Mourdock quoted in Weinger 2012).

We hypothesize that people express an abstract preference for Lugar's conception of bipartisanship, but when confronted with the specifics of actual policymaking they prefer outcomes along the lines of Mourdock's statement. Thus, bipartisanship is desired if the compromises come from the opposing side rather than one's own side. As Gutmann and Thompson (2012) write, people "say yes to compromise, but no to compromises" (27).

Bipartisanship in public discourse is often conceived in abstract terms as parties working together to achieve common ends. However, bipartisanship can take three main forms. It could be perceived as a focus on places of pre-existing common ground. Alternatively, it could comprise of a concession by both parties to meet in the middle. Finally, it could reflect a desire for the "other" side to come closer to "your" side, as suggested by Mourdock's view. The third conception of bipartisanship is very different from the first two. If people view bipartisanship to mean having the other side shift or compromise their positions, then the current acrimony we observe in Congress may simply be a function of legislators being responsive to what their co-partisan constituents mean by "bipartisan." If this is the case, then the current state of American politics may not reflect a disconnect in representation.

A review of recent polls measuring public preferences for bipartisanship shows that the concept is often not used in clear terms. Analysis of the word "bipartisan" in survey questions on Congress or the President in Roper's iPoll database (1985-2011) indicates that 113 questions provide no definition or a vague usage, 5 questions use bipartisan to indicate conceding positions or beliefs, and 11 questions use bipartisan to indicate mutual agreement. Similarly, of survey questions using the word "compromise," 153 offer no definition or a vague usage, 50 use the term to suggest compromise involves conceding positions or beliefs, and 28 are about mutual agreement. As a result, recent polling offers little help in unpacking how people interpret the term "bipartisan" when expressing their ideal level of compromise. Our main contention is that citizens' proclaim a desire for bipartisanship in an abstract sense but when confronted with specifics they exhibit self-serving partisan desires. As a result, members of Congress do not have incentives to engage in genuine compromise and build bipartisan coalitions in passing legislation.

We hypothesize that people are attracted to bipartisanship conceptually because it is associated with compromise and consensus, which have positive valence (Weisberg 1980; Dennis 1988a, 1988b). Moderation, open-mindedness, and independence are considered positive traits and

people like thinking of themselves in these terms (Keith et al. 1992; Kamieniecki 1988). Consequently, when asked about whether they want parties to work together without any specifics of the process or outcomes, people are attracted to words or phrases with positive valence such as "work together." Professing an abstract desire for bipartisanship allows people to conceive of themselves as even handed.

At the same time, political partisanship is an important social identity for Americans (Brewer 1991; Mullen et al. 1991; Greene 2004, 1999). In addition to providing a perceptual screen that affects the way they view and process information (Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006), partisanship represents an attachment to others whereby people see themselves as part of a group (Green et al. 2002). When they evaluate a specific compromise, or a manifestation of bipartisanship, this social identity is activated and people perceive lawmaking as an instance of group conflict. Even if people's policy preferences align with a bipartisan outcome (i.e. the result of both parties conceding ground), the procedure involved with one's in-group fighting with an out-group affects perceptions of fairness and primes partisanship in attitude formation, elevating the value of winning above collective policy benefits.

From this framework, we hypothesize that when confronted with concrete instances of policymaking, people will not prefer bipartisan compromises and coalitions to more partisan outcomes. This is most likely to be the case when the positions of each party are known and thus the "winners" and "losers" in a given outcome are clear. However, even when positions are less obvious, we suggest that partisan cues about the coalition may still limit support for bipartisanship in policymaking. That is, a coalition made up predominantly of in-group members may be viewed as favorably as a mixed coalition of both in-group and out-group members, with party cue effects offsetting the positive valence associated with bipartisanship. Finally, we hypothesize that magnifying partisan social identities with institutional arrangements that favor one's party will heighten preferences for partisan policymaking. As a result, when one's party is in the majority,

people should be less supportive of bipartisan approaches than when their party is in the minority.

Overview of Studies

To test our conjectures, we conducted three experimental studies, each designed to assess a different part of our argument that generically stated desires for bipartisanship ultimately reflect partisan interests. In total, the studies demonstrate the self-serving nature of people's conceptions of bipartisanship and that party leaders have few electoral incentives to seek partners from across the aisle to craft legislation. In each study, we focus on a relatively low-salience yet broadly popular issue where the experimental conditions are realistic. This decreases the level of pre-treatment bias in studying issues where attitudes may have hardened (Druckman and Leeper 2012). Further, we focus on relatively obscure issues in which there are not existing partisan divisions (unlike, e.g., gun control, taxes, abortion) since it is these less overtly partisan issues for which we would expect to find greater opportunities for common ground. The manipulations are intended to alter various aspects of congressional procedure and the policymaking process to assess how people's support for legislation and their perceptions of bipartisanship change according to different aspects of institutions such as the byproduct of negotiations, the nature of coalitions, and majority control.[2]

In Study #1, we ask people to assess a passed policy but vary the outcome of the negotiation, with some outcomes favoring a given party's position and others representing a more equitable compromise. In Study #2, we ask people to assess a passed policy where we hold the characteristics of the policy fixed but vary the composition of the coalition that supported the policy. In Study #3, we ask people to consider a policy that is yet to be passed and vary party control, seeing how party positions within the institution affect desires for bipartisanship.

[2] In order to isolate key features of the negotiation or the coalition in the treatment conditions, we included deceptive information in the blurbs given to respondents. At the end of the survey, respondents were provided with a debriefing script that noted this information and provided them with links if they wanted to read more about a particular policy.

The study was conducted by GfK Knowledge Networks over the Internet between January 28, 2012, and February 11, 2012. GfK Knowledge Networks recruits a nationally representative panel via address-based sampling and random digit dialing (RDD). Panelists are invited to complete the survey and are provided various forms of compensation in exchange for their participation, including complementary Internet access. 1,666 panelists were invited to participate in the survey; the final sample size was 1,059, yielding a completion rate of 63.6%. The AAPOR CUMRR1 cumulative response rate was 6.3%. All question wordings and response options are provided in the study descriptions below. The order of response options was randomly rotated, with half of respondents receiving the order presented in the text and the other half receiving the reverse order. The order of the three studies described below were randomly presented to respondents, eliminating treatment spillover bias (Transue et al. 2009). Item non-response was not an issue in the data. Across the ten dependent variables analyzed below, the completion rate ranged between 96%-98%.

At the beginning of the survey, all respondents were asked to report their party identification using the standard branched format used by the American National Election Studies: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or what?" Respondents reporting "Independent" or another response were then asked: "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic party or the Republican party?" (response options: "Democratic party," "Republican party"). For all analyses below, we divide respondents into Republicans and Democrats, pooling together leaners with partisans (following Keith et al. 1992). Twenty respondents did not respond to the leaning question and are therefore considered pure Independents, so the analyses below are analyzed using 1,039 respondents.[3]

Randomization checks confirmed that experimental conditions for all three studies were statistically and substantively similar on all observed pre-treatment variables (see Appendices A, B,

[3] Pure independents were dropped since the analysis focuses on treatments specific to a respondent's own party or the opposing party.

and C). Because the data are experimental, we do not need to control for potentially confounding covariates in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the treatment effects. Nonetheless, as both a robustness check because unbiasedness due to randomization is a large sample property (Gerber and Green 2012) and because controlling for covariates increases the efficiency of estimates (Angrist and Pischke 2009), we also estimate regression models which include a set of demographic controls (see Online Appendix 1).

Study 1

Design. We presented respondents with competing proposals from both Congressional Republicans and Democrats to cut NASA spending. We then randomized the outcome of the negotiation between the parties and assessed how respondents reacted to the outcome.

> President Obama and the Republican leadership in the House of Representatives are currently negotiating on how much spending to cut from NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration) in 2013. In 2012, NASA's budget was approximately $19 billion.
>
> President Obama and the Democrats propose cutting $200 million from NASA.
>
> Speaker of the House Boehner and the Republicans propose cutting $400 million from the budget.
>
> Suppose that the outcome of the negotiations was that $[X] million in NASA spending was cut.

We randomly assign respondents to receive one of three values of X: (1) $225 million, the outcome being closer to what the congressional Democrats wanted; (2) $375 million, the outcome being closer to what the congressional Republicans wanted; and (3) $300 million, the outcome exactly in between the two competing positions. By providing respondents with the preferences of each party, as well as with the outcome, respondents are able to consider the result of the negotiation in the context of alternative outcomes, how much each side compromises, and which side appears to be the winner.

We recode the treatment conditions based on the respondent's party identification: (1) "own-

party wins" (i.e. Democrats in the "$225 million outcome" condition and Republicans in the "$375 million outcome" conditions); (2) "other party wins" (i.e. Democrats in the "$375 million outcome" conditions and Republicans in the "$225 million outcome" conditions); and (3) the "$300 million" even bipartisan split condition. This allows us to pool respondents together in a single analysis. For this study as well as the other two studies reported in the paper, we also assessed whether treatment effects varied across Republicans and Democrats and we did not find this to be the case (see Online Appendix 2).[4] Hence, we report results from the pooled sample.

Hypotheses. We expect respondents to be more supportive of outcomes that reflect "wins" by their party, treating compromises as "losses" equivalent to the other party winning. Further, we predict a winning outcome will induce partisan bias in people's view of what comprises a bipartisan outcome. Additionally, being on the winning side may also enhance the partisan divide in preferences. Finally, we hypothesize that the perceived bipartisanship of one's own party leader is less sensitive to the nature of the outcome compared to the perceived bipartisanship of the opposing party's leader. In other words, when evaluating the other party's actions, people may not give credit to the other leader for being bipartisan, yet evaluate the other leader very poorly for standing his or her ground. On the other hand, when evaluating one's own leader, people may be more forgiving and less sensitive to hardline actions. This expectation is consistent with literature on motivated reasoning which has found that partisans punish presidents of the opposite party for economic performance but their evaluations of a president of their own party are not sensitive to economic indicators (Lebo and Cassino 2007).

Measures. We predict six dependent variables. First, as a manipulation check, respondents were asked to assess how bipartisan they perceived the outcome of the negotiations: "How

[4] One rational for partisan differences comes from studies by the Pew Research Center. They have found that Democrats have been more likely to prefer compromise than Republicans since 1987 (77% to 66%), with a growing gap over time (90% to 68% in 2012) (Pew 2012). This raises the possibility of differential preferences by party, even though majorities of both parties express a desire for compromise by political leaders. However, interactions terms between the treatments and party identification are generally insignificant.

'bipartisan' is the negotiated NASA budget?" (response options: "extremely bipartisan," "very bipartisan," "somewhat bipartisan," "slightly bipartisan," "not bipartisan at all"). Second, we measured support for the negotiated budget: "Would you say that you generally favor or oppose the negotiated NASA budget?" (response options: "strongly favor," "somewhat favor," "somewhat oppose," "strongly oppose"). The third and fourth dependent variables are measured using "sliders" provided to respondents to select the level of cuts (between $200 million and $400 million) that they consider "bipartisan" and that reflects their ideal outcome.[5] We created dummy variables indicating whether the respondent moved the slider toward their party's side away from the $300 million split (i.e., toward $200 million for Democrats and toward $400 million for Republicans) in reporting: (1) what they thought was a bipartisan outcome; and (2) their preferred outcome. We also asked respondents to assess the behavior of each of the parties: "To what extent did Speaker Boehner and the Republicans behave in a bipartisan fashion during the negotiations?" and "To what extent did President Obama and the Democrats behave in a bipartisan fashion during the negotiations?" (response options: "extremely bipartisan," "very bipartisan," "somewhat bipartisan," "slightly bipartisan," "not bipartisan at all"). When predicting attitudes towards the leaders involved in the negotiation, we recode the treatment dummies to represent whether the leader conceded his party's position, agreed to a bipartisan split, or stood firm for his party's position.

In this study and in others, we recode each dependent variable to lie between 0 and 1 so that a regression coefficient can be easily interpreted as producing a 100β percentage point change in the dependent variable from going from the lowest to highest point of the independent variable.

Results. We estimated OLS regressions predicting our dependent variables of interest with

[5] We first asked respondents "How much of a cut to NASA's budget would you consider to be a "bipartisan" outcome?" and asked them to move the slider below to make your choice. The dollar value they selected could be seen in a text box below. The second question asked respondents, "If you had to choose, how much would you cut NASA's budget?" An identical slider was provided for this question. The slider was initially set at $300 million. Respondents who did not move the slider and selected $300 million were given a follow-up question asking if they meant to answer $300 million, if they would like to re-answer the question, or if they wished not to provide a response.

dummy variables representing the own party win and bipartisan treatments discussed above (the "opposing party win" condition was set as the baseline category). Given that the dependent variables are rating scales, we also estimated identical versions of the models using ordered logistic regression and obtained similar results (see Online Appendix 3). We present results from OLS regressions here for ease of presentation and interpretability.

Confirming that our manipulation was successful, the equitable compromise outcome is perceived as 12.5 percentage points more bipartisan than the outcome where the opposing party wins ($p < .001$)[6] and 8.5 percentage points more bipartisan than the outcome where one's own party emerges victorious ($p < .001$) (see column one of Table 1; left-hand side of Figure 1). Interestingly, respondents perceive the outcome where their own party succeeds in the negotiations as 3.9 percentage points more bipartisan than when the budget is closer to the opposing party's position ($p = .03$). Hence, like Mourdock, it appears as if people believe it is more bipartisan for the other side to come to one's own position than vice versa.

As shown in the second column of Table 1 and the second set of bars in Figure 1, respondents were 3.7 percentage points more supportive of legislation when the negotiated budget was closer to their own party's position compared to it being closer to the opposing party's position ($p = .07$). Conversely, respondents exhibited substantively and significantly similar support when comparing the bipartisan budget to the budget outcome closer to the opposing party (1.1 percentage points, $p = .59$). This suggests that even though they viewed an even compromise as bipartisan, people equate an even compromise to a "loss" while they perceive of an outcome where their side budges very little as a "win." Because people prefer legislation passed when their party emerges victorious, leaders are incentivized to stand firm in negotiations.

Observing one's own side win also changes people's views of what they consider to be bipartisan. In the third column of Table 1, we present a regression predicting whether the respondent

[6] All significance tests reported are two-tailed.

viewed an outcome closer to their own party's position (and not the $300 million even split) as the bipartisan outcome. Compared to the other party emerging victorious, seeing the outcome come nearer to one's own party increases the likelihood of pulling the slider towards your party's position by 13.4 percentage points ($p < .001$) (see Figure 1, Partisan Bias (Bipartisan Outcome)). Further, compared to the even split condition, respondents in the "own party" win group were 9.4% more likely to believe that a bipartisan outcome was one biased toward their own party ($p = .007$). Conversely, observing a bipartisan split is no different than seeing the other party win (4.1 percentage points, $p = .24$). Consequently, people are more likely to exhibit partisan bias in what they perceive to be bipartisan after seeing their party representatives not concede in negotiations.

The outcomes of the negotiations also influenced preferences on the budget cuts themselves. In the fourth column of Table 1, we predict whether the respondent pulled the slider toward her own party's position when reporting her preferred outcome. Observing one's own party emerge victorious from the negotiations increases partisan bias in the preferred outcome by 6.7 percentage points over the "other party wins" condition ($p = .07$) and by 7.6 percentage point over the bipartisan split condition ($p = .045$) (see Figure 1, Partisan Bias (Preferred Outcome)). There was no significant difference between the "other party wins" and bipartisan split conditions (0.9 percentage points, $p = .82$). Thus, partisan polarization over issues is exacerbated by party leaders standing firm in their positions.

When evaluating the other party's leader, respondents are sensitive to outcomes they perceive as unfair. As shown in the first column of Table 2 and the left-hand side of Figure 2, respondents evaluate the leader as a substantively large 8.1 percentage points less bipartisan if the opposing party stands firm compared to the leader conceding in the negotiation ($p < .001$). Similarly, they evaluate the opposing leader as 11.1 percentage points less bipartisan when he stands firm compared to achieving an even split ($p < .001$). On the other hand, the leader earns no significant reward in terms of a bipartisan evaluation for producing a bipartisan split relative to an outcome where the leader

concedes (p = .15). Hence, people think that opposing leaders are partisan when they move outcomes to their side but believe they are bipartisan when the outcome is closer to the respondents' own position (and the opposing leader made medium to large compromises).

A different picture emerges when examining how people evaluate their own party's leader. As shown in the second column of Table 2 and the right-hand side of Figure 2, the effects of the treatments are smaller, suggesting less sensitivity to the leader's actions. Respondents evaluate the leader as only 3.5 percentage points more bipartisan if one's own party concedes the negotiation compared to the leader standing firm (p = .06). On the other hand, in the equitable compromise condition, the leader is perceived as being more bipartisan compared to the leader standing firm (6.9 percentage points, $p < .001$) and to the leader conceding (3.3 percentage points, p = .09). Hence, people do not perceive their own leaders as particularly partisan when they move outcomes to their side and are more willing to describe their own leaders as bipartisan when they make even small compromises. Thus, to be considered "bipartisan," a leader in your own party could compromise to the middle but no further, whereas a leader in the other party might as well come all the way over to your own side.

Study 2

Design. In contrast to Study 1, which highlighted the compromises made by each side, Study 2 focused on the makeup of the supporting coalition. By varying the composition of support rather than the compromises made to get there (and the resulting picture of the outcome as a win or a loss), this experiment offers a seemingly easy case for bipartisanship to be the desired outcome. We asked respondents to evaluate a piece of legislation that makes it easier for small businesses to obtain loans:

> Recently, the U.S. Senate considered the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which funded tax cuts to small businesses and made it easier for them to obtain loans.
> There are 100 members of the U.S. Senate, 53 Democrats and 47 Republicans. 46 Democrats and 46 Republicans voted on the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010.

> The bill passed on a vote of [X]. [Y1] Democrats voted for the bill and [Y2] Democrats voted against it. [Z1] Republicans voted for the bill and [Z2] Republicans voted against it.

We randomly assigned respondents to one of six conditions where we vary the composition of the coalition supporting the bill, both in terms of overall support (X), and the numbers of Democrats and Republicans voting for and against the bill (Y1/Y2; Z1/Z2):

Condition:	X (Vote):	Y1 (Dem. yea):	Y2 (Dem. nea):	Z1 (Rep. yea):	Z2 (Rep. nea):
Republican Dominated, Supermajority	68-24	22	24	46	0
Democratic Dominated, Supermajority	68-24	46	0	22	24
Bipartisan, Supermajority	68-24	34	12	34	12
Republican Dominated, Split	46-46	0	46	46	0
Democratic Dominated, Split	46-46	46	0	0	46
Bipartisan, Split	46-46	23	23	23	23

This effectively represents a 2x3 experimental design where we manipulate: (1) whether the coalition is split (46-46) or comprises a supermajority (68-24); and (2) whether the coalition is dominated by Democrats, Republicans, or cuts across party lines. Hence, we can alter the composition of the coalition while holding the size of the coalition fixed, eliminating the confound that often bipartisan coalitions are characterized by more popular support overall. We recode the second set of treatment conditions based on the respondent's party identification: (1) "own-party dominated" (i.e. Republicans in the "Republican Dominated" conditions and Democrats in the "Democrat Dominated" conditions); (2) "other-party dominated" (i.e. Republicans in the

"Democratic Dominated" conditions and Democrats in the "Republican Dominated" conditions); and (3) bipartisan. In addition to the manipulations described above, we also independently randomized whether Democrats' votes were presented before Republicans' votes, and whether yea votes were presented before nay votes.

Often when learning about a piece of passed legislation, people receive little information about the substance, and even less about the compromises that were made to reach a legislative outcome, but do learn about the composition of the coalition that passed it. Our experimental design attempts to capture this feature: people received some information about the policy's content and some information (in the form of a cue) about who supported it. By examining how respondents react to coalitions as cues, we can make inferences about how rational lawmakers, anticipating constituent responses, would aim to construct a winning coalition.

Hypotheses. For both the split and supermajority coalitions, we analyze whether respondents prefer the coalition primarily made up of their own party's supporters to the coalition that comprises both parties (assuming the coalition dominated by the other partly is strictly less preferred). On the one hand, the structure of the coalition may be purely interpreted by citizens as a party cue, activating partisan social identities and/or information about the policy. Consequently, Democrats/Republican respondents may be more likely to support the bill when they observe more Democrats/Republican members supporting the bill. They would combine the information from the partisan composition of the coalition with their prior support for the policy content to form an overall preference. The alternative hypothesis is that all respondents—regardless of partisanship—are more supportive of the legislation when it is presented as bipartisan. This experimental design allows us to test whether respondents actually do prefer bipartisan coalitions when tied to specific policies (as opposed to just expressing support for an abstract notion of bipartisanship). Or, party cues and bipartisan coalitions may have similar, positive effects on policy support. However, if citizens react strongly to coalitions as party cues or fail to provide higher levels of support for bipartisan coalitions, then party leaders

may not be incentivized to expend costs to work with the other side to construct bipartisan coalitions

Measures. As a manipulation check, we asked respondents: "How 'bipartisan' is the proposed legislation?" (response options: "extremely bipartisan," "very bipartisan," "somewhat bipartisan," "slightly bipartisan," "not bipartisan at all"). We would expect the bipartisan coalitions to be perceived as more bipartisan than both the "own party dominated" and "other party dominated" coalitions. To measure support for the small business loan policy, we asked respondents: "Would you say that you generally favor or oppose this legislation?" (response options: "strongly favor," "somewhat favor," "somewhat oppose," "strongly oppose").

Results. We estimated OLS regressions predicting our dependent variables of interest with dummy variables representing the six treatment conditions described above (the "opposing party dominated, split coalition" was set as the baseline category). As in Study 1, versions using ordered logistic regression models are presented in Online Appendix 3.

As shown in the first column of Table 3 and the left-hand sides of Figures 3a and 3b, respondents correctly understood the manipulations. In the supermajority conditions, respondents perceived the legislation produced by the bipartisan coalition to be 12 percentage points more "bipartisan" than the opposing party dominated coalition ($p < .001$) and 8 percentage points more "bipartisan" than the own party dominated coalition ($p = .009$). Similarly, in the split coalition conditions, the bipartisan coalition was perceived as being 12 percentage points more "bipartisan" than the opposing party dominated coalition ($p < .001$) and 7 percentage points more "bipartisan" than the own party dominated coalition ($p = .02$).

Despite accurately identifying truly bipartisan coalitions, we nonetheless find that respondents do not prefer legislation produced by the bipartisan coalitions to the own-party coalitions, suggesting that leaders gain little benefit from working with the other side to build support for legislation. As shown in the second column of Table 3 and the right-hand sides of Figures 3a/3b, in the supermajority coalitions, the support levels for the "own party" and "bipartisan" coalitions are

nearly identical; the difference is a substantively small 1.5 percentage points (p = .56). Similarly, in the split coalition, there is absolutely no difference in support between the "own party" and "bipartisan" coalitions (0.0 percentage points, p = .97). Unsurprisingly, under both types of coalitions, legislation produced by an opposite party dominated coalition is significantly less popular. Thus, we find that no matter whether coalitions are minimum winning coalitions or supermajorities, people do not provide extra support for bipartisan legislation, in contrast to their more abstract preference for bipartisanship exhibited in public opinion surveys. Whatever beneficial aspects citizens perceive in bipartisan legislation do not seem to outweigh the benefits—perhaps via the signaling of party cues—of legislation passed with coalitions dominated by one's own party.

Study 3

Design. The final study examines whether institutional arrangements moderate the self-serving partisan bias of conceiving of bipartisanship as being a capitulation by the other side. We manipulated whether respondents are associated with the majority or minority party in Congress to see if preferences for bipartisanship depend on institutional control. To do this, we leverage the partisan arrangement as of the date the survey was conducted to randomize whether respondents are told about a bill to increase the accessibility of higher education introduced by the leadership in either the House (with Republicans in the majority) or the Senate (with Democrats in the majority). In both conditions, respondents are told about Democratic and Republican proposals. The only difference in the blurbs is whether respondents are told that the legislation is being considered in the House or in the Senate, with the corresponding majority party.[7]

Next we would like to tell you about some proposed reforms to make higher education more

[7] One advantageous feature of this design is that the size of the majority in both chambers at the time of fielding was about the same. Of course, this design does not hold everything constant except majority status given the institutional differences between the House and Senate (e.g. the presence of the filibuster in the latter). Nonetheless, while institutional scholars are acutely aware of and sensitive to these differences, we doubt that a typical citizen would be.

affordable.

> Democrats in Congress would like to increase the accessibility and affordability of higher education by eliminating the 'middle-man' in student loans – private lenders who earn interest from student loans - and by increasing the amount of direct federal loans to students, particularly at community colleges.
>
> Republicans in Congress would also like to increase the accessibility and affordability of higher education. They propose expansion of Education Savings Accounts, by which millions of families now save for college and receive tax cuts for their education-devoted investments.
>
> The issue of higher education affordability is currently being debated in the [House, where Republicans hold the majority/Senate, where Democrats hold the majority].

Hypotheses. If respondents care about how institutions distribute power (following electoral outcomes), co-partisans may expect less bipartisan compromise from their own party (and more from the other party) when their party is in the majority relative to when their party is in the minority. The alternative is that people care only about partisan advantage and thus expectations of which party compromises is not dependent on whether their party is in the majority or in the minority. When one's party is in the majority, we predict that respondents will seek to exercise power and be less willing to compromise with the minority. In other words, people do not have a universal preference for bipartisanship *per se*; it depends on the institutional position of their party. Conversely, when one's party is in the minority, accommodation will seem to be more strategically beneficial.

Measures. We examine two dependent variables. First, we asked respondents about whether a bipartisan approach should be the priority for *their own party*: "Which do you think should be a higher priority for [Republicans/Democrats] in Congress right now—working in a bipartisan way with the [Democrats/Republicans] in Congress or sticking to [Republican/Democratic] positions on higher education affordability policies?" (response options: "work in a bipartisan way," "stick to positions"). Second, we asked: "Which of the following roles would you like to see elected representatives play in this policy area?" (response options: "work in a bipartisan way and be willing to compromise with others to make progress on important problems," "stand firm with their party on

issues and stick to their principles without compromise"). We recoded both variables to indicate whether one thought that bipartisanship should be pursued.

Results. Consistent with our hypothesis that institutional control reduces preferences for bipartisanship, we find that respondents assigned to the condition where their own party controlled the chamber exhibited 5.5 percentage points lower support for working in a bipartisan way with members of the opposing party vs. sticking to positions (p = .08) (see column one of Table 4 and the left-hand side of Figure 4).[8] Similarly, as shown in the second column of the table and the right-hand side of Figure 4, we find that respondents who were told that their party controls the chamber were 4.2 percentage points less likely to state that the role of elected representatives should be to work in a bipartisan way vs. standing firm with their party on issues (p = .098). In sum, we find that possessing power heightens partisan identities, making people less likely to support bipartisanship. This challenges the notion that people have a general preference for bipartisanship in Congress *per se*. Rather, it appears to be consistent with their strategic incentives.

Discussion

The results of these studies highlight three important features of the relationship between mass electorate preferences and partisan conflict in Congress. First, we demonstrate that voters do not express any special preference for bipartisan coalitions, preferring them as much or less than coalitions dominated by their own party. When the content of the compromise is clear, as in Study 1, partisan outcomes are strictly preferred. Support for the bipartisan coalition and the coalition dominated by one's own party received statistically similar support in Study 2. The difference in the results between Study 1 and Study 2 may reflect what respondents were told about the relationship between compromise and bipartisanship. In Study 1, both the positions of the two parties and the

[8] All analyses for Study 3 were conducted with linear probability models. We obtain similar results when estimating logistic regressions (see Online Appendix 3).

degree of compromise by each in the outcome is clear. Thus, partisan losses are evident, even in a truly bipartisan outcome. In contrast, respondents in Study 2 were not told whether or how the legislation changed between a bipartisan and partisan coalition. If this intuition is correct, then efforts by elected representatives to highlight their positions and the degree of compromise sought by the opposing side are likely to dampen support for bipartisanship among co-partisans.

Second, we show that voters' perceptions of bipartisanship reflect partisan biases, both in outcomes and in the evaluations of political leaders. Respondents perceive outcomes closer to their own party's position as more bipartisan than compromises that provide a win for the opposing side. Further, voters' perceptions of their own party's leaders are generally insensitive to inequitable compromises while their perceptions of the other party's leaders are highly sensitive. Third, we find that voters are less willing to support bipartisan action if their party is in the majority in Congress. Combined, these results suggest that when partisan conflict and a win for your side is an option, bipartisanship is not the preferred outcome despite generic claims for more bipartisanship and compromise. These findings are consistent with our theoretical framework that emphasized that while abstract conceptions of bipartisanship have positive valence, specific instances of compromise activate partisan social identities.

Turning from the experimental results to considerations of external validity, in many ways we provided what should have been the best case scenarios for observing support for bipartisanship. For instance, in Study 2 we examined a broadly popular proposal that cut across partisan lines. In Study 1, we provided an example where both parties want to move policy in the same direction—cutting NASA spending. If bipartisan compromises are not preferred, even when the direction of policy change is similar for both sides, it is unlikely that bipartisanship and compromise will be preferred on issues where the parties want to move policy in opposing directions. In addition, these were relatively low salience issues that have not received substantial attention by the media or

by candidates during campaigns, both factors that could make bipartisanship even less preferred for more contentious issues.

Future research on this topic should vary the stakes of political compromise, both by comparing more and less salient issues as well as by altering what happens if a compromise is not reached. In the studies reported here, agreement was either assumed to have already occurred (Studies 1 and 2) or was assumed to be possible (Study 3). Perhaps compromise is desired more when the alternative is policy gridlock (especially on a highly salient policy) than when the alternative is a win by your party or when no alternative is specified. Although the question wordings differ across surveys, in the polls discussed in the introduction preferences for bipartisanship were not markedly higher for questions that mentioned the consequences of gridlock. Nonetheless, considering how people react to alternatives to compromise is a fruitful avenue for subsequent scholarship.

When combined with the broader electoral and policy incentives for members to engage in partisanship, these findings suggest that not only is partisan discord in Congress likely but it is consistent with representation of co-partisans. As other scholars have noted, partisans, and especially strong partisans, are the segment of the public that is most likely to vote and to be politically engaged (Abramowitz 2010). With districts that skew toward one party (Theriault 2008), the interests of co-partisans are likely to dominate in both the primary and general elections. Thus, the preferences of a member's constituents further disincentivize bipartisanship rather than work against the numerous other incentives members have to engage in partisan behavior—heading off primary challengers, raising money, gaining interest group support, and differentiating their party in order to fight for majority status, just to name a few. As noted by Adler and Wilkerson (Forthcoming), lawmakers believe that voters value problem solving in governing; as a result, elected officials care about addressing the needs of the country and passing legislation. However, if legislation with partisan

coalitions is easier to pursue than bipartisan coalitions and there is no bonus in support for creating a bipartisan coalition, partisan problem solving is the likely outcome.

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Table 1: Results of Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation

	Perceived Bipartisanship	Support for Legislation	Partisan Bias in Perceived Bipartisan Outcome	Partisan Bias in Preferred Outcome
Own Party Wins	.039*	.037+	.134**	.067+
	(.018)	(.020)	(.034)	(.037)
Bipartisan Split	.125**	.011	.041	-.009
	(.018)	(.021)	(.035)	(.038)
Constant	.375**	.592**	.221**	.382**
	(.013)	(.014)	(.024)	(.026)
N	1025	1036	1011	1015
R^2	.04	.00	.02	.01

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Other Party Wins."
**p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed)

Table 2: Results of Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation (Leader Evaluations)

	Other Leader's Bipartisanship	Own Leader's Bipartisanship
Leader Concedes	.081**	.035+
	(.020)	(.019)
Leader Splits	.111**	.069**
	(.021)	(.019)
Constant	.343**	.427**
	(.014)	(.013)
N	1018	1015
R^2	.03	.01

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Leader Stands Firm."
**p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed)

Table 3: Results of Study 2, The Effect of the Composition of the Coalition

	Perceived Bipartisanship	Support for Legislation
Own Party Dominated, Supermajority	.099**	.172**
	(.030)	(.026)
Bipartisan, Supermajority	.175**	.158**
	(.029)	(.025)
Opposing Party Dominated, Supermajority	.063*	.080**
	(.031)	(.027)
Own Party Dominated, Split	.047	.105**
	(.030)	(.026)
Bipartisan, Split	.117**	.106**
	(.029)	(.026)
Constant	.368**	.554**
	(.021)	(.018)
N	1020	1030
R^2	.04	.05

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Opposing Party Dominated, Split."
**p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed)

Table 4: Results of Study 3, The Effect of Control of the Legislature

	Bipartisanship as Priority	Role of Representatives
Other Party Controls Chamber	.055^{+}	.042^{+}
	(.031)	(.026)
Constant	.520**	.766**
	(.022)	(.018)
N	1026	1026
R^2	.00	.00

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Own Party Controls Chamber."
$^{**}p<.01$; $^{*}p<.05$; $^{+}p<.10$ (two-tailed)

Figure 1: Treatment Effects in Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation



Note: The y-axis represents the difference between the "Own Party Wins"/"Bipartisan" group and the "Opposing Party Wins" group for each dependent variable. 90% confidence intervals are included around the estimate.

Figure 2: Treatment Effects in Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation (Leader Evaluations)



Note: The y-axis represents the difference between the "Leader Concedes"/"Leader Splits" group and the "Leader Stands Firm" group for each dependent variable. 90% confidence intervals are included around the estimate.

Figure 3a: Treatment Effects in Study 2, The Effect of the Composition of the Coalition (Split Coalition)



Figure 3b: Treatment Effects of Study 2, The Effect of the Composition of the Coalition (Supermajority Coalition)



Note: The y-axis represents the difference between the "Own Party Dominated"/"Bipartisan" group and the "Opposing Party Dominated" group for each dependent variable. 90% confidence intervals are included around the estimate.

Figure 4: Treatment Effects in Study 3, The Effect of Control of the Legislature



Note: The y-axis represents the difference between the "Majority Status" group and the "Minority Status" group for each dependent variable. 90% confidence intervals are included around the estimate.

Appendix A: Randomization Checks for Study 1

	Bipartisan Split	Dem Win	Rep Win
Gender			
Female	45.37%	46.44%	47.47%
Male	54.63	53.56	52.53
$\chi^2(2) = 0.3$, p=.86			
Race			
Nonwhite	25.93	27.70	23.60
White	74.07	72.30	76.40
$\chi^2(2) = 1.6$, p=.44			
Education			
Less HS	8.64	10.03	7.02
High School	30.25	32.45	28.37
Some College	28.40	28.50	30.90
Bachelors or higher	32.72	29.02	33.71
$\chi^2(6) = 4.8$, p=.57			
Party Identification			
Strong Democrat	21.60	17.77	19.10
Weak Democrat	17.28	18.30	14.04
Independent	35.19	33.16	32.02
Weak Republican	12.35	14.32	19.38
Strong Republican	13.8	16.45	15.45
$\chi^2(8) = 10.9$, p=.21			
Age			
18-29	15.74	18.73	14.89
30-44	27.16	21.64	22.47
45-59	29.63	30.34	31.46
60+	27.47	29.29	21.18
$\chi^2(6) = 5.4$, p=.50			
N	324	377	356

Appendix B: Randomization Checks for Study 2

	68-24 Bipartisan	68-24 Dem	68-24 Rep	46-46 Bipartisan	46-46 Dem	46-46 Rep
Gender						
Female	46.96%	47.13%	46.59%	44.62%	50.00%	45.16%
Male	54.04	52.87	53.41	55.38	50.00	54.84
$\chi^2(5) = 1.2$, p=.94						
Race						
Nonwhite	27.27	27.39	28.41	26.88	24.36	20.43
White	72.73	72.61	71.59	73.12	75.64	79.57
$\chi^2(5) = 4.1$, p=.53						
Education						
Less HS	5.56	7.01	11.93	6.45	13.46	8.06
High School	32.32	21.35	31.2	24.19	32.05	31.18
Some College	29.80	30.57	25.57	33.33	23.72	21.72
Bachelors or higher	32.32	30.57	31.25	36.02	30.77	29.03
$\chi^2(15) = 18.8$, p=.22						
Party Identification						
Strong Democrat	12.63	22.44	19.32	20.97	20.51	21.62
Weak Democrat	18.18	16.67	15.34	13.98	19.23	16.22
Independent	34.85	33.97	35.80	37.10	26.92	30.81
Weak Republican	17.68	12.82	18.18	13.44	15.38	14.59
Strong Republican	16.67	14.10	11.36	14.42	17.95	16.76
$\chi^2(20) = 17.7$, p=.61						
Age						
18-29	17.68	15.92	14.20	20.97	19.87	10.75
30-44	23.23	26.11	26.70	20.43	23.08	22.58
45-59	32.83	28.66	28.98	28.49	30.77	32.80
60+	26.26	29.30	30.11	30.11	26.28	33.87
$\chi^2(15) = 13.6$, p=.56						
N	198	156	176	186	156	185

Appendix C: Randomization Checks for Study 3

	Senate Dem Control	House Rep Control
Gender		
Female	47.18%	45.73%
Male	52.82	54.27
$\chi^2(1) = 0.1$, p=.64		
Race		
Nonwhite	26.88	24.67
White	73.12	75.33
$\chi^2(1) = 0.7$, p=.41		
Education		
Less HS	7.33	9.87
High School	29.70	31.12
Some College	28.57	29.98
Bachelors or higher	34.40	29.03
$\chi^2(3) = 4.7$, p=.19		
Party Identification		
Strong Democrat	20.49	18.29
Weak Democrat	16.35	16.67
Independent	33.65	33.14
Weak Republican	15.04	15.81
Strong Republican	14.47	16.00
$\chi^2(4) = 1.2$, p=.88		
Age		
18-29	17.11	15.94
30-44	25.56	21.63
45-59	29.14	31.88
60+	28.20	30.55
$\chi^2(3) = 3.1$, p=.38		
N	532	525

ONLINE APPENDIX

for

Compromise vs. Compromises:

Conceptions of Bipartisanship in the American Electorate

Table 1A: Results of Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation w/ Control Variables

	Perceived Bipartisanship	Support for Legislation	Partisan Bias in Perceived Bipartisan Outcome	Partisan Bias in Preferred Outcome
Own Party Wins	0.040*	0.037^{+}	0.131***	0.069^{+}
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.033)	(0.037)
Bipartisan Split	0.125***	0.012	0.034	-0.011
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Democrat	-0.010	0.004	0.142***	0.068*
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Age	-0.016	0.045	-0.035	-0.033
	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.063)	(0.070)
Education	0.030	0.020	-0.004	0.029
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.049)
White	-0.003	-0.017	-0.050	0.041
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Male	-0.004	0.007	0.008	0.044
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.031)
Constant	0.372***	0.568***	0.197***	0.285***
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.062)
N	1025	1036	1011	1015
R^2	.04	.00	.02	.01

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Other Party Wins."
$^{**}p<.01$; $^{*}p<.05$; $^{+}p<.10$ (two-tailed)

Table 1B: Results of Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation w/ Control Variables

	Other Leader's Bipartisanship	Own Leader's Bipartisanship
Leader Concedes	0.082***	0.033+
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Leader Splits	0.112***	0.066**
	(0.021)	(0.019)
Democrat	-0.027	0.009
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Age	-0.012	-0.050
	(0.038)	(0.036)
Education	0.032	0.057*
	(0.027)	(0.025)
White	-0.011	0.011
	(0.021)	(0.019)
Male	0.002	0.044**
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Constant	0.350***	0.377***
	(0.034)	(0.031)
N	1018	1015
R^2	.03	.01

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Leader Stands Firm."
**p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed)

Table 1C: Results of Study 2, The Effect of the Composition of the Coalition w/ Control Variables

	Perceived Bipartisanship	Support for Legislation
Own Party Dominated, Supermajority	0.100**	0.174***
	(0.030)	(0.026)
Bipartisan, Supermajority	0.046	0.104***
	(0.031)	(0.026)
Opposing Party Dominated, Supermajority	0.174***	0.161***
	(0.029)	(0.025)
Own Party Dominated, Split	0.114***	0.107***
	(0.030)	(0.025)
Bipartisan, Split	0.062*	0.084**
	(0.031)	(0.027)
Democrat	0.006	0.029+
	(0.018)	(0.016)
Age	-0.021	0.080*
	(0.039)	(0.034)
Education	0.045	0.050*
	(0.027)	(0.024)
White	0.026	0.055**
	(0.021)	(0.018)
Male	0.015	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.015)
Constant	0.319***	0.434***
	(0.038)	(0.033)
N	1020	1030
R^2	.04	.05

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Opposing Party Dominated, Split."

**p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed)

Table 1D: Results of Study 3, The Effect of Control of the Legislature w/ Control Variables

	Bipartisanship as Priority	Role of Representatives
Other Party Controls Chamber	0.055^{+}	0.040
	(0.031)	(0.025)
Democrat	0.073*	0.143***
	(0.032)	(0.026)
Age	0.075	0.091
	(0.070)	(0.057)
Education	0.205***	0.113**
	(0.048)	(0.039)
White	0.090*	0.125***
	(0.037)	(0.030)
Male	0.042	-0.039
	(0.031)	(0.025)
Constant	0.234***	0.510***
	(0.060)	(0.049)
N	1026	1026
R^2	.00	.00

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Own Party Controls Chamber."

$^{**}p<.01$; $^{*}p<.05$; $^{+}p<.10$ (two-tailed)

Table 2A: Results of Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation w/ Control Variables w/ Party Identification and Interactions

	Perceived Bipartisanship	Support for Legislation	Partisan Bias in Perceived Bipartisan Outcome	Partisan Bias in Preferred Outcome
Own Party Wins	0.056*	0.026	0.104*	0.057
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.054)
Bipartisan Split	0.101***	-0.030	0.036	-0.005
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.057)
Democrat	-0.011	-0.025	0.138**	0.050
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.053)
Own Party Wins × Democrat	-0.030	0.022	0.051	0.017
	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.074)
Bipartisan Split × Democrat	0.042	0.076+	-0.004	-0.011
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.069)	(0.077)
Constant	0.380***	0.604***	0.149***	0.355***
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.038)
N	1025	1036	1011	1015
R^2	.04	.00	.02	.01

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Other Party Wins."
$^{**}p<.01$; $^{*}p<.05$; $^{+}p<.10$ (two-tailed)

Table 2B: Results of Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation w/ Party Identification and Interactions

	Other Leader's Bipartisanship	Own Leader's Bipartisanship
Leader Concedes	0.127***	0.027
	(0.03)	(0.027)
Leader Splits	0.146***	0.035
	(0.031)	(0.029)
Democrat	0.025	-0.022
	(0.029)	(0.027)
Leader Concedes × Democrat	-0.086*	0.016
	(0.041)	(0.038)
Leader Splits × Democrat	-0.062	0.061
	(0.042)	(0.039)
Constant	0.350***	0.439***
	(0.034)	(0.02)
N	1018	1015
R^2	.03	.01

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Leader Stands Firm."
$^{**}p<.01$; $^{*}p<.05$; $^{+}p<.10$ (two-tailed)

Table 2C: Results of Study 2, The Effect of the Composition of the Coalition w/ Party Identification and Interactions

	Perceived Bipartisanship	Support for Legislation
Own Party Dominated, Supermajority	0.112*	0.233***
	(0.045)	(0.039)
Bipartisan, Supermajority	0.189***	0.214***
	(0.043)	(0.038)
Opposing Party Dominated, Supermajority	0.077	0.071+
	(0.048)	(0.042)
Own Party Dominated, Split	0.079+	0.142***
	(0.045)	(0.039)
Bipartisan, Split	0.103*	0.131**
	(0.044)	(0.038)
Democrat	0.015	0.064+
	(0.043)	(0.037)
Own Party Dominated, Supermajority × Democrat	-0.024	-0.108*
	(0.061)	(0.052)
Bipartisan, Supermajority × Democrat	-0.025	-0.101*
	(0.059)	(0.051)
Opposing Party Dominated, Supermajority × Democrat	-0.025	0.016
	(0.062)	(0.054)
Own Party Dominated, Split × Democrat	-0.061	-0.063
	(0.061)	(0.053)
Bipartisan, Split × Democrat	0.029	-0.041
	(0.059)	(0.051)
Constant	0.359***	0.516***
	(0.033)	(0.028)
N	1020	1030
R^2	.04	.05

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Opposing Party Dominated, Split."

** $p<.01$; * $p<.05$; + $p<.10$ (two-tailed)

Table 2D: Results of Study 3, The Effect of Control of the Legislature w/ Party Identification and Interactions

	Bipartisanship as Priority	Role of Representatives
Other Party Controls Chamber	0.107*	0.056
	(0.046)	(0.037)
Democrat	0.089*	0.122**
	(0.044)	(0.036)
Other Party Controls Chamber × Democrat	-0.098	-0.024
	(0.062)	(0.051)
Constant	0.472***	0.699***
	(0.032)	(0.026)
N	1026	1026
R^2	.00	.00

Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Own Party Controls Chamber."

**p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed)

Table 3A: Results of Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation w/ Ordered Logit Regressions

	Perceived Bipartisanship	Support for Legislation	Partisan Bias in Perceived Bipartisan Outcome	Partisan Bias in Preferred Outcome
Own Party Wins	0.329*	0.249^{+}	0.665***	0.276^{+}
	(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.170)	(0.153)
Bipartisan Split	1.050***	0.098	0.223	-0.038
	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.183)	(0.161)
τ_1	-1.576***	-2.512***	-1.262***	-0.483***
	(0.118)	(0.146)	(0.129)	(0.111)
τ_2	-0.126***	-0.726***	——	——
	(0.100)	(0.104)		
τ_3	2.069***	1.551***	——	——
	(0.123)	(0.114)		
τ_4	3.868***	——	——	——
	(0.197)			
N	1025	1036	1011	1015
Log Likelihood	-1359.2	-1225.1	-591.2	-684.3

Note: Ordered logit coefficients (standard logit for second two specifications. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Other Party Wins."
$^{**}p<.01$; $^{*}p<.05$; $^{+}p<.10$ (two-tailed)

Table 3B: Results of Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation w/ Ordered Logit Regressions

	Other Leader's Bipartisanship	Own Leader's Bipartisanship
Leader Concedes	0.544***	0.236+
	(0.136)	(0.138)
Leader Splits	0.764***	0.548***
	(0.143)	(0.142)
τ_1	-1.113***	-1.979***
	(0.109)	(0.126)
τ_2	0.174***	-0.416***
	(0.101)	(0.099)
τ_3	1.871***	1.477***
	(0.118)	(0.110)
τ_4	3.412***	3.112***
	(0.170)	(0.161)
N	1018	1015
Log Likelihood	-1468.0	-1413.8

Note: Ordered logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Leader Stands Firm."
** $p<.01$; * $p<.05$; + $p<.10$ (two-tailed)

Table 3C: Results of Study 2, The Effect of the Composition of the Coalition w/ Ordered Logit Regressions

	Perceived Bipartisanship	Support for Legislation
Own Party Dominated, Supermajority	0.756***	1.406***
	(0.206)	(0.221)
Bipartisan, Supermajority	0.403+	0.779***
	(0.218)	(0.218)
Opposing Party Dominated, Supermajority	1.259***	1.209***
	(0.201)	(0.209)
Own Party Dominated, Split	0.916***	0.815***
	(0.201)	(0.211)
Bipartisan, Split	0.525*	0.543*
	(0.204)	(0.219)
τ_1	-0.956***	-2.496***
	(0.155)	(0.204)
τ_2	-0.042***	-0.578***
	(0.152)	(0.155)
τ_3	1.853***	2.121***
	(0.164)	(0.170)
τ_4	3.343***	———
	(0.193)	
N	1020	1030
Log Likelihood	-1454.6	-1087.4

Note: Ordered logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Opposing Party Dominated, Split."

**p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed)

Table 3D: Results of Study 3, The Effect of Control of the Legislature w/ Logistic Regressions

	Bipartisanship as Priority	Role of Representatives
Other Party Controls Chamber	0.221^{+}	0.253^{+}
	(0.126)	(0.153)
Constant	0.082	1.183***
	(0.088)	(0.104)
N	1026	1026
Log Likelihood	-704.9	-530.6

Note: Logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is "Own Party Controls Chamber."

$^{**}p<.01$; $^{*}p<.05$; $^{+}p<.10$ (two-tailed)