The Chicago Neighborhood Policing Initiative: Interim Findings and Recommendations

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In January 2019, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) in collaboration with the Policing Project at New York University School of Law launched the Chicago Neighborhood Policing Initiative (CNPI). CNPI is a pilot initiative designed to change the way CPD polices and to ensure communities have a voice in how they are policed. The Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3) is CNPI’s research and evaluation partner.

The initiative’s overarching goal is for CPD and communities to work together to co-produce public safety and equitable policing. The CNPI model calls for: 1) The restructuring of CPD patrol and deployment practices to build and strengthen community ties, including the creation of a new role called the District Coordination Officer (DCO); and 2) districtwide engagement with community organizations and service providers—through the Community Engagement Initiative (CEI)—to resolve issues through community-based resources rather than enforcement. CNPI was first launched in CPD District 25, which includes the neighborhoods of Humboldt Park, Avondale, Dunning, Montclare, Belmont Cragin, Hermosa, Logan Square, and Austin. The initiative recently expanded to CPD District 15, which includes the Austin neighborhood and borders District 25.

In conducting its interim evaluation of CNPI, N3 set out to answer the following research questions:

1. Did CNPI establish the necessary infrastructure and relationships to build trust and co-produce public safety?
2. How do CPD officers perform and experience their roles as DCOs?
3. How do residents in CNPI areas experience the program?
4. Has CNPI influenced residents’ trust in the police? If so, how?
5. Is CNPI associated with a change in residents’ perceptions of public safety?
6. Does CNPI contribute to any observable reductions in crime?
To answer these questions, N3 built a multimethod research design that captured perspectives of both community residents who reside in and police who work in the program areas through in-depth interviews and systematic observations at police and community meetings and events. N3 also conducted quasi-experimental statistical analyses that tracked trends in perceptions of public safety and trust in the police in the CNPI districts before and after the program, and compared them against a statistically generated comparison group of similar police areas.

**Interim Findings**

1. **At the onset of CNPI, police and community members readily acknowledged many of the problems of policing and yet expressed a belief that building positive relationships between the community and police could improve public safety.** Both officers and community members identified several core problems, including the lack of police responsiveness, a lack of investment in relationships, and a lack of diversity among CPD officers. They nonetheless agreed that mutual respect between police and community members was central to public safety.

2. **After the program’s first full year of operation, DCOs and residents expressed several positive changes that they associated with the program.** DCOs and some community residents noted positive changes in the relationship between the police and the community, including increased police visibility, greater attentiveness to the problems expressed by Community Ambassadors (residents officially engaged in the community side of CNPI through CEI), and, most importantly, more meaningful interpersonal interactions. Officers assigned as DCOs found the new levels of engagement and autonomy rewarding and a much-needed departure from “chasing calls” or “making arrests.”

3. **Both Districts 25 and 15 had trouble realigning police roles and developing the community side of CNPI.** Some of the biggest program challenges noted by both residents and DCOs were the overall lack of investment and commitment to the program’s expressed goals of realigning police roles—specifically the DCO and Beat Officer roles—and building the necessary infrastructure on the community side to support districtwide engagement with residents and community organizations.

4. **The COVID-19 pandemic set back strategic partnerships, and forced DCOs to engage community partners in new ways.** Integral to CNPI’s approach to problem-solving was connecting people to community-based organizations for support; many of these organizations now operated at a reduced capacity. COVID restrictions also disrupted the emerging relationship between DCOs and many Community Ambassadors, and CEI meetings and joint DCO-Community Ambassador meetings stopped temporarily. Many officers and residents also became sick with COVID. Yet, despite these challenges, DCOs never left the field. They “masked up,” continued problem solving, and collaborated more with churches and other open local organizations to help with food drives and personal protective equipment (PPE) giveaways. Community Ambassadors leaned into pre-existing roles as leaders in various community organizations and continued their efforts, often separate from DCOs.
5. National events further strained an already tense police-community relationship. George Floyd’s murder and the subsequent protests happened as CNPI hit the 18-month mark in District 25 (D25) and less than 5 months after the program launched in District 15 (D15). Like others throughout the city, many residents involved with CNPI were upset and frustrated by the city’s and CPD’s responses to the civil unrest. They felt that officers—including DCOs—were being pulled from their neighborhoods to protect downtown businesses, leaving their communities vulnerable. DCOs believed that the relationships they forged prior to the civil unrest would be unaffected, but that building new connections to harder-to-reach populations and less engaged residents would prove more challenging.

6. Statistical analyses do not yet show a significant impact on crime or on residents’ perceptions of trust in the police and perceptions of safety. Results from the quasi-experimental analysis do not show any changes in levels of trust, perceptions of safety, calls for service, or violent crime after the first 24 months of CNPI in D25. It is important to note that the relatively small rollout of the program within the districts and its challenges, including the larger shocks of a global pandemic and civil unrest during the study period, likely make it difficult to demonstrate a statistically detectable impact.

Recommendations

Even as this evaluation was underway, CPD publicly committed to expanding CNPI citywide and has most recently expanded CNPI to Police Districts 9, 10, and 11. N3 would urge caution against the expansion of the program without first understanding and investing in the elements originally expressed in the program’s core philosophy—the co-production of public safety—and investing equally in the police and community sides. To sustain and expand CNPI, the following recommendations should be considered:

On the policing side:

- **Increase Commitment.** CPD should demonstrate a commitment to CNPI’s core philosophy, which would entail increasing shifting existing resources to increase staffing levels of DCOs; adhering to the recommended initiative staffing model; minimizing officer turnover, especially of DCOs; and providing the necessary resources for DCOs to fulfill their roles more effectively.

- **Increase Consistency.** CPD should ensure Beat Officers are given “time off the radio” (for example, not simply following 911 calls) as required by the program model and avoid pulling DCOs away from their shifts and duties.

- **Ensure Consistent Messaging.** To address a lack of clarity regarding the program and the role of the DCOs both within the department and in the community, CPD should develop a consistent message, at every level, that describes the program and its goals, as well as clearly describes the role of the DCOs. This may help ensure buy-in within the department and alleviate some of the misunderstandings, confusion, and, in some cases, mistrust of CNPI both internally and externally.
On the community side:

- **Increase Overall Investment in CEI.** To build a complementary infrastructure on the community side as intended by the program model, additional resources and support should, at a minimum, provide for some compensation, initial and ongoing training, and meetings or other activities necessary for Community Ambassadors to fulfill their roles.

- **Better Define the Role of Community Ambassador.** It is unclear how, and if, the role of the Community Ambassador relates to other existing CPD community engagement efforts in any particular district. Greater emphasis should be placed on clearly defining the core responsibilities and expectations of the Community Ambassador and understanding how this new role fits within the larger ecosystem of neighborhood social institutions.

- **Develop a Clear Operations and Sustainability Plan.** It remains unclear which local entity is or will be responsible for establishing and maintaining the structure and resources needed for ongoing engagement. Should there be continued interest in building this community infrastructure in each district, effort should be made to identify how this process will be managed and equitably resourced beyond the pilot period and as CPD expands to other districts across the city.

At its core, residents and police involved in CNPI do not want it to be simply “another program.” Instead, they want to see the sorts of engagement and relationships promised by CNPI to represent a new way of interacting and engaging with the police that, in and of itself, should be part of a broader network of formal and informal ways of co-producing public safety.

**Section 1. Introduction and Research Questions**

The relationship between the police and the communities they serve is at the heart of national debates surrounding policing, criminal justice reform, and public safety. Years of police abuse, violence, and neglect—especially in Black and Latino communities—have eroded the trust needed for communities to feel safe not just from crime and violence, but also from abuses from the state itself. Conversely, trust is a crucial element needed for the police to contribute productively to public safety. Chicago and the Chicago Police Department (CPD) have a troubling history of police abuse dating back more than a century that has led to systemic disparities in criminal justice contacts, police stops, misconduct, and arrest behaviors.

Understanding, repairing, and investing in the relationship between the community and the police has emerged as a crucial tenet in police reform, even serving as a central pillar in President Barack Obama’s 21st Century Policing efforts. One way in which departments have attempted to meet these goals has been through the creation of community policing programs. Community policing programs are not new, dating back to the 1980s. While these programs have varied drastically in design and implementation, three central principles sit at their core: citizen involvement, organizational restructuring, and problem solving. Through these strategies,
community policing aims to improve the relationships between local police and the residents they serve by enabling officers to draw on the public to help set policing priorities and address local public safety issues. While research shows mixed results on whether community policing can reduce crime, evaluations have shown that community policing has the potential to improve opinions of police and perceptions of public safety.

The Chicago Neighborhood Policing Initiative (CNPI) is the latest community policing effort in Chicago to attempt to address the high levels of distrust in police seen in communities following the death of Laquan McDonald and renewed national attention surrounding police violence and misconduct. The Northwestern Neighborhood and Network Initiative (N3) is currently evaluating CNPI. In 2019, it began a mixed-methods research project aimed at understanding the development and impact of the program. Specifically, N3 set out to answer the following research questions:

1. Did CNPI establish the necessary infrastructure and relationships to build trust and co-produce public safety?
2. How do CPD officers perform and experience their roles as DCOs?
3. How do residents in CNPI areas experience the program?
4. Has CNPI influenced residents’ trust in the police? If so, how?
5. Is CNPI associated with a change in residents’ perceptions of public safety?
6. Does CNPI contribute to any observable reductions in crime?

In 2020, the COVID pandemic, an increase in gun violence, and protests surrounding police violence provided a unique “stress test” for CNPI, and a chance to see whether the relationships and trust being built by the program could withstand decreased face-to-face interaction, renewed attention to police misconduct, and heightened levels of street violence. This report provides initial insights into these research questions as well as how the unique challenges of 2020 impacted the implementation of the initiative in the pilot districts.

Section 2. Chicago Neighborhood Policing Initiative (CNPI): Program Description

Program Theory, Components, and Design

CNPI was modeled, in part, after the New York Police Department’s Neighborhood Policing strategy. CNPI’s program theory starts from the basic premise that the lack of trust and legitimacy around policing has led to a breakdown in police-community relations. This broken relationship, in turn, precipitates crime and reduces public safety. The key to repairing this relationship is what CNPI calls “co-producing public safety”—a fundamental shift in policing whereby officers focus on problem-solving and relationship building directly alongside community members who are brought in as equal partners in the problem-solving and priority-setting processes. This co-engagement model is believed to improve communication and collaboration between the
police and communities, create a shared responsibility for public safety—therefore, leading to more trust between police and residents—and, eventually, aid in larger public-safety improvements.

The CNPI model calls for:

- restructuring CPD patrol and deployment practices to build and strengthen community ties while addressing public safety; and
- districtwide engagement with community organizations and service providers to resolve issues through community-based resources rather than enforcement.

To restructure patrol practices on the police side, implementation focused heavily on realignment of three police roles in a given district: the District Coordination Officer, Beat Officer, and Rapid Response Unit Officer.

The District Coordination Officer (DCO) was a new position created specifically as part of CNPI to be deployed to specified geographic units called “sectors” and directly charged with spending time, building relationships, and problem-solving with sector residents. CNPI was designed as separate and apart from the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), which was launched by CPD in 1993. While both CAPS and CNPI include community engagement, CAPS officers primarily coordinate and implement districtwide programming for community members, such as beat meetings and community service and educational events. Through CNPI, DCOs were meant to focus on building 1-to-1 relationships with community members to address the public safety issues and concerns identified directly by community residents and achieve sustainable solutions. In short, DCOs are the face of CNPI.

Beat Officers are a traditional position within CPD who patrol and respond to calls within a geographic area called a “beat.” While Beat Officers are assigned to a specific beat, a major complaint of residents and police alike is that Beat Officers are often called outside of their beat to respond to calls. As part of CNPI, Beat Officers would be required to maintain “beat integrity,” keeping their activities only within their beat (except for any necessary emergency response). Maintaining beat integrity would serve the dual purpose of allowing Beat Officers to become more familiar with their assigned neighborhoods and allowing them to work more closely with residents and DCOs. Rapid Response Unit Officers would serve the broader district, responding to emergency calls throughout the district, including providing back up to Beat Officers, investigations, and other police matters. At the management level, the CNPI staffing model for each district was to include one DCO lieutenant to coordinate DCO work at the district-level across several offices including Violent Crime Detectives, Watch Commanders, CAPS, and District Intelligence Officers. Additionally, the staffing model included two DCO sergeants whose roles were to provide direct supervision of and guidance for DCO problem-solving activities.

A crucial design element of CNPI was to change dispatch protocols, or how police respond to calls for service (911 calls), by taking DCOs and, to a lesser extent, Beat Officers off “call-driven” police work. Instead, they were assigned to geographic areas where they would engage ongoing public safety problems directly with community partners, many of whom operate during normal business hours. Under CNPI, DCOs were to be relieved of typical
call-based patrol duties so they could work specifically on CNPI-related activities. More broadly, the program design dictated that police throughout the district would prioritize the public safety issues raised by community stakeholders, as opposed to only those issues identified by police sources.

While these structural changes to police practices were designed to provide DCOs with the time and resources to invest in building relationships and solving problems, a parallel effort called the Community Engagement Initiative (CEI) was developed as a community-empowerment part of the CNPI model. Its purpose was to empower community members to engage the police in co-production of public safety. Overseen by a full-time team member from the Policing Project at New York University’s School of Law, CEI sought to establish a group of Community Ambassadors (CAs), comprised of local residents and leaders representing a wide spectrum of neighborhood groups, organizations, and interests. CAs are volunteers, tasked with helping orient officers to the community as well as directly partnering with DCOs to address problems in their assigned sectors. CAs also lead quarterly meetings with DCOs to set priorities for public safety and create a platform, independent of the police, for their fellow community members to discuss public safety and policing concerns.

At the same time, the Policing Project team, which grew from one to three full-time, Chicago-based team members, supported CNPI’s recruitment and training efforts. They recruited CAs, coordinated CA meetings, met with DCO leadership to coordinate CNPI efforts, and consulted on the training of DCOs. CNPI’s different components should result in officers spending more time engaging in non-enforcement interactions with community members. In particular, DCOs are supposed to collaborate with community members, use police resources to identify persistent public safety and quality-of-life issues, and then coordinate a non-enforcement response to those issues by connecting police and community resources.

Community Ambassadors assist the DCOs with local engagement, articulate the public-safety and policing concerns of their fellow residents to DCOs, and, in this manner, help set the agenda for the police and other city services in the district. As DCOs work to solve issues—in coordination with community members and Beat Officers—behind the chronic and repetitive calls for service, 911 calls overall should decrease, thereby allowing Beat Officers and Rapid Response Units to respond more quickly to the remaining emergency calls. Taken together, CNPI posits that more positive community-police interactions, fewer chronic problems, and increased police responsiveness should improve officer and community satisfaction in policing as well as build trust and legitimacy in policing.

**Program Rollout**

In January 2019, CNPI launched in Chicago’s 25th Police District, a large geographic area on the city’s West Side, which includes the neighborhoods of Humboldt Park, Avondale, Dunning, Montclare, Belmont Cragin, Hermosa, Logan Square, and Austin. With more than 196,000 residents as of 2018, District 25 (D25) is one of the city’s larger police districts, covering 11 square miles. D25 is also ethnically and racially diverse with 68.6% of its residents identifying as Latino and 15% identifying as Black. Nearly 19% of the households in the district live below the federal poverty line, 5.3% are unemployed, and 33.2% are not in the labor force.
In January 2020, CNPI expanded to a second police district, District 15 (D15), directly to the south of D25 (Figure 1). D15, which includes the Austin neighborhood, is considerably smaller than D25 with roughly 57,022 residents as of 2018. D15 is a primarily Black community (81%), but the number of Latino (14%) and White (5%) residents has grown recently. Roughly 14% of households in the area experienced unemployment, and 34% fell below the federal poverty line.

With respect to crime, D25 and D15 ranked near the middle and top (respectively) of all districts by two key indicators, homicides and non-fatal shootings (Figures 2 and 3). In 2018, prior to the launch of CNPI, D25 had approximately 69 shooting victims per 100,000 people and a homicide rate of 13.7 per 100,000 people—rates that place D25 in roughly the middle of Chicago’s other districts. In contrast, D15 is among the areas of the city most affected by gun violence. In 2018, D15 had 391 shooting victims per 100,000 people and a homicide rate of 80 per 100,000 people. Gun violence in D15 is more than five times higher than in D25 and three times higher than in the city as a whole.

Figure 1. Chicago Police Districts 15 and 25

Figure 2. 2018 Shooting Rates by Districts
Less than two years into the program, three significant events rocked the city—like the rest of the country:

**First**, the global public health crisis in the COVID-19 pandemic impacted every facet of daily life, including policing and programs like CNPI. As discussed, the pandemic forced an abrupt shift in CNPI’s program model as CPD and Community Ambassadors adjusted to address the immediate demands brought on by the pandemic.

**Second**, just as the country was grappling with COVID, the widespread unrest following the police-involved deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd once again forced government leaders and communities to reckon with the impact of police violence on individuals, neighborhoods, and broader communities. Chicago faced deep levels of anger and trauma among its residents, renewing tensions between police and communities. Demands to rely less on policing or criminal justice approaches to achieve public safety and, in many cases, calls to defund and dismantle policing grew in Chicago and across the country.

**Third**, Chicago, like many U.S. cities, experienced a record single-year increase in gun homicides and gun violence, creating even greater stresses to many of the very same Black and Latino neighborhoods that were most impacted by COVID and dealing most acutely with police violence.

**Section 3. Research Methods**

At its core, CNPI’s program theory rests on the ability to build the necessary infrastructure and relationships between CPD and the community. It is only by repairing and supporting these efforts and relationships that the program would lead to increased trust and, subsequently, improved perceptions of public safety. The research questions outlined above focus squarely on the relationship between the community and police. To answer these questions, N3 built a multimethod research design that captured perspectives of both community
residents and police working and residing in the program areas through in-depth interviews and systematic observations at police and community meetings and events.

**Semi-Structured Interviews**

Semi-structured interviews with both police and community residents captured each group’s first-hand perspectives about the program’s development and the nature of local police-community relationships. **Police** interviewed for the study were selected based on their participation in the program. **Two types of community experts** were recruited to participate—“**engaged**” residents, individuals who were recognized as leaders in the community, active in community organizations, or who served as Community Ambassadors, and “**less engaged**” residents, who were less active in formal community organizations. This distinction between engaged and less-engaged residents ensured that perspectives on policing more generally, and the program specifically, were not limited only to residents actively engaged with CPD. Semi-structured interviews touched upon several themes, including perceptions of crime and safety, perceptions of police-community relationships, experiences with the CNPI program, and reactions to current events (for example, the mayoral election, COVID-19, and civil unrest). Interviews began prior to the selection of DCOs and during the creation of CEI in each district, and interviewees were re-interviewed every six months. To date, N3 has conducted 91 police interviews with 62 unique officers, and 99 community interviews with 37 unique community members in D25 and D15.

**Participant Observation**

N3 also engaged in extensive participant observation in program meetings and events, especially when events were directly arranged as part of CNPI. Trained research assistants took notes at such events, observing not only the content and interactions, but also informal dimensions, such as body language, tone, and informal conversations. In addition, N3 researchers conducted observations during “ride-alongs” with DCOs to observe how they engaged with residents as they went about formal program efforts. Researchers observed a total of over 70 police meetings and community events.

**Quasi-Experimental Statistical Analyses**

To answer the research questions pertaining to the impact of CNPI on trust in the police, residents’ perceptions of public safety, and impact on crime trends, N3 conducted quasi-experimental statistical analyses that tracked trends in perceptions of public safety and trust in the police in the CNPI districts before and after the program and compared them against a statistically generated comparison group of similar police areas. Such an approach allows N3 to determine if any detected changes might be attributable to CNPI as compared to following larger citywide patterns.

Taken together, the multimethod research design allows N3 to capture a broad set of data on the opinions, attitudes, and experiences of CNPI participants, as well as the possible impact of the program on the public’s perceptions of police and public safety.
Section 4. Getting Started: Initial Perceptions on Public Safety and Policing

CNPI did not start in a vacuum. Understanding the baseline opinions, attitudes, and experiences of residents and DCOs provides important context for the program’s launch and subsequent development. At CNPI’s start, police and community residents readily acknowledged many of the problems of policing, yet they expressed a belief that building positive relationships between the community and police would benefit public safety. Some of the main problems identified initially included a lack of responsiveness, lack of investment in relationships, and lack of diversity among CPD officers.

Lack of Responsiveness

Both police and community members cited police responsiveness as a major obstacle to positive police-community relationships. For some residents, police were simply absent or failed to engage residents.

“We don’t really have a relationship with them,” noted one community resident. “Every once in a while, we’ll see one [cop] show up at a meeting. But we have to beg them to show up and a lot of times they say they’re going to show up but never do.”

Although the lack of police responsiveness has led some residents to feel there needs to be more police in their district, one Community Ambassador disagreed, “I don’t think we need more police. I just think that the officers already working should enforce whatever law or ordinances that are out there.”

The lack of engagement by police was juxtaposed with the belief that police focused their attention on the wrong members of the community or the wrong types of public safety issues.

“I think we’re policed too heavily and then we’re not policed the right way. They ignore the crimes we contact them about,” a long-time D25 resident asserted. “But they wanna stop me right around the corner from my home and interrogate me because I got a headlight out?”

Another resident said, “In the process of them allowing the drugs and allowing the guns to get here, these police, they know about this stuff. They know what’s going on ... and they really don’t wanna do much about it....” Nearly all community members interviewed said that the police are slow to respond to crimes in their areas.

Police acknowledged the lack of responsiveness but frequently attributed community sentiment to a misunderstanding of the ins and outs of police work. For example, a majority of an officer’s daily shift is spent responding to “calls for service,” generally in the order in which calls are received and prioritized based on emergency status. If investigations or certain calls take longer than others, things start to back up.

“We always got to ‘rack and stack’ what’s most important,” one officer explained. “To everybody, whatever their one issue is, it’s the biggest thing in the world and they’re not realizing that we’ve got to juggle that with what else is going on.”
Officers often feel that they get blamed for being “unresponsive” when they are responding directly to calls from community members and following protocol or department prioritizations—something which they, as individual officers, have little control over. “They don’t understand the system, the first person they’re going to blame is us,” another officer noted. “We’re the face of that call, so a lot of times it’s educating people.”

**Lack of Investment, Diversity, and Mistrust in the Police**

Police and residents both cited the lack of investment in time and resources needed to build meaningful interactions and relationships as a fundamental problem. When officers are “tied to the radio” and shifts are consumed by “chasing calls,” most interactions with residents are fleeting and procedural, offering few opportunities for officers to get to know residents. Both residents and police reported that this lack of investment undermines their relationship and could lead to stereotyping and prejudice.

Community residents believed that investing in relationships would allow officers to get to know them as individuals and better understand their problems and their neighborhood. One resident even suggested how this could help diminish policing’s stigma and humanize officers in residents’ eyes, noting:

“[I]f you want to make significant progress, then they’re going to have to make an effort to be accessible to the people, instead of driving around in a car. ... I think it's when you're in that uniform and you're not making any outreach to the people, you're just a uniform then, you're not a person anymore.”

Officers echoed this sentiment, often citing the desire to build these types of relationships as one of the key reasons they sought out CNPI in the first place. Indeed, many officers said the “DCO way” was what they imagined policing would be like before they entered the profession.

A central theme expressed by both residents and police was the lack of being treated *respectfully*. Many officers readily acknowledged that the long history of police abuses have eroded trust making it harder for them to do their jobs. Officers frequently described how they tried to leverage their own experiences and personal backgrounds to manage their individual reputations in a manner distinct from CPD’s general reputation.

For instance, after describing how Latino community members were generally wary of interacting with police, one officer explained, “When I speak Spanish, it’s a whole different light, they feel more comfortable because they can relate. ... As far as the African-American community, it’s the same, I think it helped me growing up in this environment. ... They feel that, they feel it’s real.” Even given high levels of mistrust in police, officers overwhelmingly report positive interactions with residents and think negative community perceptions are driven by the media, personal politics, and rumors more than firsthand experience.

The lack of familiarity with the community and investment in relationships is worsened by another oft-cited problem by residents and police, the lack of diversity among CPD generally and among the officers patrolling the CNPI communities. This lack of racial and ethnic diversity becomes more of an issue due to the lack of relevant
life experiences among officers. Not only are police officers often not the same race or ethnicity as those in the communities where they work, officers are also less familiar with the neighborhood, its history, and its culture prior to their assignment. Residents readily feel that this lack of diversity and familiarity with the community can lead police to unfairly target certain groups of residents—especially young Black and Latino men.

A D25 resident gave examples of past experiences with police in which he felt profiled. Officers assumed, he said, that “if you was Black in the neighborhood walking around at a certain time of night or a certain time of day, you were selling drugs, you was up to no good.” Consistent with his experiences, officers openly noted how they associated different types of crimes with different parts of the neighborhoods and different racial and ethnic groups. For example, officers in D25 suggested that “drug dealing” to make money was much more common in the Black parts of the district and particularly among Black street gangs, whereas Latino gangs were involved in more “honor-based” types of crime and violence associated with interpersonal disputes.

Most community interviews in the predominately Black D15 directly connected poor police-community relations to historical and contemporary tensions around race and policing not just in the city or country as a whole, but specifically on the West Side of Chicago. As one long-time D15 resident explained:

“It’s the history of policing. You look at what happened in the ’60s with the dogs and the hoses. That’s deeply embedded in us. Our ancestors still cry out for justice from that. There are seniors in community that still know of that time. There are families in community that have harsh realities with police. ... There are young people in community who have been stopped, and who have been harassed, or who have had harsh treatment, some deserving in some respects, some not deserving, who have a history of being violated, who have a history of knowing members of their family or members within their household or members on their block who have been violated by the police. All of that ties into the perspectives, and all of that is gonna take a lotta time, a lotta healing, and a lotta conversations to help heal, but it’s all deeply embedded from historical trauma with the police.”

While residents acknowledge that a shared historical memory, along with rumor and media accounts, play a role in their views on policing, they also offered numerous personal examples of mistreatment by CPD. One resident remembered being assaulted and having her purse stolen one evening outside her home. When she called the police, their response was to ask her what she was doing out so late—and the report went nowhere. When he was a teenager, a Black interviewee from Austin witnessed officers stop his darker-skinned brother, direct racist remarks towards him, and put him in the back of their car only to release him shortly thereafter. “The incident with my brother, when I was a child,” he explained, “really reinforced the power that the police have.”

Latino residents in D25 specifically noted that the lack of Spanish-speaking officers exacerbated community mistrust of the police, especially given heightened concerns around immigration status and restrictive changes in immigration policies during the Trump administration. As one young resident noted, “A lot of [officers] don’t
speak Spanish. And this population, a lot of them don’t speak English. So there’s just that disconnect between the police department and the community.”

Another long-time resident echoed this sentiment. “A lot of our population is undocumented, so you have to deal with the fact that they’re already scared,” she noted. “There’s gonna be a cultural difference of how you interact with them. You have to be sensitive about that.” These residents felt that having predominantly Spanish-speaking officers working in Latino neighborhoods would improve communication between police and the community and would provide residents with a level of comfort with officers that they have not been able to find otherwise.

Many officers believed that they could overcome “cultural barriers” and mistrust to solve problems through more personalized relationships with residents. For example, a Latino officer recounted one conflict where, because of his shared background with a resident, they were able to work together to address a need. “We had a complaint for improper licensing at a food vendor. We went there to talk to the vendor about it and he did not speak English.” It was only “once [he] was able to connect with him in his native tongue” that the officer was able to build rapport with this vendor such that, by the time he saw the vendor again, the man had gotten proper licensing. Another officer suggested that growing up in a similar community as residents and being able to speak both English and Spanish allowed him to build a relationship with the community. “I think I’m more able to understand what’s going on with them,” another Latino officer noted.

**Agreement That a Respectful Relationship Between Police and the Community Is Central to Public Safety**

Despite having had negative personal encounters with the police and heightened levels of mistrust, most community members expressed a desire for police to play a role in addressing public safety issues. Importantly, residents saw police as only one part of what makes them and their communities safe.

For residents, public safety is a public good that was cultivated and maintained in the social ties among residents and their families, neighborhood organizations, and other local institutions. “My neighborhood is the coolest area,” one D15 resident said. “Like if it was summertime ... my uncle barbecues every day. I have my daughter sitting outside at my grandma’s house all the time. ... It’s safe. We not the enemy... It’s family-oriented where I’m at.” Residents did not expect, nor want, police to be the sole provider of public safety or problem solver in the community. Instead, they wanted police to recognize the importance and legitimacy of local institutions and neighborhood social ties that created the vast majority of public safety residents relied on in their daily lives.

Said one longtime Austin resident:

“We have the block clubs. Then, we have the 100 churches. ... When we see [young men and women], we introduce ourselves, try to show a friendly [face]—and many times, the police is there. We’ve had many cookouts, block club meetings. We’ve even marched. ... We even cleaned up [one] area, as the community and the police were working together. People come from everywhere. It’s all mixed races, and that’s what makes it so interesting. Different organizations come together.
Then while we were cleaning up, we were speaking to the young men and women. ... I think it left a great impression when they saw that we were trying to clean up the community and make it livable and bring about hope to them.”

Many DCOs also recognized the importance of collaborating with community members and understood the value of neighborhood organizations. They envisioned their role with CNPI as way to leverage police resources and connect to community institutions.

“I think that’s a team effort ... a collaborative effort between the police, the community, and our allocated resources, whether that’s profits, not-for-profits, faith-based. I think this is an issue that we all need to tackle together. I don’t think it’s just the police’s responsibility. A community needs to partner with the police as well. But all the resources we have, have to all be on the same page.”

For DCOs, it was this idea of “being on the same page” that they hoped to translate into working directly with residents to build social ties and to deal with public safety issues. As one officer describes it, “[Y]ou need a program, I think over and above the community relation department, to bridge that gap [of mistrust] and say, ‘Okay, you know you can talk to us. We’re here for you. What’s going on?’”

Another DCO expressed the same feeling, suggesting that the biggest benefit of a program like CNPI is building and maintaining positive relationships with the community: “It’s just building trust with people and you get that rapport. Honestly, I like when I can get out of the car and talk to people.”

Residents and police expressed the idea that a fundamental way to build and repair trust—and the way they both believed police could contribute to public safety—was through more investment in relationships between officers and residents in which at least some part of public safety was co-produced. In the traditional community policing sense, residents and police often framed the co-production of public safety as the tangible ways DCOs worked with residents to identify and solve problems, especially those issues raised by residents themselves. Prior research shows wide variation in approaches to community policing programs ranging from “mere involvement” where residents might participate in meetings or events, to “true collaboration” models that involve power sharing and decision-making. Not surprisingly, the model espoused by CNPI that involves true collaboration is exceedingly rare, requiring clear articulation of program philosophy, dedication to the approach, and investments in the relationship and sharing of resources and power.

While the theme of co-producing public safety was central across all interviews, it meant something slightly different for DCOs and community residents. For example, DCOs initially expressed frustration when citizens report a crime but do not provide names or other details to ultimately support the investigative process. Residents, on the other hand, fear retaliation if they are seen cooperating with the police and worry that they will not be protected. Instead, residents can at times push back on this kind of cooperation claiming that it is the police’s responsibility, not the community’s, to carry out investigations.
Though police understand residents’ fears and concerns, they think cooperation is a key element to co-producing public safety. Ultimately, the community largely cedes responsibility for some tasks—like investigating violent crime—to the police who also believe this task in particular is fundamentally a police responsibility. Part of CNPI’s intention was for the emerging relationships between DCOs and residents to help bolster trust and cooperation for exactly these sorts of public safety needs. For example, DCOs would assist detectives with tasks that directly engage residents in their areas such as canvassing after a violent incident, filling out violent incident reports, and pulling video surveillance footage. DCOs would also help keep the community informed of investigations and help address other police-related matters that might arise in the aftermath of events—a core issue residents expressed about police responsiveness.

Additionally, community residents and police do rely on other stakeholders besides each other to co-produce public safety. Residents and police both view DCOs as one conduit for residents to obtain services to support public safety efforts, for example, youth programs, response to homelessness, access to fire and health services, and lighting and beautification of public spaces. As described above, however, residents also recognize the vibrancy of their communities and frequently highlight the numerous ways residents create public safety every day for themselves and others, despite public disinvestment in neighborhood institutions such as parks, schools, public events, etc. From the DCO side, co-producing public safety involved making themselves available to residents and generating opportunities (through building relationships, meetings, and more) for sustained and robust engagement. Working directly with businesses, churches, and local institutions was another key mechanism through which DCOs believed such co-production of safety would happen.

Section 5. One Year of Progress (Before COVID-19)

After the program’s first full year of operation, DCOs and residents expressed several positive changes which they associated with the program but also noted important challenges.

Some Indications of Positive Increases in Police-Community Relationships

Overall, DCOs and some community residents noted positive changes in the relationship between the police and the community, including increased police visibility, greater attentiveness to the problems expressed by the CAs, and, most importantly, more meaningful interpersonal interactions. One resident noted:

“I definitely think it’s starting to change. We’ve done police neighborhood walks with law enforcement to reach out to people in the community. We actually had a meet and greet with the NPI officers. And people were in the meeting and one lady said, ‘We like this program.... The officers drove by and they waved at us.’” CAs also believed that the program was gaining traction with more residents interested in the program.”

Residents and police cited several instances where they jointly tried to address concerns raised directly by CAs and residents. Some examples given included DCOs working with civic and church leaders to connect women
engaged in sex work to safe houses that provide drug rehabilitation, shelter, and job training services; connecting families and individuals seeking assistance to counseling, employment opportunities, and other services; making direct referrals to counseling services; and helping residents secure subsidized medication and healthcare. DCOs also worked with local aldermen, school officials, and businesses to mediate business disputes, traffic issues, and other problems identified directly by these organizations. In one highly charged instance raised by CAs and school officials, DCOs worked with CAs to look for arts and recreation diversion programs for local gang-involved youth after repeated calls pertaining to disturbances at a park and near a local school.

As an illustration of this improved relationship, officers and CAs in D25 separately noted a specific instance of two DCOs going “above and beyond” to connect one young resident with resources. One D25 resident, recounted the story:

“They had arrested this young guy who was selling drugs. They asked, ‘What do you need in order to not be out here like this?’ and the young guy told them, ‘I just need a job. If you give me a job, I’m gone.’ So, they called [Community Ambassador] James, and through the connections with the Get to a Job program, they got the guy a job. Only thing the guy was missing was shoes. The officers went out and took care of that. They bought him some shoes. At the time, I was doing transportation for the Get to a Job program, so I would see the guy. He got up and went to work every day. Sometimes he even did overtime. Those are some of the biggest takeaways, just being involved in community policing on a different level, where you’re actually helping the community and not harming, listening to individuals that said, ‘I was able to call my DCO and they helped me out with XYZ.’”

A DCO sergeant recounted this story in a debriefing meeting, recognizing one of the DCOs who was involved. The sergeant continued to follow up with the resident, confirming that the young man had continued his employment and was making good progress.

Importantly, this positive sentiment towards the program and its association with improved relationships with the police was expressed mainly by those residents engaged with the program. Less engaged community members and residents who reported little involvement with CPD or other formal public safety efforts continued to stress that police failed to focus on the public safety issues they care about. These residents noted that police were giving more parking tickets and moving violations in their area. One participant mentioned that officers had put up bright lights in the alleyways to deter illegal parking in those spaces:

“Yeah, I’ve never in the 30 years that I have lived here have I seen so many police cars go down the alleys. And almost overnight the alley lights got brighter. And I’m okay with that, but my bedroom’s over here, and I wonder, people who have bedrooms on the alley, how they feel?”
Around this same time, DCOs in D25 participated in a public campaign that used better lighting in high crime areas to reduce crime. Overall, less engaged residents perceived these efforts as insufficient to address the most pressing public safety problems in their neighborhoods such as shootings and burglaries.

CNPI was just launching in D15 in early 2020 when the pandemic hit. During this initial startup phase, DCOs in D15 talked about developing strong in-person relationships with local businesses in the early months of the program, but had difficulty linking to CAs, citizens, and community-based organizations once relations went virtual. Slowly, DCOs learned the local organizational landscape as they vetted service-providers regarding their capabilities and assessed how reliable they were in job placement, mental health provision, food and housing, youth programs, and more.

To improve the relationship, less-engaged residents suggested officers take the step from being visible in their cars and attending meetings to walking around the streets of the community and building relationships that way. One participant said and several months into the program’s 2019 launch in D25:

“They’re patrolling. But I would like for them to be more out. … Just talk to us. Now it’s summertime. People are out, say hi, … if they feel comfortable talking to you they won’t be scared [to] call you for anything. And I know for a fact there’s a lot of things going on but people are not saying anything. People are just too afraid.”

Many of these residents expressed having attempted to engage officers in the past, but felt like they were in a one-sided relationship in which they made an effort, but officers did not respond with the same friendliness or enthusiasm. Officers often say the same thing about residents.

**Increased Officer Satisfaction**

Overall, officers reported increased job satisfaction with the initiative, often praising colleagues and supervisors in the program. Most notably, officers found the new levels of engagement and autonomy rewarding and a much-needed departure from “chasing calls” or “making arrests.” For many officers, like the veteran officer below, this sort of engagement embodied why she joined the police in the first place. For her, being a DCO was an opportunity to be professionally rewarded for being the kind of officer she always was, as she explained after researchers observed her in the field:

“I’ve always policed this way. Myself and my partner we always liked getting out the car and interacting in the community, and we used to keep track of repeat cases in between chasing calls and try to go back to those. This program is great because now we get the resources to do what we’ve always done.”

Beyond the personal satisfaction, officers also appreciated possible professional recognition for this new style of policing. Officers commented on the satisfaction of being paired with like-minded officers and working in teams that valued community-oriented work. As one officer noted, “I think the people that we have in this program
here are amazing. ... I say we’re the dream team. I feel like everybody has something. Or we can call on somebody to come and do something. Cause everyone has something to give.”

At a professional level, officers also appreciated working during “normal business hours” and the autonomy and flexibility that came with initiating their own strategies and approaches to addressing public safety and social problems alongside community members—for them, this epitomized “co-producing public safety.” Working directly with residents and building relationships that led to the sorts of problem-solving they were doing was precisely the point of CNPI.

**Program Challenges**

Some of the biggest program challenges noted by both residents and DCOs was the overall lack of investment and commitment to the program’s expressed goals of realigning police roles and building the necessary infrastructure on the community side to support districtwide engagement with residents and community organizations.

From the DCOs’ perspectives, one of the biggest challenges was the lack of support in maintaining the promised “off-calls” time that was crucial for developing meaningful relationships, on-the-ground problem solving, and follow through on commitments. At the beginning of the program, DCOs were given new shift schedules and assignments that would directly facilitate CNPI; they were also going to be assigned to a specific geographic sector for (at least) a proposed period of time. Even midway through the first year, however, DCOs in D25 frequently noted management decisions to change schedules, shifts, and assignments that disrupted CNPI efforts. For example, at one point, DCOs were asked to change their schedules to a night shift from 5 p.m. to 2 a.m., essentially undermining their capacity as DCOs to work with local businesses and organizations.

Many officers expressed frustration. One DCO summarized the shift change as “a challenge to the mission [of CNPI] ... at those times there is no chance to engage the community, especially businesses. It’s also hard to follow up on issues because it’s more difficult to access people at those times when they don’t really want to be disturbed.” Some DCOs were asked to support other units (administrative, tactical, or patrol) and perform tasks—doing deskwork, making arrests, and answering calls for service—that seemed to run counter to the intended purpose of the DCO role.

DCOs and CAs also expressed difficulty in obtaining resources and internal support to fully carry out their respective roles. Officers wanted better equipment, such as functioning radios and safer, newer cars, and dedicated space for CNPI, both for DCOs as well as the CEI. In addition, “beat integrity”—that Beat Officers would become more focused on issues within their beats, respond to calls only within their beats, and also work on relationship building—was never fully realized. DCOs often noted tensions with Beat Officers who didn’t understand (or believe in) CNPI or expressed little knowledge or interest in the areas they policed. In practice, DCO work connected to the work of other police units on a case-by-case basis; they had started to build
individual relationships with individual officers and ambassadors but did not operate as if they were all part of the same unit.

DCOs noted that it took time and often pre-existing relationships to win the support of Beat Officers and show the program’s value—a problem, from the DCOs and other program participants’ perspective, that stems from the overall lack of clarity in how the program should be integrated into other district-level operations. This problem seemed especially acute between Beat Officers and DCOs. CPD leadership stressed the importance of collaboration between Beat Officers and DCOs as vital to building respectful relationships and the program’s success. Yet, the relationship between the DCO and the Beat Officer remained unresolved. Even months into the program, Beat Officers and other district officers had little understanding of CNPI and its role in district operations. Many even confused CNPI with the CAPS program. As one DCO explained: “It’s difficult, ‘cause even still we’ve been doing this [for months], the majority of this district is, ‘What do you guys do? You guys are CAPS. You guys go to parties.’” CPD leadership acknowledged that many Beat Officers assumed that DCOs did not contribute to patrol operations.

DCOs struggled to secure on-the-ground buy-in from many Beat Officers and believed leadership would need to more directly assist with getting other CPD staff aligned with program goals. One officer elaborated, “We need to see the commander reiterating this, so that [Beat Officers] understand even if they are resistant to change, you have people to assist you.” The officer continued, “There are still areas in the district, most areas, where you will tell people about the program and they will say, ‘What?’”

For their part, CNPI leadership faced challenges convincing leadership in other CPD units to instruct or encourage their officers to work with DCOs, to attend DCO meetings, and to discuss new strategies to recurring community problems. “We have bull-headed officers,” an officer in DCO leadership admitted. The solution for some CPD leadership was to put more back on the DCOs, encouraging them to engage their fellow Beat Officers by volunteering to take on their 911 calls and helping them with their work, thereby building relationships with them.

A related program challenge was staffing. There were too few DCOs and too much officer turnover. In a district with approximately 374 officers, DCOs felt there were simply too few of them to make a sustainable difference. Six months into the program, one DCO noted, “We’re short. We’re, you know, we need more people. And it’s, how many problems in that 12 square miles can you see out there? And there’s eight of us.” In addition, most officers in the inaugural district moved to new positions by the end of their second year.

The original program design had hoped to keep DCOs in the same position for at least a year, so, in this regard, DCO tenure met expectations. The turnover, however, did not go unnoticed by community members who felt blindsided by the changes. For some community residents, a year was just the beginning of what they had hoped would have been a much longer relationship. Turnover also potentially signaled tension internal to CPD in which officers weighed their excitement about the program with other career goals. During exit interviews, several officers stressed that they “loved” the program, but chose to leave it for “better” career opportunities.
Other officers left because of frustration with CPD leadership’s perceived lack of commitment to CNPI and the inability to establish metrics to demonstrate their effectiveness as DCOs—an important component of career advancement within CPD. One officer said:

“It is important and imperative that this program be properly incentivized. You’re gonna hear consistently that the lack of incentive pushes us away. [DCO] is not a career path. New York had a career path [from DCO to] to sergeant or detective. The only benefits you get [here] is being a DCO. While that’s good, it’s not enough to keep good people in the program. You get there and you get fatigued.”

Even less investment was directed to the community side of CNPI, especially formal community engagement efforts. Key differences in training and compensation shaped the development of the police and community side of CNPI, at times potentially reinforcing the “us vs. them” feelings between CPD and residents. For example, DCOs received several days of workshops and scenario-based departmental trainings at the beginning of the program, as well as additional trainings throughout. In contrast, Community Ambassadors received far fewer hours of training, often from a single point of contact from the Policing Project team. The training and orientation DCOs received equipped them with more of an understanding of what they could and should be doing. On the other hand, questions of what makes a community member eligible to be an ambassador and the scope and tangible objectives of a Community Ambassador are still evolving.

A compounding factor was the fact that the CA role was entirely voluntary, with residents having to balance the new unpaid role alongside work, family, and other obligations. This led some community residents in particular to note that, while in theory, CNPI was intended to promote “partnerships,” the relationship remained largely unequal and often was perceived as disingenuous from the perspective of many in the community. One Ambassador said of the program team:

“Look, [they] ask us to work with these police officers, and yet some of them are not engaging. They just blew us off. Why am I here? What am I doing? Why is he here? We know I have to be here. I’m the community, but this guy is in the program. He’s collecting a check. Is he accountable? Is he gonna do anything, gonna do his job?”

Section 6. COVID-19 and Summer 2020

Just as it did for the rest of the world, 2020 brought about significant obstacles and challenges for CNPI. COVID restrictions limited the ways CNPI could operate and reinvigorated protests around police abuse. Misconduct shook some of the fragile trust that was being built. COVID-related illnesses among police and rising levels of gun violence drained resources and personnel from the nascent program. Residents and DCOs reported tensions, fatigue, and dismay about their roles in the program, but many continued to stress the importance of programs such as CNPI in improving the relationship between the community and CPD.
COVID Set Back Strategic Partnerships, Forcing DCOs to Engage Community Partners in New Ways

CNPI was built around face-to-face interactions and DCOs and community partners scrambled to find new ways to interact under COVID restrictions. As essential personnel, police at times viewed COVID as just another problem to be solved. As one sergeant put it, “[We] never left the field, we just put our masks on and keep doing the work.”

Still, the nature of the pandemic and restrictions put in place impeded interactions and necessitated a shift in many DCO activities. Connections with business and local institutions were greatly limited to those that remained open and/or had outdoor foot traffic. DCOs shifted to spending more time on building relationships with proprietors of local businesses, often just standing outside to talk to owners.

DCOs also used new COVID relief efforts as new ways to build institutional and individual relationships. In both CNPI districts, DCOs collaborated with churches and other local organizations to help with food drives and PPE giveaways. Some DCOs even went door-to-door to distribute health literacy materials. Although DCOs strategically used giveaways such as these to start new relationships with residents prior to COVID, the pandemic shaped the delivery method and choice of incentive. While engaging in need-based transactions might not have been what most officers and residents wanted CNPI to be, they clearly viewed such activities as one of the few options to engage during the pandemic. Said one officer:

“Face-to-face services have been cut down quite a bit. In that way, yeah, it’s difficult. I would say our relationship with the community, I think, is still good because we’re still out there. We’re making sure that we’re out there. We’re doing things with them. We’re talking with them still. Even if it’s behind a mask—you know what I’m saying—we’re still out there. Now, identifying other more specific issues and trying to help people in the way that we were doing prior to COVID, yeah, that’s changed quite a bit. Opening up and identifying new problems ‘cause people are also inside.”

COVID’s Bigger Impact on Connecting with the Community

COVID had a bigger impact on the deeper problem-solving work that relied on community-based organizations. Much of CNPI’s approach to problem solving involved making referrals or connections to community-based organizations for substance abuse help, temporary housing, and job resources. The shuttering of many services or the reducing of capacity hindered this work. Officers in D15 raised this problem the most; as one officer explained:

“A lotta these organizations and businesses that we were partnering with, they were forced to close. We had [a key community partner organization]; they’re closed. A lotta these businesses have minimal functions right now because of the COVID so that was one of the big setbacks. When stuff started closing, that’s when things changed. Right now we’re trying to maintain the connections we have with the businesses that are still open.”
With limited access to the local organizations with whom they worked, DCOs worried that some of the progress made during the first year might come to a halt. Being unable to rely on these organizations meant they had fewer resources to refer residents to, limiting their ability to solve a variety of problems that relied on cooperation with community organizations.

COVID restrictions also disrupted the emerging relationship between DCOs and many Community Ambassadors in the CEI, especially since the in-person spaces and events for the program were not spared from COVID restrictions. In D25, the last joint ambassador-DCO event was held mid-March to discuss Chicago’s new 311 app and joint DCO-ambassador meetings did not resume until July 2020. By this time, many ambassadors felt disappointed that communication with DCOs and the program had slowed down or ceased all together despite efforts to reach out to the police. COVID dealt a severe blow to D15’s CEI efforts even before the program had a chance to launch. In D15, the CEI program was just launching in the months prior to COVID, with ambassadors having met their DCOs for the first time in mid-January 2020. They did not collectively meet again until May 2020. Even in early 2021, DCOs reported that they had not yet partnered with CAs.

Tensions also arose surrounding police involved violence that emerged in the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder and have continued as new instances of police shootings by CPD emerged. A CEI “reboot meeting” in late January 2021 between DCOs and CAs became tense as DCOs and residents talked candidly about the history of policing and police violence. DCOs hoped that CNPI could give the community “good experiences to replace the bad” as a way to work collectively on public safety. An Ambassador responded that while that might be true, good behavior and public events were not enough: “I don’t care how many block parties and BBQs you attend, that doesn’t change attitudes.”

For some residents, the attitude needs to extend beyond any single program or officer. Some DCOs left the encounter feeling even more determined that programs like CNPI were important in changing the narrative about policing. But residents and DCOs also left the encounter recognizing the tension and wondering how, if at all, they could find constructive ways to move forward.

While many of the joint efforts between CEI and DCOs stopped temporarily, many of the Community Ambassadors and Policing Project team members continued their work. Indeed, for many ambassadors, their pre-existing roles as community leaders in various organizations increased and their professional and informal efforts to reach fellow citizens continued undaunted. For instance, one ambassador in D15 moved her school-based, youth activities to Zoom, and another ambassador discussed hosting restorative justice circles virtually. A D25 ambassador went with a few DCOs door-to-door surveying residents about their needs to develop a block club; he often canvassed businesses and residents with DCOs prior to the pandemic.

**National Events Further Strained an Already Tense Police-Community Relationship**

George Floyd’s murder and the subsequent protests happened as CNPI hit the 18-month mark in D25 and less than 5 months after the program launched in D15. Some residents hoped that Floyd’s murder would be a wake-
up call to the broader community, especially for CPD and government officials, about the fraught condition of police-community relations and the significant role community residents should have in matters of public safety. The grief, trauma, and mistrust that stirred during this time represented another major manifestation of the problems with policing that was, for many DCOs and community residents, precisely the reason programs like CNPI are crucial.

Some residents suggested that outside of the collective pain, the events of that summer highlighted the ability of the community to come together around challenges. Other residents thought that the current moment underscored some of their enduring concerns around officer diversity within CPD. In response to many of the conversations arising around defunding the police and police reform, residents in the study expressed the deep need for improved police training and the need for hiring and supporting more Black police officers to work in their neighborhoods. While residents recognized that these were not “solutions” for the larger problems, they felt such changes could improve community-police relations and CNPI in particular.

For their part, some DCOs hoped that this might be a moment for their efforts to shine, specifically by showcasing the different approach to policing offered by CNPI. In fact, as one officer recalled, local commanders even tried to leverage the growing reputation of the program during protests:

“Whenever there’s protests, the commander will call the DCOs to stand in front of the district, because we were not the aggressors. We could talk to people. ...[E]ven though there’s only eight or nine of us, she wanted us to the frontline without our helmets on. ... The first people she called for were the DCOs. Everyone’s like, ‘Why would they call them?’ Well, it’s for a reason. Because we’re able to de-escalate situations and talk to people, and just understand them more ... yes, we’re police officers, but we still have a different role. It worked. I mean as far as the last few protests, they’ve been peaceful in our district.”

Neither residents nor DCOs were Pollyannish, however. Many Community Ambassadors felt demoralized and even hopeless, noting that like other historical moments of mobilization around police violence, the civil unrest had the potential to erase the progress they felt the program was making. Residents expressed that the events of the summer made establishing and maintaining connections with each other much more difficult and, perhaps, harder to reestablish. Said one:

“[I]t’s gonna take a lot longer now to mend. ... I feel like we were making good progress. Right? Then we just took 100 steps back. Now you gotta get back to ... where you were at. I think that’s gonna take some work. ... People are still upset, man. People are still marching and protesting.”

Like others throughout the city, many residents involved with CNPI were upset and frustrated by the city’s and CPD’s response to the unrest. They felt that officers—including DCOs—were being pulled from their neighborhoods to protect downtown businesses, leaving their communities vulnerable. “What it makes me feel like,” one resident said, “is that we’re not important.” This feeling of abandonment was compounded by high-
levels of officer turnover that were happening in response to COVID-related changes. Not only did residents think such re-deployment made it seem as if the city “didn’t care” about them, many believed it also left them vulnerable.

Several residents even linked the shifting of resources from their neighborhood to downtown to the destruction of several neighborhood businesses, many of which were already suffering from COVID restrictions. Remarked one resident:

“Of course, the looting [in our community] was just absolutely horrific to me because it impacts the community in such a way that now we have to go further to the store, or they’ve impacted the banks or the currency exchanges for businesses that we utilize. They either aren’t there, they’re boarded up, or they’re operatin’ on such a flimsy scale.”

Ultimately, police felt like the events of 2020 made their jobs more difficult overall, including in the CNPI. DCOs believed that the relationships they forged prior to the civil unrest would be unaffected, but that building new connections to hard-to-reach populations would prove more challenging, especially among less police-friendly groups. The civil unrest may have also disrupted DCO work, in cases where DCOs found themselves backfilling for other officers who had been assigned to downtown protest detail. The protests, combined with COVID and officer turnover, temporarily dampened relationships between DCOs and ambassadors. But in many cases, the pre-existing relationships have endured and some new DCOs have reconnected with Community Ambassadors. DCOs and CAs have held two joint meetings in each district since the protests. Ambassadors from D25 have not left the program, for the most part, and continue to express a desire to work with DCOs despite the turmoil and transitions.

**Increased Gun Violence and the ‘Cannibalization’ of the Program**

On top of COVID and the civil unrest, Chicago experienced a large increase in gun violence in 2020. This noteworthy increase drew sharp attention from CPD, which drew personnel from other districts to gun violence “hot-spots” in the city. Thus, on top of personnel challenges associated with the normal course of the program, with staffing adjustments due to COVID, and resources directed downtown during civil unrest, the increase in gun violence caused yet another drain of personnel from districts and programs like CNPI. Both DCOs and residents noticed and criticized this change. The personnel shock made one Ambassador feel, “Chicago PD has cannibalized the program. ... We’re stuck with new recruits or people who are gonna stay with the program for a couple weeks and leave just like the other[s]....” Overall, it left DCOs and residents feeling abandoned and that the program was not a priority—precisely at the time when community members felt like it needed the most support.
Section 7. Did CNPI Impact Trust, Perceptions of Public Safety, or Crime?

One of the foundational premises of CNPI is that the increased connection between DCOs, Community Ambassadors, and community residents should increase levels of trust in the police and, in the long term, perhaps increase perceptions of community safety and decrease in crime. Given the entrenched nature of cynicism and mistrust between the police and the community, it is unlikely that the nascent CNPI would produce statistically significant impacts on aggregate or citywide levels of trust and safety. However, it might be possible to detect small changes in such metrics within the CNPI treatment areas. This section provides an assessment of CNPI’s impact on residents’ perceptions of trust in the police and public safety by a quasi-experimental approach.

Measuring Perceptions of Safety and Trust

To consistently capture Chicago residents’ perceptions of safety and trust in the police, we rely on a set of survey data of a stratified random sample of between 1,500 to 2,000 Chicago residents in each of the city’s 69 police sectors every month. The monthly survey, collected by the private company Elucd, asks residents three different questions based on prior social scientific research—two questions centered on trust in the police and one question about perceptions of public safety (see Table 1).

Survey respondents select their score on a 1 to 10 scale, and responses are presented as the weighted average response within police sectors. As such, the reported scores represent an “average response” to the questions and can be compared across sectors with some confidence. The raw number should not be read as a percentage but, instead, as a standardized metric across sectors to compare changes over time.

Table 1. Elucd Survey Questions Used to Measure Trust and Safety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Questions</th>
<th>Safety Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How much do you agree with this statement?</td>
<td>When it comes to the threat of crime, how safe do you feel in your neighborhood?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police in my neighborhood treat local residents with respect. (Score from 1–10)</td>
<td>(Score from 1–10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much do you agree with this statement?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police in my neighborhood listen to and take into account the concerns of local residents. (Score from 1–10)</td>
<td></td>
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Levels of Trust and Public Safety in Chicago

Figure 4 maps the average safety and trust scores for 2020 by police sector. By and large, the spatial distribution of the Elucd survey metrics aligns with previous research in Chicago on perceptions of public safety and trust in the police. On average, residents of Black and Latino communities in 2020 reported lower levels of safety as well as lower levels of trust, as compared to predominately White neighborhoods. Communities on the west side of Chicago—especially Austin and West Garfield Park, which include the second CNPI district, D15—had the lowest levels of perceptions of safety and trust in the police. Levels of safety and trust in D25 were closer to citywide averages.

Figure 5 plots perceptions of safety and trust from the earliest point of data collection, November 2018 to January 2021. These trends are presented disaggregated by the majority race and ethnicity of a police sector, where a sector is considered White, Black, or Hispanic if 50% of the residents in a sector selected at least one of those categories on the American Community Survey. Admittedly, this is an imperfect measure of the racial and ethnic composition of any neighborhood, but it does provide some important insights into how perceptions of safety and trust vary across different neighborhoods. With regard to perceptions of safety, majority White sectors report the highest levels of safety while majority Black sectors report the lowest levels of safety at every single time period. Overall, levels of safety are 19% lower in Black sectors than in White sectors. By and large, perceptions of safety decline for all sectors from 2019 onward, aligning roughly with increasing homicide rates in the city.
Consistent with prior research, self-reported trust in the police is considerably lower in Black neighborhoods than in White neighborhoods, while Latino neighborhoods fall roughly between the two. Figure 5 shows that perceptions of trust in the police in Chicago fluctuated, especially in Black and Latino sectors. From 2018–19, reported levels of trust decreased markedly in Black communities as well as in Latino communities, while actually increasing in White ones. Levels of trust then appear to increase after January 2019 in both Black and Latino communities until mid-2020. After mid-2020, levels of trust in the police decline for all sectors.

Throughout this time period, Chicago underwent a series of high-profile instances of police misconduct and attempted police reforms, including the trial of officers involved in the shooting death of Laquan McDonald, the election of a new mayor, the appointment of two different police superintendents, and the passing of a federal consent decree over CPD. The changes in trust seen in the Black and Latino sectors roughly align with several of these major changes. In particular, the increase in reported trust after January 2019 coincides with the 2018 conviction of Jason Van Dyke for Laquan McDonald’s death and the steep declines in 2020 align with the unrest following George Floyd’s murder. Our proposed statistical analyses are designed to disentangle these overall trends from those trends that might be attributable to CNPI.
Trust and Safety in District 25

Levels of Trust and Safety in D25 generally followed the city trends and also show variation by the predominant race and ethnicity of the sector as seen in Figure 6. Since the start of CNPI in January 2019 to January 2021, citywide levels of safety, on average, decreased approximately 8.6%. Citywide self-reported trust, on average, increased approximately 5.4% since the start of the program. As compared to the overall city trend, levels of trust in D25 were more stable overall, but showed a downward arc in the middle of 2020 consistent with the patterns described above. The racial and ethnic differences are also evident in D25, with the perceptions of trust and safety being lower in the Black sectors of D25 and taking a steeper downward trend in 2020 than in the Latino or White sectors.

Figure 6. Sector-Level Elucid Metrics in District 25 by the Percentage of Black Residents’ Self-Reported Perceptions

Assessing whether these changes can be attributed to CNPI, as opposed to larger citywide patterns, requires comparing trends in CNPI sectors to those in a comparison or control group. Because the rollout of CNPI was not conducted as a randomized experiment, we use a quasi-experimental design based on synthetic control groups. For each CNPI sector in D25, we create a synthetic control group that is a composition of statistically similar areas of the city along key demographic, economic, and crime indicators (see the Appendix for full details). These synthetic control groups allow us to compare what happened in the CNPI districts against other non-CNPI areas of the city, thus giving some ability to parse out what might be attributable to the program rather than larger citywide trends. The present analyses focus only on D25 to allow for sufficient “post-program” time periods required for statistical evaluation.

The results of the statistical models assessing the impact of CNPI on perceptions of safety and trust are presented in the Appendix. Overall, the results provide little evidence of program impact on either residents’
perception of safety or trust in the police, suggesting that the patterns seen in D25 during the first two years in the program follow the overall patterns observed in similar sectors in the city. These results should be considered with caution for several reasons. First, by design, the program itself started small with just 21 DCOs in a single large police district and, as described above, struggled to connect with larger structural changes in CPD and with varying levels of community engagement. Importantly, as seen in the interview and observational data, the program’s small size perhaps stymied the ability to reach broader non-engaged residents. This suggests that program dosage was likely too small to determine any impact. Second, all of the challenges encountered in 2020 taxed the nascent program, adding obstacles the program struggled to overcome.

Calls for Service

One of the key objectives of CNPI was to reduce calls for service by having DCOs and CEI work collectively on longer standing problems that frequently generate a large volume of calls. Figure 7 shows the overall pattern of calls in D25 sectors, comparing them to citywide and overall D25 trends. The results show that while D25 receives fewer 911 calls per capita than the city on average, the trends are consistently flat across all districts, until 2019, when they begin to increase. For 911 calls received about violent incidents, all the sectors in D25 follow the trend for the citywide mean. Per capita call volumes for violent incidents peaked in 2017, continually decreasing since then.

Figure 7. District 25 Fields Fewer 911 Calls per Capita than City
Using the same synthetic control group approach, N3 analyzed the calls for service for violent crime in the CNPI sectors in D25. We compared each sector’s trend in the rate of 911 calls with violent final dispositions (VFD) per 100,000 residents with that of its synthetic control group for the years 2017–20. There were no significant differences between groups with regard to changes in trends before and after the CNPI rollout in D25.

**Violent Crime**

CNPI’s program theory hoped that improved trust developed through relationship building and problem solving would translate into subsequent improvements in public safety and corollary reductions in crime and violence. In this sense, improvements to actual rates of crime and violence—and diminished calls for service—should lag behind improvements in trust. **Trust should change and then crime should change.** Given the lack of detectable changes in trust (and calls for service) associated with the pilot in D25, there is, therefore, unlikely to be any detectable changes in crime and violence. Nonetheless, N3 extended its quasi-experimental analysis to detect any notable changes in crime in D25 that might be associated with the timing on CNPI by analyzing trends in homicides and non-fatal shootings.

Figure 9 displays the overall homicide and non-fatal shooting patterns in the CNPI sectors in D25 as compared to the citywide and overall D25 average. Overall, shooting and homicide patterns in D25 were slightly less than the overall city mean, but followed the same general trend. Importantly, there is some variation across sectors in D25, with at least two sectors having higher rates of shootings and homicide throughout the entire period.
Results from the synthetic control group models comparing rates of homicides and non-fatal shootings in D25 CNPI sectors are presented in the Appendix’s Figure 2. The statistical models found no discernible differences between homicide and shooting patterns in D25 sectors as compared to the comparison group in four out of the five CNPI sectors; one sector in the area did experience a decreasing trend in shootings and homicides that appears to align with the timing of CNPI—meaning one sector did see a statistically significant decline in shootings and homicides.

Figure 9. Wide Variation in Non-Fatal Shootings and Homicides per Capita by Sector in District 25

Conclusion

CNPI sought to improve the relationship between the community and police by developing and investing in structures that would foster the co-production of public safety and problem solving. In theory, this was to entail the realignment of police resources and practices—especially the creation of the DCO position—that would provide police with the ability to spend time getting to know residents, their community, and their public safety concerns. On the community side, the creation of CEI was intended to empower members of the community to engage the police and represent a wide spectrum of groups, organizations, and interests in the neighborhood. The program’s core was the coming together of these two components to create a shared responsibility for public safety and, in so doing, lead to more trust between police and community residents and, eventually, aid in larger improvements in public safety.
Despite the limitations of a small pilot across two very distinct police districts, and the unprecedented challenges CNPI faced as a result of the events of 2020, interviews with residents and DCOs suggest modest gains in improving police-community relations in D25 during the first year of the program. Residents and police appreciated the respectful interactions the program created and readily pointed to examples of positive interactions they felt helped to alleviate some of the previous difficulties engaging the police or getting the police to respond to their public safety concerns. However, even before the summer of 2020 the program faced challenges in D25 and D15. Many of the positive sentiments of the program did not extend to less engaged residents who still felt that police did not address the public safety issues of most concern to them.

Residents and police alike cited high levels of DCO turnover, the lack of resources, and the continued struggles related to officer diversity as continued challenges to the program, as well as to CPD more broadly. The lack of investment in CEI and related community dimensions of the program were noted by residents, especially in D15, which struggled to differentiate CNPI’s community element from existing CAPS activities and roles. The convergence of the COVID pandemic, the renewed protests around police misconduct, and increases in gun violence in 2020 drew resources away from CNPI, compounding the feeling, especially by residents, of the lack of seriousness in a true model of co-production of public safety and shared problem solving.

Results from the quasi-experimental analysis do not show any significant impact of CNPI within D25 on levels of trust, perceptions of safety, calls for service, or violent crime after the first 24 months. Given the above-mentioned challenges, as well as the relatively small rollout of the program, it is possible the program never achieved a large enough “dosage” to demonstrate a statistically detectable impact. It is also possible that the events of 2020 erased early programmatic gains. Thus, while according to our interview and observation data, CNPI does appear to be generating buy-in and some respectful relationship-building between officers and residents (mainly engaged residents in D25), these effects do not appear to spill over into the larger community or less-engaged residents.

Even as this evaluation was underway, CPD has publicly committed to expanding CNPI citywide and the City features the program in its comprehensive violence reduction plan as part of its work to “Improve and Advance Policing.” CPD has most recently expanded CNPI to Police Districts 9, 10, and 11. N3 would urge caution against the expansion of the program without first understanding and investing in the elements originally expressed in the program’s core philosophy—the co-production of public safety—and investing equally in the police and community sides. At its core, residents and police involved in CNPI do not want it to be simply “another program.” Instead, they want to see the sorts of engagement and relationships promised by CNPI to represent a new way of interacting and engaging with the police which, in and of itself, should be part of a broader network of formal and informal ways of co-producing public safety.

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The sustainment and expansion of CNPI should consider the following sets of recommendations.\(^2\)

**On the policing side**, there is still enthusiasm for the program among both officers and engaged community residents but a clear frustration with the lack of consistency, investment, and commitment required to implement the program model with fidelity. To address these concerns, we recommend:

**Increase commitment to CNPI.** CPD needs to demonstrate serious commitment to CNPI’s core philosophy which would entail:

- Increasing staffing levels of DCOs to expand the department’s ability to better achieve the program’s goal of building trust and enhancing public safety.
- Adhering to the recommended initiative staffing model to provide the appropriate management structure and to provide the continuity within communities needed to build productive relationships necessary to better address public residents’ safety concerns.
- Minimizing officer turnover, especially of DCOs.
- Providing the necessary resources for DCOs to fulfill their roles more effectively, as well as providing appropriate career incentives. Providing adequate resources also ensures DCOs are afforded the respect and credibility both internally and externally that the role should engender and may help stem the extensive turnover experienced in the pilot districts.

**Increase Consistency.** CPD should ensure Beat Officers are given time off the radio as required by the program model and avoid pulling DCOs away from their shifts and duties. The department had to make some of these changes to meet the demands of the past year, but as CPD seeks to embed the program citywide, the department should ensure this component of the program model is adhered to.

**Ensure Consistent Messaging.** There remains a lack of clarity regarding the program and the role of the DCOs both within the department and in the community. A consistent CPD message, at every level, that describes the program and its goals, as well as clearly describes the role of the DCOs, may help ensure buy-in within the department and alleviate some of the misunderstandings, confusion, and, in some cases, mistrust of CNPI both internally and externally. Consistent messaging may also help ensure that the program is not confused with

\(^2\) In July 2021, N3 released a series of preliminary findings and recommendations based on its interviews, observations, and analysis of CNPI in District 25. In that report, N3 recommended that: 1) CPD enroll additional officers to better achieve the initiative’s goal of building trust through consistent interaction between police and communities; 2) CPD avoid pulling officers away from their DCO duties and responsibilities; and 3) there be increased investment on the community engagement initiative, a pillar of the program. While the program model continues to evolve, these initial recommendations have yet to be adopted and are even more relevant today.
CAPS or co-opted by ongoing and oftentimes fleeting community engagement activities that do not reflect the core philosophy of CNPI.

On the community side, while there is currently support from the Policing Project to recruit, engage, and provide some training to community members selected as Community Ambassadors, this program pillar is unstructured, underdeveloped, and under-resourced. The community infrastructure that would advance an equal partnership with CPD in the co-production of public safety can only be achieved with sustained resources, commitment, and time. The level of commitment to this program element needs to be on par with investments in the policing side, taking into account the rich and vibrant community institutions in Chicago that help produce public safety every day. To help strengthen the community engagement component of the initiative, city leaders are encouraged to:

Increase Overall Investment in CEI. To build a complementary infrastructure on the community side as intended by the program model, additional resources and support should, at a minimum, provide for some compensation, initial and ongoing training, and meetings or other activities necessary for Community Ambassadors to fulfill their roles. While this program pillar is currently being overseen by the Policing Project, the long-term sustainment of this effort is likely needed to be overseen by a city office or agency.

Better Define the Role of Community Ambassador. It is unclear how, and if, the role of the Community Ambassador relates to other existing CPD community engagement efforts in any particular district. This lack of clarity was made evident by the starkly different ways this program pillar was implemented in Districts 25 and 15. Given the unique culture of each district—as well as the presence of an already existing CPD ecosystem of (at many times overlapping) community engagement efforts such as CAPS, District Advisory Councils, beat meetings, and more—some variation across districts may be expected. Nevertheless, greater emphasis should be placed on clearly defining the core responsibilities and expectations of the Community Ambassador and understanding how this new role fits within the larger ecosystem of neighborhood social institutions.

Develop a Clear Operations and Sustainability Plan. It remains unclear which local entity is or will be responsible for establishing and maintaining the structure and resources needed for ongoing engagement. Unlike CPD which has an infrastructure and budget to pursue the policing changes required to properly implement CNPI, there is no corresponding community infrastructure and budget. Should there be continued interest in building this infrastructure in each district, effort should be made to identify how this process will be managed and equitably resourced beyond the pilot period and as CPD expands to other districts across the city.

Although CNPI has faced many challenges, especially during this past year, the program shows some promise and is valued by engaged members of the community and participating officers. Implementing these recommendations may help strengthen CNPI as the program expands citywide and thereby achieve greater impact. N3 will continue to monitor the program’s implementation and impact.
Appendix

Description of Synthetic Control Group Approach

The synthetic control process begins with the selection of characteristics to match the treatment areas and the control areas. Following previous research, we use demographic and economic conditions (age and gender composition, education, employment, poverty and public assistance, race and ethnicity, immigration status, household structure, housing rental levels, and residential turnover) as well as monthly violent crime rates for the two years before the start of the CNPI program in D25. Demographic and economic data are taken from the 2018 American Community Survey (five-year estimates) at the Census tract level and translated to police sectors using area-weighted interpolation. Violent crime data are obtained from the Chicago Data Portal and include homicide, robbery, criminal sexual assault, battery, and assault.

After identifying the target areal units, in this case, D25 police sectors, we identify similar units as comparison candidates. To avoid possible spillover effects of CNPI, we excluded sectors adjacent to D25. For each sector in D25, we compute demographic, economic, and monthly crime proportion and rate statistics based on counts. We then apply a provisional weight of 0.1 to each comparison candidate sector—that is, we multiply their characteristics by 0.1—and then select the sector that most closely resembles the D25 target area in terms of the demographic, economic, and monthly crime proportion and rate statistics; this sector forms the incipient synthetic control area. The weights of the remaining sectors are reset to zero, and then all the weights are provisionally increased by 0.1.

To improve the match between the synthetic control and the target sector, we either add a newly weighted sector or increase the weight of the sector currently in the incipient synthetic control area, whichever produces statistics closest to those in the target sector. This repeats 300 times, at each turn either adding a newly weighted sector or increasing the weight of one of the sectors in the incipient control area. The result is a collection of candidate sectors, each with its own weight; when their weighted characteristics are summed, they produce demographic, economic, and crime proportion and rate statistics that approximate those of the target sector, acting as its control group. Appendix Figure 1 provides an illustrative map of one D25 treatment sector (in pink) and the sectors used to create the synthetic control group for that sector.

Following the creation of the synthetic control group, the total monthly homicide and shooting events of each sector used to create the synthetic controls group, as well as their population, are multiplied by that unit’s weight. The weighted events and population are added across member units, and then an event rate per 100,000 residents is computed. These monthly homicide and shooting rates are the outcome variable. We use a comparative interrupted time series (CITS) model to analyze differences in trends before and after the CNPI rollout in D25 between all the D25 sectors and their respective control groups. This CITS model takes as inputs the passage of time, the intervention rollout date (with a lag of one month), and membership in either the CNPI or synthetic control group. The results from the CITS models show whether there were significant differences...
between groups in event rate trends before and after the CNPI rollout. We use these results to detect changes in sector-level trends that could be attributed to CNPI in D25.

**Appendix Figure 1. Example Police Sectors Used in the Synthetic Control Group Analyses**

![Example Police Sectors Used in the Synthetic Control Group Analyses](image)

**Results of Synthetic Control Group Analyses**

The results of the synthetic control models are presented in Appendix Table 1 and visualizations of the slope changes are presented in Appendix Figure 2. As described in the main report, there are no discernable program effects of CNPI on perceptions of safety or trust in any of the D25 sectors. With respect to homicides and shootings, only D25 sector 4 exhibited a statistically significant change in the post-intervention trend. Changes in the sector 4 slope after the start of CNPI indicate a statistically significant decrease in the trend compared to its synthetic control group, which exhibited an increasing trend. The statistical model suggests that some portion of the differences between groups and over time can be attributed to the implementation of CNPI in sector 4.
## Appendix Table 1. Changes in Post-Intervention Trend Slope Compared to Changes in Synthetic Control Group

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>95% Conf. Int.</th>
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<td><strong>Elucd Safety</strong></td>
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<td>0.386</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.203</td>
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<td>0.455</td>
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<td>-0.501</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>(-1.187, 0.185)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Elucd Trust</strong></td>
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<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.380</td>
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<td><strong>Homicides &amp; Non-Fatal Shootings</strong></td>
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<td>0.063</td>
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<td><strong>911 Calls with Violent Final Disposition</strong></td>
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*The bold red text indicates a statistically significant difference with $p < .05$.***
Appendix Figure 2. Results of Synthetic Control Group Analysis of Perceptions of Safety and Trust Before and After CNPI in District 25.

*Delta in slopes post-intervention.

Appendix Figure 3. Results of Synthetic Control Group Analysis of 911 Violent Crime Calls Before and After CNPI in D25*

*Delta in slopes post-intervention, matched on all 911 calls with violent final dispositions and violent crimes, standard regression.
Appendix Figure 4. Results of Synthetic Control Group Analysis of Homicide and Non-Fatal Shooting Rates Before and After CNPI in D25*

*Delta in slopes post-intervention, standard regression.
The Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3) promotes new ways for faculty, experts, and students at Northwestern University’s Institute for Policy Research to engage communities, civic partners, and policymakers to address core problems facing the residents of Chicago and surrounding communities. Specific projects and types of engagement will be linked by a focus on how the social relationships among networks, geographic communities, and the constellation of groups, organizations, and civic partners affect what we feel, think, and do—and how understanding, building, and leveraging this sort of network-thinking can improve neighborhoods, the city, and our region.

Acknowledgements

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