Electoral
Coalitions and Market Reforms: Evidence from Argentina
Edward
L. Gibson and Ernesto Calvo
Abstract
Recent experiences with market reform in democratizing
countries have generated interest in how structural and institutional
factors contribute to the political viability of the reform process.
This article thus examines the electoral dynamics of market reform
in Argentina between 1989 and 1995, and provides insights into the
way that economic differentiation and the territorial distribution
of political resources can shape both the design of market reform
and the coalitional bases for its political sustainability. The
electoral viability of the governing Peronist party during the conflictual
period of market reform was facilitated by regionally segmented
patterns of electoral coalition-building, and by the regional phasing
of the costs of market reform over time. Fiscal adjustment and market
reforms were concentrated primarily on economically strategic regions,
while public spending and political patronage in economically marginal
but politically overrepresented regions helped sustain support for
the governing party. A conceptual distinction between "high-maintenance"
and "low-maintenance" constituencies is thus introduced to shed
light on interactions between patronage spending and market reform.
Statistical analyses contrast the social bases of Peronist electoral
support in "metropolitan" and "peripheral" regions of the country
during the period of market reform, and highlight public sector
employment as a major determinant of the interregional variations
in electoral support for the governing party.
Edward L. Gibson, Department
of Political Science, Northwestern University
Ernesto Calvo, Department of Political Science,
Northwestern University
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