

“The Belief Structure and Causes of Canadian Foreign Policy Attitudes”

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Abstract

Recent studies of public opinion on international affairs have rejected the long-held assumption that citizens, in mature democracies, are incapable of forming structured foreign policy beliefs. In this paper, we focus on Canada. We find that the foreign policy preferences of Canadians can be ordered along three dimensions. These are beliefs about military capability and its consequences (“Militarism”); the prudence or restraint of involving Canadian forces in international missions (“Forces Abroad”); and reaching out to the less fortunate through non-military means (“Internationalism”). We employ Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) with Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) as our method of analysis. After discussing the structure and relationship between the dimensions, we find that positions along these dimensions can be explained to varying degrees by partisan identification and ideology with regional cleavages in public attitudes being the exception rather than the rule.

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The focus of this paper is the attitudes and foreign policy positions of a sample of the people of Canada, citizens of one of the world's oldest mature democracies. More specifically, we are concerned with whether the Canadian public has well structured and meaningful foreign policy attitudes. Our analyses will show that they appear to be similar in content and structure to those of Americans, and are in many ways similar to the structure of foreign policy attitudes of Sweden, which is a "middle power" much like Canada. The present research suggests that there might be a basic structure of foreign policy beliefs that is broadly generalizable.

It may be asked "Why Canada?" and "Why this concern with the attitudes and foreign policy positions of average citizens?" As to the first question, consistent with a "most-similar-systems approach," Canada is a country that is in many respects similar, but in some respects different from that in the United States (cf. Lipset 1990). As to why the concern, it is because previous research has argued that foreign policy is properly an elite process that is and should be in the hands of experts. Moreover, Converse (1964) presented persuasive evidence that the responses to questions about foreign policy by mass samples of the American public are essentially random. Even when people do respond, their responses are highly unstable over even brief time periods, strongly suggesting that foreign policy issues are neither comprehended nor salient to average citizens.

As just noted, early research by Lippman (1922) and Almond (1950) spoke scornfully of the capacity of the American public to participate meaningfully in foreign

policy decision making, a view held widely for decades. While Almond once considered the American public's understanding of foreign affairs to be capricious at best (and dangerous at worst), contemporary research finds Americans' attitudes about foreign policy to be "rational" (Shapiro and Page 1988) and well structured (Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995; Chittick and Freyberg-Inan 2001; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson 1993; Richman, Malone, and Nolle 1997; and Wittkopf 1986, 1990, 1994). In sum, Americans: have stable foreign policy opinions (Achen 1975; Shapiro and Page 1998); become informed about international crises (Baum 2003); change their opinions in response to information and international events (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005; Shapiro and Page 1988; Johnson and Tierney 2006); alter preferences for defense spending in response to actual spending (Wlezien 1995; 1996); are "pretty prudent" when it comes to supporting the use of force (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998); and are capable of rough cost-benefit judgments in supporting the use of military force (Klarevas 2002; Larson 1996; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005).

Despite the accumulation of these empirical findings, research into foreign policy attitudes has suffered from the lack of an elegant theory that explains the content and origins of citizen foreign policy attitudes (Page with Bouton 2006: 28). Such a lack of theory is partly a function of how the literature was formed—provocative articles about the lack of coherent and reasonable attitudes (e.g. Almond 1950; Erskine 1963; Converse 1964) allowed empirical articles debunking this claim to make a major contribution even without proposing an elaborate "inside the black box" account of the formation of foreign affairs thinking. Perhaps the most theoretically driven account to date comes from

Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), who view attitudes on specific topics as a function of more abstract “postures” or “goals.” Their contention is that these second order questions constitute higher order beliefs that drive the specific positions, and these beliefs are dictated by social demographics, basic political predispositions such as partisan identification, and fundamental beliefs towards their nation’s posture toward international affairs (e.g. internationalism versus isolationism, unilateralism versus multilateralism).

We believe that existing research that tests for the presence and impact of the hierarchical or “vertical” path toward generating citizens’ positions on specific topics has its shortcomings, especially what Page (with Bouton 2006: 122) admits is a “causal ambiguity.” For example, can one be sure that the “ethnocentrism” factor that Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) put at the beginning of their causal model is always exogenous to citizens’ beliefs about the use of the military? We take a middle ground—we believe that general “postures” about international affairs exist and that they are explained by core values like ideology and partisan identification. At the same time, we prefer estimating domain specific postures over abstract second order beliefs about “ethnocentrism” or the “morality of warfare” because of the causal ambiguity. Postures, or dimensions, will emerge from questions about international policies using data reduction techniques (i.e. Confirmatory Factor Analysis). The task for the researcher is to come up with questions that theoretically “should” fall under postures and perform honest tests to see whether the expected latent dimensions emerge.

The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes Beyond the U.S.

While considerable progress has been made in understanding the U.S. mass public's attitudes on international affairs—and the U.S. public's ability to influence U.S. foreign policy decisions—little research has attempted to examine whether is known about the views of mass publics outside the United States. We consider this problematic because a key explanation of the democratic peace is attributed to the constraining power of public opinion (e.g. Fearon 1994; Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001; Slantchev 2006). The audience costs literature explicitly incorporates public opinion as a powerful force in foreign policy decision making by arguing that democratically elected leaders who back down in international crises will be punished by their electorate. Such punishment allows these leaders to send more credible signals of resolve in crisis bargaining. While democratic systems may allows leaders to send more credible signals, that is only true if the public actually supports the foreign policy in question. At the same time, the transparency of democracies may put strict limits on the content of credible signals; it may be difficult to send credible signals of resolve if the public does not support a particular course of action. Therefore, we argue that if scholars want to give a prominent role to public opinion in explanations of conflict processes, it is important to actually know something about the content and structure of foreign policy preferences.

We employ Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on data from a national study of the Canadian electorate conducted in 2004¹ to demonstrate that Canadian foreign policy attitudes can be arrayed along three dimensions which we label 1) Military Capability

¹ The data are from the 2004 Political Support in Canada (PSC) study, supported by U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) grants to Kornberg (#0420401) and Kornberg and Scotto (#0422569). Support for data cleaning and the analyses contained in this paper was enhanced by a Faculty Research Grant made to Scotto and Reifler administered through the Academic Relations Section of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C. The questions utilized in this study derive from the mail-back portion of the study, and information on survey design and the weights employed can be obtained from the principal investigators.

and Consequences (“Militarism”); 2) Prudence or the Restraint of Military “Forces Abroad”; and 3) “Internationalism.” Our confidence in this three dimensional latent variable model is buttressed by additional analyses indicating that positions on these dimensions in part can be explained by the partisanship and ideology of Canadians. We find that there are important differences in attitudes that are explained by region, which we believe reflects the historic differences between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians concerning the use of military force abroad (cf. Granatstein 2004). We believe that the substantial similarity to U.S. models of foreign policy attitudes, combined with the rather dramatic variation of foreign policy attitudes held by Canadians, show further evidence of the need to conduct more systematic cross-national research of foreign policy opinions.

There are relatively few attempts to see how well structural models of public opinion about foreign policy generalize from the U.S. to other countries. Hurwitz et al. (1993) examine attitudes in Costa Rica to see whether their hierarchical constraint model works in a democratic country that is substantially different than the U.S. They find that the hierarchical core values approach does work, but that the dimension of militarism does not constrain the policy beliefs of Costa Ricans. Bjereld and Ekengren (1999) compare the foreign policy attitudes of a traditional “middle power,” Sweden, to the preferences of those of the U.S., and they find that Swedish attitudes are explained by two dimensions—a militant internationalism dimension (a la Wittkopf 1990) and an identity dimension (like that of Chittick et al. 1995). Jenkins-Smith et al. (2004) compare the structure of U.S. and British foreign policy attitudes using a hierarchical model, and finds that a similar structure of attitudes among U.S. and U.K. publics.

Academic articles and policy papers about the Canadian public's attitudes on foreign affairs typically report results and patterns from survey questions on specific topics or policies. However, even these studies suggest that Canadian foreign policy attitudes operate in ways similar to U.S. foreign policy attitudes. Martin and Fortmann (1995) find that support for peacekeeping missions ebbed and flowed in response to actual events. Similarly, declining preferences for peacekeeping and the distribution of foreign aid in the 1990s were tied to the need for domestic fiscal constraint and difficult military engagements in Bosnia and Somalia (cf. Rioux and Hay 1998-1999; Munton 2002-2003).

Munton and Keating (2001) come closest to a systematic investigation of the content and structure of Canadian foreign policy attitudes. They conduct an exploratory factor analysis of survey questions on Canadian foreign policy attitudes and find four dimensions of Canadian "internationalism" that, in many ways, resembles the models of the American public. Although the survey questions they utilize do not reflect the current times and contain indicators that pertain to beliefs about the economy, Munton and Keating's (2001) analysis suggests that there is structure to Canadian foreign policy attitudes.

In the remainder of this paper, we pay particular attention to the number of meaningful dimensions structuring Canadian foreign policy attitudes. We conclude with an analysis that test the ability of three sets of variables (demographics, ideology, and partisan identification) to predict values on the latent dimensions.

Rival Models

We seek to generalize models of foreign policy from U.S. samples to other mass publics. A key debate concerning attitudes about U.S. foreign policy beliefs is the number of structuring dimensions. Wittkopf (1986, 1990, 1994) argued that foreign policy attitudes are structured along two dimensions: cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism. Respectively, these two “faces of internationalism” reflect support for international efforts to achieve peace (or support for détente) and a willingness to use the military (and realpolitik instruments of power) to achieve international objectives. Those with affirmative positions on both dimensions (and there is considerable variance across the dimensions) wish to extend an arm beyond U.S. borders, yet do so with one open hand and the other with a clenched fist.

While a two dimensional model is elegant and easy to explicate, Chittick et al. (1995) argued that a third dimension is necessary to completely explain U.S. attitudes about foreign policy. Conceptualizing foreign policy beliefs as a three dimensional construct with separate dimensions for multilateralism-unilateralism, militarism-nonmilitarism, and internationalism-isolationism, they argued that these three dimensions reflect the basic goals of foreign policy—identity, security, and prosperity, and the authors used these dimensions to predict preferences on several specific foreign policy issues.

There is also a literature that makes the claim that attitudes of the American public on foreign policy matters fall along four dimensions. Richman et al. (1997) posited that attitudes are best described by latent positions on what they label Global Altruism, Global Interests, Security, and a fourth dimension that captures the domestic consequences of international involvement. Chittick and Freyberg-Inan (2001) made the

case that the 1994 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) survey revealed four dimensions: identity (which they rename “community”), prosperity, global security, and national security. Interestingly, both these studies argued that there are, in effect, separate militarism dimensions—one for domestic security and one for the use of force for missions other than national security.

In the analyses below, we discuss the choice between two and three factor *rival models* of foreign policy belief systems, setting aside the four factor models. We set aside the four factor models because they consistently draw upon citizens’ attitudes about free trade and a nation’s economic dealings with other countries. While these are legitimate foreign policy concerns, these attitudes tend to co-vary with domestic economic considerations.² We believe adding a fourth dimension that is dominated by domestic economic concerns obfuscates interpretation of the structure of foreign policy attitudes, and is somewhat distant from the motivating concern of audience costs. At the same time, the content of our three dimensions is wholly consistent with the “non-economic” dimensions found in models that retain four substantive dimensions.

There is substantial common ground across the competing models. All models clearly propose that militarism is an important dimension structuring attitudes. The consistent militarism dimension captures those elements of foreign policy related to traditional realpolitik security concerns (strong military, defend allies, not backing down from enemies). With the exception of Wittkopf (1986, 1990, 1994) all the other models

² In the Canadian study we utilize in our estimations for this paper, there did contain a question probing attitudes towards the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A series of exploratory principal components analyses (PCA) and follow-up Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) of the data revealed attitudes towards NAFTA constituted its own dimension. Secondary analyses suggested a correlation with domestic beliefs about government intervention in the economy, a topic outside of the scope of this paper. The fourth dimension, if modeled as a latent dimension with only a single indicator due to data limitations, would be conflated by domestic economic concerns rather than acting as a straightforward latent dimension of foreign policy beliefs.

contain an internationalism/isolationism dimension that measures the degree to which citizens want to be actively engaged with other countries and people (issues like aid and peacekeeping). While we agree with Chittick et al. (1995) that Wittkopf's two-dimensional model does not do a good job of capturing this facet of internationalism, we disagree somewhat with their labelling the dimension multilateralism/unilateralism. In our view, this dimension of active engagement with the world is thematically closer to an internationalism/isolationism dimension than it is to a multilateralism/unilateralism. Aid and, to a lesser extent, peacekeeping, do not necessarily require the cooperation, or even consent, of multiple donor states. A country can unilaterally engage in either aid or peacekeeping. Consequently, we believe that the public separates the internationalism versus isolationism debate along two dimensions. One involves a willingness to see forces deployed abroad and have Canadians put in harms way. Another represents the public's position on their nation providing humanitarian assistance to others. The three factor model we test reflects this structure of two "military use" dimensions, which we believe is well supported by U.S. data (see Richman et al. (1997) and Chittick and Freyberg-Inan (2001)).

Measures and Methods

Survey data for analysis come from the mailback version of the 2004 Political Support in Canada Study (PSC), which contained a battery of seven items designed to tap citizen attitudes towards "Canada's Role in the World" and an additional question that taps general attitudes toward immigration. All items have response categories that are

three point ordinal scales (“agree,” “not sure,” and “disagree”). Question wording and response distributions are presented in Table 1.

[Table 1 about Here]

Our first goal is to ascertain the underlying dimensionality of Canadian foreign policy attitudes. Not only are we interested in the number of meaningful dimensions structuring foreign policy thinking—two (cf. Wittkopf 1986, 1990) versus three (cf. Chittick et al. 1995; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987)—but we are also interested in the content of the dimensions, and how they relate to structures suggested by prior theoretical and empirical research.³ We use Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to assess the validity of competing theoretical models. We select the “best” model using a combination of χ^2 exact fit tests and making small adjustments to specifications of correlated errors in order to improve model fit (c.f. Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993).⁴

³ In the analyses to follow, we employ the so-called “two-step” approach to Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) that dates back to Burt (1973, 1976), and James et al. (1982). We do this to: a) establish whether a two or three factor model best maps the Canadian foreign policy issue space; and b) establish latent variables that future researchers can reliably use as exogenous or endogenous variables regardless of their covariates of interest. The fit statistics and results reported in Appendix A and Table 2 are from the measurement model without exogenous predictors. There is a large and lively debate as to the appropriateness of this approach over the alternative technique of simultaneously estimating the measurement and causal components of the SEM. Hayduk (1996: Chapter 2) shows that the magnitude of the indicators on a factor, the inter-correlation between factors, and overall model fit will vary when exogenous forces are added to a measurement model. Since we are testing the propensity of the respondent’s scores on the latent variables to be a function of groups of independent variables, and fix paths from the exogenous variables to the indicators to zero, fit of the full SEM is likely to decline. To avoid the Type 2 error of rejecting a measurement model that fits the data, the structure, fit statistics, and slope coefficients for the indicators and correlations between the factors are reported in Appendix A and Table 2 before the addition of exogenous predictors.

⁴ All estimations in this paper were analyzed using MPLUS, Version 4.1. Because of the categorical nature of the data, the program’s Diagonally Weighted Least Squares (WLSMV) estimator was employed and the paths between the latent variables and indicators should be interpreted as probit coefficients. For the analyses in Appendix A and Table 2, missing data are handled using the “pairwise present” option, which Cameron McIntosh (personal e-mail) notes computes each input polychoric correlation using the cases that have complete data for the dependent variables (i.e., factor indicators) involved. The polychoric correlation matrix used in the estimations in Table 3 was generated based on all available information, and McIntosh notes this procedure allows missing data to be modelled as a function of the covariates (independent variables). In the results presented in Appendix A, 2 cases had to be excluded because the respondent failed to answer any of the seven foreign policy questions yielding a final sample size of 1056. Of the

We first attempt to replicate a two factor model with indicators that correspond to Wittkopf's (1986, 1990) dimensions of "co-operative internationalism" and "militant internationalism," with the *Foreign Aid*, *UN Peacekeeping*, and *Immigration* variables as indicators of co-operative internationalism and the *Iraq*, *Fight Terror*, and *Military Spending* questions as indicators of militant internationalism (Figure 1a). We also attempt to replicate the structure of Chittick et al.'s (1995) three dimensional model with a "Militarism" dimension (containing the *Fight Terror* and *Military Spending* indicators), a latent variable we designate as the "Forces Abroad" dimension (containing the *Iraq*, *UN*, and *Peacekeeping* variables), and an "Internationalism" dimension (containing the *Immigration*, *Foreign Aid*, and *Peacekeeping* variables) (Figure 1b).

[Figures 1a and 1b about Here]

The two factor model failed to yield an admissible solution, with several problems of note. First, specification checks indicated that the residual variance for the Iraq variable was negative, a so-called Heywood case (c.f. Bollen 1989: 282-286). Second, opposition to Canada's involvement in the Iraq War was modestly correlated with support for requiring UN approval for the usage of the Canadian military overseas. Modification indices suggested that answers to the latter question were a better indicator of support or opposition for militant-internationalism than they were for cooperative internationalism.⁵ Finally, the largest degree of misfit was associated with the failure to specify *Peacekeeping* as an indicator for both dimensions. Although we believe that making these modifications severely stretches the substantive meaning of Wittkopf's two

remaining respondents, no fewer than 97 percent answered each of the questions. Nineteen additional cases were excluded from estimations presented in Table 3 because of missing data on the exogenous covariates.

⁵ Modification indices give "the expected drop in chi-square if the parameter in question is freely estimated" and they are frequently looked to by SEM practitioners to gain a better empirical understanding of the poor performance of their theoretical models (cf. Muthén and Muthén 1998-2006: 507).

dimensional model (1986, 1990), we attempt these changes to see if any two factor solution is satisfactory.

After making these changes, overall exact and approximate fit statistics still indicate poor model fit (See Appendix A).⁶ The fit of the model was subsequently improved by (1) permitting the error terms between *Fight Terror* and three other indicators to be correlated; and (2) freeing an error covariance between the *Military Spending* and *Peacekeeping* indicators. Although specifying the error co-variances appears entirely reasonable, it is hard to ignore the loss in parsimony necessary to get a two factor model of foreign policy beliefs that passes the χ^2 exact fit test. Further, the impact of freeing four error co-variances exposes additional weaknesses in the two factor model--the Militant Internationalism factor explains over 75 percent of the variance in the Iraq indicator, but less than 10 percent of the variance in the Fight Terror and less than 15 percent of the variance in the Military Spending indicators are explained by this latent Militarism dimension. In other words, the dimension being generated by the five indicators (*Iraq*, *Fight Terror*, *Military Spending*, *UN*, and *Peacekeeping*) is dominated by the Iraq question.⁷

In contrast to the two factor model posited by Wittkopf, the three factor alternative taking its cue from the work of Chittick et al. (1995) performs quite well. The close fit statistics (RMSEA=0.05 and WRMR=0.86) indicate that the estimated model

⁶ One approximate or "close" fit statistics provided is the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) which can be thought of as the average discrepancy between the observed and model implied correlations weighted by the degrees of freedom, and the consensus is that close fit is attained when this statistic is below 0.05 (Browne and Cudeck 1992). The other is the Weighted Root Mean Square Residual (WRMR) that is a weighted measure of the difference between sample variances and co-variances and those estimated for a population. A model with a WRMR below 1.00 is generally judged to have close fit and simulations have shown it to generate acceptable Type 1 and 2 error rates when used with CFA (Yu 2002).

⁷ Results of the MPLUS estimations providing the residual variances are available on the corresponding author's website.

produces correlations among the indicators that come close to matching those observed directly from the data. An examination of the Modification Indices for the three factor model indicated the presence of correlated measurement error between a pair of indicators. Freeing the error covariance between the *Fight Terror* and *Peacekeeping* indicators yields a three factor model of the Canadian public's foreign policy issue space that is both grounded in theory and generates a statistically exact fit of the data ($\chi^2=11.63$; $p=0.114$). Fit is further improved by freeing another "nuisance error parameter" between the *Peacekeeping* and *Military Spending* variables ($\chi^2=7.28$; $p=0.403$).

In total, we judge the three factor model to be superior to the rival two factor model for the following reasons: 1) the three factor model attains exact fit without any modification between the indicators and the latent dimensions; 2) the three factor model is more parsimonious than the two factor alternative, because model modifications done to obtain exact fit on the former sacrifice fewer degrees of freedom than those undertaken for the latter; 3) the average residual variances for the indicators in the three factor model is far less than those obtained in the two factor model; and 4) all indicators had more than 25 percent of their variance explained by one or more of the three factors.

To reiterate, we find three clear dimensions underlying Canadian attitudes about foreign policy. While the strongest antecedent to our work is Chittick et al. (1995), we assign labels to the Canadian dimensions that differ from those that Chittick et al. use for the U.S. to highlight some of the substantive differences in our results. Of the three dimensions, two capture aspects of "internationalism" and two capture aspects of "militarism." Obviously, one of the three dimensions we uncover must exhibit overlap between "militarism" and "internationalism."

The dimension that we label *Militarism* captures beliefs about Canada's readiness to defend its homeland and strengthening the military. The dimensions that we label *Internationalism* relates to the positions people will take on engagement with peoples and cultures beyond Canadian borders. The leftover dimension that captures aspects of "militarism" and "internationalism" we label *Forces Abroad*. This dimension captures public support for constraining Canadian use of force in non-security type missions.

Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients for the final three factor model. To estimate the variances of the latent dimensions, the strongest indicator on each dimension was fixed at 1.0. A respondent receiving a high score on the *Militarism* factor is concerned with Canada having sufficient resources and a will to defend the nation against modern threats.⁸ In contrast, people with high scores on the *Forces Abroad* dimension are hesitant about putting Canadians in harms way, whether the cause involves joining the United States in Iraq or participating in peacekeeping missions.⁹ Individuals scoring high on this dimension also want to see Canada seek UN approval before deploying its military abroad. High scores on the *Internationalism* dimension signify that the respondent believes that Canada best engages itself with the world by opening its borders to peoples from other lands and providing foreign aid and peacekeeping forces to troubled nations or regions.

[Table 2 about Here]

⁸ For the Fight Terror and Iraq questions, agreement with the questions is coded -1 and disagreement is coded 1. For the remaining five questions, disagreement is coded -1 and agreement is coded 1. For all of the questions, respondents who were "not sure" of their position were coded 0.

⁹ The interpretation of the negative sign of the Peacekeeping indicator on the Forces Abroad dimension is that those agreeing with Canada's participation in Peacekeeping Operations are sceptical of Canada needing UN Approval to use its armed forces abroad, and supported Canada joining the United States in the conflict in Iraq.

The relationships among the three dimensions warrant mention. Although they are distinct dimensions, *Militarism* and *Forces Abroad* are significantly correlated (-0.35). In other words, the stronger one's support for an activist stance on defending the nation and building the military (*Militarism*), the less one supports putting constraints on when and how Canada use its military in the global arena (*Forces Abroad*). There is also a positive correlation (0.29) between the *Forces Abroad* and *Internationalism* factors. We believe that this signals that some who want Canada to be involved in global affairs would prefer that such involvement come largely through non-military means. Our analysis finds no relationship between the *Militarism* and *Internationalism* dimensions. The insignificant relationship between these two latent dimensions may have policy implications that we will elaborate on in the discussion section.

Explaining the Dimensions

We hypothesize that a person's positions on the three dimensions is caused by the same forces known to explain Canadian attitudes on domestic issues (cf. Clarke et al. 1996; Clarke, Kornberg, and Wearing 2000). Specifically, we expect demographics (including region) and core political beliefs (such as identification with one of Canada's federal parties or identifying with the ideological right or left) to explain attitudes about foreign affairs.¹⁰ To test our hypotheses, we simultaneously regressed our three latent

¹⁰ We consider partisan identification to be causally prior to beliefs about the foreign policy questions and use the partisan identification the respondents reported in the pre-election telephone wave of the study. In this wave, respondents identifying with a party were subsequently asked about the strength of their identification. For variables measuring identification with one of the four parties with seats in the House of Commons, those identifying "very strongly" were coded 3, a "fairly strong identification" was coded 2, and a "not very strong" identification was coded 1. The "left" or the "right" controls for ideology were coded 1 only if the respondent reported a left/right or centre-left/right orientation when first asked the question. Those reporting that they "leaned" in one direction in a follow-up prompt were coded zero. Age is a continuous variable ranging from 18 thru 95. Education is a 5 point ordinal variable coded "0" if the

variables onto the three groups of exogenous predictors.¹¹ The results reported in Table 3 tell a clear story: core political beliefs play a key role in differentiating the foreign policy beliefs of Canadians, and, after controlling for partisanship, ideology, and demographic forces, differences across Canada's vast and often politically dissimilar regions mostly disappear. For example, identification with the Conservative Party and declaring oneself ideologically to the right leads an individual to score higher on the *Militarism* dimension.

[Table 3 About Here]

The partisan divide is most prevalent on the dimension that captures beliefs about the prudence of using of Canadian forces abroad. In line with what we know about the party platforms, the New Democrats, those on the ideological left, and the sovereigntist Bloc Quebecois oppose joining international coalitions that involve the use of the military or a potential use of offensive force. Conservative identifiers find themselves on the opposite side of the *Forces Abroad* dimension, and are the one group of Canadians less willing to impose constraints on Canadian use of its military. However, Conservatives are less enthusiastic about Canada projecting itself through the use of soft power and peacekeeping. Those on the ideological left favour a distinct Canadian presence abroad—they want the nation to be active in peacekeeping missions and supportive of foreign aid, but want to limit the use of hard military force abroad.

Although the effects of demographic variables on foreign policy attitudes pale in comparison to the influence of partisan identification or ideology, older citizens rate

respondent had less than a high school education, “1” if the respondent had some high school, “2” if the respondent reported completing high school, “3” if the respondent reported having some post high school education but did not obtain a university degree, and “4” if the respondent obtained a university degree or post-graduate education. The remaining exogenous variables are dichotomous and control for the possible influence region and gender has on foreign policy attitudes.

¹¹ The latent variables are continuous.

higher on the *Militarism* dimension. More educated citizens are significantly more likely to support a Canadian influence abroad. On the *Internationalism* dimension, a gender gap appears, with men more likely to score higher. Although regionalism is an important part of the discussion in studies of voter choice and attitudes towards domestic policies in Canada, outside of Quebec, regional differences were the exception rather than the rule. Only British Columbia stands out as having citizens that score higher *Militarism*. As has been true in the past, Quebecers continue to distinguish themselves by opposing the build-up and use of force both to defend Canada and for use abroad, a likely reaction to a military that is largely English speaking and has a historically British lineage (cf. Granatstein 2004). It is important to note that these attitudes cannot be seen as solely a function of sovereigntist sentiment in the province-- those that did not identify with the Bloc Quebecois were also more sceptical of the military in comparison to Canadians in the rest of Canada.

Which set of variables (demographics, party identification, *or* left-right ideology) best explain foreign policy beliefs? To answer this question, we ran a series of three supplemental estimations. The results in Table 4 show that a measurement model that only includes partisan identification provides us with the most parsimonious estimation ($\chi^2=23.9$; $p=0.157$). However, knowing only an individual's partisan identification does not maximize our ability to understand beliefs on all three dimensions. Although partisan identification explains a fair deal of the variance on the *Forces Abroad* dimension, demographics (most notably *Quebec* and *Age*) are extremely helpful in understanding *Militarism*. Perhaps most surprising is that the *Internationalism* dimension has the least total amount of explained variance. Party identification does an especially poor job of

explaining *Internationalism*, while ideology works quite well as a predictor. In total, all three types of exogenous predictors are helpful in explaining the foreign policy attitudes of Canadians.

[Table 4 about Here]

These findings show that Canadians organize their foreign policy beliefs along a theoretically valid set of latent dimensions. Moreover, positions held on these dimensions are readily explained by the partisan and ideological cleavage present in the country. However, these results also seem to show that partisan cleavages have some interesting differences from self-reported ideological cleavages, a topic we believe should be addressed in future research.

Discussion

If public opinion (via elections) is indeed a powerful constraint on foreign policy decision making, one of the challenges facing Canadian foreign policy-makers is arriving at policy choices consistent with Canadian values. Broad consensus regarding “liberal internationalism” goals may be more perceived than real. The segment of the public most supportive of progressive *Internationalism* policies are likely to have the characteristics of governmental and academic elites—they are male, identify with the ideological left, and are highly educated. Those in the Government should be cautioned that their reading of the public has to consist of talking to more than their friends and aids. As displayed in Table 1, Canadians are more supportive of increasing military spending and combating terrorism than they are of the progressive ideals of strengthening foreign aid and promoting immigration. This finding (and warning) may extend to other

Middle Powers and warrants extending this line of research into other nations. Without more systematic research it is impossible to know whether an interventionist foreign policy reflects broad consensus and national character, or simply the policy preferences of an unrepresentative elite.

In a finding similar to that observed in another Middle Power (e.g. Sweden in Bjereld and Ekengren 1999), the issues loading on the *Militarism* dimension are supported more strongly than expected. The problem for policy-makers is that those who want a stronger military (i.e. more funding) may not be the same people who actually support using the military (i.e. deploy in peacekeeping missions)! While the correlation between *Militarism* and *Forces Abroad* is significant, the relationship is still fairly modest. Canadian electoral politics may put in place regimes that are willing to build the military, but reluctant to use it. Such policies are unlikely to harm Canadian security, but may impose a cost in terms of Canada's standing in the international community. Potentially more troubling is the reverse—regimes that use the military but do not want to allocate the resources necessary for those missions. As the U.S. has seen in Iraq, extensive use of the military “on the cheap” (i.e. sending far too few troops) can have seriously negative consequences for a nation's prestige and its security.

Although the presence of distinct dimensions show structure to Canadian foreign policy beliefs, the insignificant correlation we observe between the *Militarism* and *Internationalism* dimension may pose a particular challenge. In short, it gives voice to the cynicism expressed by Canadian military elites. Former military commander Lewis MacKenzie (2003: A14) implies that the Canadian public wants to “eat its cake and have it too,” noting that Canadians “seem to support the idea of their soldiers dying for peace

as long as they don't have to actually kill any of the belligerent's thugs, goons, and rapists along the way." Well-known Canadian human rights activist and scholar Michael Ignatieff (2003: 17) offered a more sober critique, suggesting the possibility that the Canadian government is restricted from "projecting power" because Canadians see a trade off between development aid and military spending.

Whether the Canadian government can either acknowledge the conflicting demands that may arise if many citizens take seemingly contradictory positions on the coherent but different latent foreign policy dimensions identified in this article or makes the public aware of the need to bring their positions on one dimension in line with the others remains an open question. We suspect Canadians are unlikely to be unique in expressing value conflict between the means and ends of foreign policy endeavors. The foreign policy attitudes of publics in other Middle Powers should be probed to see if their governments face similar challenges in formulating coherent international strategies.

On a more positive note, we view the finding that political attitudes do better than regional sentiments (with the exception of the strong opposition to Militarism exhibited by Quebeckers) to account for the variations of Canadians on these three dimensions as a positive outcome. Even as a mature democracy, Canada has consistently had to confront what Kornberg and Clarke (1992:11) describe as "national integration problems... grounded in [both] socio-cultural [and] economic particularisms." The debate as to how best to formulate a Canadian foreign policy is one that can be healthily left to the competing parties and interest groups rather than becoming something that threatens Canadian unity. Although Clarke et al. (2005, 2006) argue that foreign policy was not necessarily the most important issue on the minds of Canadian voters in the 2004 and

2006 federal elections, it did matter. Thus, the Canadian case supports the implication—which can be derived from both the audience costs literature and U.S. opinion literature.

While the last decade has seen an explosion in research on how domestic politics affects policy decisions in the international arena, we continue to believe this is an extremely fertile ground for additional research because the real-world consequences are far from trivial. Our findings show that the structure of Canadian foreign policy attitudes exhibit substantial similarities to the structure of U.S. and Swedish foreign policy attitudes. These similarities are suggestive that mass publics tend to think about foreign policy in similar ways. In turn, this similarity of thinking is consistent with the implicit assumption of the audience costs literature that the mass publics of different countries respond to international events and leader bargaining in much the same way. We believe that it is important to continue on this line of research to investigate whether there truly is a basic and generalizable structure of the foreign policy thinking of mass publics.

Figure 1a: *A Two Dimensional Model of Foreign Policy Issue Beliefs*




Figure 1b: *A Three Dimensional Model of Foreign Policy Issue Beliefs*




Table 1: Support and Opposition to Specific Foreign Policy Actions

Question	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
Canada needs to spend more money to strengthen its armed forces. (<i>Military Spending</i>)	66%	25%	9%
Canada should not try to combat terrorist organizations because that will encourage the terrorists to attack us. (<i>Fight Terror</i>)	13%	75%	12%
Canada should have joined with the United States and Great Britain in the war against Iraq. (<i>Iraq</i>)	14%	79%	8%
Canada should not use its armed forces abroad unless it gets approval from the United Nations. (<i>UN</i>)	66%	25%	9%
Canada should participate in peacekeeping operations abroad even if it means putting the lives of Canadian soldiers at risk. (<i>Peacekeeping</i>)	69%	18%	13%
Allowing more immigrants from foreign countries will enrich Canada's culture with new ideas and customs. (<i>Immigration</i>)	46%	38%	16%
Canada should spend more money on foreign aid to developing countries. (<i>Foreign Aid</i>)	31%	49%	21%

Table 2: Factor Loadings, Latent Factor Correlation Matrix and Summary Statistics

Question (Residual Variance/R²)	Factor 1 Militarism	Factor 2 Forces Abroad	Factor 3 Internationalism
Canada Needs to Spend More Money to Strengthen its Armed Forces [Agree=1] (0.49/0.52)	1.00 (0.72)		
Canada Should Not Try to Combat Terrorist Organizations Because That Will Encourage the Terrorists to Attack Us [Agree=-1] (0.74/0.26)	0.72 (0.51)		
Canada Should Have Joined with the United States and Great Britain in the War Against Iraq [Agree=-1] (0.32/0.69)		1.00 (0.83)	
Canada Should Not Use its Armed Forces Abroad Unless it Gets Approval from the United Nations [Agree=1] (0.61/0.38)		0.75 (0.62)	
Canada Should Participate in Peacekeeping Operations Abroad Even if it Means Putting the Lives of Canadian Soldiers at Risk [Agree=1] (0.70/0.30)		-0.50 (-0.42)	0.77 (0.60)
Allowing More Immigrants From Foreign Countries Will Enrich Canada's Culture With New Ideas And Customs [Agree=1] (0.41/0.59)			1.00 (0.77)
Canada Should Spend More Money on Foreign Aid to Developing Countries [Agree=1] (0.46/0.55)			0.96 (0.74)
Correlated Error Variances			
Peacekeeping with Terrorism (0.37)			
Peacekeeping with Defence Spending (0.17)			
Correlation Matrix			
Militarism	1.00		
Constrain Forces Abroad	-0.35	1.00	
Internationalism	-0.05 ^{NS}	0.29	1.00
Model Fit			
$\chi^2(7)$	7.28 (P<0.40)		
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation	0.006		
Weighted Root Square Residual	0.428		

Notes: Standardized Factor Loadings in Parentheses
NS: Correlation Coefficient Not Significant

Table 3: Latent Variable Estimations

	Militarism	Forces Abroad	Internationalism
Liberal Identification	0.057 (0.049)	0.111* (0.051)	-0.004 (0.041)
Conservative Identification	0.167** (0.060)	-0.275*** (0.051)	-0.100* (0.041)
N.D.P. Identification	-0.039 (0.066)	0.272*** (0.080)	0.103 [#] (0.063)
Bloc Quebecois Identification	-0.009 (0.057)	0.182*** (0.072)	-0.063 (0.056)
Left Ideology	-0.238* (0.115)	0.468* (0.172)	0.779*** (0.114)
Right Ideology	0.620*** (0.151)	-0.171 (0.147)	0.091 (0.112)
Education	0.013 (0.041)	0.123* (0.044)	0.224*** (0.037)
Age	0.012*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)
Male	0.108 (0.083)	-0.085 (0.091)	0.263*** (0.072)
British Columbia	0.280 [#] (0.147)	0.113 (0.145)	0.197 [#] (0.114)
Prairie Provinces	-0.040 (0.133)	-0.089 (0.145)	0.147 (0.111)
Quebec	-0.598*** (0.113)	0.268 [#] (0.141)	0.119 (0.102)
Atlantic Provinces	0.059 (0.164)	0.005 (0.165)	-0.048 (0.134)
Latent Variable R ²	0.450	0.353	0.288
Model Fit:	$\chi^2_{\text{WLSMV}}(44)=70.417$	RMSEA: 0.024	WRMR=0.765
<i>Notes: [#] p<0.1, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001</i>			
<i>N=1037; Unstandardized Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parenthesis</i>			

Table 4: *Fit and Explanatory Power of Rival Measurement Models with Select Exogenous Predictors*

Statistic	Full Model	Demographics	Party	Ideology
Model χ^2	70.4 (df=44) p=0.006	61.3 (df=28) p=0.000	23.9 (df=18) p=0.157	27.2 (df=14) p=0.018
Baseline χ^2	623.8 (df=68) p=0.000	706.7 (df=45) p=0.000	631.7 (df=32) p=0.000	734.75 (df=26) p=0.000
RMSEA	0.024	0.034	0.018	0.030
WRMR	0.765	0.832	0.628	0.700
Militarism R ²	0.45	0.30	0.22	0.20
Forces Abroad R ²	0.35	0.10	0.28	0.14
Internationalism R ²	0.29	0.14	0.05	0.18
N	1037	1038	1056	1056

Appendix: Steps in Fitting Models

A. The Two Dimensional Militant and Cooperative Internationalism Model

Competing Models	$\chi^2_{(WLSMV)}$	p-value	$\Delta \chi^2$	RMSEA	WRMR
1. Hypothesized Model		<i>Non-Positive Definite Solution (Heywood Case on Iraq Indicator)</i>			
2. After Peacekeeping freed on Militant Dimension	177.39	0.000	---	0.13	2.25
3. After UN Approval Freed on Militant Dimension	87.27	0.000	-90.12	0.09	1.55
4. After UN Approval Fixed to 0 on Cooperative Dimension	102.48	0.000	+15.21	0.09	1.17
5. After Freeing Error Covariance between Fight Terror and Peacekeeping	54.56	0.000	-47.92	0.06	1.25
6. After Freeing Error Covariance Between Fight Terror and Military Spending	34.98	0.000	-19.58	0.06	1.01
7. After Freeing Error Covariance Between Peacekeeping and Military Spending	14.44	0.071	-20.54	0.06	1.01
8. After Freeing Error Covariance Between Fight Terror and Immigration	9.71	0.206	-4.73	0.02	0.50

B. A Three Dimensional “Militarism, Internationalism, and Forces Abroad” Model

Competing Models	$\chi^2_{(WLSMV)}$	p-value	$\Delta \chi^2$	RMSEA	WRMR
1. Hypothesized Model	27.90	0.001	---	0.05	0.86
2. After Freeing Error Covariance between Peacekeeping and Fight Terror	11.63	0.114	-16.27	0.03	0.58
3. After Freeing Error Covariance between Peacekeeping and Military Spending	7.28	0.400	-4.35	0.01	0.43
Weighted N=1056				RMSEA= Root Mean Square Error of Approximation	WRMR= Weighted Root Mean Square Residual

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