Policy Perspective

Missile Defense: The View from the East

By Andrew Roberts

When Barack Obama declared that the United States would not pursue a planned missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland, the media noted that regardless of the wisdom of his decision, he had let down two loyal allies. Indeed, just last summer the United States had signed treaties with both countries, paving the way for construction of the bases. While acknowledging that a pledge had been broken, the Obama administration quickly tried to sooth both countries, promising to consult them first on revamped plans.

But how disappointing was this decision for Czechs and Poles? Was Obama really hanging two loyal allies out to dry? A closer look at Czech and Polish politics suggests that things are not so simple.

First, negotiations over the missile shield were not smooth in either country. Both worried about the financial cost—as well as the cost of worsened relations with Russia. The Polish government initially turned down the U.S. offer until the United States added sweeteners to the deal in the form of defense modernization. Polish Prime Minister Tusk, who signed the agreement, had been lukewarm about the system all along, refusing to reveal his position on it in the most recent election campaign.

Moreover, neither country’s parliament had ratified the treaties they signed a year ago, a step necessary for the bases to be built. In the Czech case, a right-wing government persistently tried to push the treaty through parliament, but it could not find majority backing. This lack of support was an important factor in the fall of the government last spring and its replacement by a caretaker cabinet. In Poland, the prime minister claimed that it made no sense to submit the treaty to parliament until the new American administration had made a definitive decision on its future. Whether this was simple prudence or lack of interest,,only he can say.

What is clear is that the political elite in both countries is divided over the missile shield’s utility. In both countries, the major left parties vehemently oppose the missile shield—even portions of some right-wing parties like Prime Minister Tusk’s Civic Platform and the Czech Greens have had doubts.

Opposition is even more pronounced among the general public. Public opinion polls on the issue have been conducted frequently over the past three years, with large majorities in both countries have consistently opposed the plan.

In a series of Czech polls, opposition never dropped below two-thirds of those with an opinion, and the majority of those are “strongly” opposed to constructing the bases (see chart below). An even higher percentage would like to see a referendum on the issue, presumably to take power away from a pro-missile government. In Poland, a series of polls showed, an average of 62 percent of respondents with an opinion did not want the missile shield in their country (see chart below). Meanwhile, similar majorities believe that the bases would increase—rather than reduce—the threat from both from terrorists and from Russia. These opinions persist despite governments who have publicly campaigned for the shield.

Why then does it appear that we have let both countries down? In the first place, the missile supporters are the most pro-American forces in the two countries and thus likely the most sympathetic to the United States. They have been vocal in their disappointment over Obama’s decision. They have also played on Cold War fears. They have seen the missiles mainly as a defense against Russia and viewed the Obama decision as appeasement to Russia. The United States was, again, supposedly throwing poor, defenseless democracies to the wolves.

Though emotionally appealing, this logic doesn’t take them very far. The missiles were never intended to protect them against Russia, but against Iran and North Korea. The cost of the missile bases was worsened relations with Russia, which would have hurt attempts to rein in the same rogue nations that were supposedly the main threat. Meanwhile, both countries remain committed to NATO’s policy that an attack against one is an attack against all. Never mind the serious doubts about the functionality of the defense system and the reality of the threat from rogue nations.

So, who are we letting down? It is clearly not the Czech and Polish public which has continually expressed skepticism—if not downright opposition—to the project. And it is not a united political elite. Rather it is these countries’ right-wing parties who signed the treaties with the Bush administration last summer, and in the Polish case, one of those parties might actually not be so disappointed. I suspect the “hurt feelings” of missile supporters will survive this incident, which is already on its way to being forgotten.

Source: Public Opinion Research Centre (www.cvvm.cas.cz)

Source: Centre for Public Opinion Research (www.cbos.pl)

Andrew Roberts is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University and a Faculty Fellow at the Institute for Policy Research. He is the author of The Quality of Democracy in Eastern Europe: Public Preferences and Policy Reform (Cambridge University Press, 2009).